Monday, February 21, 2022

Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) CONOPS

The Navy is embarking on a program to acquire dozens/hundreds of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) with [** warning: shocking news ahead! **] no concept of operations (CONOPS) to guide the design.  Okay, that was probably the least shocking news you could have read, right?  I mean, the Navy hasn’t developed a CONOPS for anything other than admiralty promotions in many decades so why would this be any different?  We’ve seen from the LCS program what happens when you commit to a full production program with no CONOPS and no prototype.  Way to learn a lesson, Navy.

 

Since the Navy won’t develop a CONOPS, let’s see what, if anything, we can come up with, along those lines, for a UUV.

 

The Navy is developing dozens of different UUV designs in many different sizes.  Most are just glorified torpedoes.  We’ll ignore those as the minor pieces of equipment that they are.  Instead, we’ll focus on the largest UUV, the extra large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV, also called Orca).

 

… the Navy defines XLUUVs as UUVs with a diameter of more than 84 inches, meaning that XLUUVs are to be too large to be launched from a manned Navy submarine.  Consequently, XLUUVs instead will transported to a forward operating port and then launched from pier. The Department of the Navy’s March 16, 2021, unmanned campaign framework document states that the XLUUV will be designed “to accommodate a variety of large payloads….”  The Navy testified on March 18, 2021, that mines will be the initial payload for XLUUVs.  More specifically, the Navy wants to use XLUUVs to, among other things, covertly deploy the Hammerhead mine, a planned mine that would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, broadly similar to the Navy’s Cold War-era CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine.[1]

 

The XLUUV will be based on the Boeing Echo Voyager with some Navy-specific modifications.  That being the case, let’s take a look at the Echo Voyager.

 

Echo Voyager is roughly the size of a subway car—it is 51 feet long and has a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet by 8.5 feet, a weight in the air of 50 tons, and a range of up to 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a modular payload section up to 34 feet in length, increasing its length to as much as 85 feet. A 34-foot modular payload section provides about 2,000 cubic feet of internal payload volume; a shorter (14-foot) section provides about 900 cubic feet.[1]

 

Boeing Echo Voyager


Echo Voyager has a maximum speed of 7.8 kts [2] and uses a combination diesel-electric propulsion/power system.  On battery, the vessel has a range of 150 miles at 2.6 kts whereupon it must surface and recharge its batteries using its diesel generator. 

 

With a single fuel module in its payload bay, Boeing claims the range is 6,500 miles.[2]  I’ve found no information about the size of the fuel module.  The statement that fuel modules are stored in the payload bay is important because that means that the effective payload space is less than the stated specification of 2,000 cu.ft.

 

The vessel has an obstacle avoidance sonar and inertial guidance.

 

The maximum dive depth is 11,000 ft.[2]

 

In 2019, the Navy contracted with Boeing to produce four XLUUVs for $43M which is just under $11M apiece.[2]  The contract was later expanded to include a fifth vessel.  Funding will come from a Navy Research and Development account similar to the funding mechanism used for the first two LCS.[1]

 

The preceding description suggests certain operational characteristics that will influence the CONOPS and selection of appropriate missions.

 

 

CONOPS Characteristics

 

Speed – As noted, the vessel is very slow.  The maximum speed is 7.8 kts and, presumably, the economical cruising speed is much less.  Given the statement about the range on battery being 150 miles at 2.6 kts, this suggests that the cruising speed is 2-3 kts.  This has a major impact on operations.  For example, pier launch and lack of forward bases means that for Chinese theater operations the nearest launch point (disregarding Japan which is not a guaranteed base of combat operations), Guam, would be around 2100 miles from the South China Sea.  Even at the maximum speed of 7.8 kts, the transit time to the South China Sea would be around ten days and a more economical cruising speed of, say, 3 kts, would result in around a thirty day transition time.

 

Payload – This is a small vessel with a correspondingly small usable payload.  Consider the Navy’s main postulated mission:  laying Hammerhead mines.  How many mines could fit in a 2000 cu.ft. payload space?  I can’t find any specs on the Hammerhead capsule size, however, there is a picture of the Hammerhead package so a reasonable estimate of the package size is possible.  Knowing the Mk54 torpedo size, we can visually estimate the overall package size.  Assuming the package is sized to fit a 21” torpedo tube, this gives us approximate dimensions of 21” x 21” x 19 ft, for a total of 58 cu.ft.  Simple arithmetic tells us that the maximum number of mines that could be carried in the 2000 cu.ft. payload space would be 34.  However, there needs to be room to move and secure the mines during loading.  It would be reasonable to assume that half the payload space would be dedicated to movement and securing the mines which would reduce the capacity to 17 mines.  Some sort of mine handling and ejection mechanism is required and that would further reduce the number of mines.  If the fuel module is also stored in the main payload section, the number of mines is even smaller.  A reasonable estimate would be a mine capacity of around 12.  See, ref [3] for an interesting discussion of this.

 

Hammerhead Mine Capsule


Range – On the face of it, the claimed range of 6,500 is excellent and suggests that not only can the vessel reach its operating area and return (4200 miles round trip from Guam to the South China Sea) but it will have enough excess range to effectively operate for an extended period within the operating area.  However, as noted, the submerged range is only 150 miles on a single battery charge.  Thus, in order to achieve the claimed range of 6,500 miles, the vessel will have to surface frequently … a very bad requirement for a submarine operating in enemy waters!

 

Communications – I’ve found no mention of communications in any description of the vessel which implies that once launched, the XLUUV will be largely autonomous.  Aside from being very dubious about the success of a truly autonomous vessel for any length of time, this suggests that the vessel’s usefulness in the surveillance role will be limited as that would require frequent and lengthy transmissions from the UUV back to its port - communications that would quickly pinpoint the vessel’s location for the enemy and given the UUV’s very slow speed, it would be quickly destroyed.

 

 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

 

In attempting to assemble a CONOPS, what do we have to work with?  We have a small vessel with a small payload (small on the scale of contributing to a war effort).  The vessel, itself, is very slow and unresponsive.  As with any submerged vessel, communications will be difficult once a mission is started. 

 

So, what does that suggest for a CONOPS?

 

It suggests that the only viable missions are those that are very slow developing and can afford to wait for very long periods of time and can be effective with very small payloads.

 

While various articles have postulated virtually every mission ever conceived in the history of warfare, there are only two viable missions that meet the criteria and constraints described above:

 

Mine Laying – An XLUUV can be effective as a mine layer but with a significant caveat: it is only useful and effective for a very small area.  Typically, mines are deployed in the thousands to tens of thousands for a single field.  The very small payload of the XLUUV precludes using it to lay a large field no matter how many XLUUVs we acquire.  That only leaves point mining of a very small area such as a channel or entrance to a harbor or a narrow passage between islands.  For example, one could imagine productively mining the entrance/exit to a Chinese naval port.

 

Surveillance – Given the combination of limited sensors, limited field of view, very slow speed (inability to follow a target), and communication issues, the only type of surveillance mission that would make sense is monitoring a very small, restricted area as described in the mine laying section.  In such a scenario, the XLUUV becomes, essentially, a static sensor and targets come to it (or not – that’s useful information, too).  The caution is that any important and restricted area will be heavily patrolled by the enemy.  Whether the craft is quiet enough to escape close scrutiny is unknown.  It will have to be extremely quiet since it will have no ability to fight back or maneuver to avoid detection.  Further, the extremely limited battery life that requires frequent surfacing to recharge is a major liability in this mission.  Without knowing exactly how stealthy the XLUUV can be (factoring in frequent surfacing for recharging), surveillance is a pretty iffy mission.

 

 

Rationale

 

Given the lack of worthwhile missions, why is the Navy so enthusiastic about building these UUVs?  What is their rationale?  Cheapness, compared to a real submarine, is obviously a major factor and if the XLUUV had even a fraction of a real sub’s capability, this might make sense … but it does not. 

 

Does the Navy really view these as a cheap replacement for real subs?  That would be hard to believe but we’re replacing Burkes with small, defenseless, unmanned surface vessels so … maybe.  Could they, in some twisted way, view them as a cheap, indirect replacement for surface ships in the overall force structure? 

 

Is it technology for its own sake? 

 

Is it sheer, unmitigated stupidity?

 

A handful for the limited mine laying mission is reasonable but any more than that cannot be justified and yet the Navy seems committed to a large production run and making these a significant portion of the future fleet structure.  It’s baffling.

 

 

Conclusion

 

It is very difficult to postulate a worthwhile concept of operations other than the very limited mine laying mission described above, although that single mission does have some value.  That does not, however, seem to justify the acquisition of more than a handful of XLUUVs – certainly not the large program the Navy seems to want to pursue.

 

Acquisition of this XLUUV will require a supply/support logistics train, administration, operators, specialized equipment, specialized maintenance, etc.  Does the limited scope of useful missions justify all this?  I’m doubtful.

 

This seems to be yet another case of the Navy jumping on the unmanned technology bandwagon for no demonstrable good reason;  technology for the sake of technology.

 

This also continues the trend of minimizing the value of raw firepower in combat, as the XLUUV offers no significant firepower.

 

At best, this is a niche mission/craft with a significant cost in terms of acquisition and support.


 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, 19-Jan-2022

 

[2]https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26513/boeing-is-building-the-navy-big-orca-submarine-drones-to-hunt-and-lay-mines-and-more#:~:text=Boeing%20experimental%20Echo%20Voyager.%20The%20diesel-electric%20Echo%20Voyager,and%20use%20its%20air-breathing%20diesel%20generator%20to%20recharge.

 

[3]Strikepod Systems website, 1-Jun-2021,

https://www.strikepod.com/xluuv-offensive-mining/#:~:text=Little%20is%20known%20of%20the%20CDM%2C%20but%20it,very%20shallow%20water%2C%20or%20possibly%20the%20surf%20zone.


35 comments:

  1. A couple thoughts:

    (1) It seems like the XLUUV ought to fit in the well deck of an amphib. In fact, I suspect multiple ones could fit. I wonder why they didn't mention launch from an amphib?

    (2) Given that the mine is a Hammerhead, which launches a guided torpedo which can chase the target, might we expect that a small number of those could cover a larger area than a similar number of ordinary mines?

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    1. Even a small sub needs a lot of draft. Well deck submerged is what, 4-7 feet? Its a limiting factor. If we did more with ESDs they are designed for 9 feet submerged above their deck. That would work pretty good.

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    2. " I wonder why they didn't mention launch from an amphib?"

      Good thought. No idea other than, presumably, an amphib would have other, more important tasks during a war?

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    3. "might we expect that a small number of those could cover a larger area than a similar number of ordinary mines?"

      Cover? Yes, that might be a reasonable expectation, IF THE small acoustic sensor is adequate. A more relevant consideration is that the Mk 54 torpedo is the Navy's LIGHTWEIGHT torpedo and does not have much ship-killing ability as opposed to a conventional mine. So … larger coverage but less lethal or less coverage but more lethal?

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  2. The Navy is painting itself into a corner where ships are too expensive so it has too few numbers, and has to try to cover gaps with drones. What it needs are some cheaper, single-purpose ships to cover those gaps with manned platforms.

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  3. I know the contract agreement you are referencing and I ought to keep links in my notes. I think if you read the CRS reports you'll find the real costs will be about 80-120 million each for the ships delivered in the 2023-2025 timeframe.

    I'm not sure where you are getting the propulsion or fuel taking up payload space. At one point there was a clear document out there outlining the space and performance needed of the propulsion and fuel units and they were a module, but not for the payload area.

    I think the 8 knots was picked for the noise and swet spot in acheivable design. Now even if they fly it to a pier in theatre, its value would clearly be to be on scene before shooting started. That doesn't really fix the issue. I'd think they would want a way to tow it by boat or to latch on to an SSN. Maybe we're lucky and they know that, but aren't making that public.

    As for usage. I have often thought this might be another way to take a crack at the advancd seal team delivery ssytem. Make a dry module that could get a full team to the beach. Again, the XLUUV would need to be able to latch on to an SSN.

    I think their need to deliver to the theatre by plane creates a limiting factor. I also think their strating with a platform to validate ideas and then moving it over to production has the same problems we saw with MUSV. Huge difference in experimenting vs operational application.

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    1. "I'm not sure where you are getting the propulsion or fuel taking up payload space."

      From ref 2.,

      "With just one fuel module in its modular payload bays, it would still have a full range of more than 6,500 miles."

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    2. "read the CRS reports you'll find the real costs will be about 80-120 million each for the ships delivered in the 2023-2025 timeframe."

      I noted that when I was researching this post. However, I've been unable to verify those figures in the budget documents. There's clearly a big discrepancy between the issued contract amounts and the CRS report and I haven't yet resolved it. Both the low and high figures seem unrealistic. It's hard to believe something that small and simple would cost $100M-$150M but it's also hard to believe it would cost only $10M or so. I would have thought an amount of around $30M-$50M would have been reasonable. So, for the post, I went with the actual contract amount. If you can point me at an actual budget document I'll gladly amend the post.

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  4. If you don't know how you are going to use a tool, any toll looks good. Until you know you are going to be putting screws in, a Hammer looks great. Defense Contractors love this approach by the Navy, it keeps the money flowing and they just say: we provided what the Navy requested. Only it is not $400 Hammers anymore.

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  5. Is it technology for its own sake?

    Is it sheer, unmitigated stupidity?

    Ill take "questions with the answer Yes" for $100, Alex!!
    Tens of millions of dollars for vessels with almost no capability, and blessed with another "we'll figure out how to use it later" CONOP. Brilliant. I dont have a huge problem with small experiments that prototype sensors, propulsion, communication, etc, but to buy multiples of somthing that MIGHT carry a system that doesn't exist yet, and has abysmal specs is just a waste. The fact that the word "modular" is even mentioned should be a red flag as well. $50M is a relatively paltry amount in the grand scheme, but that could renovate a drydock, or fund a mobile floating one, or any of a hundred better, current and needed uses.
    The funny(??) thing is how Ive seen on other forums how folks have latched onto this program and gone as far as pronouncing it the beginning of the end for surface ships LOL!!! Im just shaking my head at this whole mess...

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  6. Surely a better option would be to simply build a largish number of conventional SSKs that can do a ton of stuff - surveillance, anti-shipping, mine laying etc etc. You get range, versatility, increased lethality and multirole combat capabilities.

    And the US could simply acquire a licence from Japan to produce Soryu or Taigeis (which is what Australia should have done instead of this current moronic plan to induct a new nuclear submarine type in 2040s assuming it all goes on time).

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  7. "Communications – I’ve found no mention of communications in any description of the vessel "

    Under water communication is the most difficult part. Sea water is electrically conductive thus RF doesn't work. Without proper communication, even if its AI program is good, it ability is still limited.

    I am most interesting to see how Navy solves the under water communication issue. Rise up to surface (or close to) is not a good solution.

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  8. Here's a possible CONOPS for a FEW of these. Not dozens or hundreds. Note that the Russians have been working hard on deep submergence (VERY deep) vessels to scout out (and potentially mess with) our undersea infrastructure. Like undersea fiber optic cables, for example. Perhaps a few of these could be outfitted to mess with theirs (or possibly Chinese infrastructure). Delivery by amphib rather than a port thousands of miles away. Since the XLUUV can dive to 11,000 feet, that might make sense.

    This should only be a deterrent or "second strike" capability, since we have a lot more to lose in a tit for tat series of such attacks. But if the Russians start, it would at least give us the ability to respond in kind. They do have some, for example undersea listening devices for ASW purposes.

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    1. We did this kind of thing routinely during the Cold War with our regular subs. I'm not sure we need an XLUUV for the same work. Also, how would you control the sub to do whatever specific task was needed? I would think it would require human control to do the fine work?

      Put yourself in the enemy's (Russia, in this example) shoes. You see an American amphib sail up to one of your sensitive undersea locations, pause for awhile, and then [wait? move on?]. Wouldn't you be pretty certain about what was happening? Wouldn't you send a sub to destroy the undersea drone? We've already set the precedent that we won't respond to attacks against our drones.

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    2. Plenty of ships could make the delivery. Platform supply vessels, survey ships. The trick will be how to make a decision down there. Trust AI? I'll even say that feels luke a tough one. Still, the ability to go deeper than a mannned sub would seem to have vaue in this realm. That's not really anything you couldn't buy commercially off the shelf, controlled by cable.

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    3. "Plenty of ships could make the delivery."

      One of us is missing a concept, here. Is Russia going to allow a vessel, any vessel, to sit on top of known Russian military infrastructure like underwater cables? Would we allow that?

      If we think Russia will obligingly allow us to do that while we leisurely tap their comms then there are many commercial 'subs' that can do the job.

      If, on the other hand, we want to do this clandestinely then we cannot have a delivery vessel involved.

      I'm assuming we're talking peacetime. In war, an enemy would just sink any vessel that approaches any militarily useful location so, again, delivery vessels are not viable.

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    4. "We did this kind of thing routinely during the Cold War with our regular subs"

      Actually, I wasn't thinking about tapping cables. I agree that that requires fine manipulation that probably requires human intervention, so the Cold War approach is probably the right one. I was thinking about a more destructive thing. Like breaking the cable or whatever. Since my impression is that the Russians are developing the ability to do that to us, it would be good to have the capability to respond in kind. Again, respond, not first attack.

      Might want to modify the design to achieve longer range underwater, or maybe use a submarine mother ship to carry it into position.

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    5. I don't actually see the amphib (or whatever carrier vessel) sailing right over the Russian infrastructure. I see this a more of a standoff weapon, where it would be dropped off some distance away and sail over on its own.

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    6. "it would be good to have the capability to respond in kind."

      Don't we already have that capability in the form of a sort of area bombardment using torpedoes from a SSN? I have no idea whether that's feasible but I can't see why not.

      As another commenter said, it seems as if the XLUUV is a solution to a question no one had; a solution in search of a problem.

      It seems like we're committed to developing a brand new logistics/support train and all the rest to develop capabilities we already have. For example, our SSNs already have the ability to lay mines (they never practice it!) and they have a payload of 40+ mines. What problem is the XLUUV solving? This seems to happen in the military far too often … solutions looking for a problem and duplicating existing capabilities.

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  9. It just doesn't seem like the navy (or the military in general) is serious about actual war fighting.

    Lutefisk

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  10. Replies
    1. can we have an article on
      1) list of countries that have complete end to end supply chain in defense industries, how do they compare to each other, pros and cons.
      2) list of countries that had this capability in past (post WW2), what mistakes they made and could they had avoided it?
      3) List of countries which will achieve this capability in near future and what difficulties they face today?

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    2. I have no idea what you mean by this.

      Delete
    3. @Ojas, that list is empty and you know it.

      Delete
  11. Maintaining multiple defense companies is a big challenge for the government,
    what are the ways they can have a healthy competition by having as many companies as possible, while ensuring that it wont become a burden for the government ? As these defense companies requires talent that are niche and has relatively rare use in other types of Industry.

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  12. I like the idea of using it as a clandestine mine layer.
    Considering the limitation of the small torpedo used on the mines, it might be effective laying mines outside of a Chinese or Russian sub base.

    But if you're going to do that, it almost needs to be nuclear powered so that it doesn't need to surface to run its diesel engine.

    And then you have the problem of interior space and an even more limited payload.

    And you also have the problem of escalating cost.

    It quickly reaches, and then blows past, the point of feasibility.

    This little piece of gee-whiz submarine technology seems to be a non-answer to a question that nobody had.

    Lutefisk

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  13. "This little piece of gee-whiz submarine technology seems to be a non-answer to a question that nobody had."

    Solutions in search of a problem!

    We already have mine laying capability in our SSNs and they have a payload of something on the order of 40+ mines. So, what problem is this XLUUV solving?

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    Replies
    1. Might be useful as training targets. Just grasping here.

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  14. Here's a thought. How about giving them to Taiwan for mining off their relatively few good invasion beaches prior to an invasion?

    If these UUV's cost about $50 million each (the top end of the reasonable range you mentioned in replying to an earlier comment), that means we (or the Taiwanese directly) could buy 50 or 60 for the price of a single SSN, or 40 for the price of a single indigenous SSK ($16 billion program over 8 boats, or $2 billion each).

    If we assume each one can carry 10 mines (slightly more conservative than your most conservative estimate), that's a total of 400 mines for the 40 boats that could be bought for the price of a single SSK.

    You've mentioned that one problem with submarine mining is that it's relatively slow and the Chinese fleet would get there quickly. But if each one has to deliver only 10 mines and there are 50 or 100 operating in parallel, it might work.

    For close in operations near Taiwan, the range issue (even the battery range) shouldn't be an issue.

    And the UUV is small enough that Taiwan could build hardened shelters for them to protect them from the initial missile barrage that will probably sink any ships in port.

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  15. An SSGN could probably carry six of these on the missile deck, with the UUV's mounted in side by side pairs. Then, range is not an issue and the cargo bay doesn't need to carry additional fuel, thus more room for payload.

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    Replies
    1. Or we could be naughty: have them attached to the bottom commercial ships (CIA owned). They leave from a port friendly with China, release them while on the way to a Chinese port that is not the target. The sub-drones (I refuse to use the acronym as it sounds like "ex-love") go to a different port and mine it. On the return trip, the mothership picks up its naughty children while booming sounds drift over the waves.

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    2. "bottom commercial ships"

      So, you're thinking that China is going to allow a non-Chinese affiliated commercial vessel to approach anywhere near Chinese territory during a war?

      Delete
  16. Define "during war". As evidenced by their naval militia bullies, and the success of Russian "rebels" in the Ukraine, our opponents are not necessarily going to go full Pearl Harbor at the onset. Even a lead up to an invasion of Taiwan, they will no doubt still be doing trade. They are still in need of foreign capital and more importantly, they will want continue the lie that it is an internal problem since Taiwan is Chinese property. Don't even be surprised if goods from the US or going to the US are in ports right up till the first air strike. The US was still trading with Germany right up to when they declared war during both world wars. If China bans all trade then they wouldn't be losing allies (they have no true allies) but would risk turning neutral neighbors against them. The whole Silk Road they betting their soft power on disappears.
    The Sovi--er, Russians have invaded the Ukraine. There are still non-Russian ships trading in Black Sea ports including NATO allies. In fact technically the US hasn't yet suspended any trade yet either.
    If the Chinese believe the US won't directly intervene with a counter invasion, they

    For that matter it could be a true false flag operation with a ship with an ethnic Chinese crew and flying the Chinese flag. What's one more blue hulled fishing ship among hundreds on a coastline as long as China's? China isn't even using transponders in their fake territorial waters now despite the hazard to shipping.
    In fact if we wanted to be truly deceitful, why not make the drone a small parasite u-boat that would swim slow and silent to a Chinese merchant ship in a foreign port and attach. The Chinese themselves could deliver their own mines. If discovered, now the Chinese would have to start checking all their own vessels for explosive stowaways slowing down their own resupply and replenishment and no doubt ban all foreign ships.


    ReplyDelete
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    1. "Define "during war"."

      In the context of this XLUUV discussion, it's simple. War is that period of time when we're willing to place a mine in Chinese waters and let it blow something up. For the US, that would seem to be only when bullets are flying at us. At that point, China is not going to allow a non-Chinese ship to approach.

      The concept of trying to sneak a fake Chinese vessel in is possibly viable but I would think that China would be very carefully verifying any approaching ships are actually theirs so I suspect it would be difficult to sneak anything in.

      Delete
    2. "only when bullets are flying at us"

      Too true. And sometimes not even then.

      Delete

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