Washington Versus Kirishima Lessons

The night engagement between the Japanese battleship Kirishima and the US battleship Washington was one of only two battleship vs. battleship engagements in the WWII Pacific fighting.  The end result was the sinking of Kirishima by the Washington.  There are a host of lessons for us, today.  Let’s take a look.

 

There are many descriptions of the battle available in books, on the Internet, and in the public domain.  A comprehensive description of the entire battle is available on line [2] so I’ll not cover it in detail, here.

 

 

USS Washington

US Order of Battle

 

Battleship Force, Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr.

 

Washington (Capt.  Glen Davis), BB

South Dakota (Capt. Thomas Gatch), BB

 

Destroyer Screen, Cdr. Thomas Fraser

 

Walke, DD

Benham, DD

Preston, DD

Gwin, DD

 

 

Japanese Order of Battle

 

Japanese Forces Emergency Bombardment Force

Bombardment Unit, VAdm Kondo Nobutake

 

Atago, CA

Takao, CA

Kirishima, BB

Nagara, CL

Ikazuchi, DD

Samidare, DD

 

Direct Escort Unit RAdm Tamotsu Takama

 

Asagumo, DD

Shirayuki, DD

Hatsuyuki, DD

Teruzuki, DD

 

Sweeping Unit RAdm Shintaro Hashimoto

 

Sendai, CL

Ayanami, DD

Shikinami, DD

Uranami, DD

 

 

Following are some very brief battle highlights and notes.  The times listed are taken from Reference 2, however, it should be noted that I have other sources that list different times for the same events.  Other than placing the events in the proper sequence, the exact times are irrelevant so this is not an issue. 

• The US destroyers were arranged in a line ahead formation, 5000 yds ahead of the two battleships which were, themselves, separated by 2000 yds.
• South Dakota obtains first radar contact at 0008 hrs, 18,300 yds distant.
• Washington obtains first radar contact at 0000 hrs, 19,600 yds distant.
• Washington opens fire at 0016 hr
• South Dakota opens fire at 0017 hr
• Walke, at 0018 hr, leading the destroyer line, veers out of line, unordered and without communicating, and engages various targets before being quickly sunk
• Benham, second in line, nearly ran over Walke, was torpedoed and knocked out of action; survived
• Preston, third in line, engaged various targets but was hit several times and abandoned ship at 0033 hr
• Gwin, fourth and last in line, engages various targets and is ordered to withdraw at 0045 hr by Lee
• Washington passes burning Preston at 0035 hr keeping on dark side
• South Dakota passes on the light side of the burning destroyers and is illuminated and taken under fire at 0049 hr
• South Dakota loses track of Washington around 0056 hr
• Washington begins engagement with Kirishima at 0100 hr
• South Dakota loses radio aerials around 0102 hr;  unable to co-ordinate with Washington and loses track of Washington
• Washington loses track of South Dakota around 0117 hr and passes up many possible targets due to fear of friendly fire

 

 Hits - The best analysis shows the Kirishima having suffered 20x 16” hits and 17x 5” hits.[1]

 

 

 

Lessons

 

Target Identification and IFF.  The common theme in the battle (and war in general !) is uncertainty.  Many shots were passed up due to uncertainty about target identification.  There are multiple ways to deal with identification during battle but all depend on experience, procedures, and doctrine which can only come from repeated, realistic exercises where confusion [intentionally] reigns.

 

Doctrine can be a major aid to identification.  If everyone knows what everyone else will do and where everyone else will be, identification (or non-identification) becomes easier.  For example, if doctrine had dictated that the escorting destroyers, upon contact, should fire torpedoes and then immediately head away from the enemy on a perpendicular course, thus clearing the way for the battleships to fire without worry about friendly fire or misidentification, the battle would have been simpler and, likely, more successful.

 

 

Engagement Time. 

 

Demonstrating the brevity of engagement time, here is Washington’s elapsed time (min:sec) sequence of fire versus Kirishima.

 

2:39 ; 39x 16” (equivalent of 4-1/3 complete salvoes)

1:30  check fire

2:45 ; 36x 16” (equivalent of 4 complete salvoes)

 

Total engagement time = 5:24 ; 75x 16”, 107x 5”

 

Washington’s main battery fire was rapid for the initial two minutes thirty nine seconds, firing thirty nine 16-inch projectiles.  Main battery fire was checked for one minute thirty seconds based on an erroneous report that the target had been sunk.  Fire was resumed for two minutes forty five seconds, firing thirty six 16-inch projectiles. 

 

The total engagement time was a mere 5:24 during which Washington fired seventy five main caliber rounds and 107 5-inch AA common rounds between 0100 hr and 0107 hr.

 

As we demonstrated in the missile attack analysis post (see, “Missile Attack Analysis”), engagements, regardless of weapon or platform speed, tend to be very short.  The Washington’s engagement with Kirishima lasted a grand total of 5:24 (only 6:54 even with the check fire period).  We need to recognize this fact of naval combat and rethink our combat methodology.  We need to ensure that we can ‘cram’ the maximum offensive firepower into the shortest possible time.  As I have so often pointed out, having ten thousand VLS cells does no good for an 87 second engagement.  We also need to be prepared to exert maximum effective defensive firepower in the shortest possible time.  In other words, we need systems that can operate effectively in an utterly chaotic, extremely brief period.  Our current obsessive desire to obtain complete information and absolute target surety is antithetical to the reality of combat.

 

Naval weapons are so powerful and so concentrated in usage that either an attack will be quickly defeated or it will quickly succeed and the target will be destroyed.  The days of long, drawn out engagements with continuous attacks are likely over if for no other reason than the lack of offensive weapon inventories of any significant size.  A US ship has, at best, around 8 anti-ship missiles without counting Standard missiles that aren’t really anti-ship weapons.  Thus, US ships cannot sustain an attack even if they wanted to.

 

The brevity of engagement was also demonstrated by the fate of the American destroyers.  The US destroyers were all sunk or put out of action in a matter minutes.

 

In ten minutes of furious action, Task Force 64’s destroyers were out of the fight.[3]

 

 

Doctrine/Tactics/Training.  None of the US ships had ever worked or trained together and they had no doctrine to fall back on.

 

The admiral was concerned about his destroyers.  They had been chosen almost randomly from TF 16’s screen because they had the most fuel remaining in their bunkers;  no two were of the same class, no two of the same division, and they had never operated together before. … The same could be said of the battleships.  Although both were administratively part of BatDiv 6, until this operation they had never worked together, a fact that was to have its consequences.[3]

 

All reports mention losing targets as they passed into the visual shadow of surrounding islands.  This illustrates the need to exercise under every conceivable condition so as to learn how to deal with atypical situations and conditions.  In contrast, the Navy’s current exercises are all identical, set-piece, scripted works that are conducted under perfect conditions (for safety).  We must accept the risk of exercises under poor and uncontrolled conditions because those are the conditions under which we’ll fight real battles.

 

Pre-WWII live fire night battle exercises would have revealed that the blindingly bright, flashing powder used by the US offered perfect aim points for the Japanese.  In contrast, the Japanese used flashless powder which provided very little illumination and aim points.  There’s just no getting around it – you absolutely must train for every conceivable – and inconceivable – situation.

 

South Dakota, in a display of pure ignorance of combat conditions, passed the burning US destroyers on the lit side, thereby silhouetting itself against the flames and providing the Japanese with perfect aiming.  This was utter lack of tactical training.

 

South Dakota’s Number 3 main turret set the ship’s Kingfisher scout planes on fire, offering the Japanese yet another aim point.  Again, live fire exercises would, presumably, have revealed this vulnerability.

 

Poor training and tactics caused South Dakota to receive 42 hits of various calibers, 38 dead, an 60 wounded.

 

 

Gunnery.  RAdm. Lee’s passion for gunnery excellence was renowned aboard the Washington.  He established a ‘gun club’ of officers who lived and breathed gunnery.[3, p.81]  They understood that there was no point to Washington’s existence if the ship and crew could not hit what they were aiming at.  Live fire drills of some type occurred daily.

 

In contrast, most ships in the Navy today average less than one live fire exercise per year.  Many crew come and go without ever experiencing a live fire event.

 

 

Commander’s Intent.  The Washington officers were thoroughly briefed.

 

After dinner in the wardroom, all officers not on watch were asked to remain, and there followed a detailed briefing by Ching Lee and Glenn Davis on the probably events of the morrow.  … Everything was addressed, from battle formations to pyrotechnics, damage control, gunnery, navigation, and feeding the men at general quarters.[3]

 

For the Washington’s crew, everything was understood.  The same could not be said for the rest of the ships in the task force.

 

 

Communications.  Washington received reconnaissance reports from PT boats which had spotted the Japanese force, however, the reports were coded using a newer code that Washington did not have.  Thus, RAdm. Lee was unable to decipher or take advantage of the PT boat reports.

 

South Dakota lost all her radio aerials and was out of communication with Washington and RAdm. Lee.  This graphically demonstrates that the wise commander will make every effort to eliminate the need for communications during a battle.  Communications, even when successful, are often (usually?) subject to confusion and misinterpretation (for example, “The world wonders”, from Leyte Gulf ).  The best communication is no communication but that requires extensive drills and doctrine.

 

 

Inevitable Confusion.  As the American task force entered Ironbottom Sound, each ship’s magnetic compasses began spinning wildly, the result of the many wrecks littering the ocean floor.[3, p.116]  The Task Force was able to maintain dead reckoning until the effect faded away.

 

Early in the engagement, Washington believed that enemy land based gun emplacements had opened fire on them and the task force replied with 5” gunfire directed at the shoreline.  However, there were no land based guns.  The fire was from Japanese destroyers.

Confusion in battle is not to be feared.  It is to be accepted and embraced.  Just as the US Army once owned the night, we need to own the confusion of battle and master it by training with confusion as an intentional, integral part of every exercise we do.  We need to become comfortable with confusion.

 

 

Technology Dependency and Failures.  The Task Force had a theoretical radar advantage over the Japanese, however, it was negated by the surroundings and fear of friendly fire.

 

The closely confined waters of Ironbottom Sound had partially negated TF 64’s radar advantage … It was difficult to separate the radar echoes between ships and the land mass … [3]

 

The South Dakota chief engineer had tied the ship’s circuit breakers down which, in effect, put the entire electrical system in series.  As South Dakota absorbed otherwise harmless 5” hits, the concussion overloaded the system and the ship lost all electrical power.

Technology will always fail.  The only question is to what extent.  The wise naval force will train to accept those failures and fight on.  In addition to training, this requires backup systems of a completely different nature from the primary.  If our current radar fire control fails, what is our backup fire control system?  We don’t have any.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

We cannot keep ignoring the lessons of history.  Washington’s engagement offers numerous lessons that are completely relevant today and yet the Navy has no interest in studying and applying the lessons.  When we compare today’s naval force structure, strategy (none), doctrine (none), tactics (none), and training (nothing useful) to the lessons from Washington’s engagement, the disconnect between the fleet and reality becomes painfully evident.

 

The Navy must begin studying their own history.

 

 

 

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[1]http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

 

[2]http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Battleship_Action_Guadalcanal.pdf

 

[3]Musicant, Ivan, “Battleship at War”, Avon Books, 1986, ISBN 0-380-70487-0