As you know, the poor LCS has been sailing for many years
without any functional, useful modules.
The modules were supposed to have been:
ASuW (anti-surface warfare) – The module has been watered down to near nothingness. I think, now, it consists of a guy on the bow with a 9 mm handgun.
ASW (anti-submarine warfare) – The module was cancelled and ASW has been terminated as an LCS mission.
MCM (mine countermeasures) – The module has been in development since just after the Revolutionary War.
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)AN/AQS-20C mine-hunting sonar
Moton [Rear Adm. Casey Moton, program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants] said the Navy planned to deploy the first LCS with the mine countermeasure package in fiscal 2025.[1]Deployment in 2025, assuming that isn’t further delayed, would put the development at 19+ years.
“Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”[2]Well done, indeed, Adm. Moton! A mere 17+ years to develop the MCM module is a praise-worthy accomplishment, without a doubt!
For the IOT&E testing, Moton said Cincinnati’s crew operated the mission package “against a simulated minefield to achieve required mission objectives, including maintenance, pre and post-mission system prep, post-mission data analysis, in-mission command and control and launch and recovery.”[2]Does ‘simulated’ mean an inert mine body or does it mean a virtual, non-existent mine as so many of our exercises use today?
“We completed approximately 230 hours of MCM USV mine hunt operations, over 33 missions from the host LCS as well as from a shore-based command center to fully asses [sic] the sonar’s performance. We executed a total of 12 airborne sorties, with fielded ALMDS and AMNS systems demonstrating the full integration with the MCM mission package,” Moton said.[2]
We demonstrated 16 full launch and recovery iterations in the MCM mission package IOT&E.”[2]Twelve airborne sorties?! Wow! That’s testing the crap out of the system, all right! That many sorties must have thoroughly tested the system in day, night, shallow water, deep water, good weather, bad weather, warm water, cold water, fast currents, high sea states, and against all types of [simulated] mines, and each test must have been conducted many times over to establish statistical validity. The Navy managed to test all those conditions and establish statistical relevancy in only 12 sorties! And against ‘simulated’ mines at that! I’m impressed! There is no chance this system won’t work flawlessly in the real world.
- the protracted 17+ year developmental effort
- the pathetically inadequate testing
- the utterly lacking statistically valid test protocols and repetitions
- the ignoring of the many real world, operational conditions that ought to have been tested (you had 17+ years, for crying out loud!)
- the use of ‘simulated’ mines as proof of performance
- the Navy’s delusional, self-congratulatory attitude to what can only be classified as a fiasco of historic proportions
If I was the Navy, I wouldn’t have even declared IOC – and,
seriously, does anyone believe it’s a real IOC as opposed to a pencil-whipped,
public relations stunt? Instead, I would
have left it alone and hoped no one noticed the humiliating, embarrassment the
MCM module is. Heck, in a few years the
LCS will all be gone via early retirement and the MCM module status will just
be a forgotten footnote in history.
Declaring IOC just brings the entire, painful, humiliating episode to
the front for everyone to mock.
_____________________________
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/05/11/us-navy-declares-its-mine-countermeasures-suite-ready-for-operations/
https://news.usni.org/2023/05/12/navy-talks-details-on-lcs-mine-countermeaures-mission-package
"If I was the Navy, I wouldn’t have even declared IOC – and, seriously, does anyone believe it’s a real IOC as opposed to a pencil-whipped, public relations stunt?"
ReplyDeleteDeclaring IOC makes it officially a success. Having adhered to procedure (and lots more processes described only in management jargon) throughout the project officially justifies Morton's “Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”
This all fits with "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence." The only twist is that because the US services have been fighting a "global war on terror" for over 20 years, they're quite sure that they are not falling into the traps described in that book, and are ready for anything.
So it only took the combined lengths of US involvement in WW1, WW2, Korea and Vietnam to 'develop' a mine countermeasures system.
ReplyDeleteIf I was China I would be building so many damn mines enough to completely block the US from reaching Taiwan.
Various sources put the Chinese mine inventory at 100,000 - 200,000.
DeleteEven a couple 100 would be enough to create major issues!!! Let alone 1000s.....
DeleteI don't know how effective, or comparable the evolving RN autonomous mine sweeping capability will be. The one thing that is certain is that it will be a hell of a lot cheaper than the LCS
ReplyDeleteversion. It even looks as if there will be an actual CONOP as well. https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navy-autonomous-mine-hunting-at-the-sharp-end/
I assume you read the article you linked. Did you see a CONOPS in there? I saw nothing but vague, sales brochure type, claims of wonderfulness. Almost none of the equipment exists. The initial work (Block I) doesn't even deliver any functional equipment - it's described as an evaluation step! The program HOPES to deliver 6 units. Are 6 units sufficient to accomplish anything worthwhile (recalling that the Normandy assault used 300 minesweepers!)?
DeletePlease reread the article you linked and tell me what you see that's specific, real, and useful in any near term time frame.
"executive officer for unmanned and small combatants": what a clever idea to recruit trannies and pygmies.
ReplyDeleteReal battle of drone mine sweep:
Deletehttps://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ship-mine-vn.htm
I think you might already know about it from linkback notifications, but I wrote a post recently on lots of things I’ve learned here as they relate to a Taiwan conflict with mines being heavily featured.
ReplyDeletehttps://austinvernon.site/blog/navyneeds.html
There are a couple of key issues wrt the use of mines, by both sides, in a Taiwan scenario.
Delete1. Any US/Taiwan attempt to lay mines AFTER the start of hostilities will fail. China will not allow any mine-deploying asset to get anywhere near Taiwan. The ONLY solution is to lay remote activated mines now, before hostilities begin, and activate them when hostilities start. That, however, is far easier said than done. Challenges include world condemnation, Chinese pre-emptive action to prevent minelaying, and actual activation difficulties - I'm not aware of any large scale, practical method of activation.
In short, while the theoretical benefits of mines are crystal clear, I don't see any practical means of employing mines in a Taiwan scenario.
2. China faces many of the same problems in its use of mines. However, it can much more easily mine the north and south ends of the strait after the start of hostilities, thus protecting its invasion fleet from US surface and submarine forces. This negates much of the potential impact of the theoretically powerful and influential US submarine force.
China's minelaying can be successfully expanded to the Philippines-Taiwan gap, as well, since they will have sufficient control of the relevant air and water.
China will not, however, have the ability to deploy large amounts of mines to the east of Taiwan, assuming the US can muster a kinetic response quickly enough (not an assured capability, by any means) at the start of hostilities. Presumably, Guam will be rendered inoperable on hour-1 of any conflict since, as you noted, we're not really serious about base defense/hardening. This eliminates any kinetic response to Chinese minelaying attempts.
It is easy to get caught up in theoretical benefits of various weapons (mines) without considering the practical challenges of employing the weapons. You might want to run the theoretical benefits that you see through the filter of operational reality. For example, mines are, theoretically, great but can they actually be deployed and employed in a timely and useful manner? This is what an operational plan does for us and what a REALISTIC wargame (of course, we don't do realistic wargames and that includes the one you obliquely referenced!) can show us.
Just food for thought.
Good points, thanks for the feedback.
Delete"The ONLY solution is to lay remote activated mines now, before hostilities begin, and activate them when hostilities start. That, however, is far easier said than done."
DeleteTaiwan has the option to do that, by laying cable-controlled mines in their own territorial waters. The Swedish and Danish navies probably have applicable technology.
"Taiwan has the option to do that, by laying cable-controlled mines in their own territorial waters."
DeleteThink operationally!
I'm not aware of any capability to lay cable commanded mines on the required scale.
If they stick to the 12 mile limit of territorial waters, that won't be terribly difficult to sweep/negate for the Chinese. A handful of lanes through a 12 mile deep zone is relatively easy to clear. To be effective, the mines ought to be laid the width of the strait. THAT would be an obstacle for the Chinese and a challenge to clear zones ... but it's not possible for the reasons mentioned in the previous comment.
China is not going to allow a mine laying effort. Even a limited cable-controlled effort would be quite obvious to the Chinese who would, almost assuredly, respond militarily, likely with the very invasion that the mines seek to prevent!
"Good points, thanks for the feedback."
DeleteYou write well, by the way!
"Any US/Taiwan attempt to lay mines AFTER the start of hostilities will fail."
DeleteA couple of thoughts. Probably flawed. Maybe you can point out why.
Note: both of these would need to be given to the Taiwanese in advance.
(1) Put a Quickstrike mine on the end of a short range (10 or 20 miles) rocket, with a mobile launcher. Keep the launchers in hardened shelters to survive the initial missile strikes. Then launch the Quickstrike mines, with the glide capability, from land. Obviously it's too expensive to buy enough of these to cover the whole strait, but then there are only a few places on Taiwan where an amphibious landing is possible, so just cover those?
(2) Use UUV's to place the mines. Obviously you'd need a lot of UUV's but they are also a lot cheaper than actual submarines. And they're also small enough to keep in hardened shelters. In the hands of Taiwan, they'd need fairly simple capabilities. Don't need long range, since the operating region is within a hundred miles or so of base. And don't need to go deep since the Taiwan Strait (especially where they'd be planting mines) is fairly shallow.
" Probably flawed. Maybe you can point out why."
DeleteThe first idea about rocket launched mines is conceptually not without merit and would be analogous to a scatterable minefield on land. However, you're talking about very large, very heavy mines (500-2000 lb) which would require very large rockets which, in turn, would require very large launchers and would have very slow launch rates. Trying to lay a minefield of thousands of mines that way would require many hundreds of launchers and stockpiles of thousands of mines. As I said, the concept is not without merit but the practicalities of trying to lay a useful field that way while under fire from a Chinese bombardment would be challenging, to put it mildly.
The second idea is simply not feasible. UUVs have speeds of around 5kts. That's far too slow to lay a minefield of thousands in any useful time frame. In addition, the mines (say, 500-2000 lb each) are as big and heavy as the UUVs unless you build, essentially, a giant unmanned submarine (which the Navy is looking at doing and I did a post on the Hammerhead concept and it isn't very practical).
You should note from history that most minefields are laid in controlled waters to secure flanks or less likely approaches. The key is you have to have control of the waters long enough to lay the mines. Taiwan would not have control of the waters at all.
Hope this helps.
In the vein of defending the Taiwan strait, mines seem handy for sure. But wouldnt torpedoes themselves be potentially a better way to inflict damage on an invasion fleet? Rather than ships trying to attack the fleet (clearly bad idea) what about a torpedo wielding mini-fort of sorts? With only specific places suitable for landings, maybe some kind of offshore, or maybe onshore, hardened torpedo launch stations around them could be an effective option(??) The invasion fleet, being large and relatively close together, I wonder how effective countermeasures and decoys would be, especially in the face of a torpedo saturation attack. I envision small versions of the U-Boat pens- heavy concrete emplacements on the shore, mostly or totally underground, with the ability to each fire significant numbers of torps rapidly, and each has a small warehouse worth of reloads. Obviously they might need additional armor or protection to survive the initial onslaught and penetrating weapons since itd be impossible to conceal building them. And im sure industry wouldnt mind selling a thousand or so Mk48s, or whatever is the best choice... While tactically quite different, I feel like the events in Drobak Sound have lessons that might be applicable here....
Deletedidn't we mine North Vietnam's harbors during Nam? How did we manage to lose that capability in 60 years?
Delete"didn't we mine North Vietnam's harbors during Nam? How did we manage to lose that capability in 60 years?"
DeleteYes, we did mine North Vietnam's harbors during Nam, but NO, we have NOT lost that capability. We did it with aircraft, largely from carriers (don't know if they were all from carriers). We could still do that, BUT China will be able to resist, threaten, and shoot down our aircraft in that area to a MUCH greater extent than North Vietnam could. So it's not practical in a Taiwan scenario.
@Bob. Been trying to find more info on mining ops. I guess the first wave was delivered by jets from carriers but not sure how the rest were delivered, saw somewhere something in the order of 11000 mines? Seems like a lot just by carrier jets. Wonder whats in inventory today.....
DeleteRe: the referenced public war game.
DeleteOne of the things that bothered me were that no players opted to take down satellites in any iteration.
That obviously skews a lot of the strategy on both sides. The focus on the regular JASSM being anti-ship capable was also weird when it’s not designed with that sensor suite.
@Bob @NICO : Among the assets used to mine NV harbors were B-52 bombers equipped with air-dropped mines. The air force has been shilling the Quickstrike ER mine kits, that are basically mating the Quickstrike mines to JDAM-ER guided glided bomb kits, so that you can easily, quickly and precisely seed a minefield using bombers (as opposed to training minelaying crews dropping dumb mines). That said, even at the maximum range of Quickstrike ER, some 50 or so miles, you'd still be looking at entering detection range of ground-based radars and AEW, if you were going to try and mine chinese harbors. Using a B-2 would reduce the detection factor somewhat, but not enough, and there's only 21 B-2s so this wouldn't be a good use of them. Maybe in 30 years from now, when we have 100 B-21s...
DeleteWhat I would like to see are test results from MCM platforms used by our Allies vs what the LCS/ MCM module accomplishes. However this info may be classified.
ReplyDeleteBack in 2005 time frame, an AIP sub from Sweden was leased with crew for ASW exercises with our Navy.. Perhaps our Navy could do the same by testing our MCM capabilities vs some foreign ones .
Delete"test results from MCM platforms used by our Allies vs what the LCS/ MCM module accomplishes."
DeleteThere is no public data that I'm aware of. The closest we can come to a valid comparison is to note the theoretical clearance RATES. The LCS clearance rate, not counting the UISS, is on the order of 1-2 mines per hour (abysmal). Foreign clearance rates are similar.
Sweeping is the only method/technology that has any useful clearance rate and there is zero published data on the effectiveness of that technology. I suspect that the effectiveness is quite low since it is easier to create a smart mine than an effective, smart sweeper.
"Perhaps our Navy could do the same by testing our MCM capabilities vs some foreign ones ."
DeleteIt is of little interest how our MCM compares to foreign MCM. The only thing that matters is how our MCM (or how foreign MCM) compares to operational requirements. For example, if our MCM is 10% better than a foreign MCM but still 90% short of operational requirements, what does it matter that we're marginally better than someone else? Both are still woefully short of being useful! I suspect this is the case.
We need to establish operational MCM requirements (for example, clear a specified area to a specified degree of risk in a specified time and then we either can meet it or not. If not, our MCM is combat-useless and we need to start over.
We, and foreign navies, are all using the same basic technology (unmanned drones) so there won't be any significant differences in performance. The question is whether this basic technology and approach is combat-useful and combat-effective and I don't think it is for any realistic combat scenario.
"ASuW (anti-surface warfare) – The module has been watered down to near nothingness. I think, now, it consists of a guy on the bow with a 9 mm handgun."
ReplyDeleteThe Navy standardized on the new improved .22 short. A high power telescope is currently in development.
LCS was designed to fight near weak enemies' coastal lines ("littoral" means this). Original idea was these nations might deploy some outdated mines. It was not worthy to bring advanced mine sweepers there but if needed, some LCS could load MCM module.
ReplyDeleteBecause of this strategic blunder, Navy has decided to retire LCS but have to avoiding piss off the military industry complex but phase away LCS at what they can accept.
This isn't even remotely correct. The LCS was envisioned to be the 'minesweeper' of the future, able to deal with the most sophisticated mines through the use of a plethora of unmanned vehicles (almost none of which have panned out).
DeleteThe LCS-MCM was intended to replace EVERY maritime mine clearance asset in the US military. There was (and is!) no more advanced mine clearance asset in the Navy. The fact that the LCS-MCM module is woefully inadequate in both capabilities and numbers is the fault of poor planning and execution rather than any strategic lack. The LCS-MCM had good intentions but horribly execution.
Since Vietnam War, it has been demonstrated that drones are best tools to do mine sweep as this is a very dangerous mission.
DeleteDuring Vietnam War, China used type 312 drone to sweep mines near North Vietnam's ports, first time drones used in mine sweep. From N. Vietnam's point, it was a very successful operation. Results were also confirmed by US after the Vietnam War.
This mine sweep missions still have high value even in today's mine sweeps - face smart mines from advanced nations.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ship-mine-vn.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_312_minesweeper#:~:text=The%20Chinese%20Type%20312%20class,used%20in%20the%20Vietnam%20War.&text=Although%20originally%20designed%20as%20a,crew%20as%20a%20regular%20minesweeper.
Interesting article about TB2 drones.
ReplyDeleteHeard from another article, an Ukrainian weapon buyer that they lose a drone every 3 to 5 days. He didn't say which size and weight category but it just shows how these so called wonder weapons are nice and all but if u don't have the supply chain and production line behind them, they will disappear really fast from the battlefield. Ukrainians are all over the world trying to find drones to buy, I'm surprised Iran hasn't managed to sell to BOTH SIDES yet!
I think its somewhat safe to say the same thing about so many DoD projects that sound great and even if they WORKED and DELIVER, how long do they survive and we end up a few weeks to month later with nothing left?!?!
https://share.newsbreak.com/3zusnsc7
I won't even waste words of long length on it, it's just plain stupid to take a multi-use warship and then put in the ultimate specialist role- which is probably under the guise of saving $ as multi use ships means not buying small specialist ships- as the warship is basically going to be the equivalent of an F-35 without any fantastic performance at the LCS price tag. Mine hunting should be done by mine-hunters, and if they need something more out of them, say range and speed, then design that in with more fuel, bigger engines. Instead using the LCS, which is now just a big struggling platform carrying failed MCM experiments, too noisy due to engine choice to hunt subs and one of the least armed Corvettes (at a Frigate's size) out there to kill ships or be used in an anti-air role. At this juncture, since it's paid for and they were too proud, and Congress too invested in individual state shipyards to stop building them when they realized they had an issue, they might as well figure out how to carry more NSM's and since it is probably too tough to configure them for the SM family of missiles, that they should just load up with more ESSM's and RAM's to perhaps do short range escort duty. I'd add it's basically in the Secret service mode, you sit in front of the valued merchant ship or other warship and "take the bullet" unless they have a small missile attack that the LCS can overwhelm with sea sparrows or RAM's. Admit defeat, and though the chopper mode of MCM could be kept as well as the USV, it's going to be more a back-up mode where they don't have a true minesweeper, and we should look to take a successful ship model from somewhere else and imitate it at this point unless we want to spend 2 billion designing that as well. We are a delusional navy and Marine Corps at times, look at exercise Steel Knight just a few months ago. Simulated attacks on enemy ships by H-1 Hueys. Does anyone think a Huey can get anywhere close to a real warship with SAM's? Maybe if it launched something small from a cove of trees from an island at a ship within VR. Must be nice to dream..
ReplyDelete"since it's paid for"
DeleteThe LCS is NOT paid for. True, the initial construction costs are already spent but the yearly operating costs continue to rack up for no combat benefit in return. The LCS is draining our budget while providing no return on investment.
"perhaps do short range escort duty."
The problem with relegating them to escort duty is that the places we need escort to are long distances (Guam, for example) and the very short-legged LCS is unsuited for that. I don't know what short range escort duty you have in mind but I can't, offhand, think of any that would justify the draining expense of an LCS.
Only thing LCS is good for is being towed behind a carrier as a decoy.
DeleteRead about the Navy's ORCA program .They have a prototype 50ft submersible which has been tested and may still be tested .This unmanned submersible is being considered as a minelayer first.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/us-navys-orca-xluuv-64-over-budget-3-years-late/
Have not anything recent about this XLUUV program.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navys-85-foot-orca-unmanned-submarine-will-be-a-minelayer-first
This XLUUV is 85 ft in length not 50 ft.. Have not read any recent articles on this program. My thoughts revolve around the question, what could go wrong ?
DeleteThe base XLUUV is 51 ft in length but can be expanded up to 85 ft with modular payload sections.
DeleteHere's a post on the XLUUV: XLUUV
"This unmanned submersible is being considered as a minelayer first."
DeleteYes and no. Yes, that is the stated functional intent. No, it won't be an effective minelayer. We analyzed this in a post (see, XLUUV CONOPS). It simply hasn't got the effective range, speed, stealth, or payload to conduct useful minelaying operations.
Given the very limited capabilities that remain in the mine warfare module, do we have any idea how they compare to what we've had for a generation with the Avenger mine hunters coupled with the helicopter sweep sleds?
ReplyDeleteIn broad terms, the legacy Avengers and MH-53E helos were sweep assets and, as such, potentially useful in combat situations (assuming sweeping would work to a reasonable degree - no sure thing!). In contrast, the LCS-MCM is focused more on one-at-a-time clearance. It remains to be seen whether the UISS will be an effective sweep asset.
DeleteEven more troubling, I can only confirm the planned existence of three LCS-MCM vessels since the Freedom variant LCS-MCM appear to have been early retired or reassigned. I'm also unsure how many MCM modules will be acquired.
This article is not about mine countermeasures, but there are observations about program management.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.yahoo.com/news/may-world-best-warships-not-005636495.html
Quote:
Cost overruns, endemic in US defense contracting, are not common in Japan, Schuster says, because – unlike the US – the country holds manufacturers to their estimates.
“A Japanese shipbuilder’s bid is an absolute. If they finish it below expected cost, they make a larger profit. If they encounter delays and mistakes, the builder has to correct it at their own expense,” Schuster said.
That approach was “much wiser” than that of the US, he claims, pointing to the alleged problems with Zumwalt-class destroyers and littoral combat ships that have seen the Pentagon spend billions on platforms that critics say the US Navy doesn’t know what to do with.
We have, in theory, the same type of contract. We call it a 'fixed price' contract. The problem is that it isn't really a fixed price. When a problem (cost overrun) occurs, the manufacturer and govt haggle and wind up splitting the cost with the govt usually paying the bulk of it.
DeleteWorse, we don't have fixed requirements which are a mandatory condition for a fixed price contract. We have a bad habit of issuing non-stop change orders throughout the construction. The manufacturer has no hope of holding to a fixed price. Yes, in theory, the change orders are negotiated as an add-on price adjustment but it's impossible to fully quantify change order costs because they often (always?) involve retrofits and modifications that the manufacturer really has no way of knowing what they cost.
We also have a nasty habit of issuing contracts BEFORE we have actual designs and blueprints. Again, that makes it impossible for the manufacturer to accurately establish a price.
I'm not absolving manufacturers from contract malfeasance, by any means. They engage in low-ball bidding, knowing they can recoup any losses by making claims against the govt or fixing problems after delivery since the US military does not normally use warranties.
So, before you pass judgement on this contract issue, check Japan's 'fixed requirements' practices and other issues I've touched on.
Our system is broken, without a doubt, but we do have the procedures available to fix it ... we just refuse to use them!