LCS Organization Update

As you know, the LCS program has been in a state of disarray – to put it politely and mildly! – for quite some time.  LCS vessels – the Freedom variant, in particular – are being slated for retirement almost as fast as they’re being built.  Further, the Navy has cancelled the anti-submarine (ASW) module and eliminated that function from the LCS mission (to the extent the LCS has a mission!).
 
You may recall that the Navy had organized the LCS into two groups, one on each coast, with four ships dedicated to each mission (ASW, ASuW, MCM).  Each group of four were to consist of one dedicated training ship and three deployable ships.  Thus, in total, there were to be six dedicated ASW ships, six dedicated ASuW ships, and six MCM ships.
 
The elimination of the ASW mission and the [very] early retirement of a dozen or more LCS has thrown that organization out the window.  Now, the 2023 GAO annual report offers some partial clarity on the new plan for task organization of the LCS.
 
.. 24 MCM packages will support 15 MCM-assigned LCS and nine will deploy from shore and other ships. Ten SUW packages will support eight SUW-assigned LCS and two MCM-assigned LCS.[1]
 
This raises some interesting points:
 
- It appears that the Navy will have only 15 MCM vessels as the total fleet mine countermeasures capability as the current Avengers and MH-53E helos retire shortly.  That’s a pitifully small number against the hundreds of thousands of mines in the Chinese (and NKorean, Iranian, and Russian) inventory.
 
- It appears that the Navy will have only 8 dedicated ASuW LCS which is surprising since anti-swarm was, arguably, the main function of the LCS.
 
- There is some confusion about the meaning of the statement that two of the ASuW packages will support two MCM LCS.  Does this mean the Navy will attempt to double up on modules on two ships?  Given the critical weight limits, that seems not to be feasible.  Perhaps it means that those two LCS will be ‘swappers’ even though the Navy officially abandoned the module swapping concept?
 
- It appears that the Navy will be left with 25 active LCS out of the original 38 that have been built with 5 already retired and around a dozen more slated for retirement over the next two years.
 
 
 
A program in disarray has become even more confused!
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.148

PT Boat

Conversations about the LCS, even among professional Navy officers, often seem to equate the LCS to PT boats from WWII.  I don’t know about any official Navy position (I doubt they have any official position!) but many Navy leaders seem to believe that the LCS can operate like a PT boat – skulking about concealing islands and shorelines, springing forth to deliver salvoes of death and destruction, and then vanishing back into the littorals to repeat the cycle, impervious to enemy detection or retaliation.

According to Rear Adm. Donald Gabrielson, who commands the Navy’s operational hub in Singapore,

“It can hide behind islands and in shallow waters, sniping at the enemy fleet — much like the PT boats of World War II …” (1)

Referring to operations in the South China Sea and surrounding areas,

“With 50,000 islands for LCS to hide among, “good luck finding me,” Gabrielson said. “I know I’m going to be able find you…and I’m going to hurt you.” (1)

What an appealing and, dare I say it, romantic notion?  This kind of naval guerilla warfare tugs at the heartstrings of Americans and appeals to our notion of heroic naval combat.

If we could rejoin reality for a few moments, though, let’s look at what the WWII PT boat really was, how effective it was, how it was used, and what lessons it offers us today.

What was a PT Boat?  Without boring you with specifications that are easily found on the Internet, in its original form the PT boat was a very heavily armed and very fast boat that was designed to sink larger enemy ships.  This is almost exactly today’s distributed lethality concept, isn’t it?  The PT boats were an expedient stopgap measure that, it was hoped, could provide cheap naval firepower to some extent until we were able to ramp up actual warship production.

Restored PT Boat

How effective was the PT boat?  Relative to its original anti-ship function, the PT boat was almost totally ineffective.  As far as I know, of the several hundred PT boats that served, there were only a very small handful of successful anti-ship attacks and many/most of those were found to have been false claims after the war.  I would estimate that there were perhaps a half dozen successful attacks.

As the war went on, the PT boat found other roles for which it was better suited and proved far more successful.  The two notable roles were early warning and barge-busting.

Early Warning – Due to their abundant numbers, PT boats were able to be deployed in strings across possible enemy transit routes and were often able to provide valuable early warning and monitoring of enemy movements.  In essence, they acted like a distributed sensor net, as we would refer to it today.

WWII was mainly an “eyeballs” sensor war.  Yes, early radar was present and often played a useful role, especially towards the end of the war, but most sensing was via eye.  It might be visual sightings from an aircraft, the lookout station on a ship, the periscope of a sub, or the hills of a coast watcher but the prevailing detection method was visual.  Aircraft were used to extend the range of our eyeball sensors and, in this role, the PT boat excelled.  It was able to extend the range of visual sensing and cover a larger area.

Barge-busting – Later in the war, PT boats were found to be ideal for interdicting resuppy barges.  The PT boats were loaded with all manner of ‘gunboat’ weaponry such as 40 mm guns, 37 mm anti-tank cannons, rockets, grenade launchers, etc.  Again, the boats were very heavily armed for their size.

Finally, let’s note that, as reported by Wiki, 99 of the 531 PT boats that served in WWII were lost to combat related causes – that’s 19%.  Given that many of the boats didn’t really see any significant combat, that loss rate is actually much higher, probably two or three times that among boats that saw significant combat.

How Was the PT Boat Used?  Early in the war, the PT boat was used as a stopgap means of applying disproportionately heavy firepower from a cheap, expendable, and inefficient/ineffective platform.  It was a necessity born out of our lack of real warships.  It achieved very few sinkings although it did cause a fair amount of doubt and confusion among the enemy.

Later in the war, the PT boat was used far more successfully as a remote sensor with strings of PT boats being deployed along/across suspected travel lanes and approaches of enemy shipping.  The early warnings that these boats supplied were invaluable.

The barge-busting role provided interdiction of desperation supply efforts and, again, were quite effective.

The PT boats were also used for myriad transport, search and rescue, and patrol functions.  The large numbers of boats allowed them to be used for a variety of purposes while still being able to fulfill their main purposes.

What Lessons Does the PT Boat Offer Today?  History is always willing to educate us if we’re willing to learn.  Here’s what WWII’s PT boat experience can teach us today.

• The PT Boat was the distributed lethality of its day and, as far as sinkings of enemy ships, was a failure.  The failure was due mainly to the lack of sensor range.  PT boats were limited to visual sensing and, typically, night visual sensing.  Thus, their sensor range was on the order of hundreds of feet.  Unsurprisingly, then, they were unable to find targets even when they had pretty good intel on target movements and timing.  The PT boat’s weapons far outranged their sensors. 

We’ve noted the same problem today where we may have weapons with hundreds or thousands of miles range but our sensors are more on the order of tens of miles.  That distributed lethality LCS with an over the horizon anti-ship missile is going to be limited by a sensor with a radar horizon range.  The Navy hopes to solve this by using a vast, magical “system of systems”, all-encompassing sensor net of non-survivable platforms linked by a vast network that is assumed to be impervious to enemy electronic and cyber attack.  We’ll see how well that works.  If the sensor limitation can’t be solved, today’s distributed lethality platforms will be no more successful than yesterday’s PT boats.

We should also note that sensors work both ways.  If the LCS is going to use its radar to find targets then it is giving away its position and the enemy’s radar can find it.

We should also note that the islands that are hoped to provide concealment for the LCS by allowing it to blend into the radar clutter of the shoreline will also significantly degrade the performance of the LCS’ radar as the surrounding hills and elevations block large sectors of the radar picture.  The Navy seems to note all the advantages while ignoring the disadvantages.  I have yet to hear anyone elucidate how the LCS will find targets without itself being found.

In short, history and today’s parallels with that history, strongly suggest that the LCS will be every bit as ineffective in the distributed lethality role as were the PT-boats.

• Size matters.  In the barge-busting role, the PT boat’s small size and disproportionately heavy weaponry proved advantageous.  The boats were able to blend in with the surrounding island shorelines and were difficult to detect.  Navy Admirals who are envisioning the LCS as today’s PT boat may be overlooking the discrepancy in size between the 80 ft PT boat and the 400 ft LCS!

• Numbers matter.  PT boats were very successful as remote sensors and were able to extend the situational awareness of the fleet.  Of course, many boats were lost during the course of that performance.  That was an acceptable trade because the cheapness of the PT boat allowed us to deploy large numbers and accept the inevitable losses.  Can we afford to treat a $600M+ LCS, for example, as an expendable remote sensor?  What’s more, we certainly don’t have sufficient numbers of LCSs to deploy an effective network of ships as remote sensors.  We had hundreds of PT boats and we have only 20 or so deployable LCSs.

• Support matters.  The PT-boats had very limited endurance at sea and depended on crude forward bases and motherships for resupply and maintenance.  Today’s LCS also has very limited endurance and, by design, cannot support itself with even basic maintenance.  Among the 50,000 islands that Adm. Gabrielson references, how many have forward operating bases?  None.  How many could support a forward base?  Few.  How many of the forward bases would be survivable given today’s thousand mile cruise and ballistic missiles?  None.  How many LCS motherships do we have?  None.  So, where is the support for the distributed, PT-boat-ish LCS going to come from?  I have yet to hear the Navy explain that.

One final thought about PT boats. In WWII, they were safe from attack from anything that they couldn't see and, given their heavy weaponry relative to their size, they at least had a chance of fighting back. WWII was basically a visual range war. Today, a "PT boat" is subject to attack from dozens/hundreds of miles away, far beyond its own sensors. They're not survivable in combat for long and will likely never know where the attack that sank them came from and will, therefore, be unable to fight back.

On a related note, a much better equivalent to the PT-boat is the Chinese Type 22 missile boat which is stealthy, 35% the size of the LCS, and heavily armed with 8 C-80x type anti-ship missiles.  It also suffers from the same weakness as the PT-boat – limited sensor range.

Type 022 Missile Boat

_________________________________________

(1)Breaking Defense website, “LCS In Pacific: Run Silent, Run Shallow”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 23-Jan-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/lcs-in-pacific-run-silent-run-shallow/

LCS Assessment Update

Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), revealed a great deal of previously unknown (at least to me!) information regarding issues with the LCS in a statement to Congress before the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee (1).  Here’s some highlights with my emphasis added.  This is a long post but worth the read.

Regarding survivability, we see what ComNavOps has been saying all along about the LCS’ lack of shock hardening and failure to meet even Level 1 standards, contrary to the Navy’s explicit lies on this matter.

“With respect to survivability, neither LCS variant is expected to be survivable in high-intensity combat because the Navy’s requirements accept the risk of abandoning the ship under circumstances that would not require such an action on other surface combatants. As designed, the LCS lacks the shock hardening, redundancy, and the vertical and longitudinal separation of equipment found in other combatants. … Thus far, the results of the LCS Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) program confirm this assessment.”

“…the LFT&E program has already identified over 100 technical improvements that could be applied to improve LCS’s performance against threat weapons, although, given the ships’ fundamental limitations, none of these improvements will make the ships’ survivability comparable to that of the Navy’s other surface combatants.”

Moving on, Gilmore calls into question the very concept of the LCS - that it will free up larger ships for more important missions.

“… the Navy’s CONOPS require LCS, in some scenarios, to remain stationed near much slower units who are providing the LCS with dedicated air defense support to have any reasonable chance of surviving attacks using ASCMs… Moreover, this CONOPS implies that destroyers and cruisers will be required to provide this protection to LCSs, which is contrary to the concept that independently operated LCSs will free up the Navy’s destroyers and cruiser and “allow [them] to focus on the high-end missions,” which is what the Navy has touted in the past.”

DOT&E’s overall assessment is bleak.

“…DOT&E has sufficient data to conclude that both seaframe variants are not operationally suitable …”

“Not operationally suitable” – ouch!

Here’s some failures that weren’t widely known.

“During this last year, problems with main engines, waterjets, communications, air defense systems, and cooling for the combat system occurred regularly …”

It’s distressing that the listed problems occur regularly given that the ships have been in production and operation for several years.  They’re no longer first of class problems.  At this point, they’re systemic problems.

Gilmore had this to say about reliability,

“… when averaged over time, and accounting for both planned and unplanned maintenance downtimes, LCS 4 was fully mission capable for SUW missions just 24 percent of the 2015 test period.”

Further,

“Both variants … have a near-zero chance of completing a 30-day mission (the Navy’s requirement) without a critical failure of one or more seaframe subsystems essential for wartime operations.”

Crew size comes under fire.

“… the small crew size has limited the Independence variant from operating with sufficient watchstanders to maintain an alert posture for extended periods of time.”

The fundamental maintenance concept for the LCS whereby on-board maintenance is deferred is cited as a limiting factor in LCS effectiveness.

“An example of this limitation occurred during LCS 4’s operational testing during 2015 and 2016, where the ship’s primary air defense system, SeaRAM, suffered from seven long periods of downtime (greater than 48 hours).”

The inherent helplessness of the LCS was further highlighted.

“During the LCS 3 operational test period, the crew was unable to repair multiple critical systems, such as the ship’s navigation data distribution system, the air search radar, and Link 16 tactical link, each of which resulted in multiple days of downtime while awaiting assistance from contractors to troubleshoot and repair the systems.”

The LCS air defense capability is also questioned along with previously unreported revelations about SeaRAM problems.

“it is unlikely that LCS will be able to meet the Navy’s requirements for air defens … More recently, limitations in the SeaRAM system (currently installed on Independence variants) revealed some significant classified concerns.”

One of the oft called for “solutions” to acquisition problems is to buy foreign.  DOT&E, however, offers some practical warnings about problems with foreign purchases.

“… the Navy stopped work on the air defense modeling and simulation test bed because it did not have the intellectual property rights and detailed technical information for the ship’s air defense radar (AN/SPS-75). The lack of intellectual property for these foreign radars has been a problem for both variants of LCS, making it difficult for engineers to develop high-fidelity models and understand the capabilities and limitations of these radars or effect changes when problems are found.”

Although the Navy plans to eventually replace the Freedom variant’s RAM with SeaRAM, DOT&E notes an issue with the Navy’s related decision not to test the RAM system.

“… the Navy does not plan to test (at all) the existing Freedom-variant air defense systems installed on LCS 1 through 15. This is a high risk for deploying crews, given that many Freedom-variant ships will deploy between now and 2020 when backfits of the SeaRAM system on those hulls are scheduled to begin.”

Worse, the Navy has cancelled plans to test the Independence variant’s SeaRAM system.

“The Navy had planned to conduct the first of the planned operationally realistic live-fire events on the self-defense test ship in FY16, but postponed the test indefinitely because of anticipated poor performance predicted by pre-test modeling and analysis of the planned test event scenario.”

Setting aside RAM issues, the Freedom variant has additional AAW issues.

“For the Freedom variant, these tests revealed that because of the limited capabilities of the air defense radar, the crew was unable to detect and track some types of air threats well enough to engage them.”

The Independence variant also had threat detection issues.

“For the Independence variant, although the ships relies on the SeaRAM system, the ship’s air surveillance radar provided LCS crews with only limited warning to defend itself against ASCMs in certain situations.”

And more,

“In the Navy’s developmental test events, we learned that the electro-optical system used to target the seaframe’s gun was unable to provide reliable tracking information against some targets.”

More,

“…the program decided to cancel all subsequent live-fire events, including those scheduled for operational testing, conceding that the Independence variant is unlikely to be consistently successful when engaging some of these threats until future upgrades of the tracking system can be implemented.”

The LCS’ cyber security is also problematic.

“Much of my assessment of the two seaframes’ cybersecurity posture and capabilities is classified and covered in detail in my recent operational test reports. However, I will state that the testing conducted in FY14 on LCS 3, testing conducted in 2015 on LCS 2, and finally the most recent test aboard LCS 4 have revealed significant deficiencies in the ship’s ability to protect the security of information and prevent malicious intrusion. …  the severity of the cybersecurity problems discovered on LCS will degrade the operational effectiveness of either variant until the problems are corrected.”

I have repeatedly discussed the shortcomings of the 57 mm gun and opined that reliance on it to stop swarm attacks was flawed.  Here is DOT&E’s thoughts.

“The inaccuracy of the targeting systems, the difficulty in establishing a track on the target, and the requirement to hit the target directly when using the point-detonation fuze combine to severely impair effective employment of the gun, and limit effective performance to dangerously short ranges.”

The electro-optical fire control has always been a source of puzzlement and DOT&E singled it out for criticism.

“The ship’s electro-optical/infrared camera, SAFIRE, is the primary sensor for targeting the 57 mm gun. The system suffers from a number of shortcomings that contribute to inconsistent tracking performance against surface and air targets, including a cumbersome human-systems interface, poor auto-tracker performance, and long intervals between laser range finder returns.”

The LCS’ single function limitation is noted.

“LCS will have no capability to detect or defend against torpedoes unless the ASW mission package is embarked … The lack of capability implies that a submarine could launch an attack on an LCS, without the crew knowing that they were under attack …”

The LCS’ single function limitation requires that multiple LCS be used to accomplish a given mission and, worse, may require the addition of an Aegis destroyer to provide the AAW capability that the LCS inherently lacks.

“The original vision, therefore, of a nimble, mission-focused ship has been overcome by the realities of the multi-mission nature of naval warfare combined with the multiple threat environments of high-intensity naval conflicts.

…

Providing additional warships for LCS protection means stretching already limited battle group air defense assets.”

What about ASW performance?  Apparently, the LCS sonar is not optimized for littoral ASW.  Wait, what now?  Doesn’t the “L” in LCS stand for littoral?

“LCS’s sonar system is specifically optimized for deep water and will not be suitable for some very shallow-water environments such as in the littorals.”

If the LCS does find a submarine, there’s not a lot it can do about it.

“LCS has no organic capability to engage submarines and must rely on a single embarked helicopter to deliver torpedoes …”

In summary, Dr. Gilmore’s assessment of the state of the LCS was brutal and paints a picture of a Navy that is blind and zealous in its pursuit of hulls in the water regardless of capability or lack thereof.

__________________________

(1) “Statement By J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Before the  US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Program”, Dec 8, 2016

Forgotten LCS Capabilities - The LCS Air Group

The LCS program garners much criticism which makes it easy to forget that that the class possesses potentially useful inherent capabilities.  We are honored today to have guest author Steven Wills (aka Lazarus) to remind us of one of those capabilities and offer some much needed balance to the LCS discussion.  Please enjoy this post and give it your serious consideration.  Check out Mr. Will's bio at the end of the post.

Regarding comments, LCS discussions too often degenerate into positive and negative platitudes and this will not be allowed.  Comments must be specific and supported with facts and logic.  As always, politeness and respect are mandatory.

_______________________

Forgotten LCS Capabilities

The LCS Air Group

One of the significant capabilities of the littoral combat ship (LCS) that is often overlooked in discussion is the ship’s extensive aviation facilities. Both LCS variants have large flight decks and helicopter hangars. Their modular spaces also support the storage of ordnance and aviation maintenance gear in support of extended rotary wing operations. The three ship deployed LCS squadron can theoretically support six MH 60R helicopters and Firescout unmanned rotary-wing vehicles (1), or a combination of those assets. The LCS air group can perform a number of warfare and surveillance roles in support of a naval component commander’s campaign effort.

Both LCS variants boast the most expansive helicopter operating limits in terms of wind speeds due to their expansive flight decks. At 7300 square feet in size (2), the LCS-2 (Independence) variant has the largest flight deck of any surface combatant in the fleet. The LCS-1 (Freedom) variant has a smaller flight deck at 5200 square feet, but can land a helicopter in the face of 45 knot relative winds (3). The LCS sea frames also carry more aviation fuel (JP-5) (75-80 metric tons (4)) than the preceding Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (64 metric tons (5)). While neither LCS variant has the traditional RAST (Recovery, Assist, Secure, Traverse (6)) system to aid in landing and deck movement, helicopter operations are supported by the British-made MacTaggart Scott Trigon (7) cable recovery and traversing system. The Trigon system has not been used in past U.S. ship classes, but has been a staple of Commonwealth navies (8) for the last 40 years. It was pioneered by the British Royal Navy for use with small flight decks and smaller deck crews than larger ships. It uses a system of deck-mounted cables to secure a helicopter to a ship’s flight deck and move it to/from the vessel’s helicopter hangar (9).

USS Freedom and FireScout UAV

The MH-60R helicopter (10) is capable of a wide range of missions to include reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare. It can mount up to 3 MK54 lightweight antisubmarine (ASW) torpedoes or 4 AGM 114 Hellfire air to surface missiles. The MQ-8B Firescout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (11) also carries the Hellfire missile as well as the small (1 kg) GBU 144 Viper Strike laser guided bomb (LGB). The MK54 is the standard U.S. ASW torpedo while the Hellfire has an air to surface range of 4.5 nautical miles. The AGM 119 Penguin antiship missile with a range of 18 nautical miles might also be carried on LCS-based MH-60R’s.

Trigon Helo Handling System

An LCS air wing of multiple assets operating in conjunction with other weapons and capabilities based on the LCS sea frames such as the Harpoon and Naval Strike missiles constitutes a significant surface warfare capability. Operating in a distributive configuration but linked using air and surface equipment, an LCS squadron might launch coordinated strikes from air and surface assets. The high speed of the LCS sea frames allows them to rapidly re-position away from aircraft launch and recovery sites (12), thus increasing an opponent’s area of uncertainty in planning a counter-strike. The distributive employment of LCS at maximum distance forces an opponent to contemplate a much wider battle space in locating and striking at LCS sea frames. Unlike one or two conventional frigates that might support 12-16 antiship cruise missiles, the loss of one LCS only degrades the formation’s strike capacity rather than halving or entirely losing it.

The LCS’ sea frame capabilities are available today and do not need an associative mission module to contribute to the surface and subsurface battle. Potential LCS aviation assets provide the maritime component commander with a medium surface strike capability. Utilization of the emerging distributive lethality concept allows for an integrated strike capability from both sea frames and aircraft while maximizing their survivability through dispersion. The LCS air group is not waiting on a certification from the Department of Defense Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), or funding stalled in Congress, but is ready whenever and wherever the sea frames can be assembled.

_____________________________

(1)Defense Industry Daily website, “LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships”,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

(2)National Defense website, “Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All The Stops”, Grace V. Jean, March 2010,

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/LittoralCombatShip.aspx

(3)Navy.mil website,  COMLCSRON ONE Newsletter, “USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Commissioned In Galveston”,  MC2 (SW/AW) Garcia, SURFPAC Public Affairs,  October 2012, Volume 2, Issue 4,

http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lcsron1/Documents/LCS_Newsletter_Vol_2_Issue4-Oct_2012.pdf

(4)GAO, “Littoral Combat Ship - Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, July 2014, GAO-14-749,

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665114.pdf

(5)“The Continuation of a Damage Control Stability Module for the FFG-7”, Charles Arthur Bush, B.S.N.A., United States Naval Academy, Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1984

(6)Curtiss-Wright website, products/naval systems/helicopter securing & traversing/RAST, 30-Sep-2016,

https://www.curtisswrightds.com/products/naval-systems/helicopter-securing-traversing/rast.html

(7)DocSlide, 30-Sep-2016,

http://docslide.us/documents/why-trigon-has-no-rails-rev6.html

(8)MacTaggart Scott website, defense products/surface ship systems/helicopter handling, 30-Sep-2016,

http://www.mactag.com/94_HelicopterHandling.html

(9)YouTube, “MacTaggart Trigon helicopter recovery and handling system”, jimbarc, published 15-Sep-2014,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xh01qPp7ia4

(10)Lockheed Martin website, products/naval systems/mh 60 seahawk helicopters,

http://lockheedmartin.com/us/products/mh60r.html

(11)Naval Air Systems Command website, aircraft and weapons/uas/firescout,

http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=8250AFBA-DF2B-4999-9EF3-0B0E46144D03

(12)Aviation Week website, “Seahawk Helicopters Provide Punch For LCS Operations”, Michael Babey, 23-Sep-2013,

http://aviationweek.com/awin/seahawk-helicopters-provide-punch-lcs-operations

_________________________________

Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer who spent most of his sea going career in small combatants including two frigates, a mine countermeasures ship (MCM) and a patrol coastal (PC). He is currently a PhD Candidate in Military History at Ohio University. His areas of expertise are Cold War naval history and the history of British sea power from 1889-1941. He posts on a number of sites under the pen name of "Lazarus."

Exploring Distributed Lethality

As regular readers know, ComNavOps has not been a fan of the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  In its original, articulated form, the Navy wanted to arm every ship that floated including amphibious ships, logistic ships, MLPs, MCM, and so on.  That’s just stupid.  Those ships are far too valuable to risk having them within attack range of enemy ships – if you’re in attack range then you’re also in range to be attacked.  Risking vital support ships just to carry 8 Harpoons is idiotic, but, hey, that’s the Navy for you.

Of late, I’ve heard less about arming support ships and more about focusing on arming the LCS as the distributed lethality platform.  Of course, arming a warship isn’t exactly distributed lethality;  it’s just making a warship what it’s supposed to be – a warship.  The only reason this is even a point of discussion is because the Navy has built a class of warship that has no useful weapons!

Let’s focus on arming the LCS with a credible anti-ship missile.  We’ll assume it’s the Harpoon, for sake of discussion, although the Navy is also looking at the NSM and other options.  Let’s further assume that the LCS will carry 8 Harpoons on two Mk 141 rack launchers which has been the standard Harpoon loadout on every ship that has carried Harpoons since the Perry FFGs.  It’s also possible that the LCS will only carry a single launcher which would mean just 4 Harpoons.  The number of missiles is likely a weight related issue given that the LCS is hard up against its weight margins.  For our discussion, the number of missiles doesn’t matter.

So, conceptually, how does this distributed lethality work?

Well, the LCS will have a 100 nm (the exact range depends on the exact missile but this is a good discussion figure) missile and a 20 nm targeting radar.  This is the first challenge in distributed lethality – how does the distributed shooter find a target?  The Navy’s answer is that targeting will come from off board sensors like a P-8 Poseidon, F-35, or Triton UAV.

What happens when an off board sensor finds a target?  In the case of the manned aircraft, does the pilot instantly radio the LCS and tell them to launch a missile?  Of course not.  The pilot doesn’t know what distributed shooters are available.  Further, the pilot doesn’t know the various missions that are on-going in the area and what priority the target he’s found would have.  He doesn’t know the weapon loadouts on the various distributed shooters.  He doesn’t know what missions the distributed shooters are currently on and whether it’s worthwhile to disrupt their current mission.  He doesn’t know whether it’s better to reveal the distributed shooter’s position by attacking or if it’s better to pass up the shot and stay hidden.  In short, the pilot doesn’t have the necessary situational awareness to make a “shoot” call. 

The pilot will simply transmit the information back to the local task group or regional commander for evaluation and decision.  The commander (presumably an Admiral and his staff) will get the information, weigh it against all of his tasks, and decide what to do about it.  You know how those things go.  We’re probably looking at a many hours long process to arrive at a decision. 

Side Note:  What does the off board sensor platform do while waiting for a decision to be made?  If he moves on or returns to base, contact is lost.  Given that the target is moving, the target co-ordinates are lost and the ability to launch an attack is lost if the delay is an hour or more (a ship moving at 20 kts has now displaced from its original target location by 20 nm).  Of course, we can always launch an attack at a predicted location and hope for the best but that’s a rapidly diminishing likelihood of success that, if it fails, will waste a shooter’s load and reveal its location for no gain.  Alternatively, does the off board sensor platform try to stay in contact for, potentially, many hours while waiting for command to make a decision?  Given the relatively short endurance of aerial platforms, that may not even be possible.  If possible, it may not be wise to stay tied to one location near an enemy.  That’s a good way to get shot down!

Let’s say a decision is made to launch an attack.  If there happens to be a shooter within range then the rest is simple.  The shooter is sent targeting data and the attack occurs.  More likely, there are no shooters in range (or not enough shooters in range – an attack will likely require multiple shooters to have a good chance of success).  More hours will pass while the shooters maneuver into range (refer again to the previous side note).  Once all the shooters are in position, the attack occurs.

So, setting aside the issue of trying to operate a data network in the face of peer level ECM, there is nothing wrong with the concept of distributed lethality.  It can find targets and attack them with any available distributed shooter ship.  The major issues would seem to be the process of simply making a decision whether to shoot and what to do with the off board sensor while that decision making process and shooter assembly plays out.

As I pointed out earlier, this is not really distributed lethality but simply networked warships akin to the Navy’s AAW Co-operative Engagement Capabiity (CEC).  Regardless of the semantics, it can work, though clumsily. 

One other possible scenario is that the LCS’ own helo or UAV is used to provide off-board target detection.  A helo or UAV is relatively short ranged which is not a problem since the Harpoon is relatively short ranged.  The problem is that the helo/UAV is also relatively short endurance – a few to several hours – and that assumes the target was located early in the flight.  More likely, the target is located during the second half of the flight with consequently much shorter target contact endurance.  As previously described, locating a target is only part of the process.  A sufficient number of shooters still need to be moved into position and that can take many hours, depending on the dispersal of the shooters. 

Of course, a squadron of LCS can operate together, in close proximity, so that upon target detection most or all of the shooters will be in range or can achieve firing positions in short order.  The flip side of having a squadron operate in close proximity is that it greatly increases the likelihood of the group being spotted and attacked before they can accomplish their purpose.  Close grouping of the shooters inherently contradicts the concept of “distributed” lethality.  If you’re going to have a squadron of LCS operate in close proximity then you may as well just have a single Burke which could not only carry as many weapons as a squadron (assuming a vertical launch anti-ship missile) but could also defend itself which a squadron of LCS cannot.

Let’s now consider what the distributed shooters are doing when they aren’t actively shooting.  Presumably, the shooters are cruising around in enemy or contested waters looking for targets.  However, given the mismatch between the shooter’s sensing range, even using helo/UAVs, and the enemy’s sensors (land based Over The Horizon radar, submarines, AWACS-ish aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, UAVs, and larger ship radars, it is more likely that the shooters will be found before the shooters can find the enemy.  Thus, the shooters will be sunk one by one.

In the classic distributed lethality model, especially as espoused by Hughes, being detected doesn’t really matter because the individual shooters are cheap and expendable and individual losses create, hopefully, flaming data points due to the enemy revealing their location(s).  Of course, if the enemy attacks with land based anti-ship missiles or aircraft, they haven’t really revealed anything, have they?  It’s only if they attack with ships that they reveal anything we probably didn’t already know. 

So, the likelihood is that our distributed shooters will be destroyed piecemeal for no gain until a suitable target can be found.  If the shooters were cheap enough this might be acceptable.  However, an LCS currently costs $500M - $750M after including post-delivery construction, Government Furnished Equipment, and modules.  The “frigate” version will be even more expensive – likely $750M - $1B.  I’m not sure that a $500M - $1B ship can be considered expendable and sacrificing several just to obtain a single attack opportunity is unlikely to be a beneficial trade.

This also raises the question of how many LCS’s are available for use as distributed shooters?  Let’s assume we build the full 40 that are currently planned.  Of those, 12 are scheduled to be dedicated MCM vessels.  Would we really want to risk our very rare and very valuable MCM vessels?  Remember, when the LCS-MCM comes on line we’ll retire the Avengers and those 12 LCS-MCM’s will constitute our entire ship-based MCM capability!  So, if we don’t risk those as distributed shooters, that only leaves us with 28 possible distributed LCS shooters.  Another 12 or so are scheduled to be dedicated anti-submarine (ASW) ships.  The same logic applies.  Do we really want to risk them?  In this case, the answer may be yes because we do have other ASW assets throughout the fleet.  But, if we opt not to risk them, that drops the available distributed LCS shooters to 16 or less. 

If half to two thirds of  the LCS’s are in port at any given moment, and that’s being generous given the reliability issues, scheduled in-port maintenance requirements (every two weeks), and extremely limited endurance (8-14 days with the current crew levels), then we’re looking at only a half a dozen LCS being available as distributed shooters at any given moment.  That’s not a lot and won’t cover much area!

The LCS’ very limited endurance (8-14 days) combined with the maintenance model that requires the ship to put into port every two weeks (hence, the designed limited stores endurance) makes the LCS a very poor choice as a distributed shooter – no surprise, it’s a poor choice for anything! 

Worse, the requirement to put into port every two weeks implies that it will have to leave the war zone for two weeks or more every two weeks.  The enemy is not going to allow us to use a port located in the contested region.  Thus, the LCS will have to leave and travel to a protected or safe port well back from the war zone.  The LCS will use up most of its at sea endurance and two week operating window just traveling to and from its maintenance ports!  I don’t think the Navy really thought through the use of LCS’s in combat and has not thought through the use of the LCS as a distributed shooter ship.

Let’s now look at this from the enemy’s perspective.  One of the claimed benefits of distributed lethality is that it hugely complicates the enemy’s job.  He won’t know which ships can shoot and will have to assume they all can.  Supposedly, this somehow complicates his day to day life.

In war, each side will attempt to sink every enemy ship they find, right?  It doesn’t matter if the ship is armed or not.  It doesn’t matter if the ship is a warship or cargo vessel.  In short, the enemy will attempt to sink every ship they find.  So, if the enemy will attempt to sink every ship they find, how or why does it matter if the ship is a distributed shooter?  They’re going to try to sink it anyway.  I’m failing to see how the enemy’s tactical position is more complicated.  If they see an LCS, they’ll sink it (it’s not like the LCS can defend itself) whether it has Harpoon missiles on board or not. 

I’m mentally wargaming this from the enemy’s perspective and I just don’t see how the question of whether an LCS is armed or not affects anything the enemy will do.  The enemy’s task is:  see a ship, sink a ship.  It’s not:  see a ship, decide whether it’s a distributed shooter or not, maybe sink it or maybe not. 

If the reverse were true, that the enemy could not, or did not want to, sink a non-distributed shooter ship then their tactical situation would be greatly more complicated.  They’d have to somehow make a definitive determination of the target ship’s weapon load out which would require additional recon assets and time and add a great deal of uncertainty to the tactical picture.  However, that’s a ridiculous scenario.  In a war, the enemy will, see a ship, sink a ship, and not care what weapons, if any, it was carrying.

So, the claim of distributed lethality being a complication for the enemy seems unfounded.

Considering all of this, the concept of using the LCS as distributed shooters seems like a costly, high attrition exercise for relatively little benefit.  Further, the very LCS maintenance model and associated limited endurance make the LCS ill-suited as a distributed shooter. 

Surface Warfare Perfect Storm

USNI website has an interesting article about the size of the future surface warfare fleet.

“Rapid growth in the capability and quality of guided missiles — mostly Chinese in origin — is causing the U.S. Navy to rethink the number of surface ships it needs to effectively fight a high-end war.”

“Early estimates based [on] ongoing war games could mean the current number of 88 large surface combatants — the Navy’s fleet of guided missile destroyers and cruisers — needs to grow to more than a hundred into the 2020s just to keep to today’s current level of risk, USNI News has learned.”

From 88 ships to more than a hundred?!  As you digest that, consider that we’ve documented the steady decline in combat fleet size and the coming shortfall in destroyers as retirements outpace new construction.  We’ve also discussed the extremely unwise decision to forego maintenance and upgrades.

This is all very disturbing but we’ve already covered it and warned about the shortfall.  So, what’s the point of this post?  Well, the article touches on some interesting implications.

For instance, the article states that the existing requirement for 88 surface vessels is based on, among other factors, a requirement to provide 5 major surface combatants as escorts for each carrier group.  However, the new requirement places the escort number at 7 or 8 per carrier group.  OK, again, aside from not having that number available, what’s the point?  The point goes back to one we’ve previously addressed which is tactics and training.  Carrier groups currently deploy with 2 or 3 escorts.  If we intend to fight with 5-8, where and how are our commanders learning to tactically handle a group that is 2-3 times larger than what we routinely deploy with?  We have Admirals who have never commanded or tactically exercised the size group that they would fight with.  This is not the way to prepare for combat!

Another interesting point that the article makes is the impact of the LCS on the major combatant force level.

“In addition, decisions to leave the two emerging Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) variants without a significant AAW capability also stresses the cruiser and destroyer fleets, since the LCS could not then help protect non-combatant ships like oilers and logistics ships in an escort role …”

Thus, we see that the decision to continue producing the non-combat LCS and to add only very minimal improvements to the follow on “frigate LCS” have the consequence of requiring more Burkes.  Thus, the LCS, which was supposed to free up major combatants is actually tying down more Burkes conducting low end missions because the LCS is so impotent and ineffective.

Finally, the article documents the Navy’s decision to forego Burke upgrades that would allow the ships to conduct simultaneous BMD and AAW.  Thus, in many cases, it may require two Burkes to fill the role of a single upgraded one. 

“Planned upgrades that would allow destroyers to fight ballistic missiles and aircraft at the same time have been scaled back in some cases, requiring two less capable ships to do the mission of one upgraded destroyer.”

The prioritization and decision making of the Navy is mystifying, at best (that’s my polite way of saying incompetent).

Please read the linked article.  It’s well worth it.

The surface warfare perfect storm is coming and the Navy is ignoring it.

  

(1)http://news.usni.org/2015/04/21/global-guided-missile-expansion-forcing-u-s-navy-to-rethink-surface-fleet-size

LCS - Mass or Disperse?

In his book, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (1), Capt. Hughes discusses the concept of dispersion/massing as applied to surface ships and, particularly, to smaller ships.  He notes,

“When dispersion is an important means of defense, small ships and distributed firepower are an important advantage.  Much of the modern debate over the size of warships concerns the comparative merits of dispersal in small ships (to complicate enemy targeting) and of concentration of force in large ships (to fight off the enemy).  …  Today if a commander’s fleet comprises large ships with strong defenses he masses and fights the enemy off.  If he has small ships or weak defenses he must disperse.  In either case he is buying time to carry out his mission, which is not to steam around waiting to be sunk.  If the defense cannot buy time for the offense to perform, then the fleet ought to be somewhere else.”

 

Hughes brings up two good points in this short paragraph which are highly relevant to the Navy’s LCS.  Remember, the LCS was built before a coherent concept of operations was developed (we’ll set aside the lunacy of that sequence, for the moment) and they are now trying to develop one.  Let’s see what Capt. Hughes has to offer in the way of guidance for the LCS.

Hughes’ first point is that the purpose of a ship/fleet/Navy is to conduct offensive operations.  While a Navy may occasionally be forced into defensive operations (protecting a base or defending sea lanes, for example) they would still, ultimately, be linked to offensive operations - for instance, defending a base from which future offensive operations may be launched.  So, offense is the purpose of a Navy.  Herein lies the initial problem for the LCS.  Currently, it has no offensive capability.  The Navy is working to develop modules which will give it some offensive capability but that appears to be a long ways down the road.  Nonetheless, let’s assume that the LCS acquires offensive anti-submarine, anti-surface, or land strike (either direct via munitions or indirect via Marine/SOF land forces) capability.



LCS Operations - Mass or Disperse?

The small size of the LCS precludes applying a significant strike capability from a single ship.  Thus, multiple LCSs will need to mass to apply a significant strike of whatever form.  This leads directly to Hughes’ second point concerning the balance between massing and dispersion.  Massing creates an efficient target for the enemy.  As Hughes points out, if massing creates a defense strong enough to compensate for the easy target the mass makes, then massing is desirable.  If not, dispersion is the better tactic. 

The LCS was not designed to be able to provide area anti-air defense nor to have a significant anti-surface defense.  Thus, massing provides no enhancement in defense.  One LCS cannot “cover” another so LCSs derive no defensive benefit from being grouped.  This leads to the conclusion that the LCS should operate dispersed to maximize the chance of surviving long enough to carry out offensive operations.

But wait …  If the LCS should operate dispersed and no single LCS can generate a significant strike, how then can the LCS be effective?  Well, we may well have uncovered a flaw in the LCS concept.  However, bear in mind that massing for a strike does not necessarily mean that the massing must occur at the point of origin of the strike.  Massing can be at the destination of the strike.  In other words, ten ships, each with a single missile, don’t have to be near each other at launch time in order to conduct a massed strike of ten missiles – they can be dispersed and simply time their individual missiles to arrive at the target together to achieve the massed strike.  So, it is possible for LCSs to operate dispersed and still provide massed strike, under the right conditions.

The preceding discussion has enormous implications for the development of the LCS.  As the Navy attempts to develop a concept of operations for the LCS and continues to develop modules, the concept of physical dispersion for defense and massing for offense should be the guiding light.  The LCS needs weapons and offensive capabilities that are capable of destination point massing.  This implies a level of range and targeting capability that the LCS not only doesn’t have currently but is not even being discussed, as far as I know.  The dispersion aspect also suggests that a certain amount of attrition of individual units will occur which should dictate that the ships be small, cheap, and expendable.  Unfortunately, that ship has already sailed.  The LCS is neither small nor cheap nor expendable (given its cost).  Since the desired characteristics of a dispersed unit are not achievable, additional emphasis should be placed on self-defense, meaning a better anti-air (more CIWS/RAM) and anti-surface (bigger/more guns) fit.



Griffon - The Right Weapons Development Path?



If the Navy would think this through, direct the module development along these lines, and consider modifying the core capabilities to increase self-defense, we might be able to someday have a moderately useful LCS.  Of course, it’s equally possible that a rational analysis of the above might lead to the conclusion that the LCS was incorrectly designed, can’t be sufficiently modified, and should be terminated.  Either approach would be better than the floundering that’s occurring now with the Navy desperately searching for a mission for the LCS.  This is why a concept of operations should come before construction, not after!

(1) Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2^nd Ed., Capt. Wayne Hughes, Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN-13: 978-1-55750-392-3, p.191