XLUUV Status

As part of the Navy’s wholesale – and uninformed by experimentation – leap into unmanned technology, the Navy has contracted with Boeing to produce 5 Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUV).   The cost estimate and contract was for $379M (FY2016 dollars) for the five vehicles with delivery of the first vehicle to have taken place in Dec 2020.

 

XLUUV / Echo Voyager

We previously discussed the CONOPS aspects of this project (see, “Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) CONOPS”).

 

Shockingly Predictably, the project is hugely over budget [1, p.8] and long overdue.

 

 

XLUUV Cost Overrun
Contract	$379M
Current	$621M
Overrun	$242M

 

 

That’s a 64% overrun and the contract isn’t complete, yet.  The cost will increase further.

 

Apparently, the cost is even higher as the contractor’s portion of the overruns is not included.

 

This cost growth accounts for the government’s liability and does not include cost growth absorbed by the contractor.[1]

 

The Navy also added a smaller, simpler, test vehicle to the contract which, according to the Navy, accounts for $73M of the $242M overrun.

 

 

In addition to being hugely over budget, the project is woefully behind schedule.

 

The delivery of the first XLUUV is now expected to be over 3 years late. The contractor originally planned to deliver the first XLUUV in December 2020 and all five by the end of calendar year 2022.[1, p.8] [emphasis added]

 

Deliveries are now tentatively scheduled for 2024.  History assures us that will be further delayed.

 

Why did all this happen?  According to GAO,

 

The Navy did not require the contractor to demonstrate its readiness to fabricate and deliver the XLUUVs prior to beginning fabrication, as called for by leading acquisition practices.[1, p.10]

 

Illustrating just how far from production-ready the XLUUV was, the contractor has requested a staggering number of deviations from specification.

 

If shipbuilders discover that they cannot build a ship according to the plan in the ship’s specifications, they can request a deviation from the plan. According to the Navy, the contractor has submitted over 1,500 deviation requests since the critical design review in October 2018.[1, p.12] [emphasis added]

 

I guess that design review didn’t cover anything relevant, did it?

 

 

Conclusion

 

For an organization whose stock in trade is the acquisition of ships, this kind of horrendous budget and schedule performance on project after project is appalling.  The situation is all the worse when one considers how small and simple this vehicle is.  People need to be fired.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Government Accountability Office, “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle”, Sep 2022, GAO-22-105974

Knifefish

General Dynamics Mission Systems (GD) has opened a new Knifefish UUV (unmanned underwater vehicle) manufacturing facility at its Taunton, Massachusetts site.(1)

 

As a reminder, Knifefish is intended to be part of the LCS mine countermeasures (MCM) module and will be used to search for buried or bottom mines.  Suspect mine locations and data are recorded to the UUV’s onboard data storage module for later upload to the host LCS for analysis.  More recently, a data transmission capability has been added to try to streamline the data transfer process. 

 

Knifefish UUV

Knifefish is a 21” diameter, torpedo shaped UUV with a length of around 19 ft and a weight of 1700 lb.  It uses a low frequency, broadband, synthetic aperture sonar.  Knifefish is capable of operating for around 16 hrs (3) which, depending on the distance to and from the area of operation allows for perhaps 10-12 hrs of actual search operations.  Its operational speed is a maximum of 4.5 kts(4).

 

GD is currently building five systems, with each system consisting of two UUVs, launch and recovery equipment, and control equipment.(1)  The Navy is planning to procure 48 Knifefish UUVs with two allocated to each of 24 MCM modules the Navy hopes to buy.

 

We’ve often discussed the need to produce weapons and systems quickly during a time of war.  So, what’s the production rate of the Knifefish?

 

The facility, approximately 8,000 square feet in size, will be capable of producing one system per month after receiving long-lead-time materials, said Craig Regnier, the manufacturing operations manager at the Taunton plant. (2)

 

One system per month?  I hope we have a very slow war!

 

Unfortunately, Knifefish epitomizes the problem with the LCS MCM module.  Knifefish is not a one-step mine disposal system as you might expect.  Instead, Knifefish is just the first step in a multi-step process that requires a great deal of time. The major problem is that detection is not even remotely a real-time operation.  The Knifefish UUV runs its scan pattern (at 4.5 kts!) and is then recovered aboard the LCS where the data is then analyzed.  Carlo Zaffanella, vice president and general manager of the GDMS Maritime and Strategic Systems business noted this problem and identified it as something he wants to improve.

 

The next step is finding ways to make UUVs operationally more useful. A top focus here, he said, is the ability to analyze data while the UUV is still in the water, for something closer to real-time threat identification.

 

“Clearly, you would like to get to where more of that analysis were possible in real time, or at least as close to real time as you can make it,” Zaffanella told reporters. “If we could get the devices to provide not just essentially a map of what’s out there but perhaps detects or even tracks and say, ‘This is really what you want to be concerned about in real time,’ then the operational utility will go up.” (1)

 

So … even the manufacturer recognizes that the UUV has only limited utility and yet the Navy still wants it.  Hmm …

 

The overall LCS MCM process involves multiple initial scans by various methods, followed by confirmation scans, followed by individual mine disposal.  The mine clearance rate is something on the order of 1 per hour or less which is far from being combat-useful.  For leisurely, peacetime clearance operations that can span weeks or months, that process might be fine but for combat operations that clearance rate is a non-starter.

 

Setting that aside, do you find the following as disturbing as I did?

 

Capt. Gus Weekes, the Navy’s LCS mission modules program manager, said he had watched GD staff launch a Knifefish at the waterfront in Quincy earlier in the week. During the testing, he said the UUV experienced a failure but praised the company for its ability to recover the drone despite the issue. (2)

 

So, let me get this straight.  At a planned PR showcase event, where the UUV undoubtedly was exquisitely fine-tuned for the event, the UUV fails and the Navy program manager praises it?  Shouldn’t this raise some red flags?  Shouldn’t this prompt suspicion and criticism instead of praise?

 

Unfortunately, the current trend is that the Navy routinely accepts delivery of damaged and incomplete ships and equipment.  Now, we’re extending that trend to praising malfunctioning MCM components.  Shouldn’t the Navy have slammed the brakes on the program instead of praising it?  This is how you get EMALS and AGS and LCS failures – by not questioning and holding manufacturers accountable.  I’d have suspended all contracts and payments and demanded proof of success before resuming production.

 

This is yet another system whose effectiveness and value seem exceedingly questionable.  Time after time, the Navy rides questionable systems right down the drain until they’re total failures instead of cutting their losses and terminating questionable systems early on.  This is how we wound up with the LCS, Zumwalt, and so many other useless systems.

 

Even if Knifefish worked perfectly, it’s not suitable or effective for combat mine clearance operations.  It’s time to cut the cord on this one.

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “General Dynamics opens new unmanned underwater vehicle manufacturing center”, Megan Eckstein, 16-Aug-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2021/08/16/general-dynamics-opens-new-unmanned-underwater-vehicle-manufacturing-center/

 

(2)Breaking Defense website, “GD Mission Systems Launches Knifefish Production Facility ”, Justin Katz, 17-Aug-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/gd-mission-systems-launches-knifefish-production-facility/

 

(3)https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/knifefish-unmanned-undersea-vehicle-uuv/

 

(4)https://auvac.org/files/uploads/platform_pdf/bluefin-21-product-sheet.pdf

UUV Seizures

In the latest slap in the face for the Navy, Houthi rebels have reportedly captured a Navy REMUS 600 unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) off the coast of Yemen. (1) 

In a similar incident in Dec 2016, the Chinese Navy seized a U.S. UUV about 50 miles northwest of Subic Bay in the Philippines as the drone was in the process of being recovered.  The UUV was later returned.

These incidents raise some interesting issues regarding UUV operations.

Sovereignty

According to Peter Cook, Pentagon press secretary, the UUV is a sovereign American vessel just as any Navy ship is.

“The UUV [unmanned underwater vehicle] is a sovereign immune vessel of the United States.” (2)

The Maritime Awareness Project website affirms that position.

“… the seizure was unlawful because the drone enjoyed sovereign immunity as a U.S. vessel.” (4)

If UUVs are sovereign US vessels then their seizure in international waters is illegal, at best, and an act of piracy or war, more likely.  This is tantamount to a foreign country seizing a US naval warship which would be an act of war.

Clearly, the US has no policy for dealing with this occurrence other than strongly worded notes of protest.  Evidence for this is that the US has failed to defend or, indeed, take any action in the past when foreign countries have seized our military assets.  Recall the Chinese force-down, seizure, and dismantling of the EP-3 in April 2001 or the recent Iranian seizure of two riverine boats and crews.  No action was taken by the U.S. in either case.

We need to establish a response policy and, preferably, one that recognizes the illegality of the action and responds accordingly and forcefully.

Protection

If drones are going to be seized, we need to give consideration to providing protection for them.  We need to have ships or aircraft available to respond to seizures.  For example, the Chinese seizure of the UUV should have elicited a SEAL retrieval operation and/or sinking of the Chinese ship.  It is clear that the Chinese are not in the least deterred by either international law or U.S. military forward presence.  What is needed is a swift and brutal response that makes it clear that we will not accept the seizure of sovereign U.S. property.  You don’t placate a bully, you punch them hard in the nose.

Safety

Referring to the Dec 2016 seizure by the Chinese, a Chinese spokesman had this to say.

"The Chinese navy discovered the device -- and identified and verified it in a responsible and professional manner. … And they did so to prevent it from harming navigational and personnel safety of passing ships." (3)

While the statement is just the usual lies and spin from the Chinese, it does raise an interesting point – who is responsible for the operation of UUVs when they come in contact with commercial or naval ships?  Will a UUV apply the navigational and safety rules of the sea?  Are ships under any obligation to avoid UUVs?  Who is financially responsible if a UUV causes damage to a ship?  Who is responsible if a UUV causes a death?

The US seems to be operating UUVs on an ever-expanding basis and without enough positive control to even avoid seizures so what makes us think that we can avoid potentially detrimental interactions with ships?  True, a UUV is not big enough to substantially damage a ship of any size but they can certainly foul fishing nets, drag nets and equipment away, foul and damage rudders and props, and potentially cause collisions as ships attempt to steer out of their way.  They could certainly severely damage or sink fishing boats and put lives at risk.

We need to carefully think through our operational policies as they pertain to commercial and naval shipping.

Area of Operation

The Houthi UUV seizure suggests that we are operating UUVs within other country’s territorial waters.  This is not surprising as it is generally acknowledged that we operated submarines within enemy territorial waters during the Cold War.  It does, however, mean that we need to think through the ramifications of being caught operating within territorial waters.

Does the procedure of Innocent Passage (as defined in UNCLOS) apply to a drone?  If it does, can Innocent Passage be claimed if a UUV is conducting surveillance or even benign oceanographic surveys?

If one of our UUVs is caught operating in another country’s territorial waters is that an illegal act, as we would undoubtedly accuse anyone of who would do that to us, and would we acknowledge the illegality of it?  Are we prepared to accept the hypocrisy inherent in those positions?  Our behavior in the Cold War would suggest we are.  If so, that undermines our moral high ground as we criticize China’s manifold territorial transgressions.  Are we comfortable with that double standard?

Technology

If seizing American UUVs is going to become the new international sport, are we comfortable with the loss of technological secrets that goes with that?  If not, and referring back to protection and sovereignty issues, are we prepared to use force to protect our UUVs?

We have more than enthusiastically plunged into the production and use of unmanned vehicles/vessels without taking the time to think through the associated issues.  I would urge the military and government to think about these issues and formulate relevant policies before the various events discussed herein occur.

_________________________________________

(1)Navy Times website, “Video reportedly shows Houthi rebels with captured underwater Navy drone”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 3-Jan-2018,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/01/04/video-reportedly-shows-houthi-rebels-with-captured-underwater-navy-drone/

(2)The Guardian website, “Chinese warship seizes US underwater drone in international waters”, Julian Borger, 16-Dec-2016,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/16/china-seizes-us-underwater-drone-south-china-sea

(3)CNN website, “China returns seized US underwater drone” Steven Jiang and Kevin Bohn, December 20, 2016,

http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/20/politics/china-drone-return/index.html

(4)Maritime Awareness Project website,

http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/analysis_fravel_122116-1.pdf

Blind Faith

ComNavOps is disgusted and repulsed by unsubstantiated statements that are presented as blanket truisms, especially when spouted by uniformed military professionals.  The common and most disturbing one, currently, is that the future of warfare is unmanned.  I just read yet another article that laid out that suspect premise with absolutely no logical or factual support and then leapfrogged into the author’s pet idea of transforming the entire fleet into a giant UxV operation with no further thought.

Are UxV’s really the future of warfare?  Everyone seems to think so but there is no evidence to support that view.  Indeed, the new offset strategy being promoted by Mr. Work is heavily based on UxVs.  Now, admittedly, anytime a new idea presents itself, there is a dearth of evidence to support the new concept - understandable, since the concept hasn’t yet been implemented.  However, the concept can be logically evaluated through wargames, scale models, small scale trials, and simulated performance by surrogates.  If the experiments and tests warrant, the new idea can then be implemented in a carefully managed, phased approach so that we don’t forfeit our current capabilities on a shiny new toy that may not pan out in the real world. 

What we can’t do is instantly and totally commit to a new idea that is unproven or, worse, may demonstrate weaknesses that are glossed over because they don’t support the new idea.  Witness the LCS fiasco – a complete and total leap into a brand new concept with absolutely no evidence that it would work – and it didn’t.

All right, let’s look at UxVs.

To refresh, on the plus side,

• Reduced risk for the operator.
• Endurance – UxVs are not limited by human endurance and have already proven well suited to long endurance surveillance missions with the caveat of mean time between failures which currently is typically a matter of hours, not days.

On the minus side,

• Communications, both control and data, are a major weak link.  Many UAVs have been lost to failed comms both as a result of deliberate enemy action and simple technology failure.  UUVs are notorious for wandering off during exercises, never to be seen again.
• Situational awareness – Anyone who has flown real aircraft and simulators will attest to the fact that situational awareness is greatly reduced in a simulator/controller.  While this may not be critical for simple surveillance missions it will be for unmanned combat.  The air-to-air (or sea-to-sea) combat advantage currently lies overwhelmingly with manned platforms.

Neutral factors include,

• Cost – while many suggest that UxV production costs should be less, the reality is that UxV costs are the same as the corresponding manned versions and, often, greater.  Logically, the costs should be about the same for the same capability.  The incremental cost of manning is relatively small and generally offset by the increased costs of communications and automation.  At the moment, there is no evidence or logic to support claims of cost savings.

That’s a cursory look at some individual factors that go into the evaluation of UxV applications.  Now, let’s try a little logical thought exercise on a more holistic basis.  Let’s look at a “typical” UAV mission as envisioned by proponents.

Specifically, let’s consider a deep penetration UAV strike into a heavily defended area against a peer enemy.  We’d have, perhaps, two dozen aircraft attacking a target, say, 300 nm overland and launched from a carrier 1000 nm away.  Each UAV would carry two guided bombs or moderately short range missiles of some sort.  There would be no electronic warfare (EW) support although we could theorize such but an EW UAV would broadcast its location and would be a magnet for enemy attack and would not last long.  The UAVs would be mid subsonic, at best.

How would such a strike fare?

The aircraft would be slow, only moderately stealthy, with poor situational awareness and probable communication/control lags (remember, in combat a lag of just a second is likely fatal).  They would have to penetrate several hundred miles of enemy aircraft, sensors, and SAMs with no EW assistance.  How many are going to make it to the target?  Not many.  How many are going to successfully strike and survive the return flight to be available for the next mission?  Even fewer.

Is that the kind of result that justifies a total conversion of the fleet to unmanned platforms as the CSBA offset strategy advocates?  I’m not seeing it.

UxVs have a niche role to play, for sure, but not a dominant one.  They simply don’t have the capability to be successful, at least not at the cost point we seem to be facing.  Now, if we could build a long range, penetrating UAV for $1M each instead of $190M each, we might be able to change tactics and conduct strikes with massive numbers so that some aircraft are assured of getting through.

The UUV situation is even more unproven with nothing but vague ideas being substituted for rigorous engineering and tactical evaluations.  Again, hardly the basis for an immediate remake of the fleet.

Unmanned supporters will likely grudgingly acknowledge that we don’t have the full technology yet but someday we will and therefore we need to begin the fleet’s transformation now.  Well, fine, then someday when the technology proves itself we can re-evaluate and, if warranted, modify the fleet.  In the meantime, converting the fleet structure to feature UxVs is akin to having removed all the masts from all the ships in the sailing navy because someone thought steam engines would someday be superior.  In the meantime, though, the hulls would float uselessly, unable to move, while hoping that someday an engine would come along that would allow them to move.

Simple thought exercises show that UxVs not only do not have any magic properties but that they have some significant weaknesses as combat platforms.  So, let’s continue to develop UxVs but let’s not bet the fleet on an unproven theory that has thus far demonstrated severe limitations.  The CSBA offset strategy needs to be halted in its tracks until we have enough operational experience to be able to pass a reasoned judgment.  Until then, it’s folly.

LCS MCM Update

One of the key components of the Navy’s MCM mission module for the LCS is the Remote Minehunting System (RMS).  It consists of an unmanned underwater vehicle, the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), currently v4.2, that tows a minehunting sonar, the AQS-20.  This system has demonstrated severe reliability and performance problems.  As the most recent 2014 Annual Report from Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation summarizes it,

“… the combined results of shore-based and LCS-based testing conducted since the program was recertified following a Nunn-McCurdy in 2010 have not demonstrated that an LCS equipped with an MCM mission package that includes two RMMVs and three AN/AQS-20A sonars will be able to support the sustained area coverage rate that the Navy has established for the Increment 1 MCM mission package.”

The two specific concerns are reliability and performance.  The two must both be achieved to have a viable system.  It does no good to have a reliable system that can’t perform or, conversely, a system that performs but is unreliable.

Here is DOT&E’s assessment of the RMMV reliability.

“The reliability of the v4.2 RMMV during combined developmental and integrated testing completed in FY14 was 31.3 hours MTBOMF [ed., Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure], which is well below the required reliability of 75 hours MTBOMF.”

Given the extended period of development that the RMMV has undergone, this level of reliability is extremely troubling.

While reliability is problematic, to say the least, DOT&E points out that what’s even worse is that the recovery of the RMS from failures is largely relegated to off-board maintenance.  The LCS crew has very limited on-board ability to recover from failures.  This is a consequence of the LCS operating model of limited on-board maintenance.

It’s not just the RMMV that has problems.  The AQS-20 sonar has consistently failed to meet performance specifications.

“Contact depth (vertical localization) errors and false classification density exceeded Navy limits in all AQS-20A operating modes.”

“The sensor also has trouble meeting the probability of detection and classification requirement in shallow waters and RMS has difficulty guiding the sensor over bottom contacts for identification in deep water.”

Communications are a problem, as well.

“RMS radios have had difficulty establishing reliable communications with the LCS during developmental testing, and once communications are established, the current communications systems do not support RMMV mine identification operations beyond the horizon. Although the RMMV can search autonomously while operating over the horizon from the LCS, it currently only can conduct operations to reacquire and identify bottom mines within the range of Ultra High Frequency communications. This limitation will complicate MCM operations in long shipping channels, and may make it necessary to clear a series of LCS operating areas to allow MCM operations to progress along the channel.  The cleared operating areas will be needed to keep the LCS and its crew out of mined waters. The additional effort required to clear these LCS operating areas would increase the demand for mine clearance and delay attainment of strategic objectives. This issue is not new to RMS; however, it did not become operationally significant until the Navy decertified the MH-60S helicopter for towing MCM devices, including the AN/AQS-20A/B sensor.”

Simply launching and recovering the RMMV is a challenge.

“The Independence class LCS has had difficulty launching and recovering the RMMV because of the vehicle’s erratic motion in the ship’s wake.”

Overall system reliability is poor.  DOT&E noted that in the most recent 3-week period of intensive testing, the system was only able to operate for 50 hours (16 hours per week).

The DOT&E report contains many, many more examples of specific failures and shortcomings in the RMS – too many to document in this limited space.  It’s clear that the Navy’s all-in bet on the LCS as the only MCM vessel in the fleet and the use of unproven (largely non-existent) technology has been an abysmal failure thus far.  Given that mines are, arguably, the biggest threat the Navy faces, this is extremely bad news.  Rather than pausing this problematic development effort long enough to beef up more conventional MCM capabilities throughout the fleet in order to buy time for continued development, the Navy has doubled down on their bet.  While a reduced capability version of the MCM module will, undoubtedly, eventually be fielded, it will surely prove woefully inadequate to the task when ultimately called on.

Asymmetric Advantage

The general media has gone to great lengths to point out, correctly, that many of our potential enemies have or are pursuing asymmetric advantages.  Mines, small boat suicide attacks, small boat swarms, fast attack missile boats, intermediate range ballistic missiles, small and quiet non-nuclear subs, and so forth.  What isn’t discussed is the fact that the US possesses, or could develop, asymmetric advantages of our own. 

Our two biggest conventional advantages are technology and money (current budget problems notwithstanding!).  These can be leveraged into asymmetric advantages.  What kinds of asymmetric advantages?  Well, this is where the imagination can go wild.  For the sake of brevity, I’d like to nominate one particular area that few other countries or non-state actors can match and that would provide disproportionate advantages for us.



Underwater Glider UUV



In real estate it’s location, location, location.  In war it’s recon, recon, recon.  Where’s the enemy and what are they doing?  If you know that, the battle gets a whole lot easier.  Call it intel or surveillance or recon or whatever, the ability to monitor the enemy is a priceless advantage.  Of course, the Navy already has many systems for collecting intel:  submarines, satellites, electronic signal intercepts, and so on.  To a greater or lesser extent those systems all collect information from a distance or, in the case of subs, put themselves at risk to get up close.  Why not develop systems that can get extremely close and have little risk of detection?  Well, in fact, the Navy is working on just such systems in the form of unmanned vehicles, both aerial and subsurface.



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are solidly into their development curve and offer well known and powerful surveillance capabilities as demonstrated over today’s battlefields.  They do have a few disadvantages or limitations such as being fairly detectable, if one wishes to look for them, they have relatively limited range and endurance, and they are susceptible to control signal disruption.  These issues are undoubtedly being addressed.

Let’s look a bit further at Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).  By comparison to UAVs, UUVs are in their infancy.  The Navy and industry are currently developing a variety of UUVs and there is no point attempting to describe specific systems.  Conceptually, UUVs offer the potential to retain many of the advantages of UAVs while avoiding some of the limitations.

UUVs, by their very nature as underwater vehicles, are extremely difficult to detect.  Consider how hard it is to detect a full size submarine and how much harder it must be to detect something a fraction of that size.  Once deployed in their operating area, UUVs can provide very close range surveillance of ships, mines, subs, harbors, coastlines, water conditions, geography, etc. with little risk.

Various technologies are being explored which may allow UUVs to operate almost indefinitely, thereby overcoming one of the limitations of UAVs.  Solar power, wave regeneration, thermal recharge, ionic recharge, etc. are all methods that offer the possibility of extremely long endurance.  Consider the advantages inherent in a UUV that can loiter for days or months, undetected, and providing continuous monitoring of an area.



Undetectable and Long Endurance



As the imagination expands a bit, the possible uses for UUVs are almost limitless.  Imagine being able to attach small shaped charges to an enemy ship in its own harbor, or being able to have a small UUV attach itself like a limpet to a ship or submarine to provide continuous tracking, or, with some lead time, mapping out a minefield.  The possibilities are endless!

Of course, there are associated problems.  Underwater communications is challenging.  It does no good to collect information if it can’t be transmitted.  Remote underwater control is even more difficult, bordering on impossible over any significant distance.  UUVs would largely have to operate autonomously.  Still, as with UAVs, these problems can be solved over time.

UUVs offer a potential asymmetric advantage that is extremely powerful and well worth continued intense development.  Few other countries and no non-state groups can either utilize or counter this technology.  The Navy would do well to commit significant resources to developing this potential advantage.