Here is a companion piece to
the recent post, “Does Every Ship Need A Helicopter?” which examined US Navy
design assumptions. This time, we’ll
take a look at submarine design.
One of the seeming absolute
characteristics of a US Navy submarine design is the capability to shoot
Tomahawk cruise missiles. Here are the
recent submarine classes and their possible Tomahawk loads.
Seawolf 50
Without a doubt, having the
capability to covertly shoot Tomahawks from submarines is a useful
capability. But, does every sub need to
be able to shoot Tomahawks?
The question is not whether Tomahawk
cruise missiles are useful but whether their usefulness is sufficient to
justify the expenditure of ship’s volume, the concomitant increase in cost and
the resulting decrease in number of submarines built? The volume and money dedicated to a submarine
cruise missile capability could go to other ship’s functions and to building
more subs. In other words, there is an
opportunity cost associated with submarine launched cruise missiles.
Let’s look a bit closer.
Tomahawk missiles add size
and cost to submarines. The size
increase is 20% or so, depending on the specific sub class and version. The cost increase is harder to determine but
one solid data point is the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) scheduled to be
installed on the newest Virginias
By leaving out the VPM, we
could build one extra Virginia
The problem with “missions”
is that people tend to assemble a laundry list and then, in discussions, assign
by implication equal value to every mission.
For instance, here’s a partial list of submarine missions in no
particular order.
- Anti-submarine warfare
- Anti-surface warfare
- Long range strike warfare
- Intelligence gathering
- Special operations forces support
- Presence
- Cross training with foreign navies
- Mine laying
- Carrier group escort
- Area denial
- Blockade
As we examine the list of
missions, we see that long range strike warfare is on the list. Ergo, we must have Tomahawks on every
submarine! See what I’ve done,
there? I’ve equated every mission. They are all equally important. Therefore, they must all be incorporated into
the design of any sub. This is what we
do today but it is wrong.
What we should be doing is
prioritizing the list of missions. We
should be asking ourselves, what is the most important mission? We might also ask ourselves what the most
likely mission is – it’s often not the same as the most important! If we do that then we can begin to
intelligently design a submarine and make informed tradeoffs between cost and
capability.
In war, a submarine’s most
important mission is anti-submarine warfare according to US Navy doctrine since
the Cold War – I’m talking about attack subs, SSN’s, not ballistic missile
submarines. The main job of our
submarines is to eliminate the enemy’s submarines. A close second mission, but still second, is
anti-surface warfare. Every mission
after that is extraneous, in a sense.
If, by eliminating all the other missions – Tomahawk capability, in this
case – we could build an extra submarine for every five we now build, would
this be worth the loss of 12-40 Tomahawks (we’re talking about Virginia
Consider, of the 50 or so
attack subs we’d like to have, we could have 10 extra subs if we dropped the
Tomahawk capability! 60 subs vs.
50. That’s a trade I’ll take!
But wait! What about the loss of Tomahawk strike
capability? Well, that’s a significant
loss, no doubt. However, we have plenty
of alternate Tomahawk strike capability in the form of Burkes and we could have
much more if we took the retiring Ohio
 |
| Submarine Launched Tomahawk - Is It Needed? |
You’re asking yourself, how
does an SSGN square with my previous mission list and stated priorities of ASW
and ASuW? Well, an SSGN has a different
mission priority – pure cruise missile strike warfare – so the SSGN falls in
line with the concept of recognizing what the priority mission is.
We see, then, that we could
have more subs for the same cost and maintain or increase our fleet wide
Tomahawk strike capability if we choose to spend a little bit more.
Note, the cost of one LCS
would just about cover the cost of converting one SSBN to SSGN. Would you rather have one LCS or one Ohio
SSGN with 154 Tomahawk missiles?
So, does every submarine
need to have Tomahawk launch capability?
My answer is no. The Navy needs
to look at submarine CONOPS and rethink submarine design and numbers. We need to abandon the
every-ship-must-be-capable-of-every-mission thinking that now dominates our
design philosophy.
Arent submarine tomahawks fired from torpedo tubes?
ReplyDeleteOr do US subs have VLS for them?
US subs use mainly vertical launch tubes.
DeleteI have a couple of questions;
ReplyDeleteThe first is that I had thought that since the early era of the LA class, subs used a form of VLS to launch it's missiles? Back in the day this made sense because there was more money, and because the fact that each TLAM could also be a TLAM-N gave our enemies fits in terms of us having *alot* of nuclear capable ships out there. Talk about distributed lethality! Nowadays things are different though.
It seems what we are talking about isn't the tomahawks per se, but rather the added expense of VLS/VPM.
Could we eliminate the VLS, maybe go (or go back to?) some sort of tube launched arrangement for TLAM's, and get the best of both worlds?
As an aside, I think we *really* need to find a way to get some sort of sub launched AShM. It doesn't have to be super long ranged, but in the anti-surface role I think that a fast, survivable sub launched missile makes ASW that much harder for our enemies.
The second question is based off of this:
"If, by eliminating all the other missions – Tomahawk capability, in this case – we could build an extra submarine for every five we now build, would this be worth the loss of 12-40 Tomahawks (we’re talking about Virginia class subs, now)? I suggest it would be and would be well worth it. "
Isn't it more fair to say 12-40 Tomahawks *per Sub*?
I still agree with your contention, if we can have a tube launched option available in a pinch, but that is a fair amount of loss of launch capacity when you extend it across the whole build plan of the Virginias.
Yes, US subs use vertical launch.
DeleteYes, the Tomahawk loss would be 12-40 per sub. Thought that was obvious but maybe not. Currently, it's only 12 per sub. The VPM may or may not ever be built.
Remember, if we went with torpedo tube launch of missiles, every missile means one less torpedo that can be carried. This gets back to my comments about mission priorities in the post. The main mission is ASW. The second mission is ASuW. Both require torpedoes, not missiles. So, you'd be enhancing a tertiary (at best) mission at the expense of the primary and secondary mission. That's the kind of out of whack thinking that the Navy routinely engages in. Hopefully, we're wiser than Navy leadership and recognize the need to maintain the full primary mission capability.
As far as Tomahawks, do you recall the post about the Tomahawk missile strike on the Syrian air base? We launched 60 missiles in a restricted strike against a small base (probably double that for a larger, defended base). It would have required 5 subs to accomplish even that small effort. Is that really the best use of subs? In war, would we really want to pull 5 subs off their primary and secondary missions to attack a minor air base (probably 10 subs to mass enough missiles against a larger, defended base). Does that seem like the best use of a scarce and valuable submarine? As I mentioned in the post, a single SSGN could accomplish the mission by itself, freeing up 5-10 subs for their primary and secondary missions.
"Remember, if we went with torpedo tube launch of missiles, every missile means one less torpedo that can be carried. This gets back to my comments about mission priorities in the post. The main mission is ASW. The second mission is ASuW. Both require torpedoes, not missiles. So, you'd be enhancing a tertiary (at best) mission at the expense of the primary and secondary mission."
DeleteVery true. I'm not saying that we regularly do it, just keep the capability. The scenario I'm thinking of is that in a war with China we might need a TLAM capability available for a 'regular' sub if the SSGN's are tasked elsewhere. Admittedly, it's rare, but if we can keep the ability to tube launch a TLAM* without having the expense of VLS that seems a smart thing. If its too expensive then it isn't worth it.
*Ideally, we might be at the point of needing a better land attack missile if 60 did such a pour job.
So, to me, the priority would be served by this:
ASW : Torpedoes
ASuW : Torpedoes, tube launched AShM's.
Land Attack: Tube launched TLAMs/TLAM follow on.
In this scenario, to my thinking, 95% of the time the subs go out with Torpedoes only, or maybe Torpedoes and some anti ship cruise missiles.
The only time that they would go out with TLAMs is specialty situations.
I suppose, now that I am thinking of it, I'm probably being overly argumentative. Not meaning to, I was just going down the path of 'Do they need tomahawks' and to me the answer is 'sometimes they might be super useful, and without VLS we could get the best of both worlds'.
Have to agree with Jim. If all SSN’s are capable of tube launching, not VLS, this seems like the best solution.
DeleteI was recently on HMS Alliance, and talking to one of her submariners, I asked about her proportion of mines to torps, and his response was that “subs are Swiss army knives”, Alliance was kitted for the job at hand. And re-kitted as required.
Having the capability to go all mines, all TLAM, all MK48 or a mix, AND CHANGE mid mission. Allows flexibility but also, for the enemy, tactical uncertainty.
VLS seems from you figures to be too expensive. I can only assume the justification is that it’s cheaper than buying new SSGN, and allows for distributed SSGN’ness.
Beno
CNOPS- re your series on "does every ship/sub" need helos/tomahawks.
ReplyDeleteWhat is next in your series? Does every SuperHornet need to carry Aerial refueling Store? LOL. Yes.
IMO, with a 255 ship Navy we probably need these various capabilities inherent in the design, CSGs being pitifully small, despite the expense....If we really are going to go for 350 ships and the aircraft weapons systems to man them, maybe not so...See my point A larger fleet allows more specialized platforms and systems. Jack of all trades, master of none logic.
b2
"with a 255 ship Navy we probably need these various capabilities inherent in the design"
DeleteOoohh ... You're so close to grasping the issue but you're falling just short.
You recognize that the small fleet "needs" multi-function ships/aircraft and acknowledge that a larger fleet might not but you fail to recognize the death spiral that lead to the smaller fleet. We started building more capable (meaning multi-function) ships in an attempt to save money but that drove the cost of ships up and we had to cut numbers which meant that each ship had to be still more capable which further drove up costs which meant we needed even more capable ships which drove up costs which ...
And so we have a steadily declining fleet size with each ship being too expensive to risk in combat. IT'S A DEATH SPIRAL!
The way to break the cycle and reverse the cycle is to build smaller, single function ships that are significantly cheaper. Then we can buy more of them which means shipyards will have more work and prices will drop which means we can build even more which will drive prices down which means we can build still more which will drive prices down which .... See? A growth spiral instead of a death spiral! Then we can get back to a carrier group with three AAW escorts, 8 destroyers, and 10 ASW corvettes/DE's - the way it should be!
I hate saying this, because it sounds (and is) bloodthirsty, but we've lost the ability to think of attrition units.
DeleteIn WWII the subs and DE's were arguably attrition units. You could build a ton of them and if we lost some it didn't break the Navy.
Now the ships serving DE roles in many Navy's are nearly $1bn dollar Frigates and the 'Destroyers' in our Navy are arguably cruisers.
Back in the late 80's I heard a similar "death spiral" anecdote. Went like this- eventually, given the seeming logarithmic price escalation of USAF jets (B-1/2 in particular) was that the USAF would eventually amount to one aircraft, flown daily...
DeleteThe $14B Ford class fits that anecdote profile for you and I do understand. However, a $300 million ship frigate or DDG seems unobtainable to me and the word "cheaper" raises my neck hairs every time because nothing in small lots for the military is ever going to be Amazon proof...
Plus, like I keep hammering on, I know the present leadership is not capable of delivering on any design (ship-aircraft-drone) with fundamental capability as good as what it is to replace, and keep the cost down.
Much as I like your common sense approachs I can't see you, CNOPs, doing that much better with a new mix of stuff when we don't have much for you to build off of, today. Yes the "death spiral" exists because our defense spending is way down in order to pay for.. well, you know what....
I agree that perhaps not all SSNs should have
Tomahawk capability for fixed-target, day 1, land attack capability; but they better have MK-46 and HARPOON capability for their primary missions of ASUW/ASW.
IMO, we need more platforms, to include combatant ships-combat aircraft-subs that "work".
K.I.S.S. Principle:
1- sustain the stuff we have in service; 2- increase training/readiness across the board; 3- increase industrial capacity and buy stuff that works, shortcomings notwithstanding- Ford, Burke series, Va. class, SuperHornets, P-8s, H-60Rs, weapon systems upgrades, etc...
Accomplish 1-3 and then then try to sell me a new CVW-toting carrier or a new cruiser, or a new way of doing business...
b2
This article touches on a number of interesting points: I would like to raise a few.
ReplyDelete1. The gorilla in the room is that current Tomahawk missiles are at least an order of magnitude *less effective* due to compliance with the convention on cluster munitions, which has effectively eliminated submunition warheads. Rather than buying more VPMs, we probably should *fix Tomahawk* by building submunitions that are compliant with the convention on cluster munitions. This is technically possible (e.g. incorporate a secondary timer function into the fuzes of the submunitions to ensure they all detonate), and should be priority number one for the Tomahawk universe, because unitary warheads really do not suit most of the target sets we should be using Tomahawk against.
2. Tomahawk is only one means of putting explosives on target: I would like to see a cost comparison of maintaining and endless number of deployed surface ships just in the off chance for the odd Tomahawk shot at some illiterate goat herder; versus the cost of a one-time B-1/2/52 strike with air launched cruise missiles - my bet is that the exorbitant cost of a transcontinental bomber strike (~$180,000 per bomber flight hour + multiple aerial tanker hours +munitions) is far less than the global Navy deployment model. This isn't a slam on the surface/subsurface force, but I am critical of the way we run an endless "peacetime" deployment cycle designed pretty much for unnecessary interventions.
3. Tomahawk is getting long in the teeth (but still useful) – are we spending too much on VPM to support an aging weapon?
4. Following on to #2 above, by buying so many VPMs, we are effectively constraining the missile size of the follow on to Tomahawk, just at a time when we are looking for more range out of this type of missile.
5. On the issue of numbers of submarines, some fool noted that the USN will be hard pressed to produce enough nuclear submarines to fight a conventional war; perhaps the SS or SSG merits consideration? A modern German diesel boat is reported to cost about $500 million, or as much as each VPM modification to a Virginia.
GAB
Re item 3 above...
DeleteVPM is not being designed for Tomahawk. It's really an hull slug that provides an additional water interface for the VA class SSN, with an obvious payload being Tomahawk but also used for SOF insertion, UxV deployment, etc. Presumably, a future land attack or other missile would not be constrained by current Tomahawk size, similar to the MK 41/57 VLS.
Key statement in the linked article - "The Navy plans to engineer a new 84-foot long module into the length of the submarine in order to add four 87-inch launch tubes into the body of the ship." Seven Tomahawks could be packaged into each 87-inch launch tube.
whoops...forgot to include the link
Deletehttp://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1691503-navy-prototypes-new-attack-sub-missile-power
GAB, outstanding comment and right on the money, as usual. I should have asked someone to write a post on Tomahawks.
Delete"Seven Tomahawks could be packaged into each 87-inch launch tube."
DeleteSeven Tomahawks WILL be the standard loadout.
"Tomahawk is getting long in the teeth (but still useful) – are we spending too much on VPM to support an aging weapon?"
DeleteThis is an absolutely stunningly astute question along with the corollary in your point 4. I wish I had an answer. Even more, I wish the Navy had an answer!
IP,
DeleteGood points and in theory you are correct, but the reality is that seven Tomahawks per VPM did not com out of thin air, it is an optimal load out of missiles given certain constraints.
If a new missile is developed with a different size (presumably physically larger), VPM is probably no longer the optimum configuration.
In reality, VPM, and the MK41 VLS will be the primary constraints on a replacement missile, and that may or may not make sense.
GAB
The question is not really "does every sub need to be able to shoot Tomahawks?" but rather does every submarine need a vertical launch capability to supplement the internally stowed torpedo tubes, or does every submarine need to participate in land attack.
ReplyDeleteI think you've made a good case that the land attack mission should be down on the list of missions, so the focus of submarine design should be back on the primary missions of ASW and ASuW. So the follow on question is what the marginal costs really are for incorporating Tomahawks, especially in an environment where the Navy is supporting operations ashore rather than currently going toe-to-toe with a near-peer competitor. And does the Tomahawk capability support the primary missions since that vertical launch interface would be available if the Navy would field a viable ASuW missile.
As I posted elsewhere, the VPM is not really just for Tomahawk, so it's not entirely fair to "assign" the VPM costs to the land attack mission. The 688I class incorporated 12 vertical launch tubes for launch of Tomahawks, and my understanding was that this was done without extending the hull by using available hull space. The Virginia class was designed with the vertical launch capability. So what is the true marginal cost for the vertical launch capability?
"I think you've made a good case that the land attack mission should be down on the list of missions"
DeleteIf you think I've made a good case for land attack being down on the mission priority list then I have to have made a better case for SOF insertion, UxV deployment, etc. being even further down the list which brings us right back to questioning the wisdom of losing submarine numbers in order to support missions that are way down the priority list.
Tomahawk wasn't even in service when the first LA boats arrived in the late 1970s. Space was reserved for them in the design, however. Not exactly analogous to the Virginia-class VPM situation.
Delete"and we could have much more if we took the retiring Ohio class subs and converted them into additional SSGNs with 154 Tomahawks each."
ReplyDeleteI think it's safe to say that isn't going to happen. The Ohio-class boats are going to be 45(!) years old when they are decommissioned as it is. Extending their service life further would require not only another reactor refueling, but massive investment in modernisation and certification for ongoing service. Given how hard it is to work within a completed submarine, I wouldn't be surprised if the total cost for such an endeavour came in close to that of building a new Virginia.
The remaining unconverted Ohios were commissioned between 1984 and 1997. That makes their current age range from 33-20 years. There is room to work if we don't draw the replacement program out for an extended period.
DeleteThe option is to build dedicated SSGNs. A few would go a long way toward building both overall submarine numbers and USEFUL Tomahawk capacity.
Of course you're right that SSGN conversions aren't going to happen. However, this blog is about both what will and will not happen and what should and should not happen. In other words, I deal equally with the way things are (reality) and the way things ought to be.
Well, I was trying to be polite. In the broader context of what is actually happening (i.e. the Columbia-class SSBN and its timelines), I think that converting the remaining Ohio-class boats to SSGNs is a foolish idea that shouldn't happen -- and won't.
DeleteThe broader concept of future dedicated SSGNs is an interesting one, and there is possibly some merit to the notion of building a Columbia-SSGN derivative to deliver a true Ohio-SSGN replacement capability while at the same time improving economies of scale for the Columbia class.
But there are two issues even with that. The first is timelines: the Ohio SSGNs are out of service mid-2020s and won't go beyond that because they will be out of fuel. Columbia-class boats won't *begin* to arrive for another five years, and even accelerating production of SSBNs, the gap at this point would realistically be at least ten years and probably more. Hence, Virginia VPMs.
The other question is more fundamental, along the lines you like to pose in fact: what is the rationale for these boats in the first place such that they need to be replaced, either by VPM-augmented-Virginias or a dedicated SSGN. Recall that the current Ohio SSGNs were about making use of a resource that already existed: Ohio hulls that were excess to national security requirements. Seems to me that there's a need to go back to first principles.
>>>By leaving out the VPM, we could build one extra Virginia class sub for every five subs built.
ReplyDeletePerhaps. But you forgot the cost for these additional crews.
I'm talking strictly about construction costs. Operating costs are another matter!
DeleteI might be wrong, but doesn't launching a tomahawk also increase the chance of the sun being detected? That might be worth it if you are launching 100+ like an SSGN or if nuclear tipped as a deterrent but against a peer opponent that seems risky anyway to fire a dozen TLAMs.
ReplyDeleteTo replace the SSGN why not stretch two of the SeaWolf class, repurposing an existing hull the way we did the Ohio's. Put Virginia Payloads modules each and call it a day.
That's not a bad idea.
DeleteI am way late to the party on this one, but doing a little digging, isnt the elimination of the land attack capability one of the main reasons the Virginia's were cheaper than the Seawolf's in the first place?
DeleteSeems like it was one of those compounding cost saving measures you like so much: no missile tubes meant a smaller boat overall with all the associated cost savings. And now they are trying to undo all of that for no actual benefit (it looks good on a chart but doesnt work if you actually want to use the capability).
How hard would it be to fire up Seawolf production again? Since the final design of the VPM resulted in a hull bulge to accommodate the VPT's, seems like they would be more easily incorporated into the Seawolf's larger hull. 3 billion for a newish build SSGN with around 60 TLAMs seems like a much better option.
CNO,
ReplyDeleteThe submarine TLAM-mission imposes huge costs of connectivity, comms, training, & ship design on the SSN fleet. Including loss of focus on the primary mission.
The submarine TLAM-mission has near-total redundancy with existing Air Force and surface Navy capabilities. However, there are no redundancies for the submarine's ASW role.
SSGN TLAM capacity more than covers any contingency requiring a surprise TLAM launch and no other US launchers available.
I get why TLAM was adopted (relevance, budget), but it was a bad & costly idea that's just gotten worse over time.
The VPM is change without progress. We're just iterating on our own budget dysfunction of survival of the fattest program, vs. building effective tools.
If there's one place where a cheap, single purpose platform can do disproportional harm per dollar of cost and US lives risked, its in ASW.
I don't see it happening, but cut back on electrical loads, crew size, admin, ancillary missions, nice-to-have vs. need-to-have systems and the result would be revelatory in terms of improved performance vs. cost.
But no one talking about improved performance or cost effectiveness anymore.
Is there a reason why we really need submarine launched tomahawks?
ReplyDeleteI'm not well read on submarine tactics, most of what I know is from casual conversations with submarine sailors.
A submarine's big asset is stealth. Wouldn't some of that stealth be compromised when launching a tomahawk? In that same vein, a SSBN's stealth would be compromised when launching an ICBM, but the the situation leading an ICBM launch would be very dire. What situations would favor submarine launched tomahawks were the benefits outweigh the risk? I'd think it best to keep a sub's location hidden as much as possible, or am I missing something?
MM-13B
Unless a submarine happens to launch a missile right next to an enemy ship or plane, the risk associated with revealing their location is minimal. The sub can be long gone before any enemy ASW assets can arrive.
DeleteThis does, however, point to the US pattern of having grown accustomed to not having to worry about anyone else operating in the water or air. We've done sub launches of missiles and haven't cared about location because we haven't fought anyone with significant naval or air forces. That would radically change in a peer war.
Golly gee! Did a few tomahawks come out of the ocean on their own? We don't see any ships in the area where the tomahawks came from. Don't American subs have the ability to launch them? Let's deploy our anti submarine assets in that area and make hell for that American sub.
DeleteCould things work like that for the opposition? Maybe I'm over-simplifying.
MM-13B
As I said, assuming a sub doesn't launch right next to an enemy, the risk is minimal. Even, optimistically, if it takes an hour to get an asset to the area, the sub could have travelled 20-30 nm during that time, in any direction. A 20 mile radius in any direction yields around a 1200 sq nm area to search. A 30 mile radius yields around a 2700 sq nm area. Barring dumb, bad luck, the sub isn't going to be found.
Delete"A submarine's big asset is stealth. Wouldn't some of that stealth be compromised when launching a tomahawk?"
DeleteYes, but as its been pointed out, that may not be a problem.
By the time that the (low flying, low observability) missiles are detected, they could be a hundred miles from their launch site. Making tracking them back to source impossible.
Even if they are detected soon after launch, submarines are fast, they can run and hide, and an aggressor is unlikely to have the weeks free to hunt one down, especially if other submarines are playing games, and the surface assets are shooting the sub hunters.
"In that same vein, a SSBN's stealth would be compromised when launching an ICBM, but the the situation leading an ICBM launch would be very dire."
Its questionable if an SSBN would be able to launch all of its missiles before an incoming nuke destroyed it.
"What situations would favor submarine launched tomahawks were the benefits outweigh the risk? I'd think it best to keep a sub's location hidden as much as possible, or am I missing something?"
Behind the lines rear stuff
You might spot a war fleet at anchor during resupply or repair or rest, or a supply convoy
Attacks against dry docks and shipyards, any sort of port infrastructure.
Even a Doolittle raid, could divert masses of resources from the war.
Imagine the air defences deployed to Beijing if the CCP feared "The Great Hall of the People" or the "Central & Southern Sea" could be successfully attacked?
When was the last time a SSN used a weapon other than a TLAM? With an ASM mode gives a longer stick to use against ships. Need no? Useful enough to justify cost? IMO yes.
ReplyDeleteShould every nuclear powered attack submarine have VLS cells, Yes because its really of what you put in them, today its the Tomahawk in ten years it could be some other weapon systems like newer anti-ship missiles or whatever .
ReplyDeleteEvery other global player seems to add VLS cells to they're SSN's just look at the Chinese Type 093 or the Russian Yasen class.
https://news.usni.org/2014/10/28/u-s-navy-impressed-new-russian-attack-boat
Point being if you have a modern SSN at a displacement of around 8000-9000 tons, having VLS cells on them is a force multiplier.
Launching cruise missiles from torpedo tubes is a force multiplier for smaller diesel subs, like recently demonstrated by the Russian Kilo class subs launching Kalibr crusie missiles in Syria
Well, from the post, we see that the Navy could build an extra sub for every 5 subs so, since VLS is reducing the size of our sub fleet, one could view VLS as a force divider (that would be the opposite of multiplier, right?).
DeleteThing is, with or without VLS cells SSN's are still darn expensive boats, if you want more boats in a quantity that is strategically significant then you next post should be:
DeleteDoes the USN need an all nuclear powered submarine force?
Again, from the post, the Navy wants 50 subs or thereabouts. So, if we had dropped Tomahawk vertical launch, we could have 60 subs. Ten extra subs is strategically significant. There's your force multiplier! Given all the other ways we have of delivering Tomahawk missiles, I'd rather have ten extra subs. Of course, I'd also convert or build more SSGNs, too.
DeleteNuclear versus non-nuc subs is, indeed, a worth post. The problem is, I don't have a good take on it. There are good arguments for and against. It all depends on what assumptions you make about costs and missions.
When I write a post, I normally have an opinion or position. On this, I have no strong opinion either way so I have no post position to offer. I could always do a neutral post that simply describes the pluses and minuses, I guess.
This has been on my long term to-do list for quite awhile and I keep waiting for some inspiration one way or the other.
If you have a strong opinion one way or the other perhaps you'd like to take a shot at a guest post?
Well, im not that of a specialist in therms of submarines :D, but lets look just at the prices.
DeleteA Virginia class costs about 2.5 billion dollars.
So speculating around the characteristics and price of the Shortfin Barracuda submarine that Australia is buying, a US build SSK ( around 4000 tons displacement ) should cost around 1 billion $ or even less if manufactured in more quantity .
BTW, that Dude had a nice write up a few years back :
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/is-this-jumbo-diesel-electric-submarine-a-true-nuclear-1652659060
"should cost around 1 billion $ or even less"
DeleteThe issue is not cost - it's capability. If SSK's were free they still wouldn't be worth acquiring if they couldn't do the job.
Capability is where I get ambivalent. No one has demonstrated a use FOR THE US NAVY that would offer net benefits. As a general statement, the US Navy does not engage in the the kinds of missions that an SSK would be well suited for.
The deep water, high performance missions that the Navy will use SSN's for during war demand deep water, high performance submarines and that is not SSK's, at least not yet.
Are there some applications for the Navy that an SSK could perform adequately? Probably. But, is it worth establishing an entire new training and logistics train to support SSK's that are only useful on occasion and in limited circumstances? Probably not.
An SSN can perform almost any SSK mission. The reverse is not true.
Much of the discussion revolves around how one intends to fight a war. If our strategy is to sit back and establish long term blockades around choke points and shallow water passages then SSK's make sense. If we're going to fight open ocean, fast paced, high intensity wars then we need SSN's. SSK's might also be useful for US harbor defense.
You can see why I'm ambivalent. There's no overriding demand for SSK's that I can see. Construction cost savings will be negated by the added training and logistics requirements. There's just not a strong case to be made or, if there is, I haven't heard it yet.
Interestingly, you, yourself, have not elucidated a compelling reason for SSK's other than cost which, as I said, is probably a wash when you factor in the added training/logistics trains that would have to be established.
Do you see any operational use FOR THE US NAVY that demands an SSK?
This is much like the frigate debate. Supporters list all kinds of generic things that frigates do but fail to describe how the US Navy would benefit from a frigate.
Regarding the article you cite, the author's claims of benefits fall into one of two categories:
1. Stuff that any sub could use: unmanned vehicles, the floating mast, etc.; that's not a case for the SSK, that's a case for some new equipment for any sub.
2. Missions that are very low on the priority list: special ops, unmanned vehicle ops, etc.
"A Virginia class costs about 2.5 billion dollars.
ReplyDeleteSo speculating around the characteristics and price of the Shortfin Barracuda submarine that Australia is buying, a US build SSK ( around 4000 tons displacement ) should cost around 1 billion $ or even less if manufactured in more quantity ."
I've read this, but I have to admit I'm somewhat skeptical. I'd like to see a deeper dive into that number.
It just doesn't make sense to me that we can barely build an NSC or LSC for 500-800 million, but an SSK with all the sensors and weapons it needs costs less than $1 Billion.
lets specify what kind of vessel we are talking of, i think a conventional powered submarine with AIP
ReplyDeletedisplacement around 4500-5000 tons
range around 10.000 - 12.000 nautical miles
and endurance for around 60 days
Would be technically low risk, and useful in many scenarios that do not lead to WWIII
say enforcing a naval blockade around the second island chain to contain Chinese navy or around the Barents sea.
Besides modern conflicts between two near peer opponents won't last for years like WWII.
Theoretically, if a high intensity all out warfare ( without using nukes ) between the USN and the Chinese navy occurs in the south china sea, how long would it last?
A week, a month before a political solution is reached but certainly not years, same thing with Russia, its gonna be who looses they're major surface combatants first and whos navy will suffer more attrition .
So in a scenario like this you need more numbers
Oh, yeah and the USN operating smaller ( relatively smaller i mean not like the type 212 class small ) conventional powered submarines would make basing and logistics a lot more easier in friendly/allied countries .
"Theoretically, if a high intensity all out warfare ( without using nukes ) between the USN and the Chinese navy occurs in the south china sea, how long would it last?"
DeleteAssuming neither side invades the other's mainland (a reasonable assumption) a war would last indefinitely because neither side could decisively knock out the other's manufacturing capacity. There would be an initial, relatively short period of high intensity combat between equal, modern forces. The result would be mutual destruction of high end forces. Combat would then settle into infrequent clashes between second tier forces with neither side being able to gain a clear advantage. That would go on for years and probably, eventually, settle into a quasi-truce as both sides realize they can't achieve victory. I foresee a several to ten year war.
"It just doesn't make sense to me that we can barely build an NSC or LSC for 500-800 million, but an SSK with all the sensors and weapons it needs costs less than $1 Billion."
ReplyDeleteJim, the over hyped prices on many US build weapons system does not make sense to a lot of people around the world thats why they're simply not buying.
Say the LCS costs 20% less then any euro frigate and has a little bit more weapons on it, i think it would have many export orders until now
From what I can tell, the 10 VPM equipped Virginia's will cost about $31 billion and, in total, field 400 cruise missiles. A Burke goes for less than $2 billion and carries 30 or so cruise missiles. The USS Ross and USS Porter fired a total of 60 cruise missiles in to Syria in April.
ReplyDeleteFor the same cost of building the 10 VPM Virginia's, we could build 15 more Burke's and field 50 more missiles.
Please be accurate. A Burke can carry up to 96 cruise missiles, if so desired. The ability to customize the VLS loadout is an advantage of the Burkes.
DeleteThat said, what was your point?
Existing Virginia class have 2 of the large VLS vertical launch tubes, each with 6 Tomahawks. The VPM adds 4 more larger tubes - with 7 miisiles each. The existing LA class had a set of single tubes behind the sonar space, with 6 each side for a total of 12.
ReplyDeleteSo the question is not if submarines should be able to launch Tomahawks, but if the VPM with 28 missiles ( and sized for later larger missiles) should be added . Part of the reason for more missile capacity is the newer anti-ship capable Tomahawk which not a lot is being said
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/u-s-navy-packs-firepower-into-shrinking-sub-fleet-50c72bd38b83
What ASV Tomahawk can do that a very long range harpoon cant is not clear, but foreign capability now includes supersonic in the final phase.
OK, Just going to flip everything on its head now, for the hell of it.
ReplyDeleteDevils advocate.
How many TLAMS have been fired in combat, and when was the last time.
Vs.
When was the last time MK48 launch off an SSN in wartime ?
( p.s. the Kurst doesn't count, it wasn't wartime. )
or if you prefer. When was the last time an SSN attacked a surface or sub surface contact. Vs it terciary missions including land attack.
;)
Beno
"Does every submarine need Tomahawks"
ReplyDeleteProbably not
"Can submarines make use of Tomahawks"
Undoubtedly
"What is the acceptable price to pay for submarine launched cruise missiles"
It seems easy to argue somewhere between 25% and 75% of the Torpedo load out could be substituted for tube launched missiles, depending on the area and expected mission profile.
Its hard to envision a scenario in which a submarine needs 40 torpedo.
"In war, a submarine’s most important mission is anti-submarine warfare according to US Navy doctrine since the Cold War"
ReplyDeleteI recently read an article talking about the F-22 and what an expensive and worthless idea it was to put guns on modern aircraft. Of course, I disagree.
This seems similar (but certainly not the same). Maybe Navy orthodoxy has been for subs to fight enemy subs. I don't agree with that. It should be subs fighting subs and ships, with land attack secondary.
After sub-munitions are being phased out, the difference between land attack cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles is mainly software. Software takes up little space. Therefore, anti-ship and land attack can be the same missile.
I vote that we continue putting on these missiles and launchers. 20% will be a small price to pay for such an option.
You may have missed the point of the post (or may just not agree with it). The issue is not whether Tomahawks are useful - they are, as stated in the post, it's whether the extra cost justifies the decrease in submarine numbers. From the post,
Delete"By leaving out the VPM, we could build one extra Virginia class sub for every five subs built. Are the added Tomahawks worth losing one extra sub for every five built?"
Given that you, yourself, acknowledge land attack as a secondary mission, wouldn't having an extra sub in every five be far more valuable for the main missions?
We have LOTS of ways to attack land targets other than submarine Tomahawks. We have a fair amount of ways to attack ships. What we don't have much of is a good way to conduct ASW. Subs are that way. The more subs we have, the more effective our ASW will be. The added cost of Tomahawks means one less sub in every five which hurts our ASW far more than the loss of Tomahawks hurts our land attack or ship attack.
The anti-ship Tomahawk was just a different use of the same land-attack missile. As you know, this is currently true with other missiles (eg. "Joint Strike Missile" and "Naval Strike Missile.") I know that software for each mission could be held within the same missiles and brought forward depending upon which mission.
ReplyDeleteThus, land-attack and anti-ship need not be separated in this case. Also, cruise missiles have greater range than torpedoes and so not having these missiles would greatly limit the use of these subs against ships.
As a brilliant person once told me: "The more options the better! Too many people argue for or against any particular weapon system as if it's the only one we'll have and that's absurd. Options grant flexibility and flexibility promotes victory."
This is not a question of one weapon system or another. It's a question of the cost effectiveness of Tomahawks on all subs versus 20% more subs in the fleet. Given the myriad other ways to accomplish the Tomahawk's tasks, I come down solidly on having more subs. It's a cost-benefit analysis, pure and simple.
DeleteThis does not, by the way, rule out dedicated SSGNs.
I'm not suggesting your ideas are wrong. I guess my argument would be "quality over quantity." I feel that a submarine with more firepower is better than one with less, even at higher cost.
ReplyDeleteA submarine that can attack shipping at long range is better than one that can only do so with torpedoes. One that can attack land targets is better than one that cannot.
Your Fleet Structure shows as Attack Submarines 60, Ballistic Missile Sub 12, Guided Missile Sub 10.
10 Guided Missile Subs would have a LOT of missiles, that's true. But another 60 subs carrying missiles in more places would also be a powerful back-up, especially since we have usually planned to be able to fight in more than one arena in a major conflict.
You seem not to be grasping the cost effectiveness aspect. No one, least of all me, is suggesting that cruise missiles aren't desirable. It's purely a question of where best to spend a limited budget. I'd rather have 20% more subs in the fleet. If you value cruise missiles over numbers of subs, that's a judgement and you're welcome to it. I see a lot more ASW, ASuW, blockading, ISR, etc. that can be done with a 20% larger sub fleet than the good that can come from having cruise missiles on a 20% smaller sub fleet.
DeleteBy the way, you seem to be equating, in your mind, an almost one-for-one cruise missile to target kill rate and that's not even remotely accurate. For example, let's say a sub with cruise missiles spots a Chinese task force of several ships (they'll be a group unless China is stupid enough to operate ships individually like our distributed lethality!). The sub decides to attack with anti-ship cruise missiles. Let's assume that the sub is a Block IV Virginia with 40 Tomahawk missiles and that all are available and all are launched at the Chinese group. What is the likelihood of success? Forty missiles against the combined defenses of several ships each with, presumably, 30-100+ VLS and various medium and short range AAW weapons. What's the likelihood of the 40 missiles getting through that defense? Well, no one knows but I would rate the chance of success (meaning sinking at least one ship) at around 20%. In the modern age of sophisticated AAW defenses, attackers need overwhelming amounts of missiles. My assessment is that it would require around 100-200 missiles to stand a decent chance of success (consider the Okinawa post, for example). Thus, the 'value' of the cruise missiles on a single sub is minimal. The same applies to land targets. You'll recall the use of 70+ missiles the US used to execute a PARTIAL attack against the small Syrian air base? And that was an undefended base. Forty missiles against a defended base would be almost useless. Sure, we could assemble a group of several subs to pool their missiles but the level of coordination to execute that, during a war with disrupted communications, would be challenging, at best, and each sub dedicated to that attack would a sub not conducting the primary mission of ASW.
You might also consider that warship attacks by subs are quite uncommon, as we've documented. Merchant ships are, potentially, a more common occurrence but, again, we have plenty of ways to accomplish that.
So, it comes down to how best to spend the money and, again, I'd rather have 20% more subs in my fleet! If you see it differently, you're welcome to your opinion. Just be sure you've considered all the factors.
The summary of my thoughts is, a submarine with missiles costs 20% more but is more than 20% better...
ReplyDeleteI guess as a computer nerd, I’m base too much upon math but check out these figures:
ReplyDeleteRange of the Mk-48 is 31 miles, therefore the strike radius includes about 3,019 square miles.
Range of the Tomahawk is 620 miles, therefore the strike radius includes about 1,207,628 miles.
Also, as your article on Okinawa proved, a major war with China would require a massive grouping of our surface ships as well as all the weapons contained in the Guided Missile Subs. It would probably required most of our attack subs as well. Now imagine that we go against China -- and Venezuela, Cuba, Iran and etc. jump in against us. We would want to stop their reinforcements and supplies from reaching each other. That is when we would need such a secondary capability.
In discussing the vulnerability of Carriers to submarines, you have also proven how difficult it is for a sub to get in to attack. With such short range weapons as torpedoes, even merchant shipping would be difficult targets to get into range of.
"Range of the Tomahawk is 620 miles, therefore the strike radius includes about 1,207,628 miles."
DeleteWow, that's impressive, isn't it? There is one, slight problem, however. The targeting range of a sub is considerably less than 620 miles so that Tomahawk range is useless unless you believe the in miracle of Navy worldwide networking, totally unhindered by enemy cyber and electronic disruption.
A single sub has a targeting range of perhaps 10-20 miles (the high end being for large, loud targets). Thus, the 620 mile Tomahawk range is limited, in practice, to 10-20 miles. Too many people make the mistake of only considering weapon range and ignoring sensor range. This is the problem the Marines with their island anti-ship missiles will face: long range missiles and no targeting.
The Mk48 does not have a 31 mile EFFECTIVE range, by the way. That range would be effective only if the target vessel NEVER MOVED AWAY. The 31 miles is the max range. If the target moves a hundred yards away, the torpedo runs out of fuel. To be effective, meaning to launch at a range from which the target CANNOT run away before the torpedo fuel runs out, the launch range has to be much shorter, like around 1/3 - 1/2 the max torpedo range. You like math? Run the scenario. The torpedo launches at X range and the target detects the incoming torpedo at Y range and turns and runs at Z knots. What is the effective launch range? It will vary depending on what values you use. A warship, for example, can run away at 30+ kts whereas a merchant ship can only run at 15-20 kts or so.
"even merchant shipping would be difficult targets to get into range of."
DeleteMerchant ships are a different story. In addition to being slower, having no sonar, and having no defenses, they tend to follow predictable shipping paths so subs can lie in wait. The US used this tendency against Japanese shipping. The Japanese shipping had known origination and destination ports and had to follow fairly predictable paths between the two. That still holds today.
"Forty missiles against a defended base would be almost useless."
ReplyDeleteYou may recall the recent attack against the Saudi oil facilities. Those facilities were protected by such weaponry as a Patriot Missile Battery. The weapons used by the "Houthis" (yeah right) were not even as sophisticated as the Tomahawk.
I also would like to see the Tomahawk replaced by a more capable missile, which would only serve to amplify the firepower such launchers on subs would contain.
"Too many people make the mistake of only considering weapon range and ignoring sensor range."
ReplyDeleteI often read about weaponry on the websites of those selling them. One of the most valuable parts of your blog is getting past the sales pitches to see what is really going on. Why I suggest your site to everyone I know!
I'll ponder the sensor issue before playing anymore devil's advocate here!
A perfect example of the weapon outranging the sensor is the Chinese DF-21, the fear-hyped 'carrier killer' missile. With a claimed range of over 1000 miles, the DF-21 would seem to be the end of the US Navy - except that the Chinese have no way of finding and targeting a ship that's over a thousand miles away.
DeleteIn the case of a carrier, for example, the Chinese targeting sensor (a plane, for example) would have to penetrate the 200-300 mile layered defense of the carrier group to find and generate targeting data for the carrier. That's simply not believable.
Despite popular belief, satellites are NOT targeting quality sensors. They are not direct connected to missile batteries. Instead, like ours, the satellite images pass through multiple layers of analysis, evaluation, decision, and command which requires many hours before a launch commit can be ordered. By then, the target has long gone.
The effective range of any weapon is the effective range of its associated sensor.
That's why the idea that a LCS with a 200 mile anti-ship NSM missile can be effective is a joke. The LCS has either its own radar which has a 20 mile horizon range limit or a helo which is sporadically available, broadcasts its own location, and is utterly non-survivable in combat (ask the Soviets in Afghanistan or the US in Vietnam!).