As part of the Navy’s wholesale – and uninformed by experimentation – leap into unmanned technology, the Navy has contracted with Boeing to produce 5 Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUV). The cost estimate and contract was for $379M (FY2016 dollars) for the five vehicles with delivery of the first vehicle to have taken place in Dec 2020.
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| XLUUV / Echo Voyager |
We previously discussed the CONOPS aspects of this project (see, “Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) CONOPS”).
Shockingly Predictably, the project is hugely over
budget [1, p.8] and long overdue.
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XLUUV Cost Overrun |
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|
Contract |
$379M |
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Current |
$621M |
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Overrun |
$242M |
That’s a 64% overrun and the contract isn’t complete, yet. The cost will increase further.
Apparently, the cost is even higher as the contractor’s portion of the overruns is not included.
This cost growth accounts for the government’s liability and does not include cost growth absorbed by the contractor.[1]
The Navy also added a smaller, simpler, test vehicle to the contract which, according to the Navy, accounts for $73M of the $242M overrun.
In addition to being hugely over budget, the project is woefully behind schedule.
The delivery of the first XLUUV is now expected to be over 3 years late. The contractor originally planned to deliver the first XLUUV in December 2020 and all five by the end of calendar year 2022.[1, p.8] [emphasis added]
Deliveries are now tentatively scheduled for 2024. History assures us that will be further delayed.
Why did all this happen? According to GAO,
The Navy did not require the contractor to demonstrate its readiness to fabricate and deliver the XLUUVs prior to beginning fabrication, as called for by leading acquisition practices.[1, p.10]
Illustrating just how far from production-ready the XLUUV was, the contractor has requested a staggering number of deviations from specification.
If shipbuilders discover that they cannot build a ship according to the plan in the ship’s specifications, they can request a deviation from the plan. According to the Navy, the contractor has submitted over 1,500 deviation requests since the critical design review in October 2018.[1, p.12] [emphasis added]
I guess that design review didn’t cover anything relevant, did it?
Conclusion
For an organization whose stock in trade is the acquisition of ships, this kind of horrendous budget and schedule performance on project after project is appalling. The situation is all the worse when one considers how small and simple this vehicle is. People need to be fired.
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[1]Government Accountability Office, “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle”, Sep 2022, GAO-22-105974
It is shameful as Navalnews reported satellite image of newly discovered China's large unmanned submarine:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/chinas-secret-extra-large-submarine-drone-program-revealed/
These two subs are much bigger than its HSU-001 unmanned submarine displayed in its 2019 military parade.
The Chinese have a saying: "Those with great wisdom, seem dumb," i.e., mute. The Chinese Navy isn't proudly boasting about how its unmanned ships are the "next big thing," the way the USN is; that allows them to avoid public embarrassment when amd if these ships fail in tests.
DeleteAnd if they succeed? Then the Chinese Navy has an unpleasant surprise for its enemies.
The USN REALLY needs to learn some lessons from its Chinese counterpart.
"the Navy wants to use XLUUVs to, among other things, covertly deploy the Hammerhead mine, A PLANNED MINE"
ReplyDeleteOh, goody another ship designed to use an unfinished weapon. I guess the Zumwalt lessons learn report is late.
A Zumwalt-class AGS reboot.
DeleteUUVs are highlightinh the sorry state of the Navy's Acquisition expertise. From trying to use OTAs from DIU to get SCUUVs to the cancelled LDUUV it jsut shows the lack of CONOPS and inability to develop new items. Now with MUUV 5 months into a 12 month design CLIN (with the major subcontractor not under contract yet) and this XLUUV fiasco don't expect any cost realism or deliveries anytime soon. Unfortunately whatever is delviered will most propbably not work, but will be declared a success becuase that is what the Navy does as it keeps the money flowing.
ReplyDeleteI kept wondering how they could do this for less than the also over budget and canceled advanced SEAL delivery vehicle. About the same size sub, manned. Same low ball estimate.
ReplyDelete"The Navy did not require the contractor to demonstrate its readiness to fabricate and deliver the XLUUVs prior to beginning fabrication"
ReplyDeleteHilarious.
Navy bought something from people who apparently weren't ready or even able (?) to build it.
I wonder how that contract was assigned...
I'm morbidly certain the contractor provided monetary "gifts," alcoholic drinks, Cuban cigars, and prostitutes to the USN officers responsible.
DeleteThe US Navy officers in charge of this debacle should be; investigated, prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated.
ReplyDeleteThat would end this kind of BS in a big hurry.
Lutefisk
What is the purpose of this thing? Does it have a CONOPS?
ReplyDeleteMore than even the delays and cost overruns, if we are spending this much to build something that we don't know what to do with it, that is a major, major problem.
Of course, there is always the possibility that building something without knowing what to do with it may be a major reason for the delays and cost overruns.
It seems to me that small to perhaps medium unmanned air, surface, and underwater vehicles for purposes of recon, intel, and targeting may make sense. But I'm just not sure what an XLUUV actually does.
We discussed the CONOPS issue in the linked post.
DeleteThe article makes clear that the lack of a CONOPS was not the reason for the delays and cost overruns. They were due to manufacturing shortcomings.
This: They were due to manufacturing shortcomings.
DeleteWhy on earth was a company that mainly builds aircraft, building a submersible ?
"The article makes clear that the lack of a CONOPS was not the reason for the delays and cost overruns. They were due to manufacturing shortcomings."
DeleteUnderstood. My point is a different one. The lack of a CONOPS is a reason why the project should never ave been undertaken, cost overruns or no cost overruns. Without a CONOPS it would have been a massive waste even if brought in on time and under budget.
And while the lack of CONOPS is not a direct cause of cost overruns, I would be willing to wager that mission creep was, and the lack of a CONOPS is one thing that lets mission creep work its way in.
#ComNavOps what do you think of loitering munitions, their secondary role as an ISR platform, and it's feasibility for shore bombardment and SEAD operations
ReplyDeleteObvious issue: Loitering munitions sacrifice much of their speed- compare the IAI Harop's max speed of 259 miles per hour, to a Tomahawk cruise missile's 568 miles per hour- to achieve their in-air endurance. The loitering munition has its uses, but not if you need something done with any urgency.
DeleteLooks like nearly ALL Navy's new weapon developments end up in delay, cost overrun, eventually fail in past two decades.
ReplyDeleteCan any one name a success development in past 20 years?
I am not up on weapons developments. But, I do know that some of the posters here would know. ComNavOps is very fair in both his criticism and approval of things.
Delete