- The F-35 (or the occasional F-22 from Guam?) might have the stealth to get close enough to provide targeting against HVUs (though not enemy stealth fighters). HVUs are not stealthy and are relatively easily detected. Note: this is one reason I’ve called for stealthy ‘Hawkeyes’, possibly based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”), to thwart enemy attacks against our HVUs.
- A B-2/21 equipped with passive sensors could be used to provide targeting although it is questionable whether it would be worth the risk.
- Taiwan ground assets might well be able to provide targeting, particularly using passive EO and IR sensors. It would be almost impossible for the Chinese to completely eliminate this kind of small, non-radiating, hard to find asset.
Tuesday, May 27, 2025
Changing the Calculus
Monday, June 10, 2024
Deadly Fish
Range:
38 km (24 mi; 21 nmi) at 55 kts
50 km (31 mi; 27 nmi) at 40 kts
Range:
50 km (31 miles) at 50 kts
100 km (62 miles) at 30 kts
Range:
137 km (85 miles; 74 nmi) at 30 kts with 60 kt terminal attack speed
- Sinking merchant ships in a blockade scenario, something that the current Navy surface ships would have a very difficult time doing.
- Launching specialized recon torpedoes (USV) for recon of harbors, shorelines, chokepoint passages, etc.
- Land attack using torpedoes with suitable fuzing against docks, dry docks, shoreline facilities, etc.
- Destruction of causeways being used to unload ships
- Anti-ship attack from over the horizon using with the aid of spotter UAVs
- Convoy escort
- The torpedo inventory of the U.S. Navy in 2001 was 1,046 Mk-48 torpedoes.
- In 2017 Lockheed's production was approximately 50 per year.
- Mk48 production ended in 1996. Production restarted in 2016 with initial deliveries in 2022, as best I can tell.
Monday, August 21, 2023
Why the Last Post?
- How many subs do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- What kind of aircraft do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- How big an air wing do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- What kind of ASW effort do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- How many carriers do we need to defend Taiwan? Operations will tell us that.
- How do we logistically support a Taiwan defense fleet? Operations will tell us that.
Thursday, August 17, 2023
Defending Taiwan
Friday, December 24, 2021
Taiwan Submarines
Taiwan is attempting to build 8 new indigenously designed SSKs. Reuters has a good article summarizing the effort.[1]
Shipbuilder CSBC began construction last year and is aiming to deliver the first of the planned eight vessels by 2025, according to government statements. The value of the project is estimated at up to $16 billion, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. [1]
Taiwan’s current submarine fleet consists of two Sea Dragon SSKs built in the Netherlands and delivered in 1987. Typical of SSKs, they have six 533 mm bow tubes and 28 torpedoes.
The central rationale for acquiring new submarines appears to be the following,
The eight new submarines, plus the Sea Dragons, would pose a deadly threat to an invasion fleet, say veteran Western, Japanese and Taiwanese submariners. Armed with powerful torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, these vessels could attack the convoys of troop transports and warships that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), would need for any landing on Taiwan. [1]
This smacks of the kind of everything-we-do-will-work-and-the-enemy-won’t-try-to-stop-us thinking that the US military routinely engages in. Can a handful of SSKs really present a significant threat to what would be a massive invasion fleet? Let’s analyze that premise.
Despite anyone’s desperate wishes, the Chinese are not going to launch an invasion fleet with no anti-submarine (ASW) protection. Chinese ASW efforts will be extensive and will greatly diminish the effectiveness of defending SSKs unless the SSKs are determined to perform a suicidal attack that would only result in a couple of sinkings per submarine.
Even without considering Chinese ASW efforts, ten SSKs have a limited capacity. With a total of 60 torpedo tubes across ten submarines and using an initial salvo of six torpedoes per sub, two per target, this would only result in 30 targets being hit (sunk or mission kill). This is ridiculously optimistic and assumes that every sub is available, every sub finds targets, every sub launches unhindered, and every torpedo hits but it defines the absolute upper edge of expectations. So, the upper end of expectations is 30 hits. The invasion fleet would consist of two or three hundred ships so this amounts to 10-15% of the invading fleet being stopped (sunk or mission killed). That’s not insignificant but it’s hardly an invasion stopper, either. The Chinese would gladly pay that price to seize Taiwan. To assume further success by the submarines would be compounding the ridiculousness by assuming that, having given away their positions by firing, the Chinese would stand back, do nothing, and allow the subs to continue firing until all their torpedoes were exhausted. Of course this won’t happen. It is highly unlikely that any submarine would get a second attack opportunity before the defending ASW forces made a second attack impossible.
Now, let’s inject just a small degree of realism into the scenario. For starters, not all ten submarines would be available and in the right location to attack an invasion fleet, not all the available submarines would achieve a firing situation due to enemy ASW activity, and not all torpedoes fired would hit their intended targets. So, a slightly more realistic estimate would be that five subs would achieve a firing situation and half the torpedoes fired would hit a target thus giving around 7 targets hit (sunk or mission kill). There would be no follow up attacks as the submarines would be too busy evading and dying.
| This is what a serious invasion fleet would look like. |
Not only would a few submarines always be unavailable due to maintenance, the submarines might well have other duties that prevent them from being used against an invasion fleet. For example,
The two people in Taiwan with direct knowledge of the sub program said the vessels would also be deployed in the deeper waters east of the island. That would help keep open ports along Taiwan’s eastern coastline, which is furthest from China, for resupplies in a conflict. [1]
Thus, some number of subs would be deployed on the opposite side of Taiwan from an invasion fleet and would be unavailable to attack the fleet.
So, our more realistic assessment is that a fleet of ten SSKs could achieve 7 hits from an invasion fleet of two or three hundred ships. Is this level of result sufficient to justify a $16B program? The best way to answer this question is to pose another question: could the money be better spent on small, mobile, land based anti-ship missile launchers? For example, the Norwegians have demonstrated that small anti-ship missiles like the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) can be launched from mobile, land based launch vehicles. Taiwan could acquire thousands of such systems for what they plan to spend on 8 submarines. Which would do more damage … thirty or so torpedoes or many thousands of anti-ship missiles?
Let’s ask some more questions:
Which would be more survivable?
Which would be easier to acquire?
Which would be easier to man?
Which would cost less to operate?
Which would be easier to deploy on short notice?
Unless Taiwan chooses to start a war, they are going to unavoidably take the first hit in an invasion. That means they need widely scattered, numerous, hard to find, hard to hit weapons that will survive to strike back. China will commence an invasion by finding and striking at the submarines and employing sufficient ASW resources as to prevent the subs from achieving viable firing situations. In contrast, thousands of small, mobile anti-ship launchers present a capability that cannot be eliminated or even significantly reduced prior to an assault. The SSK program represents time, resources, and money that could be much better spent on other alternatives.
Even if Taiwan is determined to go through with the SSK program, there are many obstacles that make project success less than a given. Aside from the fact that this is a brand new, never before done effort from a non-existent indigenous submarine building industry (recall how the US LCS turned out when we contracted two companies that had never built a warship before?), the various technologies that make up a modern submarine must largely come from foreign companies and many of those companies and their parent countries are very reluctant to upset China. Again, the odds of success for a small anti-ship weapon system are much greater than an indigenous SSK program.
Ten SSKs are an annoyance to China, not an invasion stopper.
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[1]Reuters website, “T-Day: The Battle For Taiwan”, Saito et. al., 29-Nov-2021,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-submarines/
Sunday, August 1, 2021
Taiwan and Normandy
In any direct war with China (as opposed to a proxy war in, say, Africa), Taiwan will be the first objective of the Chinese. They simply cannot allow a Western aligned country to exist that close to them, providing bases for surveillance and attack. This is elementary war strategy (that the US has ignored multiple times to our detriment!).
In addition to the inevitability of a direct war, there is also the quite likely possibility that China may simply launch an assault on Taiwan outside the context of a general war – in other words, a focused campaign to reclaim Taiwan. This should not be a surprising possibility as China has been saying exactly this for many years. In their minds, they’re giving Taiwan time to come to their senses but China’s magnanimous patience will end at some point and China will take military action to reclaim their wayward territory. Even the US military has recognized this likelihood and has set a ballpark time frame of the next several years, according to Adm. Philip Davidson.(1)
A Chinese assault on Taiwan will be most comparable to Normandy in WWII. It will be a massive undertaking. Taiwan has an active military of 275,000 plus a reserve of 2.8M and a paramilitary (whatever that means) of 1.9M equipped with reasonably modern weapons and systems. For comparison, Germany had less than 50,000 troops available for the defense of Normandy.
Drawing on lessons from the Normandy assault, we can expect to see:
Speed – Whether as part of a general war or a narrowly focused Taiwan-only operation, it will be mandatory for China to accomplish its goals in a very short time frame. In a general war, a short time frame would allow China to move on to its other objectives and free up massive forces for other operations. Failure to do so would hamstring Chinese operations as the war progressed. In a Taiwan-only operation, China would have to accomplish its objectives very quickly or risk the US having time to gear up and enter the conflict in support of Taiwan. Failure to secure its objectives quickly would also open China to criticism from the world community to an even greater extent. Thus, regardless of the scenario, China would make every effort to see the bulk of immediate objectives completed and ground forces substantially ashore within the first 24-48 hrs.
Scope – A Taiwan operation would require a substantial portion of China’s forces with hundreds of thousands of troops poured into the effort. A staggeringly massive missile barrage would be required to render as many defenses inoperable as possible from the start. The Chinese amphibious fleet would be hugely supplemented by civilian transport ships. This would be quite doable and efficient since all Chinese merchant shipping is built with military conversion capabilities included in their design. The West will be stunned at the amphibious resources China can bring to bear. Air superiority operations will be truly massive and will be quickly followed by continuous air strikes and close air support. The Chinese navy will be deployed on the eastern side of Taiwan to prevent US interference.

Normandy and Taiwan - Massive Scope
Reinforcement – At the invasion site, Germany had a window of only hours or a few days, at most, to make effective use of reinforcements. As it happened, one of the major goals of the Allies was to cut off the movement of reinforcements to the Normandy area and they succeeded. Germany was never able to effectively reinforce their defenses. Longer term, Germany had all of Europe as well as the German homeland to assemble reinforcements and push the Allies back off of Europe but could not do it. Of course, the Soviet front siphoned off huge numbers of troops and resources that could have otherwise been used against the Allied landing.
In the same vein, Taiwan has very limited reinforcements – none, for all practical purposes, since the limited geography assures that every unit will be fully committed right from the start. Taiwan lacks any strategic depth wherein it can trade land for time to prepare counterattacks. What they have immediately available is all they’ll ever have. Conversely, China can draw on immense reserve forces although the aforementioned speed requirement suggests that the need for Chinese reinforcements would indicate a significant strategic, if not operational, failure by the Chinese.
Strategic Goals – The Allies goal was to seize ports to provide supplies for the subsequent march across Europe and they succeeded. China’s strategic goals would be to eliminate Taiwan as a US base of operations and to conduct the assault so quickly that the US would be faced with a fait accompli that would discourage US intervention. In essence, speed would be China’s method of interdicting US reinforcements.
More broadly, the seizure of Taiwan would allow Chinese mainland based air defenses to be substantially transferred to Taiwan which would significantly expand China’s defensive perimeter and make any counter-actions or counterattacks by the US much more difficult. Seizure of Taiwan would greatly expand China’s defensive cushion and eliminate a glaring salient that could, otherwise, be used against China.
If China conducts just an isolated assault rather than as part of a larger war, China will immediately announce to the world that it is an internal Chinese affair in an attempt to make the US seem like a meddling outsider on the world political stage. By doing so, China would hope to blunt any attempt by the US to build an opposition coalition. Quite likely, China would quickly offer to negotiate a final settlement which, of course, would never produce any result and would just serve to further erode any US justification for intervention while ensuring China’s continued occupation of Taiwan.
Conclusion
The key consideration is the size of Taiwan’s defensive force versus the speed with which China could secure the island. The defensive force is, potentially, much greater than was available to the German’s at Normandy but the question is whether that defensive force could retain its combat effectiveness after the initial deluge of missiles, bombs, and shells. Without question, the fixed defensive assets such as airfields, missile sites, AAW sites, etc. would be largely destroyed in the initial bombardment. Armored forces and artillery would also, presumably, suffer significant initial losses. Whether the remaining troops and mobile or protected assets would retain enough coherent command and control, mobility, and firepower to provide an effective, coordinated defensive force is an open question. Unfortunately, the result of the initial bombardment will be to reduce Taiwan’s forces toward the light infantry end of the spectrum and they would be left to fight heavily armored forces supported by air power and artillery. There is no doubt about the final outcome but there is a great deal of doubt about the speed with which China could achieve its goals. If Taiwan could delay the ultimate outcome long enough, China will have failed, strategically, as noted above which opens the possibility of US intervention.
In short, the Allies at Normandy were able to push supplies and troops ashore faster than Germany could reinforce their defenses. Whether China can push forces ashore faster than Taiwan can relocate and reinforce its defenses is an open question as is whether Taiwan’s forces can muster sufficient firepower to be effective.
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(1)Washington Examiner website, “Pacific Commander Warns China Could Move To Take Taiwan In The Next Five Years If US Doesn’t Increase Deterrence”, Jamie McIntyre, 5-Mar-2021,
Friday, May 1, 2020
The Taiwan Opportunity
Monday, November 4, 2019
The First Battle
Networked to each other and the main group
Function: Arsenal barge
Networked and fire-controlled by Burke/F-35



