Japanese Minesweepers

A few comments in recent posts have suggested that the US Navy buy minesweeper ships from foreign navies/yards.  Japan has one of the more extensive fleets of MCM vessels so let’s take a look at Japan’s minesweepers as a good example of a possible MCM vessel for the US Navy.
 
Japan has MCM vessels of various types, size, and function.  We’ll look at the Awaji class mine countermeasures ship.  The Awaji is classified as a mine sweeper as opposed to the larger mine warfare mother ships that Japan also operates.
 

Awaji Class Minesweeper

As a brief summary, the Awaji class has a displacement of 690 tons, a length of 219 ft, a width of 36 ft, and is powered by 2x 2,200 hp diesel engines.  Top speed is 14 kt.  Crew size is around 50.  The hull is a composite fiber-reinforced plastic for weight and magnetic signature reduction.  Service life is 30 years.[1]
 
The ship has LIDAR mine detection systems that use reflected light to detect underwater mines.  Note, however, that this is similar to the ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) the U.S. Navy attempted to develop for the LCS MCM module and which has encountered significant problems and limitations in capability.
 
A variable depth sonar (VDS) system is also used to detect mines.  It also has a Remus 600 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), known as OZZ-4 to detect deeper mines.
 
For mine destruction, the ship has the Mitsui expendable mine disposal system (EMDS) which is fiber optic cable controlled and uses a camera for detection and identification before blowing up itself and the mine. Surface mines can also be engaged with a remote control 20 mm weapon station.
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that this is not a minesweeper in any sense of the word but, rather, a one-at-a-time mine hunting/clearance vessel.  Of course, this means that the clearance rate is incredibly slow and is utterly unsuited for dynamic combat operations. 
 
Unfortunately, the one-at-a-time mine clearance approach has been adopted by all Western navies with only an occasional and minor nod to actual sweeping operations.  Again, this approach is useless in combat is reflective of the West’s fixation on unmanned and crippling dependence on technology as the solution to the brutal, hard aspects of warfare.
 
We see, once again, that foreign MCM assets offer no value to the US Navy although they might be of use to Coast Guard ships charged with harbor defense.  This is not to say that glacially slow mine hunting is not without its uses for countries that are only concerned with limited territorial waters but for a global US Navy that must be able to fight anywhere and ensure vast areas are free of mines, mine hunting is a non-starter.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Japan commissions fourth Awaji-class minesweeper”, Kosuke Takahashi, 12-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/japan-commissions-fourth-awaji-class-minesweeper/

Mine Countermeasures Emphasis

Recently, a reader (username “Chinese Gordon”) made the astute observation that mine countermeasures (MCM) was not a path to flag rank.  He’s correct, as far as I can tell.  Of the 250 or so  flag officers we have, how many are former MCM operators?  I don’t know but my guess is somewhere between none and almost none.  This may explain, in part, why the Navy has, for all practical purposes, abandoned MCM.  If we had a couple dozen flag officers with MCM career backgrounds, I’d like to think the Navy would be paying more than lip service to MCM.
 
How do we get more MCM officers into flag ranks?
 
Well, this is where we run into a brick wall.  Even if the Navy magically decided to add MCM officers to the flag ranks … … there aren’t any to add.  There simply are no MCM focused officers left in the Navy.  The Avengers are essentially gone, parked pierside, rotting as they wait to be officially retired.  The LCS has yet to field a viable MCM module so there are no LCS officers that have worked LCS-MCM.
 
You’d have to go down to the Lieutenant level to find anyone who deals with MCM to any degree and those few are doing one-at-a-time, unmanned mine hunting technology development, not real world MCM.
 
Who in the Navy has ever cleared a thousand-mine field, or even just a hundred, in the real world?  No one.  Who has engaged in an amphibious assault exercise that included actual clearance of mines from a 50 mile approach to the beach?  No one.  Who has cleared mines from a chokepoint while under enemy fire, real or simulated?  No one.  And so it goes.  No officer in the Navy has even a rudimentary level of MCM expertise as it would pertain to a peer war or even a disagreement with a group of radical Girl Scouts.
 
We can’t develop flag level focus on MCM because no one in the Navy has any MCM experience.
 
We’re screwed.  We’ll be forced to learn MCM on the fly in a real war and that is a very costly way to learn anything.
 
By the way, the same applies to offensive mine warfare.

This is Your Mine Countermeasures

The last Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel, USS Devastator (MCM 6), has now been retired.[1]  Our surface MCM capability is now entirely in the hands of the Independence class LCS.  Yes, that LCS.  The ship and MCM module that has suffered years of delay, failure after failure, and no realistic operational testing.  That one.  That disaster.  No, this isn’t a Halloween horror story, although it should scare you to death.  This is our current naval MCM reality.
 
To briefly review, the LCS-MCM consists of a helo and an unmanned boat, each of which carry/tow various attachments as listed below.
 
MH-60S Seahawk mine warfare helicopters 

• AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) shallow water laser mine detection
• AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) suicide drones

 
Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV) tow boat 

• AN/AQS-20C forward/side scan mine detection sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) acoustic and influence sweep

 
Now, how is that all working?  Go read the annual GAO and DOT&E weapon assessments and you’ll get the history and status of the LCS MCM module.  It’s not pretty.  In addition, Naval News website offers a fantastic summary of the Independence-MCM.  Here’s some excerpts. 

Embarked helicopters also operate with the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), offering a safer method to counter-mine potential threats compared to traditional mechanical minesweeping with EOD divers.[1]

Safer?  Yes.
Effective?  No.
Efficient?  No.
Fast?  No. 

The sonars on the CUSVs are not a high enough resolution to identify specific threats. The lasers used on MH-60S helicopters require water that is not too turbid to operate in.[1]

So, the system only works in clear water and even then can’t reliably identify the threats?  Good … good. 

… when it comes to the unmanned systems used for mine countermeasures. Each mission takes roughly four hours of maintenance pre-mission followed by one-and-a-half hours of calibration of GPS and sonar to reach acceptable accuracy for MCM missions. The rough estimate is six hours of pre-mission preparation before mine countermeasures can begin. In real-world scenarios, that time may not exist.[1]

So, the equipment may not be effective but it’s slow.  Agonizingly slow.  That might be okay for clearing a fifty foot wide channel over the course of a month but that’s useless for combat operations. 

These concerns do not address the single points of failure in the LCS and MCM package, which make the package an extremely risk-prone platform for operations.
 
The platform lift on the LCS that moves equipment from the mission bay to the flight deck is a major operational point for equipping the MH-60S with ALMDS or AMNS. If the lift fails, the helicopter is combat ineffective. If the tow hook on a CUSV breaks, it is combat ineffective and must be towed back or recovered another way. If the Twin Boom Extensible Frame, used to lower CUSVs into the water, breaks, the entire MCM platform is inoperable and USVs cannot be launched for missions.[1]

As an example, 

One test of the MCM package on USS Tulsa (LCS 16), a ship that arrived in Bahrain in May for MCM operations, resulted in a runaway USV, according to one U.S. Navy official familiar with the testing. During that test, part of the tow bracket used to recover the mine countermeasures CUSV broke, leaving it unrecoverable.[1]

But wait, there’s more! 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[2]
 
Due to these space constraints, modularity of this platform is no longer offered or being pursued by the U.S. Navy to switch between mission modules, a sharp turn from the original planning of the LCS.[2]
 
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[2]
 
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites. The U.S. Navy is working on methods to extend the range of deployed CUSVs, including the use of Starshield, the U.S. military’s arm of the Starlink satellite internet platform.[2]

Conclusion
 
Really?  Isn’t the conclusion pretty obvious?
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Unproven Littoral Combat Ships are replacing retired MCM ships in Bahrain”, Carter Johnson, 26-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/combat-ineffective-littoral-combat-ships-are-replacing-mcm-ships-in-bahrain/
 
[2]Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnson, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

UK’s Commercial Mine Countermeasures Ship

The UK’s Royal Navy just commissioned a former commercial offshore support vessel (OSV) into the fleet as HMS Stirling Castle, a mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership. 

The ship – previously named MV Island Crown – was acquired from the commercial market for £39.8 million at the start of 2023 to provide a UK host platform for autonomous MCM payloads … [1]

So, for the sum of around $51M(US), the Royal Navy acquired a mine countermeasures ship.  Of course, there had to have been additional expenses in converting it from its commercial role to a naval MCM ship although one cannot imagine the scope of work or the cost would be too significant since the roles are not all that different.  Compare that cost to the cost of a new, purpose built MCM ship and the Royal Navy likely saved something on the order of $300M.

 

HMS Stirling Castle

The salient question, though, is how well suited is the vessel for its new role?  The ship’s duties are described as:

 

Stirling Castle…will now take her place on front-line duties, carrying high-tech equipment, including autonomous surface and underwater vehicles, for specialist mine hunting operations, primarily in UK waters.[1]

This is not a terribly demanding role and consists primarily of launching and recovering unmanned MCM assets, not too dissimilar from its previous role of loading and unloading supplies.  Is the ship exquisitely optimized for the role?  Of course not but is it adequate?  Almost certainly … and for a substantial savings.

 

This is exactly the kind of pragmatic, responsible action that the US Navy should be engaged in.  At the moment, we have no viable MCM ships.  The LCS remains a joke both in terms of its non-existent capabilities and inadequate numbers.  Wouldn’t some US Navy $50M MCM motherships look pretty good about now?

 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “UK Royal Navy commissions HMS Stirling Castle as first MHC mother ship”, Richard Scott, 25-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/uk-royal-navy-commissions-hms-stirling-castle-as-first-mhc-mother-ship/

LCS Mine Countermeasures Module Ready? Not Really

The LCS modules have been under development for something on the order of two decades, now, and none are yet ready at anything approaching the original specifications or concepts.  In fact, the anti-submarine (ASW) module has been terminated.  The anti-surface (ASuW) module is a joke, having little capability and what there is, is a faint shadow of the original intent and specifications.  The mine countermeasures (MCM) module is ready in the sense that there are a group of individual components that kind of perform limited mine clearance.  Even those components are constrained in their performance, as a Naval News website article documents.[1]
 
For starters, the entire MCM module doesn’t fit in the LCS!
 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[1]

The unmanned tow vessel is also causing performance problems.
 

According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[1]

Communications are another issue.
 

Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites.[1]

The original intent was to keep the host LCS well away from the actual minefield but the communication issues are causing the ship to operate near the minefield, nullifying the original intended benefit of unmanned operations.
 
The Navy is looking to incorporate some kind of UAV as a communications relay.
 

“We’re looking at having a UAV with a towed antenna, raising the elevation to hundreds of feet in the air that will allow us to increase the range of USVs …[1]

The MCM module is becoming a real ‘Rube Goldberg’ collection of increasingly ridiculous, mismatched, and constrained components attempting to meet a bare minimum capability.
 
A reminder … Even if all this works perfectly, it’s still a failure in that it’s predominantly a one-at-a-time hunting method which is operationally useless in a combat situation.  Yes, the Navy claims to have an influence sweep capability but, to the best of my knowledge, that has never been tested and certainly not realistically.  I have severe doubts that the sweeping method will work against modern smart mines.
 
Two decades or more of work and we have a cobbled together collection of misfit, limited capability MCM components.  Well done, Navy!  You’ve made us proud.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Update On The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnston, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

Same As Us

There is a large segment of naval observers and commentators who believe that all of our shipbuilding woes could be solved by contracting our construction to foreign shipyards.  The claim, with almost no supporting evidence, is that foreign builders build ships faster, better, and cheaper.  ComNavOps has refuted that belief, repeatedly, and pointed out that when all the ‘tricks’ of production and accounting are considered, foreign ships are not cheaper, have similar quality issues, and are not more likely to be on time.  The Belgian-Dutch new mine countermeasures ship program (see, “Dutch-Belgian MCMMothership”) provides yet another example.
 

At the request of Belgium Naval & Robotics, a Naval Group-Exail consortium, the delivery schedule of the first four of the twelve ships acquired in 2019 has been updated. The lead ship, BNS Oostende (M940), was originally expected on December 23, 2024. The Belgian Navy will have to wait eight more months.[1]

The delay is not just for the first ship of the class.  The next three will also be delayed.
 

The Dutch Navy’s first ship, the BNS Vlissingen (M840), was to be delivered in June 2025. Dutch sailors will to wait five to six more months. The BNS Tournai (M941) and BNS Scheveningen (M841) will arrive respectively one and two months late.[1]

So, a simple MCM vessel will be delayed nearly a year (and you know it will be later than that!).  Perhaps foreign shipyards/builders are not the miracle workers so many of us want to believe?  Perhaps they’re not really any different or better than we are?  Perhaps they do some things a bit better and some things a bit worse but, overall, they’re no different from us?
 

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

Every time I’ve looked into foreign shipyards and builders in any detail, they come up no better than us.  You might recall a recent post citing many examples of foreign shipyard failures similar to ours (see, “Foreign Ships AreMagnificent”).
 
I have nothing against using a foreign shipyard under certain, limited circumstances but I doubt it will produce any real improvement in quality, faster builds, or cheaper costs.  On the plus side, it would add an element of competition which is conspicuously absent and that alone might spur some small degree of improvement.
 
 
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[1]Naval News, “Belgian-Dutch RMCM Mine Warfare Program Facing Delays”, Nathan Gain, 13-May-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/05/belgian-dutch-rmcm-mine-warfare-program-facing-delays/

LCS MCM Status Update

As you know, the poor LCS has been sailing for many years without any functional, useful modules.  The modules were supposed to have been:
 

ASuW (anti-surface warfare) – The module has been watered down to near nothingness.  I think, now, it consists of a guy on the bow with a 9 mm handgun.

 

ASW (anti-submarine warfare) – The module was cancelled and ASW has been terminated as an LCS mission.

 

MCM (mine countermeasures) – The module has been in development since just after the Revolutionary War.

 
Well now, after a dozen or so LCS have been retired or scheduled for retirement, the Navy has finally declared initial operating capability (IOC) for the LCS MCM module.  Let’s update ourselves on the MCM module.
 
The mission module components keep changing as they fail, one after the other, so it’s difficult to keep up with the current status but, as best I can glean, the main components of the MCM module are:
 
MH-60 Helicopter

Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)

 
Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV)

Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

AN/AQS-20C mine-hunting sonar

 
 
The helo tows or operates the ALMDS and AMNS while the USV tows the UISS and sonar.
 
Knifefish and other (too many to list) individual components have been tested over the years and have fallen by the wayside.
 
It’s been quite a wait for the MCM module, hasn’t it?  And the wait isn’t quite over.  The first LCS was launched in 2006 and the modules began development prior to that so the MCM module has been in development for an unbelievable 17+ years … and still isn’t quite complete! 

Moton [Rear Adm. Casey Moton, program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants] said the Navy planned to deploy the first LCS with the mine countermeasure package in fiscal 2025.[1]

Deployment in 2025, assuming that isn’t further delayed, would put the development at 19+ years.
 
The Navy’s next task is to congratulate themselves and hand out medals all around.  When asked about the development effort, Moton had this to say, 

“Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”[2] 

Well done, indeed, Adm. Moton!  A mere 17+ years to develop the MCM module is a praise-worthy accomplishment, without a doubt!
 
Well, at least the MCM module is here, now, and we know it works because it’s been tested against simulated mines rather than real ones. 

For the IOT&E testing, Moton said Cincinnati’s crew operated the mission package “against a simulated minefield to achieve required mission objectives, including maintenance, pre and post-mission system prep, post-mission data analysis, in-mission command and control and launch and recovery.”[2] 

Does ‘simulated’ mean an inert mine body or does it mean a virtual, non-existent mine as so many of our exercises use today? 

“We completed approximately 230 hours of MCM USV mine hunt operations, over 33 missions from the host LCS as well as from a shore-based command center to fully asses [sic] the sonar’s performance. We executed a total of 12 airborne sorties, with fielded ALMDS and AMNS systems demonstrating the full integration with the MCM mission package,” Moton said.[2] 

We demonstrated 16 full launch and recovery iterations in the MCM mission package IOT&E.”[2] 

Twelve airborne sorties?!  Wow!  That’s testing the crap out of the system, all right!  That many sorties must have thoroughly tested the system in day, night, shallow water, deep water, good weather, bad weather, warm water, cold water, fast currents, high sea states, and against all types of [simulated] mines, and each test must have been conducted many times over to establish statistical validity.  The Navy managed to test all those conditions and establish statistical relevancy in only 12 sorties!  And against ‘simulated’ mines at that!  I’m impressed!  There is no chance this system won’t work flawlessly in the real world.
 
Sixteen launch and recovery iterations?!  Under all the conditions just mentioned?  Again … wow!
 
Well, obviously, I’m mocking the Navy’s LCS-MCM effort.  Specifically, I’m mocking 

• the protracted 17+ year developmental effort
• the pathetically inadequate testing
• the utterly lacking statistically valid test protocols and repetitions
• the ignoring of the many real world, operational conditions that ought to have been tested (you had 17+ years, for crying out loud!)
• the use of ‘simulated’ mines as proof of performance
• the Navy’s delusional, self-congratulatory attitude to what can only be classified as a fiasco of historic proportions 

If I was the Navy, I wouldn’t have even declared IOC – and, seriously, does anyone believe it’s a real IOC as opposed to a pencil-whipped, public relations stunt?  Instead, I would have left it alone and hoped no one noticed the humiliating, embarrassment the MCM module is.  Heck, in a few years the LCS will all be gone via early retirement and the MCM module status will just be a forgotten footnote in history.  Declaring IOC just brings the entire, painful, humiliating episode to the front for everyone to mock.
 
 
 
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[1]Defense News website, “US Navy declares its mine countermeasures suite ready for operations”, Megan Eckstein, 11-May-2023,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/05/11/us-navy-declares-its-mine-countermeasures-suite-ready-for-operations/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Talks Details on LCS Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Mallory Shelbourne, 12-May-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/05/12/navy-talks-details-on-lcs-mine-countermeaures-mission-package

Atlas Elektronik SeaFox

ComNavOps has long criticized the Navy for its utterly misguided philosophical approach to mine countermeasures (MCM) as well as its incompetent execution thereof.  It’s the philosophy that I want to look at today.

 

To review, there are two broad categories of MCM:

 

Leisurely Clearance – This is the removal of mines with no special time constraints and no threat of combat while doing so.  Examples would be mine removal after a conflict or mine removal from an area that has been bypassed by war and is no longer a critical task.  The clearance effort can be conducted at a leisurely pace and the goal is 100% clearance.

 

Combat Clearance – This is the removal of mines with immediate combat implications and severe time constraints.  Examples would be mine removal from the beach approach lanes during an amphibious assault or mine removal from a navigational chokepoint in support of fleet combat movements.  The clearance effort must be conducted at a very fast rate and likely under enemy fire.

 

 

For unfathomable reasons, the Navy seems totally fixated only on the former, the leisurely clearance option.  Almost every Navy MCM platform and piece of equipment is designed for slow, leisurely clearance and the numbers of MCM platforms is woefully small and shrinking every day.  In fact, the Navy’s only formal MCM force will be the LCS once the two dozen or so decrepit MH-53 helos [2] complete their long overdue retirement and the final Avenger class MCM vessels complete their on-going retirement.

 

Emphasizing the Navy’s leisurely MCM approach is the lack of numbers of MCM platforms.  There are currently only 8 Avenger MCM vessels (and all are scheduled for near term retirement), two dozen flyable MH-53E helos, and 6 deployable (I use that term loosely) LCS MCM ships although the Navy is retiring the Freedom variant so the LCS MCM responsibility may fall to the three deployable Independence variant MCM vessels.

 

As an example of the Navy’s leisurely approach to mine hunting, let’s consider the Seafox drone.  Seafox is a small underwater drone that is controlled from the host ships via a fiber optic cable.  The Navy has just issued a contract for maintenance support for the drone ASQ-232A Seafox Mine Neutralization System (for a video description, see ‘Seafox’).

 

Seafox Launching from its Cradle

 

Atlas North America LLC, Yorktown, Virginia, is awarded an $8,619,126 firm-fixed-priced, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity requirements contract for depot level support and maintenance for the Seafox Mine Neutralization System. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $35,887,986.[1]

 

SeaFox encapsulates everything that is wrong with our current MCM approach.  The SeaFox operational sequence is:

 

• Detection of possible mines by the mine hunting host ship’s sonar which, by definition, puts the host ship in or close to the minefield.
• SeaFox is prepared, launched from the host ship, travels to the suspect mine’s location, acquires the suspect object, and the shipboard operator visually identifies the object as a mine.
• Seafox returns to the host ship and is recovered.
• A ‘Combat SeaFox’ is prep’ed, launched, travels to target, and reacquires the mine.
• Seafox is positioned and detonated
• Repeat

 

A minimal time estimate to destroy a single mine is on the order of 2 hrs … likely much more.

 

As excruciatingly demonstrated in the product video, the mine hunting process is:

 

• Far too long
• Far too complex (too many steps)
• Far too costly
• Still too risky to host vessel

 

This is the approach the Navy is wedded to.  Yes, they claim to be working on a sweep system for the LCS but has anyone seen an operational sweep system?  Worse, they’ve decided to retire half the LCS vessels, leaving only a few Independence variants to conduct the entire fleet’s mine clearance.

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/3046664/

 

[2]The Navy has been scavenging parts from retired Japanese MH-53 helos in order to keep its own helos flying.

https://seapowermagazine.org/reclamation-of-ex-japanese-mh-53e-helicopter-parts-complete-for-u-s-navy/ 

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

The Dutch-Belgian mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership project offers a glimpse at one vision of future mine countermeasures.  MCM motherships have been frequently discussed and proposed for US Navy mine clearance efforts.  In fact, the original purpose of the Afloat Forward Staging Base was supposed to have been to act as an MCM mothership.  However, that usage appears to have fallen by the wayside as the ship searches for a new mission (see, “AFSB – Looking For Something To Do”).  Regardless, let’s take a look at the Dutch-Belgian MCM mothership project and see if there are any lessons from the project that are applicable to US Navy MCM needs.

 

In no particular order, here are some observations, good and bad, collected from a YouTube promotional video[1] narrated by the program manager:

 

Ship Size – The mothership is 82 m long (269 ft) with a displacement of 2800 tons.  Maximum speed is 15 kts and range is 3500 nm (speed basis unknown).  Base crew is 33 with a capacity of 63.  Contrast this with the Freedom class LCS MCM which is 378 ft long with a displacement of 3500 tons and a maximum speed of 40 kts.  Clearly, in the quest for multi-mission modularity, the LCS was grossly overbuilt for the MCM role.  Overbuilt means wasted money and resources.

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

 Buzzwords and Graphics – The mothership project managers refer to the MCM equipment as the ‘toolbox’ which is, presumably, a marketing buzzword suggesting modularity.  This kind of buzzword fascination serves no beneficial purpose and contributes to a feeling of undeserved superiority and arrogance.  In other words, when exposed to buzzwords on a daily basis, people begin to believe the hype and fail to ruthlessly examine the concepts and execution, believing that the system is inherently superior.  We’ve seen this with the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, F-35, etc.  …  all abject failures due, in large measure to a failure to ruthlessly examine and critique the projects at early stages.  The projects were protected by their buzzwords.  No one wanted to be seen contradicting or criticizing the magnificent buzzwords.

 

Similarly, today’s digital public relations graphics are hugely detrimental to programs.  Again, they convey an awe-inspiring sense of superiority and accomplishment that blinds program personnel to the flaws in the product.  It may not seem like it but glitzy graphics are one of the causes of project failure.

 

Hosting – The mothership can host two UAVs, two RHIBs, and two unmanned surface vessels (USV).  While that technically meets the definition of a mothership, in that it plays host to a smaller craft, it is a very small complement for a mothership.  I would have preferred to see a mothership capable of hosting a dozen USVs and a dozen UAVs (although I’m dubious about the value of small UAVs for MCM work).  That would make the mothership a significant MCM asset. 

 

Hosting merely two USVs and two UAVs of dubious utility is a very minimal capability. The two RHIBs are, presumably, for personnel movements and, perhaps, diver platforms for addressing single mines which serve no useful purpose in combat mine clearance operations.  That leaves just two USVs which are far too few to be effective in combat mine clearance.

 

Launching – One decidedly positive feature is the presence of two separate davit based USV launch mechanisms, port and starboard.  This provides redundancy and speed of operations as opposed to a single launch point.  One of the major failings of the LCS MCM variant was the installation of only a single UUV/USV launch point which has become a logistic and efficiency choke point with individual launches and recoveries requiring one to two hours per evolution.

 

Communications – The program manager emphasized that the mothership needed extensive communications with the various unmanned vehicles.  The concept of operations calls for a stand off distance of 12 nm from the minefield and the UAVs are intended to act as communication relays as well as providing surface mine visual detection.  The downside of all the communications is that it provides the enemy with a positive location.  Extensive, continuous communications will be detected regardless of any claims of line-of-sight or low probability of intercept.

 

Sonar – The mothership has a mine and obstacle avoidance sonar in recognition of the reality of operating near a minefield and never being 100% sure that you’ve avoided all mine threats.  This is lacking in the LCS MCM, I believe.

 

Shock Testing – The mothership was tested for resistance to nearby explosive shocks although no details were provided as to test conditions.  As you recall, the LCS failed its shock testing quite badly with the explosive loads having to be reduced and the final tests cancelled due to anticipated damage.  Being shock resistant is just a common sense requirement for a MCM vessel.

 

Mine Hunting – The mine hunting concept involves at least two to three passes.  The individual steps are:  detection, identification, and destruction.  This is a very time consuming process and is, essentially, a one-at-a-time process as opposed to sweeping.  The process is suitable for small area clearance with no time constraints but would be unsuited for combat clearance of large areas in short time frames.

 

 

Additional information is available in a Naval News article [2]

 

 

Conclusion

 

So, what does all this offer the US Navy in the way of lessons?

 

There are aspects to like about the Dutch-Belgian MCM mothership such as multiple launch mechanisms, mine detecting sonar, limited size, limited speed, and single function.

 

There are also aspects that are detrimental such as the very limited vessel capacity, the inclusion of UAVs that serve no real MCM purpose, the limited number of launch/recovery stations, and the need for incessant communications.

 

Considering the benefits and detriments, it is possible to design a conceptual MCM mothership for the US Navy.  An MCM mothership should have the following characteristics:

 

• Host at least a dozen USVs capable of conducting sweep operations as opposed to one-at-a-time hunting.
• Speed should be limited to around 15 kts which is sufficient for the task and avoids over-building and unnecessary costs.
• Physical dimensions should be minimized to the extent possible.
• No aviation capabilities beyond Scan Eagle type UAVs and even that should be justified by a CONOPS that can actually benefit from them.
• Very long endurance and range.

With the demise of most/all of the Freedom class LCS, the Navy is  woefully short of MCM assets and the LCS is not even a capable, effective MCM asset if it was available in numbers.  We desperately need a new MCM ship and a mothership, as described, would be a good start.

As a reminder, the Allies used over 250 minesweepers for the Normandy assault.

 

 

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[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCrfvHAKJwg

 

[2]Naval News website, “This Is What The Future Belgian & Dutch MCM Motherships Will Look Like”, Xavier Vavasseur, 27-May-2019,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/05/this-is-what-the-future-belgian-dutch-mcm-motherships-will-look-like/

MCM – Speed is Everything

The LCS mine clearance capability was a very marginal capability from day one, even if it had worked perfectly.  The fundamental, inherent, problem was – and still is – that the MCM module simply could not clear mines efficiently or quickly and in combat mine clearance, speed is everything.  An amphibious assault that has to stand offshore for days or weeks while mines are slowly cleared is a disaster.  A carrier group that is forced to drift in one spot for days while a navigational chokepoint is cleared of mines is a disaster.

 

As an example, the WWII Normandy D-Day landing accomplished its mine clearance ‘in stride’ as the invasion fleet crossed the channel.  There was no delay and there was no pre-sweeping to give away the element of surprise.  The mine clearance was an ‘instantaneous’ event that occurred as the assault began.

 

So, what do we know about LCS mine clearance?

 

From LT Roxanne Sumanga (MCM Naval Mine Warfare school) commenting at the Surface Navy Association (SNA 2021) Virtual Symposium held in mid-January 2021,

 

“The time piece is a little bit more tricky.  So generally as MCM Officers, we’re always working against time.  So regardless of platform, regardless of systems, we can always finish faster. The question is how much risk are you willing to inter?  [Example] So we can take a channel [and] clear it in 10 days, [and do it] by 7 [days].  Are you willing to sail through a channel with 40% risk?  So the time piece is relative.

Compare the LCS to the MCM Avengers. If the Avenger acquires a mine via sonar, it can do a run to detonate the mine.  With an LCS using unmanned systems, the LCS sends out the drone, gathers the data, analyzes it, and if questionable, sends out the drone again, do a different pattern to gather more data and then analyzes it again, and then send out a system to neutralize the mine.  So, for an Avenger that can detect and destroy a mine in four hours, it might take the LCS an entire day and that is because the LCS cannot do a single sortie to detect and engage and relies on unmanned systems.” (1)

Let’s repeat … Combat clearance is all about speed.

 

Speed can be achieved via individual speed from a single platform, cumulative speed by using a lot of platforms, or a combination of both.  The worst situation would be what the Navy currently has which is neither individual platform speed nor numbers of platforms.

 

The Navy currently has 8 active Avenger class MCM.  There are no LCS with functional MCM modules and only 6 LCS – 3 on each coast – are designated as future deployable MCM vessels.  The Navy has discussed various MCM module procurement plans but it is unclear where any additional modules beyond the designated 6 would go.  Regardless, it leaves the MCM numbers woefully short of any useful speed and capacity.

 

In previous posts and comments, I’ve analyzed the LCS clearance process and estimated the LCS can clear one mine per hour.  Based on Lt. Sumanga’s comment, that estimate may be wildly optimistic.

 

In combat mine clearance, speed is everything and we have nothing.

 

 

 

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(1)Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Program”, Peter Ong, 4-Feb-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-program/

Knifefish

General Dynamics Mission Systems (GD) has opened a new Knifefish UUV (unmanned underwater vehicle) manufacturing facility at its Taunton, Massachusetts site.(1)

 

As a reminder, Knifefish is intended to be part of the LCS mine countermeasures (MCM) module and will be used to search for buried or bottom mines.  Suspect mine locations and data are recorded to the UUV’s onboard data storage module for later upload to the host LCS for analysis.  More recently, a data transmission capability has been added to try to streamline the data transfer process. 

 

Knifefish UUV

Knifefish is a 21” diameter, torpedo shaped UUV with a length of around 19 ft and a weight of 1700 lb.  It uses a low frequency, broadband, synthetic aperture sonar.  Knifefish is capable of operating for around 16 hrs (3) which, depending on the distance to and from the area of operation allows for perhaps 10-12 hrs of actual search operations.  Its operational speed is a maximum of 4.5 kts(4).

 

GD is currently building five systems, with each system consisting of two UUVs, launch and recovery equipment, and control equipment.(1)  The Navy is planning to procure 48 Knifefish UUVs with two allocated to each of 24 MCM modules the Navy hopes to buy.

 

We’ve often discussed the need to produce weapons and systems quickly during a time of war.  So, what’s the production rate of the Knifefish?

 

The facility, approximately 8,000 square feet in size, will be capable of producing one system per month after receiving long-lead-time materials, said Craig Regnier, the manufacturing operations manager at the Taunton plant. (2)

 

One system per month?  I hope we have a very slow war!

 

Unfortunately, Knifefish epitomizes the problem with the LCS MCM module.  Knifefish is not a one-step mine disposal system as you might expect.  Instead, Knifefish is just the first step in a multi-step process that requires a great deal of time. The major problem is that detection is not even remotely a real-time operation.  The Knifefish UUV runs its scan pattern (at 4.5 kts!) and is then recovered aboard the LCS where the data is then analyzed.  Carlo Zaffanella, vice president and general manager of the GDMS Maritime and Strategic Systems business noted this problem and identified it as something he wants to improve.

 

The next step is finding ways to make UUVs operationally more useful. A top focus here, he said, is the ability to analyze data while the UUV is still in the water, for something closer to real-time threat identification.

 

“Clearly, you would like to get to where more of that analysis were possible in real time, or at least as close to real time as you can make it,” Zaffanella told reporters. “If we could get the devices to provide not just essentially a map of what’s out there but perhaps detects or even tracks and say, ‘This is really what you want to be concerned about in real time,’ then the operational utility will go up.” (1)

 

So … even the manufacturer recognizes that the UUV has only limited utility and yet the Navy still wants it.  Hmm …

 

The overall LCS MCM process involves multiple initial scans by various methods, followed by confirmation scans, followed by individual mine disposal.  The mine clearance rate is something on the order of 1 per hour or less which is far from being combat-useful.  For leisurely, peacetime clearance operations that can span weeks or months, that process might be fine but for combat operations that clearance rate is a non-starter.

 

Setting that aside, do you find the following as disturbing as I did?

 

Capt. Gus Weekes, the Navy’s LCS mission modules program manager, said he had watched GD staff launch a Knifefish at the waterfront in Quincy earlier in the week. During the testing, he said the UUV experienced a failure but praised the company for its ability to recover the drone despite the issue. (2)

 

So, let me get this straight.  At a planned PR showcase event, where the UUV undoubtedly was exquisitely fine-tuned for the event, the UUV fails and the Navy program manager praises it?  Shouldn’t this raise some red flags?  Shouldn’t this prompt suspicion and criticism instead of praise?

 

Unfortunately, the current trend is that the Navy routinely accepts delivery of damaged and incomplete ships and equipment.  Now, we’re extending that trend to praising malfunctioning MCM components.  Shouldn’t the Navy have slammed the brakes on the program instead of praising it?  This is how you get EMALS and AGS and LCS failures – by not questioning and holding manufacturers accountable.  I’d have suspended all contracts and payments and demanded proof of success before resuming production.

 

This is yet another system whose effectiveness and value seem exceedingly questionable.  Time after time, the Navy rides questionable systems right down the drain until they’re total failures instead of cutting their losses and terminating questionable systems early on.  This is how we wound up with the LCS, Zumwalt, and so many other useless systems.

 

Even if Knifefish worked perfectly, it’s not suitable or effective for combat mine clearance operations.  It’s time to cut the cord on this one.

 

 

 

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(1)Defense News website, “General Dynamics opens new unmanned underwater vehicle manufacturing center”, Megan Eckstein, 16-Aug-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2021/08/16/general-dynamics-opens-new-unmanned-underwater-vehicle-manufacturing-center/

 

(2)Breaking Defense website, “GD Mission Systems Launches Knifefish Production Facility ”, Justin Katz, 17-Aug-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/gd-mission-systems-launches-knifefish-production-facility/

 

(3)https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/knifefish-unmanned-undersea-vehicle-uuv/

 

(4)https://auvac.org/files/uploads/platform_pdf/bluefin-21-product-sheet.pdf

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)

The Navy – and, I suspect, many naval observers – have a completely unrealistic idea about mine clearance (MCM, mine countermeasures) and the speed with which it occurs.  The Navy would have us believe that half dozen LCS-MCM vessels are all we need.  On a particularly honest day, you might get a Navy admiral to grudgingly admit that a few MCM operators in a RHIB might also lend a hand but that’s the extent of the clearance assets that the Navy is developing.

 

The problem (well, one of many!) with the Navy’s MCM vision is that it is excruciatingly slow and I’ve pointed this out many times.  I won’t rehash the overall discussion.  Instead, I’d like to take a deeper look at the heart of the MCM system, the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS, AN/ASQ-235).

 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System - Empty 

Carrier Being Recovered

As enumerated by the Navy, mine clearance consists of three basic steps:

 

Detect possible mines with a broad area search

Identify mines with small AQS-20A towed sonar

Destroy mines with AMNS/Archerfish

 

This already sounds slow, doesn’t it?  Searching an area twice before you can neutralize the first mine is not a process designed for speed.  But, I digress …

 

The AMNS is the neutralizer which is the Navy’s less-violent euphemism for the destructor system.  The system consists of a helicopter (MH-60S or MH-53E) which mounts a carrying cradle (Launch and Handling System, LHS) for four mini-unmanned ‘torpedoes’ which are individually guided to a mine and then blow themselves up, destroying the mine in the process.  Thus, each helo can destroy a maximum of four mines before it has to return to the host ship to reload or replace the cradle.

 

 

 

Archerfish is the destructor for the AMNS.  It is a small, lightweight (34 lb), expendable, remote controlled, underwater vehicle which carries a small shaped charge to destroy mines one at a time.  It is a suicide vehicle since it is destroyed each time it is used.  Each Archerfish contains a sonar, video camera, and light to assist the operator in reacquiring the mine. 

 

Archerfish

Unfortunately – and repetitively inefficiently - , AMNS has to reacquire the previously detected mines and the Archerfish is then guided to the mine by a sonar sensor operator on the helo, using a fiber optic communication cable, positive identification is established, and the destructor is command detonated.

 

The destructor reacquisition and approach phase is not a lightning fast operation as some might imagine.  The destructor doesn’t approach the target at 50 kts, ram into it, and explode.  Instead, the approach is slow and time-consuming.  From the BAE Archerfish data sheet we get a sense of the slow, deliberate approach process,

 

Excellent maneuvering characteristics enable Archerfish to traverse the target to obtain pictures and sonar images from a variety of angles.  Archerfish approaches the target under command guidance. In the final stages of the approach, the Archerfish sonar and video also acquire the target and transmit more detailed information to the operator via the fibre optic link.(1)

 

Shown below is the launch system with four destructors.

AMNS with Four Archerfish Loaded

 

AMNS - Note the Size of the LHS Mounting System

 

Setting aside the first two steps of the MCM process which are the initial survey and subsequent sonar identification, the speed of the AMNS portion is determined by the steps below.  The time estimates are just ballpark figures and would depend on a multitude of factors but they offer a decent approximation.

 

 

AMNS Speed of Operation
Step	Time
Configure helo for LHS carry	Hours?(a)
Load LHS	1 hr
Transit to operation area	30 min
Lower LHS	10 min
Launch destructor	10 min
Locate and identify target mine	15 min
Detonate	instantaneous
Repeat until four destructors have been consumed	-
Return to ship	30 min
Reload LHS	30 min
Repeat cycle	-

 

 ^(a)demonstrated on an LCS video; very lengthy process

 

 

The overall time for a single cycle with the helo already configured for the AMNS and with the LHS already loaded is on the order of 2h:20m.  That equates to a mine clearance rate of 4 mines per 2h:20m or 1 mine every 35 min or, roughly, 2 mines per hour.  This is the best case clearance rate but the actual rate is lower since the helo has to return for maintenance, crew changes, fuel, etc., multiple times over the course of a day so the actual clearance rate is less than 2 mines per hour.

 

It is also important to note that the helo is also used for the initial broad area detection sweep, using the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and that time has to be included in the overall mine clearance rate so the effective clearance rate is further reduced to around 1 mine per hour on a sustained basis.

 

The AMNS system, assuming it works as advertised – and they never do - , is decisively effective, in that it blows up the mine, while also being utterly inefficient.  Clearing minefields one at a time is the worst possible approach especially in combat where speed of clearance is vital.  Ships waiting for passage through a chokepoint or amphibious forces waiting to land can’t wait while mines are cleared one at a time and yet this is the system that the Navy has decided on for its future mine clearance capability. 

 

We should note that the Navy is also working on a rapid sweep technique using the Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), however, the effectiveness of sweeps against modern smart mines is highly questionable.  As with so many other weapon systems, we desperately need to test the sweep system under realistic conditions against actual smart mines to determine whether the system can work, at all.

 

AMNS is fine for peacetime or very limited mine clearance operations but in war mines are likely to be laid by the thousands and AMNS will be completely unsuited for the task.  We need to develop highly efficient, wide area sweeping and neutralization capabilities. 

 

AMNS is yet another example of the Navy developing peacetime capabilities instead of large scale war capabilities.  We must break out of this peacetime mentality that the Navy is married to and start preparing for real war.

 

 

 

 

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(1)https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/archerfish-mine-neutralisation-system