The Military is not a Business

ComNavOps continues to see examples of the military-as-as-business mindset and this is horribly wrong.  The military is not a business.  It’s not subject to business case studies.  Because it’s not a business, there are [many] times when it will be run inefficiently and that must be accepted.  For example, a business study of ship manning would point to the minimum number of sailors necessary to operate the ship.  Combat, however, demands excess crew for damage control, casualties, etc.  Inefficient but necessary.
 
It seems that the higher up the officer, the more likely they are to approach the military as a business case.  I guess this is because so many officers pursue degrees in business related studies.  By the time an officer gets to flag rank, they’re damn near accountants instead of professional warriors!
 
The military is a combat case, not a business case.  Understand it.  Accept it.  Embrace it.
 
Here’s yet another example.  This one is from a retired admiral, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, arguing for restructuring the submarine Navy as a service provider.
 
Note:  The phrase ‘as a service’ refers to a business model where a product or service is offered on a subscription basis rather than being owned outright by the customer.
 
He points out, correctly but with zero understanding of the real issue, that the submarine fleet is overworked.
 

The U.S. submarine industrial base that builds and sustains our existing fleet is not keeping pace with operational demands. Combatant Commanders’ requests for submarine capability in theater go unfulfilled.[1]

He then sets out to offer a business solution instead of recognizing the real problem is the Combatant Commander’s incessant and unjustified requests for submarines when, in reality, the submarines need to be undergoing maintenance and intensive combat training not answering useless requests from the Combatant Commanders so that they can increase the public perception of the importance of their little fiefdom.
 
Trussler suggests a ‘service’ model for submarines.
 

The “as-a-service” model—already proven in air and space—could offer a solution by using conventionally powered submarines to improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet. The goal is not to replace nuclear-powered SSNs but to ensure they remain focused on their most critical missions while using diesel-electric submarines for two key roles:
 
Providing platforms for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new undersea technologies. This would reduce the risk and cost of fielding new capabilities by thoroughly testing their performance and tactical applicability before pulling an SSN offline for months of installation, testing at sea, and removal.
 
Expanding training opportunities. U.S.-trained civilian crews operating conventionally powered submarines could act as adversary forces in exercises, helping undersea, surface, and air forces refine their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills. These platforms could also support personnel training and qualification pipelines, ensuring crews receive adequate at-sea experience before deploying on SSNs.[1]

And, of course, he makes the usual bogus claim that this will free up nuclear subs for more important tasks.
 

… by freeing SSNs for high-end missions.[1]

We’ve already debunked this mythical claim (see, “Free Up Ships for More Important Duties”).
 
He then goes on to make a cost comparison claim (without any reference or link and the claim is highly suspect).
 

According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, operating a Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $1.6 million per operational day. In contrast, a conventionally powered diesel-electric submarine can operate at a significantly lower daily cost—approximately 40% less than an SSN.[1]

He also proposes operating these non-nuclear subs with civilian crews.
 

By offloading lower-risk missions to commercially operated submarines with Navy-trained civilian crews, uniformed personnel can stay focused on high-end warfighting while maintaining operational proficiency.[1]

 
Discussion
 
There are several questionable aspects to this entire concept of submarines as a service.
 
For starters, no references are provided for any of the claims made in the article which makes verification and understanding of the claims difficult or impossible.  As an example, the claimed operating cost for a Virginia class submarine of $1.6M per day seems unbelievable under any reasonable assumptions.  Nuclear subs have no daily fuel costs so that pretty much leaves the crew salaries as the major operating cost.  Salaries for a crew of 135 would be something on the order of $55,000 per day.  Food would be, what, several hundred dollars a day?  So, where does the rest of the $1.6M per day come from?  My guess would be that someone is piling occasional maintenance and overhaul/refit costs onto the operating cost and perhaps other not-really-operational costs like nuclear fuel/reactor disposal costs, base facility costs, etc.  Without an itemized breakdown, I have no idea but $1.6M seems ridiculous.  This is one of those cases where you can make the number anything you want by manipulating what you choose to include or exclude in the category of operating costs.
 
Another example of unsubstantiated claims is,
 

… improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet.[1]

There is absolutely no documentation or logic to support the idea that operating a few non-nuclear subs will increase fleet readiness, improve lethality, or increase SSN availability.  Logic would suggest there is no relationship, at all, between a few non-nuclear subs and the SSN fleet.
 
Civilian submarine crews are a suspect idea.  How do we handle secrecy and security with civilians?  We don’t even share our submarine technology with our military allies so it’s hard to imagine sharing it with a civilian crew regardless of how many non-disclosure agreements you make them sign.
 
How does the chain of command work with civilians?
 
The entire premise that non-nuclear subs would free up SSNs for more important tasks is completely bogus.  Aside from having previously demonstrated that there are no ‘more important’ tasks sitting around for lack of a sub, the harsh reality is that we have more than enough subs already.  Heck, we’ve got a dozen or more subs sitting idle, pierside, just waiting for their turn at maintenance.  As an example, the Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise, has been waiting, idle, for over eight years for maintenance.  If we think we need more subs, the solution is to our idled fleet back in service.
 
Another fallacy is that non-nuclear subs can be used to test equipment and develop tactics for nuclear subs.  They’re two different beasts.  They operate differently.  They have different noise levels, different speeds, different endurance, different dive depths, different sizes, different maneuverability, and so on.  Sure, if you want to test a new coffee maker, a non-nuclear sub is fine but if you want to test, say, a new sonar, you need the platform it will actually be installed on to get realistic and applicable results.  We already do far too much simulation testing and we’ve seen the flaws in that when we sent weapons to Ukraine and most failed or had significant flaws.
 
Having said all that, there’s nothing wrong with buying a foreign non-nuclear sub for adversary training but to embark on an entire new type of submarine because Combatant Commanders whine is stupidity on a plate.
 
We need to stop approaching the military as a business case and start viewing it as the often intentionally inefficient warfighting organization it is.
 
 

Reporting for Duty!

 
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[1]Naval News website, “Submarines “As-a-Service” Will Get More Players on the Field Today”, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, 7-Jun-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/submarines-as-a-service-will-get-more-players-on-the-field-today/

Submarine Shortfall

You’re probably heard, recently, that the attack submarine (SSN) force is declining in numbers and is projected to reach a low of around 40 (versus the publicly stated, desired target of 60-70) over the next decade and naval observers and Congress are suddenly worried.  However, this is not a new development.  The shortfall was predicted at least two decades ago.  For example, the 2014 Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan noted that the SSN level would fall from the 2014 level of 55 to less than 50 in 2020 and ultimately down to a low of 42 in 2029 and would not recover to 50 subs until 2038 and would stay at that level through 2043. 
 
The looming shortfall was not only anticipated but embraced by the Navy in 2005. 

The Navy announced in late March 2005 that it planned to reduce its attack submarine fleet to 41 from its current level of 55.[1]

Thus, the SSN shortfall was not a surprise event.  In fact, it was long anticipated and intentionally inflicted.  The Navy actually planned the shortfall !
 
In fact, given that we just noted that 18 subs are sitting in extended idle status awaiting maintenance (see, “SSNMaintenance Backlog”), the predicted low point could be closer to 30 deployable subs!
 
How did this happen?  It’s not a trick question.  For the last couple of decades we’ve been retiring subs faster than we’re building them.  For example, the 2014 30-year shipbuilding plan called for 52 retirements versus 47 launches.  That’s a net decrease of 5 subs over that time period … hence, a decrease and a shortfall. 
 
Despite anticipating the shortfall decades ago, the Navy allowed a several year gap in submarine construction between the last Los Angeles and the first Virginia.  The last Los Angeles class submarine was launched in 1995.  The first Virginia class submarine was launched in 2003.  That’s an 8 year gap.  Yes, there were two Seawolf class subs mixed in there but it was an 8 year gap between major submarine classes.
 
Even when the Virginia class began production, construction was limited to 5 launches, less than one per year, from 2003-2008, inclusive. 
 
So, facing a known shortfall, the Navy’s response was to program in an 8 year gap in production and build less than one per year for the 6 years subsequent to the gap.  Clearly, the Navy was unconcerned about the looming shortfall.  Now, however, the Navy is attempting to deflect by placing the blame and responsibility on industry for somehow failing to have adequate production capacity.
 
And still the Navy is not serious about mitigating the shortfall.  For example, the current 5-year plan calls for 10 retirements which is two per year.  Compared to the build rate of 1.2 subs per year, it’s obvious why we have a worsening shortfall.
 
According to industry, US submarine production capacity is currently limited to a theoretical maximum of two subs per year, however, the actual production rate is barely more than one per year.  The entire Virginia class has, thus far, seen 25 launches in the 21 years from 2003-2023, inclusive.  That’s a sustained production rate of only 1.2 subs per year.
 
In comparison, the Los Angeles class saw 62 subs built in the 22 year period from 1974-1995, inclusive.  That’s a build rate of 2.8 subs per year, nearly three per year!  Now, we’re down to barely one per year.
 
The Navy talks publicly about building three subs per year but that’s clearly a fantasy that’s entirely disconnected from reality.
 
The Navy had two decades to address the shortfall and consciously chose not to address it.  They are only now attempting to address it because a panicking Congress is beginning to ask questions and, even so, the only real effort the Navy is making is to try to place blame on industry instead of themselves.  That’s not addressing the shortfall, that’s addressing the public relations.
 
 
Options
 
So, what could have been done over the preceding two decades and what can we currently do to mitigate the shortfall?
 
Retirements - The obvious, immediate, short term solution is to stop retiring subs.  We early retired a dozen Los Angeles class subs with less than 20 years service (see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls and Retirements”)!  Many more have been retired with less than 30 years.  Even subs nearing the end of their scheduled service life can be retained in an idled status against the advent of war.
 
Operational Patterns – We could have, and still should, stop deploying subs on extended cruises.  Going to a home-port maintenance and training concept, as we’ve frequently discussed, would reduce the ‘dive cycles’ and full power nuclear use which depletes the nuclear fuel and would extend the life of the subs.
 
There is value in submarine missions that map out the underwater battlefield, determine water conditions (salinity, density, currents, thermoclines, etc.), monitor and collect intel on foreign submarines, monitor enemy ASW capabilities, etc. but they do not require full combat submarines.  A much reduced capability submarine could be built for the specific purpose of monitoring, as just described.  Non-combat SSKs would be a cheap and highly effective platform for the types of data collection just listed while the bulk of the SSNs remain in a home-port training/maintenance condition, preserving and extending their life spans.
 
Capacity – The Navy had two decades to promote and develop additional production capacity and, perhaps, an additional shipyard but opted not to.  Programming in an 8 year production gap followed by 6 years of one sub per year is the opposite of building production capacity.  Instead, the Navy allowed industry’s production capacity to decrease as shipyards adjusted to lower production demands and allowed skilled workers to retire without replacement.  As industry noted, 

The presidents of both shipyards [General Dynamics and Newport News] recently said they believed they could handle three SSNs a year but that they and their suppliers would only invest in the additional infrastructure, machinery and people if the Navy sent a clear demand signal and committed to higher shipbuilding rates for a long duration.[2]

The Navy’s haphazard production program does not give industry the confidence to increase production capacity.  You may recall the 29-boat Seawolf class that was truncated to just three?  Not exactly confidence-inspiring.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The incompetence and willful disregard by the Navy in addressing the shortfall has been nothing short of stunning and constitutes dereliction of duty by a succession of CNOs, each of whom should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.
 
Finally, let’s close this out with an hysterical lie by the Navy.  Referring to production capacity, Rear Admiral David Goggins had this to say, 

He said the Navy would not build the ships if they couldn’t properly maintain them … [2]

That’s hilarious!  Hey, Admiral … I’ve got some bad news for you.  The Navy isn’t properly maintaining any of their ships!
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/scn-sub.htm
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Confident It Could Build 3 Virginia SSNs a Year, Though More Study Needed On Shipyard Capacity”, Megan Eckstein, 18-Nov-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/11/18/navy-confident-it-could-build-3-virginia-ssns-a-year-though-more-study-needed-on-shipyard-capacity#:~:text=The%20Navy%20has%20just%2050%20SSNs%20today%2C%20is,goal%20of%20as%20many%20as%2080%20by%202045.

SSN Maintenance Backlog

We just read about the USS Boise (SSN-764), which has been idled since Jan 2015 awaiting dry dock availability and is finally beginning its maintenance period.  The optimistic unrealistic hope is that Boise returns to service in late 2023 or sometime in 2024 which would be an 8-9 year period of idleness.  You would hope that this is some sort of sick April Fool’s joke but it isn’t.  This is the sad reality of our naval maintenance effort.
 
Was Boise just a bad luck, bad circumstances, fluke?  How is the rest of the SSN submarine fleet doing as regards maintenance?
 
According to a just released CRS report, 37% of the SSN fleet is currently idled in, or awaiting, depot maintenance, overhauls, and dry dock availability and are non-operational.[1]  That’s 18 of the 49 SSN subs in the fleet that are sitting idle, leaving just 31 operational SSNs in the US fleet.
 
China doesn’t need to worry about our submarine fleet … it’s sitting idle.
 
Sure, we couldn’t keep SSNs, arguably the most lethal component of our military, in service but we made sure we kept building LCS so that we could retire them as they completed construction and we made sure that we built all the Zumwalts and we pushed the Ford through despite having utterly unreliable catapults, traps, and weapon elevators.
 
New hulls … yes!
 
Maintenance … no.

Our Submarine Force?

 
 
 
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[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, 6-Jul-2023, RL32418

Australian Nuclear Submarine

USNI News had an article about Australia acquiring asymmetric military capabilities to help deter China.  Unfortunately, the article was just a useless collection of vague babbling by John Lee (former national security advisor to Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, 2016-18) who clearly has no idea what asymmetric means.  For example, he cited ‘unmanned and undersea technologies’ as examples of asymmetric capabilities, apparently unaware that unmanned equipment is pretty much standard by now and hardly constitutes ‘asymmetric’.  I have no idea what he meant by ‘undersea technologies’;  presumably unmanned undersea vehicles which, again, are now commonplace.

 

There was, however, one good thought in the article which appeared to reference Australia’s nuclear submarine acquisition desire:

 

“Leasing has to be an option” to fill the timeline gap in undersea readiness, but the submarine does not necessarily have to be an American Virginia-class boat. “We need to learn how to operate them” and maintain them, he said. [1]

 

Now, I’m not sure what, exactly, the leasing reference was to …  perhaps SSKs? perhaps a nuclear sub from some country?  perhaps training simulators or facilities?  Regardless, this raises the intriguing possibility of Australia acquiring an early-retired Los Angeles class submarine … of which we have many.

 

The LA class subs would provide valuable nuclear submarine and nuclear power plant operating experience.  While the subs may not have thirty more years of operational life left, that’s not a requirement for a country that first needs to simply learn how to operate the subs and their reactors. 

Los Angeles Class Submarine

 Of course, there are practical considerations to deal with:

 

• You don’t become a [safe] nuclear capable navy overnight.  Australia has no nuclear plant operating expertise that I’m aware of.  It would require years to build up that level of [safe] competency.  This is also not something that can be done on a part-time, occasional basis which leads directly to the next consideration …
• Nuclear subs require fairly substantial crews and long term, sustained expert manning.  This is not something that can be done using one-enlistment term sailors.  I’m thinking now about the difficulty Australia has had manning the few conventional subs that they have.[2]  Where are the needed long term, professional nuclear organizations and personnel going to come from?
• It’s not enough to train a crew to operate a nuclear sub.  It also requires a substantial shore-side nuclear support organization for specialized maintenance, inspection, repair, refueling, etc.  Again, given Australia’s manning challenges, where will the shore support people come from?
• Assuming an Australian nuclear submarine force would operate much closer to China than is currently the case for Australian submarines, this would require substantial open ocean and first island chain oceanography/mapping support.  Perhaps the US Navy would share their data but, if not, Australia would have to generate their own which requires a large investment and effort.
• Nuclear submarines are a major commitment.  I hope the Australian military/navy has carefully thought out the CONOPS for a [very?] small force of nuclear subs and thought through how these fit into, and support, the country’s overall geopolitical and military strategies.  If not, it will be a massive waste of resources and effort.  I hope this isn’t just a knee-jerk reaction to something … you know, the way the US Navy does things.  Given that the desire for nuclear subs seems to have appeared out of nowhere, this is a concern.
• Finally, operating nuclear powered ships does impact political interactions in the region.  New Zealand, for example, bans ships with nuclear weapons or power from their waters. 

 

 

Assuming Australia can successfully address the various concerns, acquiring an LA class sub(s) would provide a rapid (on a relative basis) route to nuclear submarine operations and is well worth pursuing.  However, this is not something to be entered into lightly.  It requires a massive commitment of people and resources and needs to be carefully thought out prior to acting.

 

 

Note:  I am not well versed on Australian naval matters so some of the preceding may be inaccurate and, if so, feel free to [politely!] offer corrections.

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Australia Needs Asymmetric Capabilities to Counter China in Indo-Pacific, Former Australian Official Says”, John Grady, 26-Nov-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/11/26/australia-needs-asymmetric-capabilities-to-counter-china-in-indo-pacific-former-australian-official-says

 

[2]The Guardian website, “Crew shortage could leave Australia's new submarines high and dry – report”, Lisa Martin, 8-Oct-2018,

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/08/crew-shortage-could-leave-australias-new-submarines-high-and-dry-report

SSN Shortfall Update

One of the near-criminal failings of Navy leadership over the last few decades is the looming shortfall of attack subs (SSN) with 30 year shipbuilding forecasts demonstrating a steady drop to around 40 subs in the 2030 or so time range.  We touched on this, briefly, back in 2013 (see, “SSN Shortfall”).  The Navy’s stated goal for SSN numbers is 66, derived from the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment.(1, p.8)  That’s quite a shortfall from 66 to around 40.  Here's a graph showing one of the typical projections that demonstrates the shortfall.

 

It’s not as if this shortfall is a recent development.  Navy long range shipbuilding plans have been forecasting it for decades.  For example, the Aug 2006 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan shows that the Navy forecast a dip to 40 SSN subs in the year 2028.(5)  A few years after that, the Jun 2010 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan shows that the Navy forecast a dip to 39 SSN subs in the year 2030.(4)    In fact, every Navy long term shipbuilding plan has clearly forecast the shortfall and yet the Navy has done nothing about it.

 

Where are we at, now?  The current SSN inventory is 50 subs, broken out as follows:

 

 

SSN Inventory (3)
Class	Class Name	Current Active
SSBN-726	Ohio	14
SSGN-	Ohio	4
SSN-21	Seawolf	3
SSN-688	Los Angeles	28
SSN-774	Virginia	19
	Total	68

 

 

 

So, what has the Navy been doing to mitigate the coming shortfall?  Contrary to what any sane person would expect, they’ve been early retiring Los Angeles class submarines for many years (see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls And Retirements”)

 

That is absolute bat-excrement crazy!  …  but it fits the pattern of incompetent, insane Navy leadership decisions, doesn’t it?

 

Let’s examine some aspects of the submarine shortfall

 

Cost – By early retiring Los Angeles class subs, we’re not only exacerbating the submarine shortfall but we’re trading paid for Los Angeles submarines for $3B Virginias.  This might – barely – be excusable if we were getting stunningly more capable submarines for the money but there is no indication that is the case.  The very sparse information available suggests that the Virginias are marginally more capable, at best.  Wait, that can’t be, you say.  The Virginias are decades newer.  They must be greatly improved.  Well, the Ford costs twice the recent Nimitz class, is decades newer and offers absolutely no improvement in combat capability and, quite likely, represents a decrease in some areas.  So, yes, it’s quite conceivable that the Virginias are not a significant improvement over the Los Angeles class.  To be fair, there is almost no public information on performance of either class on which to base a comparison.

 

Shipyard Capacity – The Navy is trying build more subs but the current shipyard construction capacity is limited to barely two subs per year.  Growth out of the shortfall is simply not possible.  Despite this, the Navy has early retired dozens of Los Angeles subs.  Shipyard capacity also affects maintenance.  Currently, subs are sitting idle pierside for years waiting for their turn at maintenance.

 

All of this is made worse by the coming Columbia class SSBN construction program.  There are only two yards building nuclear subs for the Navy:  Electric Boat and Newport News.  Electric Boat has been chosen as the prime builder for the new SSBN.  This will likely reduce Virginia class construction to one per year, if that.  We are not going to build our way out of the submarine shortfall any time soon.

 

Ironically, Congress has signaled its willingness to add more subs to the Navy’s budget but yard capacity is simply not available.  Given that the Navy has known about the coming shortfall for decades, has the Navy been investing in increased yard capacity?  No.  Well done, Navy.

 

Budget – The SSBN program is going to have a profound impact on the Navy’s shipbuilding budget.  The 2019 GAO annual report cites a SSBNs cost of nearly $9B per sub and history assures us that cost will only increase.

 

Comparative Numbers – China’s submarine numbers are shown below.  Currently, China has more subs than the US (76 vs 68) although their advantage lies in SSKs as opposed to the US emphasis on nuclear powered subs.  Given that the Chinese operating area is the South/East China Seas and the first island chain, the SSKs do not represent a disadvantage and may actually be an advantage in the shallower, more confined operating areas.

 

 

Chinese Submarine Inventory (6)
Class	Current Active
SSBN	7
SSN	12
SSK	57
Total	76

 

 

 

Trend – Far more concerning than the current total numbers of submarines is the trend.  China’s submarine fleet is expected to increase to around 76 subs, or so, by 2030, depending on which report you care to believe while, at the same time, improving the quality by retiring older subs and replacing them with new ones.  At the same time, as the Navy has indicated, the US submarine fleet will be steadily decreasing as the SSN fleet drops towards 39-40.

Summary

 

This post is mainly informational.  There is no particular point other than the criminal stupidity and mismanagement by the Navy that has allowed this situation to develop.  Submarines represent one of the US Navy’s biggest advantages over any other country and Navy leadership is knowingly squandering it.

 

Unfortunately, lacking the yard capacity, we can’t build our way out this shortfall but what we can do is stop early retiring perfectly capable Los Angeles class subs.  We also need to begin the long term process of building more maintenance capacity so that we don’t have submarines sitting idle waiting for their turn at maintenance.  Seriously, this is the kind of thing we used to mock the Soviets/Russia for and now we’re doing it:  building subs and leaving them sitting idle, unable to operate.

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

(1)Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of  the Navy’s  Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan”, Oct 2018

 

(2)Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of  the Navy’s  Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan”, Jul 2012

 

(3)https://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/SHIPBATTLEFORCE.HTML

 

(4)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronal O’Rourke, 10-Jun-2010, p.7

 

(5)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronal O’Rourke, 14-Aug-2006, p.14

 

(6)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_People%27s_Liberation_Army_Navy_ships

Undersea - Some Good, Some Bad

USNI News website reports on the Navy’s path for future submarine warfare and it contains some good news and some bad news.(1)

Good

Virginia Payload Module (VPM)  – The VPM is not new news but the fact that the Navy is looking at adding additional missile types beyond the standard Tomahawk land attack missile is good.  An anti-ship Tomahawk is being contemplated as well as a possible multi-role Tomahawk.  Beyond that, the article describes “electromagnetic warfare kind of payloads” which, one would hope, might include Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons, non-kinetic conductive missiles of the type used in Desert Storm which can short out electrical grids, and persistent jamming/decoy missiles among other possibilities.

Harpoon – The Navy is beginning to take delivery of refurbished sub-launched Harpoon missiles.  While the Harpoon is bordering on obsolete (slow, non-stealthy, limited maneuverability), it still gives submarines a longer range anti-ship weapon.

Networking – I have no idea how one could construct a high bandwidth undersea network but if the Navy thinks they have a technology that can do it, that’s great.  Communications isolation – and the associated command and control and operational isolation – has always been the weak link in submarine warfare.  If submarines can be made part of an overall shared tactical picture, that would be a tremendous accomplishment and significantly enhance submarine effectiveness.  Simply having the equivalent of an IFF type of information to distinguish friend from enemy would be a valuable aid by itself.  However, this is a technology that I’m going to put in the ‘highly skeptical’ column for the time being.  I’m unaware of any foundational technology that could even begin to approach these kinds of requirements.  Still, it’s well worth pursuing as an R&D effort.

Mk 48 Torpedo – The article describes an ongoing development of enhanced torpedoes, which is good, except that the Navy has been talking about this or many years and has done very little so I’m quite dubious about this.

Good and Bad

SSN(X) – The Virginia replacement submarine is being described as a revolutionary rather than evolutionary design. 

SSN(X) will be designed to have improved mobility, speed and stealth; greater magazine size and payload integration capability; artificial intelligence to increase warfighter decision space; and improved survivability, so the hull could take a hit and keep on fighting in a high-end battle.(1)

This is scary because the Navy has turned every attempt at revolutionary design into major debacles.  On the plus side, designing a hull that can take a hit and keep fighting is something that ComNavOps has been calling for, for many years.

If the Navy will do this intelligently and build a single prototype to work out the inevitable problems that accompany any revolutionary design, this could be a good effort.  On the other hand, if they do as they usually do and commit to a production run of forty subs before the first one is even designed then we’ll have yet another debacle to add to the Navy’s growing list of failures and yet more proof that the Navy is incapable of learning lessons about ship design and procurement.

Honestly, this feels like yet another attempt at leap ahead, transformative (curse you Donald Rumsfeld) development rather than putting in the hard work in the research realm that real progress inevitably demands.

Bad

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) – The article describes the Navy’s embrace of large UUVs that can carry all manner of near-magical payloads to accomplish reality-defying missions – you know, the usual unmanned blather.

The larger problem with these UUVs is that, even in the best case, they aren’t geared at accomplishing anything significant in a war setting.  The vague applications that the Navy floats for these are all small scale, minor effects, even if they worked.  This is yet more evidence of the Navy’s dismissive attitude towards peer war.  They simply don’t believe a war with China is even possible, let alone inevitable.  Their efforts are directed towards, low end, peacetime work rather than high end, intense, combat.

A UUV is a minor effects, niche capability.  It might be nice, in peacetime, to use a UUV to plant a small signals sensor near a foreign base, for example, but that isn’t the kind of capability that’s going to change the outcome of a war.  Yes, data collection is always good and helpful but a single, small sensor isn’t significant.

While there are some potentially good elements to this submarine warfare path, there are some bad or pointless ones.  Worse, too many elements are wishful thinking, fantasy, or not geared at war.  This mixed assessment leads me to ponder what I’d suggest for a submarine warfare path and it would contain these elements:

Torpedo – We desperately need a significantly enhanced torpedo which is longer ranged, faster, quieter, and with about a 50% larger warhead.  What we need is the conceptual equivalent of the BrahMos cruise missile:  fast, large, and absolutely lethal – a one-hit killing machine.

SSGN – It is folly to abandon the Ohio class SSGN with its 150+ cruise missiles.  That’s significant firepower!  While the Virginia Payload Module somewhat helps mitigate the lack of firepower there’s no getting around the fact that it requires four Virginias to equal a single SSGN.

Numbers – We are facing a submarine shortfall that has been recognized for many years and yet the Navy has done nothing about it.  As much or more than any technological development, we simply need greater numbers – much greater.

Mine Laying – The Navy has almost totally ignored submarine mine laying despite that fact that it offers an immensely potent and stealthy means of laying mines very deep in enemy waters.  We need to greatly enhance and begin training for submarine mine laying.

Sensors – This is a purely research effort but we need to develop sensors other than acoustic.  There have been research efforts to develop chemical, electromagnetic, nuclear, turbulence, and other methods of detecting and tracking enemy subs and we should be sponsoring much more research along those lines.  The submarine that gains the first detection likely wins the encounter.

My path is heavy on practical firepower applicable to high end, peer war.  Along with the things we should be working on, there are some things that are distractions and should be dropped.  These include unmanned vehicles, widespread special forces support, networking, gender integrated crews, and the Columbia class (it should be redesigned as a smaller, more focused sub).

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Undersea Warfare Priorities: Strategic Deterrence, Lethality and Networked Systems”, Megan Eckstein, 8-Nov-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/11/08/navy-undersea-warfare-priorities-strategic-deterrence-lethality-and-networked-systems

Does Every Sub Need Tomahawks?

Here is a companion piece to the recent post, “Does Every Ship Need A Helicopter?” which examined US Navy design assumptions.  This time, we’ll take a look at submarine design.

One of the seeming absolute characteristics of a US Navy submarine design is the capability to shoot Tomahawk cruise missiles.  Here are the recent submarine classes and their possible Tomahawk loads.

Los Angeles  12

Ohio SSGN    154

Seawolf      50

Virginia     12-40

Without a doubt, having the capability to covertly shoot Tomahawks from submarines is a useful capability.  But, does every sub need to be able to shoot Tomahawks?

The question is not whether Tomahawk cruise missiles are useful but whether their usefulness is sufficient to justify the expenditure of ship’s volume, the concomitant increase in cost and the resulting decrease in number of submarines built?  The volume and money dedicated to a submarine cruise missile capability could go to other ship’s functions and to building more subs.  In other words, there is an opportunity cost associated with submarine launched cruise missiles.

Let’s look a bit closer.

Tomahawk missiles add size and cost to submarines.  The size increase is 20% or so, depending on the specific sub class and version.  The cost increase is harder to determine but one solid data point is the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) scheduled to be installed on the newest Virginias.  The cost increase is estimated to be around $500M which is a 20% increase over the base cost of around $2.5B.

By leaving out the VPM, we could build one extra Virginia class sub for every five subs built.  Are the added Tomahawks worth losing one extra sub for every five built?  To answer that, we need to recall the submarine’s mission(s).

The problem with “missions” is that people tend to assemble a laundry list and then, in discussions, assign by implication equal value to every mission.  For instance, here’s a partial list of submarine missions in no particular order.

• Anti-submarine warfare
• Anti-surface warfare
• Long range strike warfare
• Intelligence gathering
• Special operations forces support
• Presence
• Cross training with foreign navies
• Mine laying
• Carrier group escort
• Area denial
• Blockade

As we examine the list of missions, we see that long range strike warfare is on the list.  Ergo, we must have Tomahawks on every submarine!  See what I’ve done, there?  I’ve equated every mission.  They are all equally important.  Therefore, they must all be incorporated into the design of any sub.  This is what we do today but it is wrong.

What we should be doing is prioritizing the list of missions.  We should be asking ourselves, what is the most important mission?  We might also ask ourselves what the most likely mission is – it’s often not the same as the most important!  If we do that then we can begin to intelligently design a submarine and make informed tradeoffs between cost and capability.

In war, a submarine’s most important mission is anti-submarine warfare according to US Navy doctrine since the Cold War – I’m talking about attack subs, SSN’s, not ballistic missile submarines.  The main job of our submarines is to eliminate the enemy’s submarines.  A close second mission, but still second, is anti-surface warfare.  Every mission after that is extraneous, in a sense.  If, by eliminating all the other missions – Tomahawk capability, in this case – we could build an extra submarine for every five we now build, would this be worth the loss of 12-40 Tomahawks (we’re talking about Virginia class subs, now)?  I suggest it would be and would be well worth it. 

Consider, of the 50 or so attack subs we’d like to have, we could have 10 extra subs if we dropped the Tomahawk capability!  60 subs vs. 50.  That’s a trade I’ll take!

But wait!  What about the loss of Tomahawk strike capability?  Well, that’s a significant loss, no doubt.  However, we have plenty of alternate Tomahawk strike capability in the form of Burkes and we could have much more if we took the retiring Ohio class subs and converted them into additional SSGNs with 154 Tomahawks each.  The subs are already built so it would just require the incremental cost to modify them to launch cruise missiles.  Wiki reports the conversion cost at around $700M per sub in mid-2000’s dollars.  Relative to ship building costs, that’s quite reasonable.

Submarine Launched Tomahawk - Is It Needed?

You’re asking yourself, how does an SSGN square with my previous mission list and stated priorities of ASW and ASuW?  Well, an SSGN has a different mission priority – pure cruise missile strike warfare – so the SSGN falls in line with the concept of recognizing what the priority mission is.

We see, then, that we could have more subs for the same cost and maintain or increase our fleet wide Tomahawk strike capability if we choose to spend a little bit more. 

Note, the cost of one LCS would just about cover the cost of converting one SSBN to SSGN.  Would you rather have one LCS or one Ohio SSGN with 154 Tomahawk missiles?

So, does every submarine need to have Tomahawk launch capability?  My answer is no.  The Navy needs to look at submarine CONOPS and rethink submarine design and numbers.  We need to abandon the every-ship-must-be-capable-of-every-mission thinking that now dominates our design philosophy.

Virginia SSN Review

The Virginia class SSN has been around for some time now and it’s worth a quick review.  The program was begun in the 1990’s as a replacement for the Los Angeles class and as a cheaper alternative to the Seawolf class.  Construction began in the late 1990’s with around 16 subs completed so far.  Construction is proceeding at a rate of two per year.

The SSN force peaked at 98 SSNs in 1987 and has been declining since.  The current force goal is 48 SSNs, however, the Navy’s various 30 year plan projections show a dip to 42-43 in the late 2020’s and a sustained shortfall below the 48 goal from 2022 – 2034.

Here’s a quick dimensional comparison of the classes.  Note the trend towards bigger boats just as we’ve observed with the SSBN(X) Ohio replacement sub which is bigger than the Ohio despite having several fewer missile tubes.  I’ve never seen a documented reason why the Virginia needs to be bigger than the preceeding classes.

Los Angeles  362’ x 33’                   4 tubes / 26 torpedoes

Seawolf          353’ x 40’                   8 tubes / 50 torpedoes

Virginia           377’ x 34’                   4 tubes / 27 torpedoes

The Virginia construction program was beset by cost overruns early on.  To be fair, that’s a characteristic of almost every Navy construction program.  The Virginia’s were envisioned to be low cost alternatives to the Seawolf but it hasn’t turned out that way with the subs running around $2.5B in today’s dollars.  Proceedings offers an article with the early cost history and states that the total obligation authority increased from $60B in the mid-1990’s to $90B+ in the mid 2000’s (4).  Here’s a partial cost history and planned budget amounts (1).

1998 – 2011  14        $2.6B (average cost for the period)

2012                 2        $2.6B

2013                 2        $2.5B

2014                 2        $2.7B

2015                 2        $2.7B

2016                 2        $2.8B

2017                 2        $2.9B

2018                 2        $3.0B

2019                 2        ?  VPM will be incorporated from this point on

CRS reports (3) that construction in FY14-FY18 will be performed under a Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) arrangement which is estimated by the Navy to produce 14% savings.  However, looking at the planned construction costs versus previous years, there is no evidence of cost savings.  Serial construction cost savings and MYP should be combined in FY14-FY18 for significant savings but the projected costs are not only not reduced, they’re anticipated to rise by $300M.

The Virginia Payload Module (VPM) is planned to be incorporated starting in 2019.  The module consists of 4 tubes x 7 Tomahawk missiles = 28 missiles per sub.  The VPM is the Navy’s response to losing the SSGNs which carry over 150 Tomahawks each.  According to the Navy, it will require 15-20 Virginias to replace the Tomahawk capability of the 4 current SSGNs (yeah, the arithmetic suggests around 16 but Navy articles suggest around 20 – not sure what the exact thinking is).  According to the CRS report (3), VPM will increase the Virginia construction cost by 15%-20% ($375M - $500M).

While the Virginia class is generally considered to be a success, there are some issues, to be sure.  From the DOT&E report (2), we note comments about the Navy’s reluctance to conduct realistic testing.

“Because Navy security rules prevent collection of useful operational test data from Virginia when conducting exercises with foreign ASW capable platforms, the Navy finished IOT&E and recent FOT&E without testing the Virginia class submarine against one of its primary threats, the foreign diesel electric submarine (SSK).”

No surprise there.  We’ve noted in previous posts that realistic testing, in general,  is a Navy shortcoming.

The overall assessment comes across as neutral or a slight improvement over the 688 class.

“Although Virginia was not effective for some of the missions tested, it remains an effective replacement for the Los Angeles class submarine, providing similar mission performance and improved covertness.”

The report notes specific problems with the Wide Aperture Arrays.

“After completion of operational testing, the Navy issued software changes intended to address the severe performance problems observed with the Wide Aperture Array.”

“… the Navy should re-evaluate operational effectiveness on a submarine with a repaired Wide Aperture Array.”

DOT&E notes that problems are propagating into the fleet due to the Navy’s insistence on meeting schedules over identifying and fixing problems.

“DOT&E assesses that the late fix of the array’s deficiencies is a result of the Navy’s schedule-driven development processes, which fields new increments without completing adequate developmental testing.”

Further testing is recommended.

“Repeat the FOT&E event to determine Virginia’s susceptibility to low-frequency active sonar and Virginia’s ability to conduct ASUW in a low-frequency active environment. This testing should include a Los Angeles class submarine operating in the same environment to enable comparison with the Virginia class.”

In summary, the Virginia program has exhibited poor cost performance although not too bad by Navy standards (of course, that’s a pretty low bar!).  With respect to performance, the Virginia appears adequate and probably represents a modest improvement over the Los Angeles class.  To be fair, actual performance data is nearly non-existent in the public domain.  My vague impression is that the Virginia is to the Los Angeles what the JSF is to the Super Hornet – a modest improvement at a hefty price.  Nevertheless, the Virginia is needed and reasonably meets the need at an acceptable, if disappointing, cost.

(1) Dept of Navy FY14 Budget Estimates, Shibuilding and Conversion, Apr 2013

(2) DOT&E FY2012 Annual Report

(3) Congressional Research Service, “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack

Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, 2-Apr-12

(4) U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, “The Sweet Smell of Acquisition Success”, RAdm. John Butler (USN, Ret.), June 2011