Wednesday, August 2, 2023

The New CNO’s To-Do List

Here’s a to-do list for the new CNO, Adm. Lisa Franchetti.  I’ve broken it into two lists:  the ideal list that she ought to do but, realistically, wouldn’t even consider and the more realistic list of limited, but useful, items.
 
 
Ideal List 
  • Eliminate NavSea.  They’re not performing their function and appear to be staffed by total incompetents.
  • Reconstitute the General Board and BuShips.
  • Terminate the Navy’s involvement with, and purchase of, the F-35 and accelerate the next generation fighter.
  • Refocus the carrier role on long range air superiority instead of strike.
  • Eliminate the demon-spawned concept of ‘strike-fighter’ and return to separate, optimized aircraft for each role.
  • Retire the entire LCS class and eliminate that black hole of operating costs for a vessel with very little combat capability.
  • Eliminate deployments, institute home-porting and missions.
  • Cut 80% of Flag positions
  • End the Ford class debacle (cost and performance) and return to conventional Kitty Hawk type carriers.
  
Realistic List 
  • Stop issuing ship trial waivers.  All ship trial waivers must be personally approved by the CNO.  Simply stop doing that.  Make every ship meet all its trial requirements.
  • Forbid the use of waivers, in general
  • Stop all early retirements of ships (except the LCS!).
  • Reinstitute scheduled maintenance and do not deviate from it.
  • Abandon any form of reduced manning.
  • Eliminate 10% of the Navy’s shore personnel jobs and transfer the people to sea billets.


36 comments:

  1. And now for the list of what will actually get done:

    - Green initiatives
    - More "diversity"
    - Wasting money
    - Accepting incomplete ships
    - catchy acronyms
    - pork.

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  2. A good list!! Agree with moving into the next fighter, but would add it needs to be on an F-14-esque timeline. Same thing goes for a new carrier if its pursued. We cant afford anything else thats incomplete on "delivery" and then takes another half decade to be functional. Whatever we build new, it needs to be 100% existing tech with just a fresh, more capable wrapper. Imho, the most important word for the USN and DOD right now should be "urgency"...

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    1. +1 for this.

      Actually, I question if starting fresh actually makes sense when it seems that most of the cost comes from the initial development and tooling up of specialized production facilities.

      In a practical sense, the capability already exists to keep building more Fords, and it doesn't to build more Kitty Hawks. Rebuilding that capability will be outrageously expensive. More expensive, I think, than just figuring out how to put steam cats and other improvements to the basic Ford design.

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    2. "it doesn't to build more Kitty Hawks."

      ???? We build supercarriers on an on-going basis. Of course we have the ability to build a modern version of a Kitty Hawk. I'm sure you know this so what is it you were really trying to say?

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    3. Id agree- the only issue I have with continuing Ford production is I feel like all the new gadgetry, namely the elevators and EMALS, are very fragile and I think they will be, at best, mission killed when hit with the first enemy sneeze. Never mind the absurd pricetag compared to the conventional or Nimitz platforms. I truly think a Nimitz restart was our best bet, but with three hulls in existence, that opportunity seems to have passed. Now we just have to settle for a "fingers crossed" that Im wrong...

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    4. " I truly think a Nimitz restart was our best bet"

      It would certainly be better than more Fords, however, I would remind you that it was the Nimitz class that began the downward spiral of carrier fleet size due to the costs increasing above the rate of inflation. I've posted the documentation for this. Therefore, building new Nimitz won't solve the problem; it will only delay the continued and inevitable death spiral of carrier construction.

      We need to remind ourselves what we MUST have in a carrier versus what we'd LIKE to have. We have to ruthlessly eliminate crew comforts (lounges, game rooms, spas, gyms, post offices, lawyer's offices, etc.). Nothing should be designed into a carrier that does not DIRECTLY support combat.

      Another aspect you may be overlooking is the ability to build new carriers for wartime needs. A Nimitz, being nuclear, requires much more time, including reactor construction time, than a conventional carrier. In a war, we'd like to be able to replace carriers in a useful time frame which means making the design as simple as possible while still being combat-effective. We can build modern Kitty Hawks quicker than we can build new Nimitz or Fords.

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    5. Certainly see your points... But, looking at various levels of "what ifs"... How many (other)places can we build a supercarrier- conventional or nuclear?? How much could we accelerate its construction if need be? Can we expand to build more than one at a time, and have the space, resources, and enough workers to do so? How much supply chain "lead time" do we eliminate by going conventional?? Also, what kind of propulsion will we use?? How much boiler tech will we need to relearn, and how much industrial base needs to be recreated to go that way?? (Im making the boiler assumption because im not sure how we'd get catapult steam out of a GT. Is there some possible electrical method or ??) With our carrier deliveries often being delayed to spread out the financing, how much "other" money is there to accelerate builds, or add more to replace losses?? How fast could we actually build a carrier today?? Whats the liklihood that an emergency-authorized carrier could even be in the water before any future conflict is over- I struggle to see any Kaiser-esque production of anything that big, even in an ideal world.
      Btw, don't misunderstand. I also, like you, am a believer in being able to do almost anything if the will and urgency is there. Just because we dont, or havent done somthing recently (like boilers, or armor plate, or 16in guns) doesnt mean its impossible. But I asked these genuine questions as things that should be looked at through the lenses of todays world, an ideal world, and somewhere in the middle.

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    6. I can't speak for ComNavOps, but isn't the will to do these things the real issue? It's been pointed out before that at some point we didn't have 16-inch guns, but then we developed them. And I'd add that today we have the advantages of computer-aided design and modern quality control.

      This article says that Kitty Hawk would cost $2.5 billion in 2021 dollars. Even if modern systems increased the cost by another $2 billion (admittedly, this is speculation), we could build two or three Kitty Hawks for the price of one Ford. If a Ford worked as advertised, would it be worth two or three Kitty Hawks? Not likely.

      To say the will to get things done is the real issue might not be a satisfying answer. But could that be it? I also like to think revitalizing our shipbuilding industry would do more for the country than prohibitively expensive, gold-plated weapons that don't work well.

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    7. I forgot to paste my link. Sorry.
      https://www.10news.com/us-aircraft-carrier-sold-scrap-penny/

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    8. "How many (other)places can we build a supercarrier- conventional or nuclear?"

      Any shipbuilder that can build large commercial tankers (General Dynamics NASSCO, for example) should be able to build conventional supercarriers with suitable modifications.

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    9. > Of course we have the ability to build a modern version of a Kitty Hawk. I'm sure you know this so what is it you were really trying to say?

      I'm saying that putting a 70 year old design into production that hasn't been produced in 55 years is going to be a lot more like starting from scratch than not. Probably a lot more costly and more time-consuming than modifying a current, in-production design. And we don't have money or time.

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    10. "I'm saying that putting a 70 year old design into production that hasn't been produced in 55 years is going to be a lot more like starting from scratch than not."

      That's absurd. The Nimitz - and subsequently the Ford - were modifications of the basic Kitty Hawk. They're approximately the same size and shape, use much of the same equipment, are functionally identical, and would use the same basic construction techniques (steel, welding, lifts, etc.).

      "Probably a lot more costly and more time-consuming than modifying a current, in-production design. "

      That's a humorous statement although you apparently don't see it. You got it backward. As I pointed out, the Nimitz/Ford is a modification of the Kitty Hawk. To revert to a Kitty Hawk would just be a reverse modification of a current in-production design which, according to you, would be much cheaper and less time-consuming!

      Every year the automakers slightly retool their products which is not an impossibly expensive process. Similarly, assembling the carrier lifts in a slightly different way to produce a modified Ford (let's call it a Kitty Hawk) would not be an impossibly expensive process. In fact, EVERY Nimitz and Ford we built was a modification of the previous carrier. That's the nature of shipbuilding. Why you seem to think that a SIMPLER modification of a Ford/Nimitz would be prohibitively expensive is a mystery to me.

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    11. Rebuilding a conventual class of carriers requires the Navy to do something that they no longer do adequately....repair ships.

      The LCS started this trend with the "We are operators, not maintainers" though process and it has permeated the entire fleet. There is no such thing as a Boiler Tech in the Navy any longer. They have lost the "corporate knowledge" on how to repair their ships.

      The Navy is COMPLETELY reliant on commercial shipyards to repair their ships. The Navy yards? If it is not a sub or nuclear-powered they ain't working on it.

      And the man power shortage in the skilled trades suffers because the US Navy cannot figure out how to schedule ships for routine maintenance. The "feast or famine" style work loads the Navy farms out to the commerical shipyards makes it damn difficult to maintain a stable work force.
      Lack of skilled work force directly relates to longer than expected avail timelines.

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    12. > That's a humorous statement although you apparently don't see it. You got it backward. As I pointed out, the Nimitz/Ford is a modification of the Kitty Hawk. To revert to a Kitty Hawk would just be a reverse modification of a current in-production design which, according to you, would be much cheaper and less time-consuming!

      I very much see it, since you've adopted my point as your own! The less that needs to be changed, the better.

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  3. "Abandon any form of reduced manning."

    It may be worthwhile to experimentally deploy ships with minimal manning, to determine how many casualties a ship may suffer before she's completely useless for any mission but to serve as a decoy, drawing enemy attention (and attacks) from more useful ships. This information will be useful in event of war.

    It should be noted such experimental deployments cannot last long, as minimal manning prevents a ship from being properly maintained while at sea,. meaning once the experiment is over, the ship will need extensive time at port to make up for the deferred maintenance.

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    1. "It may be worthwhile to experimentally deploy ships with minimal manning, to determine how many casualties a ship may suffer before she's completely useless"

      It doesn't matter how many casualties. The impact of minimal manning goes far beyond mechanical casualties. Impacts like the inability to replace battle deaths and the inability to conduct successful damage control rule out minimal manning even if the ship never suffered a mechanical casualty.

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    2. The other problem with minimal manning is even in peace a bad ideal. Its not the navy but the Biotech I worked at decided way back in the day early 90s well OK we can get by with one helpdesk guy (who just works the 9-5), one guy who is remote and only really deals with financial software and its ok if one of our 2 senior systems admins moves to Texas and works remote (On just projects) and myself the last man standing as the other senior systems admin can handle all the on location work and and all the 24/7 support (because the help desk guy can do much more than figure out you failed to plug your ethernet cable in)

      It worked sorta but it only took maybe 6 months before I submitted a letter that I was quitting or they were going to hire another person who could also be available for troubleshooting 24/7 because I was going to run over my company phone with my car posthaste.

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  4. * Have the Coast Guard teach the USN how to paint a ship.

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    1. AGREE!!! USN ships look like a disgrace!

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    2. + Have the Coast Guard teach the USN how to paint a ship.

      Substitute "steer" for "paint".

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  5. Eliminate FTS/TAR (whatever we are calling it). Make those job normal shore tour positions. Integrate reserves into active duty units.

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  6. "Eliminate deployments, institute home-porting and missions."

    To me this really stands out.
    The navy needs to stop plowing furrows in the oceans and start getting serious about maintaining and training.

    Lutefisk

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  7. Create a fleet of roughly 60 Patrol Corvettes and 12 Independent Cruisers to form a Maritime Fleet to do patrols, FON, and engage in Naval Diplomacy.

    This would relieve our Battle Fleets from having to do any routine deployments ever again. They can concentrate on training, maintenance, and practicing their wartime missions.

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    1. This is really interesting that USN is probably the only Navy that lacks Patrol Vessels, even though it is the one doing the most Patrolling.

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    2. "...do patrols, FON, and engage in Naval Diplomacy."

      As a non-navy person, what does the navy actually do during those activities?

      Lutefisk

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    3. "As a non-navy person, what does the navy actually do during those activities?"

      Burn fuel and write public relations blurbs.

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    4. Traditionally, the Navy is THE force to Win the Peace.

      Naval Diplomacy is a legitimate, and very ancient, part of the wider diplomatic efforts to do this. This is especially true when dealing with the ~100 to 150 countries in the 3rd World. The great advantage the Navy has over any other service in this role is: Persistence. A corvette can sit offshore for months if needed.

      After WWII, this role was completely forgotten by the US Navy, but it wasn't always so. For many years, our Navy Ship Captains had an enormous role in our nation's diplomatic relations (Think Commodore Matthew Perry in Japan, and many others). They worked very closely with the State Dept., the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Marines to uphold our interests, maintain contacts, and extend our relations with people who could, possibly, be in a position to help us one day. A periodic port visit, with a dinner for dignitaries in the wardroom, goes a long way in maintaining those little relationships.

      Secondly, there are about 18 important choke points or strategic areas around the world which need to be patrolled. Doing that with a smaller patrol vessel makes it clear it is not a "deterrence", but simply a patrol. So many countries get annoyed at us when they see huge American warships off their coasts. This avoids that. However, if a patrol Corvette gets into trouble, they can still be backed up by a Cruiser, well offshore. On the other hand, this is still not a "deterrence". The possibility a powerful American Carrier Battle Group could be summoned IS THE DETERRENCE. This understanding gives our leaders much more flexibility how they can handle various situations.

      Lastly, these Corvettes act as a shield and protection for merchant shipping. They can handle pirates and other minor problems without too much trouble. Of course, in the case of war, they become the hunter! Sinking or capturing enemy merchant ships. Thus, the shield becomes the sword. Or they can protect merchant convoys delivering supplies to our troops.

      A Maritime Fleet would be more effective, and much cheaper, than how we are doing it now.

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    5. "Naval Diplomacy is a legitimate, and very ancient, part of the wider diplomatic efforts to do this."

      This role arose out of necessity due to the inability of the government to communicate with on-scene personnel. Since the advent of radio, this role has been eliminated, as you noted. With instantaneous worldwide video, communications, and Internet as well as rapid global transport (airplanes), the role of naval diplomacy is never coming back. Thus, the first half of your comment, while historically interesting, is moot.

      Your second suggestion - the use of smaller corvettes for patrol instead of larger ships - is highly questionable. There is no evidence that smaller ships provoke a lesser emotional response toward us from unfriendly countries. It is very difficult to believe that Iran, NKorea, Russia, and China will be happier seeing US corvettes near them than seeing, say, Burkes.

      We have disproven the entire concept of deterrence in previous posts.

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  8. It was all foretold:

    "Stick close to your desks and never go to sea,
    And you all may be rulers of the Queen's Navee!"

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  9. Add ramping up munitions production. We need more Tomahawks and LRASMs in the fleet, but we also dumb bombs and the guidance kits that turn them into smart bombs and sea mines.

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    1. To be fair, that's not something that a CNO has control over other than providing budget for it. The actual production capacity and priorities are not within the CNO's control.

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  10. In the vein of this:
    " Reconstitute the General Board and BuShips."
    Id add: Make all INSURV, OPPE, and other other reports public again. Make Navy accounting more transparent as well. Hiding whats happening within our Navy isnt ok. In making things visible, Im sure there'd be an uproar, but if public and Congressional scrutiny forced change that results in a better fighting force, so be it.

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  11. I would add proper mine mitigation with new technology. Have read CNO's thread on this and it seems our navy is slow to act PB

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    1. The USN has never cared about mine warfare, except when they get caught with their pants down like at Wonsan or with End Sweep.

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    2. I agree, Our ports are vulnerable and according to CNO the technology being brought forth will not work with sweeping large mine fields having modern mines.
      PB

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  12. I would add, probably unfortunately to the ideal list rather than the realistic, "Conduct an annual fleet exercise like the Fleet Problems between WWI and WWII."

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