Naval Gun Accuracy

It’s discouraging to see how many people believe that modern fire control systems guarantee unerring accuracy.  I’ve seen claims that the Oto Melara 76 mm only needs three rounds per engagement against anti-ship missiles.  That’s absurd!  When the head of Oto Melara, in a live fire test, agrees to stand on a target protected by one of his guns that has only three rounds in the magazine, I’ll begin to believe the claim.
 
So many people seem to think that modern guns can’t miss.  I guess this is an example of a little bit of knowledge being a dangerous thing.  People understand just enough about computers to know that we can write a program that predicts where a round should go to impact/intercept the target and they assume that the program can’t be wrong, therefore, the shot must hit with unfailing accuracy. 
 
Reality, however, is much different.  Yes, a program can make a prediction – that’s just simple mathematics and that’s child’s play.  What the program can’t do is account for the hundreds of factors that actually affect the accuracy of a naval gun.  Let’s briefly consider some of the more obvious factors:
 
Stabilization – One of the most blatantly incorrect beliefs among naval observers is the myth of stabilization.  People forget that both the firing platform and the target are continuously pitching and rolling, among other movements.  Yes, we have stabilization (of the firing platform, not the target!) but stabilization is not even remotely perfect.  The guns are large, heavy chunks of steel and have inertia.  Just because the stabilizer computer signals the gun to move doesn’t mean it can instantaneously accomplish that movement.  There is a lag and in the world of micro-deviations (we’ll address that shortly), which is what we’re discussing, that’s a problem.  Stabilization is a gross phenomenon, not a micro phenomenon and it does not, indeed cannot, assure accuracy – it just reduces gross inaccuracy.
 
Let’s consider some other common factors that impact accuracy:
 

• Barrel Wear – wear is a constantly changing phenomenon and is not uniform along the length of the barrel
• Barrel Temperature – changes on every shot and is not uniform along the length of the barrel
• Wind – constantly changing and changing throughout the length/time of the shell’s flight profile
• Barrel Movement – the barrel is moving (pitching, rolling, and attempting to stabilize) while the round is traveling through it!
• Shell Uniformity – every round has minute (and no so minute!) differences in weight, shape, smoothness, dents, etc. and each one affects accuracy
• Friction – this is a factor of the shape of the round, density of the air, humidity, wind, etc. and, of course, there’s always friction between the barrel and the shell
• Humidity – this is constantly changing on the micro scale as the shell encounters wind currents, spray, fog, rain, etc.
• Density – the density of the air is constantly changing due to temperature, humidity, altitude, etc. causing changes in friction and speed of the projectile
• Temperature – changes with elevation, wind currents, and wave behavior causing updrafts and downdrafts
• Target Movement – the target is constantly moving in all three dimensions while the intercepting shell is being fired and traveling through the barrel and the target continues to move during the entire travel time of intercepting shell;  some of the movement is due to physical factors (wind, friction, etc.) and some is due to intentional terminal maneuvering;  when we take a radar ‘fix’ on the target, the implicit assumption is that the target will continue on its path and that’s utterly false, as we just noted

 
What program has the slightest hope of accurately modeling those factors especially since we have no means of measuring most of them other than in the grossest sense?
 
 
Deviations
 
So, we’ve now acknowledged that there are too many factors that impact accuracy for us to account for all of them and we lack the sensors to do so even if we could program them into the fire control algorithm.  But, you say, the deviations are minor.  Well, let’s examine the magnitude of the effect of the cumulative ‘minor’ deviations.
 
Projecting a straight line from the shell in the barrel, waiting to be fired, to the predicted intercept point, gives us a travel path that we think/hope will meet the target.  Any deviation will cause an angular change from the predicted travel path.  That angular deviation can be considered in degrees.  If the shell perfectly follows the predicted path, that would be 0 degrees deviation.  If the shell were to, ridiculously, take an immediate right angle turn off the predicted path, that would be a 90 degree deviation.  Realistically, the deviation will be on the order of 0-10 degrees or so.  Let’s see what impact small degrees of deviation have on the difference between the actual intercept point as compared to the predicted point.
 
For this illustrative example, let’s consider a predicted intercept point at a distance of 1 mile (5,280 feet).  We’ll use the geometry of a right triangle to calculate the deviation.  Specifically, we’ll use the formula
 
     tan(deviation angle) = opposite/adjacent
 
rearranging,
 
     opposite = tan(deviation angle) * adjacent
 
where,
 
opposite = the deviation from theoretical intercept point, in feet
adjacent = 5,280 ft  (distance to theoretical intercept point)
deviation angle = the angular deviation from the predicted intercept path, in degrees
 
Using the above formula, we get the following results for various degrees of deviation.
 
10 deg = 931 ft
5 deg = 462 ft
1 deg = 92 ft
0.5 deg = 46 ft
0.1 deg = 9 ft
 
We see then that even a miniscule 0.5 deg deviation will result in a 46 ft miss.  We have to be down around 0.1 deg or less deviation to hit our predicted intercept point close enough to be effective.  Of course, that assumes the target perfectly followed its predicted travel path and didn’t change course, altitude, or speed!
 
Wow!  That is not much allowable deviation before we have a clean miss!  From observations of video of live fire gun exercises, my estimate is that deviations of 0.5-5 degrees are normal.  That’s not encouraging.  I’m beginning to think that hitting a target with a naval gun is almost impossible.
 
Before we throw up our hands and give up trying to hit an intercept point with a naval gun, let’s recall that there are a few things that can help improve our odds.
 
Number of Shells – It’s a given that every shot we fire will have a deviation to some extent.  However, if we fire enough shells toward the predicted intercept point, one or some of them will, statistically, wind up being close enough to be effective.  This argues for smaller caliber projectiles that can be fired quickly and in large numbers.
 
Rate of Fire – This is another way of saying, number of shells, but it goes beyond that.  There’s a time lag between every shot and the greater the time lag, the fewer shells we can put into the predicted intercept point.  To illustrate, if we could fire a thousand shells in one second, we’d saturate the intercept point and compensate for the individual inaccuracies with numbers.  On the other hand, if we can only fire one shell per minute, then we can only ever have one shell in the intercept area at a time before the intercept point changes significantly and odds are it will miss due to the various factors we’ve discussed.  This argues for extremely high rates of fire.
 
Stabilization – The quicker our gun can respond to stabilization commands, the more accurate we’ll be.  This is accomplished by decreasing the inertia of the gun which is accomplished by decreasing the weight of the gun and/or increasing the power of the train/elevation motors.  This argues for smaller, lighter weight guns.
 
We see, now, why a 5” gun is very unlikely to be effective at hitting a cruise missile.  In fact, modern 5” guns have been proven to be woefully inaccurate even against slow moving (relative to a missile) Boghammer boats (the Vincennes incident).
 
Fragmentation - Yet another compensating measure is fragmentation.  If we have to have a direct hit on the target to kill it, our odds are extremely poor.  However, if we can just be in the general vicinity of the target and kill it via shrapnel (fragmentation), our odds increase.  The larger the effective fragmentation area, the better our chances.  This suggests using large shells that can disperse large quantities of shrapnel.  However, there is a limit because the fragmentation pattern takes time to spread out after the shell explodes and if too much time is taken the target has flown past before the shrapnel can spread out.  So, there’s an effective limit on how big a pattern can be effectively used but I have no idea what that limit is.
 
Guidance – Guided projectiles offer another way to improve accuracy but at a significant, literal cost.  There are companies who offer, or are developing, small guided projectiles but, as far as I know, there is no test data under remotely realistic conditions that demonstrates that they are effective.  They may or may not be.
 
 
Conclusion
 
It is clear that naval guns are inherently inaccurate.  For the case of fixed land targets, we can compensate for inaccuracy with explosiveness.  If we’re firing 16” battleship shells, accuracy is a lesser concern as the giant 50 foot craters will compensate for a lot a inaccuracy.  We can also substitute multiple salvos for accuracy knowing that statistical odds will ensure that if we fire enough rounds, some will hit the target.  Besides, it’s not as if a fixed target is going anywhere.
 
However, if we’re trying to shoot down an anti-ship missile, we need small, light, very rapid fire guns which is the concept behind 20-30 mm CIWS guns.  It’s clear that larger guns (5”, 57/76 mm) are ineffective for the anti-air role, barring dumb luck.

Naval Bombardment Philosophy Recap

Well, our discussion wandered off into a land artillery discussion which is, admittedly, more than a bit related to naval bombardment.  The upshot of the discussion seemed to be that there are good reasons for the semi-standardization of land artillery on 155 mm guns.  The reasons include logistics, cost of the gun, ease of movement of the guns/munitions, munitions inventory, and general applicability/effectiveness of the 155 mm caliber.

I would note that most of those reasons don’t apply to naval guns in any significant way.  The cost of the naval gun is small compared to the overall cost of the ship, movement is effortless since the ship moves anyway, logistics are no more of a burden/challenge than for any other aspect of the ship’s logistical needs, and ships have relatively large magazines and sufficient inventory of munitions for their mission needs.

Beyond that, naval guns have a few advantages over land.  Modern naval gun loading is largely or totally automated which allows the rate of fire to be maintained indefinitely as opposed to hand loaded land artillery.  This allows the extended operation of larger caliber guns, if desired.  Being on ships, naval guns are inherently more survivable due to ‘stealth’, continual movement, and armor (well, guns used to be in armored mounts and ought to be today).

The conclusion seems to be that land artillery has settled on a reasonable compromise in the 155 mm gun but that naval guns are not bound by the same limitations.  Therefore, there is no reason not to have larger caliber naval guns.  Larger caliber guns produce bigger ‘booms’ and that is generally good.  For those cases where bigger is not better, ships, both individually and as a fleet, traditionally have a range of gun sizes and can choose the appropriate size. 

As with most things, a range of naval guns offers the best overall performance and value.  Too many people want to argue for one-or-the-other options when a mix is almost always best.  I don’t think anyone would argue that there are times when having a 16” gun available is highly desirable but that doesn’t mean the entire fleet should be armed with them.  A fleet mix of 5”, 8”, and 16” would seem reasonable. 

Some commenters have made the case for naval 155 mm guns and that’s a fair discussion.  Whether the benefits of moving to that size would be worth the disruption of the current 5” logistics, training, and support train is debatable.

In short, nothing about land artillery experience precludes larger caliber naval guns and I see no reason why they should not be part of the fleet gun mix.

Naval Bombardment Philosophy

Current US Navy gun support for amphibious landings has a capability gap – we have none!  The question is, is that due to a belief that naval bombardment as a vital element of an amphibious assault is not needed or is it due to mere neglect and stupidity?  In other words, is our utter lack of gun support due to philosophy or neglect?  One would be tempted to say that it must be due to neglect because the value of naval bombardment is so incontestable as to be self-evident.  However, historically, this has not always been the case.  Naval bombardment has not always been seen as necessary for the success of an amphibious assault.

The largest amphibious assault in history, Normandy, employed only brief and perfunctory pre-assault bombardment that was intended only to suppress the defenses, not destroy them. (2)  Contrast that to the Pacific assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa where the Navy conducted non-stop bombardments for weeks prior to the actual assault.  There you have the two extremes – nearly none and almost unlimited.  Which philosophy is right?  They can’t both be right, can they?  Let’s look a bit closer at the historical basis for the two different philosophies and, with that understanding, try to assess our current naval bombardment needs, if any.

As noted by historian and former naval amphibious planner, Christopher Yung, in his book “Gators of Neptune (1), which documented the naval amphibious planning for Normandy,

Another point of departure with Pacific amphibious doctrine was the Mediterranean view of the purpose, effectiveness, and duration of a naval bombardment of coastal defenses just before an amphibious assault.  Admiral Cunningham [Command in Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, First Sea Lord] … stated that, “the Americans in the Pacific placed a high value on naval bombardment in support of amphibious assaults, particularly by battleships, much higher than I thought was really justifiable.” (1, p.38)

However, Yung further notes that Admiral Cunningham changed his mind.

Following the war, Cunningham felt he should have given greater credence to the value of naval gunfire support for an amphibious landing … (1, p.38)

Based on their experience with various Mediterranean assaults, the US Army believed that pre-assault bombardment served only to alert the enemy and ruin the element of surprise. (1, p.38)  The Royal Navy’s RAdm. L.E.H. Maund seconded this philosophy but ascribed it to the British military’s deficient resources. (1, p.39)  We see in this thinking the belief, potentially correct, that if the attackers have less than overwhelming force that the element of surprise may be more important than pre-assault destruction.  Of course, one could ask why anyone would attempt an amphibious assault with less than overwhelming force but that’s a separate issue.

Supporting this minimal bombardment belief was British data on artillery effectiveness against hardened defenses which led the British to conclude that naval gunfire could, at best, provide suppressing fire which might temporarily neutralize the defenses but would be ineffective at destroying them. (1, p.39) It should be noted, however, that there is a world of difference between artillery fire and very larger caliber battleship and heavy cruiser fire with up to 16” guns.  The British did not appear to take that difference into consideration.

Yung notes, however, that this ‘Mediterranean’ minimal bombardment philosophy was not unanimous.  VAdm. Hewitt (commander US naval forces, Mediterranean) noted that pre-assault bombardment was an essential precursor for a successful assault. (1, p.39)

It is also noteworthy that the Mediterranean philosophy was derived from early war experience with less accurate and less lethal artillery and naval guns.  As the war went on, naval gunfire accuracy and lethality improved immensely

Eisenhower, himself, weighed in on the value of naval bombardment, stating that,

Pre-assault and support naval gunfire on beach defenses and pre-arranged targets was so devastating in its effectiveness as to dispose finally of any doubts that naval guns are suitable for shore bombardment. (1, p.39)

His thoughts did not, however, wind up dictating the extent of the Normandy pre-assault bombardment which was, by Pacific standards, minimal, at best.

RAdm. Hall (Commander, 11^th PHIBFOR, Force Omaha), expressed his dissatisfaction with the pre-assault bombardment after the Normandy operation was over.

It is believed that the time available for pre-landing bombardment was not sufficient.  German defensive positions were well camouflaged and strong.  It is considered that these positions should be destroyed by slow aimed fire from close range prior to the landing.  Something more than temporary neutralization is required when troops face beach mines, wire, anti-tank ditches and similar obstacles after landing. (1, p.208)

Note Hall’s call for close range naval fire (enhanced accuracy) as opposed to standoff fire (reduced accuracy).  As it happened, there were instances of individual destroyer Captains, on their own initiative and in violation of planning, moving their ships very close in to provide effective and critical point-blank gunfire.  This illustrates the element of risk in effective naval bombardment and the acceptance of that risk in order to achieve objectives.  Contrast this with today’s exceedingly risk averse Navy culture!

In contrast to Hall’s deprecating view of the bombardment effort, Adm. Ramsay (Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force) thought the minimal pre-bombardment was adequate and justified.

That naval gunfire neutralizes rather than destroys is still considered to be true … the policy of beach drenching [ed. short term suppressive fire] has been fully justified. (1, p.208)

Ramsay, then, believed it preferable to momentarily neutralize (suppress) enemy defenses rather than put any great effort into destroying them.

In the actual event, post-assault observation and analysis indicated that relatively few fortifications, gun housings, and casemates were outright destroyed.  This should come as no surprise given the inaccuracy of fire control at that time and the minimal amount of time the bombardments were conducted.  Pacific experience differed greatly.

The use of high velocity guns at [Kwajalein] showed, at least according to the US Navy, that this weaponry could be effective at smashing concrete pillboxes. (1, p.77)

As the Army noted, pre-assault bombardment does, indeed, notify the enemy of the coming assault.  At that point, it becomes a race between the attackers getting sufficient force ashore to achieve their objectives and the defenders getting sufficient reinforcements to the area to ward off the assault.  For Normandy, where the potential pool of reinforcement was vast, it was feared that a prolonged pre-assault bombardment might have allowed the Germans time to reinforce beyond the point that the assault force could overcome.  In contrast, in the Pacific, the Japanese forces on a given island had no source of reinforcement.  Hence, losing the element of surprise was irrelevant – the defenders couldn’t reinforce and couldn’t leave.  They were fixed and isolated and every additional hour of bombardment meant fewer and less effective defenders and defenses.

Naval Bombardment

While the concept of minimizing pre-assault bombardment in order to minimize the enemy’s time for reaction and reinforcement has some surface appeal and, indeed, logic behind it, the larger driving force of overwhelming force ought to negate the concept.  If one has overwhelming force (and if you don’t, why are you attempting the assault?) then the enemy’s reinforcement efforts can be interdicted with air power, airborne infantry, and long range battleship gunfire.  This presents the best of all worlds: extensive pre-assault bombardment reduces the immediate enemy defenses and the overwhelming force interdicts the reinforcement effort.  Thus, both the immediate defenses and the reinforcements are attrited before the actual landing occurs.  To a large extent, interdiction of reinforcements actually occurred at Normandy, thanks to overwhelming force, although the interdiction was divorced from an extensive pre-assault bombardment.

The British view that the element of surprise was necessary to make up for a lack of resources – meaning, a less than overwhelming assault force – was not an issue for the Americans in the Pacific as every US assault did involve overwhelming force.  Thus, surprise was, again, irrelevant.

In contrast to the Mediterranean view that bombardment was ineffective at destroying defenses, Pacific bombardments did achieve the objective of forcing the Japanese to concede the actual landing and retreat to inland prepared defenses in the form of caves, tunnels, and other fortifications that could be hidden from easy observation and protected from heavy bombardment.  Shore defenses were, in fact, found to be susceptible to prolonged bombardment, hence, the relocation of the defending assets to inland locations.

From the preceding discussion we see, then, the tension between the two conflicting philosophies:

• The desire to maintain the element of surprise
• The desire to inflict as much pre-assault destruction on the enemy as possible

While both philosophies offer seemingly valid arguments and rationales, it appears that the Mediterranean philosophy of minimal bombardment is largely based on assault force shortcomings and failings such as the lack of overwhelming force, limited resources, and doctrinally ineffective application of naval gunfire.  Thus, for a properly resourced amphibious assault the Pacific practice of prolonged pre-bombardment would appear to be the correct choice.

Having examined the issue of pre-assault bombardment, it is important to note that the discussion has nothing to do with bombardment support during and immediately after the assault landing.  Regardless of whether the assault used minimal or maximum pre-assault bombardment there is an undisputed need for naval gun support during the actual landing and immediately after, until the landing force can get their own artillery ashore and operating.

How does all this impact our views on naval gunfire today?  As you might expect, the exact same considerations and conclusions about pre-assault bombardment still apply.  However, technology has introduced some modifications into the methodology:

Range – Today’s defenders can use cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of hundreds or thousands of miles.  Even modern artillery and rocket launchers have ranges of many dozens of miles.  Thus, bombardment must not be limited to the immediate landing area but must take into account defending ‘batteries’ located hundreds of miles away.  These remote targets may need to be serviced by air power rather than naval guns but, regardless, they must be accounted for.

Interestingly, the potential remote range of defenses might, in some cases, mean that there are relatively fewer defenses/defenders at the actual landing site as compared to the WWII scenarios of highly concentrated, localized defenses and defenders.  If this is the case, the need for local bombardment may be reduced. 

The effect of range, then, results in a modification of the definition of bombardment to include not just naval guns but also missiles and aircraft/bombs.

Interdiction – The ability to defend from hundreds or thousands of miles away means that the concept of interdiction has to be greatly expanded.  Interdiction may have to occur hundreds or thousands of miles away.  This also leads to the possibility that there may be no interdiction in the strictest sense of the word since the enemy may have no need to physically move reinforcements to the landing site.  Still, there will almost certainly be some movement of enemy defenses toward the assault site and that movement, however far away, must be interdicted.

Precision Guidance – Many observers mistakenly believe that massive bombardments are no longer necessary thanks to precision guidance.  However, the reality is that precision guidance is a very limited capability in a peer defended assault scenario. 

For example, laser guided rounds are useless in bombardment because there will be no assets available to laser designate.  In a peer defended assault scenario, aircraft laser designators will be unable to loiter over the battlefield providing target designation and ground forces won’t even be available until well after the initial landing and will be too busy surviving to calmly and casually laser spot targets.  Further, the ground forces will be too localized and ‘compacted’ to designate targets more than a hundred feet in front of them even if they were willing to lift their heads above cover long enough to do so. 

Ships can, if so equipped, provide their own laser designation but that would be valid only for visible, line of sight targets and a smart enemy is not going to provide many of those.

GPS guided rounds would be effective but only against known, fixed, visible targets.  The reality is that a smart enemy will not provide many fixed, visible targets.

The reality is that unguided area bombardment is the only generally effective method.

Conclusions  

• For a properly resourced amphibious assault, prolonged and heavy pre-assault bombardment is clearly the preferred action and is essential to ensure a successful landing.
• Post-assault gun support is always required.
• In order for bombardment to be effective and worth the effort, naval gunfire must employ large caliber, heavy guns of 8” or greater size.  As demonstrated by WWII experience, 5” guns simply don’t have the power to effectively destroy hardened fortifications. 
• The area of bombardment on today’s battlefield will likely have to be greatly expanded although the bombardment may take the form of aircraft or missiles in order to achieve the required range.
• Precision guidance is only marginally useful in an amphibious assault.  Old fashioned area bombardment is still required.

Today’s US Navy utterly lacks the capability to provide amphibious pre-assault bombardment or supporting fires during the landing.  If we continue to insist that we want and have this capability, we need to procure bombardment capability.  The Marines long ago gave up their battleship gun support in exchange for a handful of magic beans and promises by the Navy that never came to fruition and they are now left with no naval gun support, whatsoever. 

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(1)“Gators of Neptune”, Christopher Yung, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2006, ISBN 1-59114-997-5

(2)Ibid. p.80-81,

From the Overlord Outline Plan: “As preliminary bombardment compromises surprise, it should be confined to the shortest possible duration consistent with the achievement of the required degree of neutralization.”

Assault Ratio

One of the well known cornerstones of maritime strategy is,

The Seat of Purpose is on Land (1)

Too many naval observers tend to view naval matters in isolation, as purely ship-on-ship affairs.  The reality is that navies exist to support ground actions.  Yes, they may do this, in part, by ship-on-ship battles but the ultimate purpose of a navy is to influence and support matters on land.  Thus, the US Navy in WWII found itself conducting a series of amphibious assaults in the Pacific in order to support the overall strategy of seizing the LAND(S) of Japan.

Unfortunately, the land (islands) that needed to be seized was held by Japanese forces that had had sufficient – often lengthy – periods of time to build fortified defenses.  Thus, overwhelming force was needed to ensure victory against a dug in and fortified defense.  This brings us to that well known axiom of attack which gives the advantage to the defenders by a margin of 3:1.  This means that the attacker must bring a numerical superiority in troops of 3:1 in order to ensure victory.

Attack is to Defense as 3 is to 1

Let’s look at the historical data for the Pacific campaign and see how the numbers and troop attack:defense ratios compared in several of the major defended assaults.

	Date	US Troops	Japanese Troops	Attack:Defense
Tarawa	Nov 1943	18,000	4,800	3.75 : 1
Hollandia	Apr 1944	50,000	14,000	3.57 : 1
Saipan	Jun 1944	59,000	29,000	2.03 : 1
Guam	Jul 1944	36,000	22,000	1.64 : 1
Tinian	Jul 1944	41,000	8,000	5.12 : 1
Peleliu	Sep 1944	47,500	10,900	4.36 : 1
Philippines	Oct 1944	200,000	85,000	2.35 : 1
Iwo Jima	Feb 1945	110,000	21,000	5.24 : 1
Okinawa	Apr 1945	183,000	76,000	2.41 : 1

Indeed, we see that the attacking US forces did, generally, have a 3:1 advantage although the ratios varied quite a bit.  A further factor affecting the ratio is that in an amphibious assault, there are other elements involved such as aircraft and ships which may positively impact the attacker’s effective ratio (fire support, bombardment, etc.) while not impacting the numerical ratio.  In short, the attacker:defender ratio is a useful concept but is affected by many factors beyond just troop counts.  The takeaway from the ratios we see in the table is that the attacking force did seem to recognize the necessity and/or desirability of having a significant numerical advantage and this is the lesson for us, today.

One also can’t help but be struck by the sheer numbers of troops involved.  We’ve come to believe that war is something that is conducted by a squad or platoon on patrol and that a major action might involve a company of a hundred or so troops.  In stark contrast, amphibious assaults in WWII involved multiple regiments, divisions, and even armies!  Given that a single big deck LHA amphibious ship can carry 1600 or so troops and other amphibious ship classes even less, where are we going to get the transport capacity to move 50,000 – 200,000 assault troops for a single operation?  But, I digress …

The numbers of troops – and remember that this was repeated for each assault! – suggest that we need to radically readjust our operational thinking.  When was the last time we practiced an amphibious assault with more than a single ship, let alone the twenty to ninety troop transports necessary for a serious assault?  If we think we’re going to conduct major amphibious assaults (a notion that ComNavOps does not agree with!), as the Marines claim to be able to do, we need to begin practicing how to coordinate that many ships, how to integrate them into a single operational plan, how to simultaneously unload them without them getting in each other’s way, how to get all those troops ashore (currently, we can only land a portion of the troops as we are limited by AAV numbers – how will the rest get ashore?), how to get the troops ashore quickly, how to move enough supplies (the logistics that are the heart of any operation) to sustain an assault, and a thousand other aspects – including fire support and, yes, I’m going to continue to bang that drum because our doctrine calls for it, assumes we have it, and yet we have none.

On a broader level, this same 3:1 requirement applies to land battles.  I’m not as familiar with Army matters but I know that for the last few decades we have stopped exercising complete, large units.  It’s probably safe to say that there is no serving General who has commanded an entire division in an exercise.  The Army has been leading the way among the services as far as refocusing on major war but even they are still woefully behind the curve.  Perhaps they’ve begun to exercise at brigade and larger levels but, if so, I’m unaware of it.  Regardless, the Navy and Marines are absolutely not operating at these levels and they need to begin doing so, immediately.

I touched on it, already, but these kinds of troop numbers also point to a need to reinvigorate our logistic capability.  How will we supply food, ammo, fuel, water, and the thousand other items needed by 50,000 – 200,000 men in the field?  How will we get that quantity of supplies to the operational area?  How will we provide escort for the logistic ships?  How will we get the vast quantity of supplies ashore in a timely manner given that we struggle to get enough supplies ashore during a minor humanitarian assistance mission?  How will we get supplies ashore if we don’t have a secure port?  And so on …

As I’ve stated in previous posts, it is not reasonable to have all the equipment and capabilities to accomplish this on hand today.  We didn’t have that capability at the start of WWII, either.  Those are the things you build during the war.  What is reasonable is to have designs for cheap troopships ready to go, prototypes of effective landing craft (not the nearly useless LCACs that we have) that are operational and working on tactics, plans in hand for likely major assaults, fire support plans (you know, for our non-existent fire support capability), etc.

Regarding exercises, no, I don’t expect us to perform an amphibious exercise involving 50,000 – 200,000 troops (although the assault fleets did exactly that prior to each assault!) but we should do at least a yearly assault exercise involving, say, a complete Marine Expeditionary Brigade (14,000 troops or so).  What a cluster**** that would be but, at least, we’d know where the problems are and we could begin addressing them now rather than waiting for our own Tarawa to find out that we don’t know what we’re doing.

We need to wake up. 

We need to remember that war involves massive numbers of people and equipment. 

We need to recognize that what we’re organized for and training for, today, bears almost no resemblance to actual war. 

We need to begin preparing for war …  China is.

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(1)http://www.navy.mil.za/SANGP100/SANGP100_CH01.pdf , p.6

Landing Craft And Firepower

It is foolish to ignore the lessons of history - those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it - and even more foolish to ignore the lessons when those lessons were learned in combat and paid for in blood.  Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we’re doing, right now, as regards landing craft.

Let’s take a look at our current amphibious assault landing craft capability and then compare it to what we had and how we executed assaults in WWII and see what the trends are and what lessons we’ve learned or forgotten.

Broadly speaking, today’s amphibious assault calls for an initial wave of infantry delivered via Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV).  The initial wave consists of infantry with no firepower beyond machine guns.  Once the initial wave has secured a “safe” beachhead, a follow on wave of troops, vehicles, artillery, tanks, and supplies will be delivered via high speed, air cushioned landing craft (LCAC) and LCU’s. 

One of the significant differences between WWII and now is that the military commanders of WWII understood the importance of firepower in the initial wave and constantly sought better means of delivering it.  Today, we’ve abandoned any pretense of attempting to deliver firepower with the initial wave.  Thus, the initial assault will likely wind up pitting our light infantry, with no significant firepower, against enemy armor and artillery, possibly supported by fortifications and larger guns, and backed up by long range rockets and cruise/ballistic missiles.  This will be a significant mismatch.

The initial wave will have no firepower and no rocket, artillery, mortar, and missile defense (C-RAM). 

In WWII, the main source of firepower during the assault was naval gunfire.  The initial assault force was supported by massive battleship, cruiser, and destroyer gunfire.  Naval gunfire provided days of pre-assault bombardment, suppressive fire as the initial assault waves were landing, and post-assault fire support as additional targets were identified.  Today, our naval gunfire is limited to a single 5” gun per Burke and, worse, even that meager level of gunfire has been rendered moot by our amphibious assault doctrine which calls for ships to stand 25-50+ miles off shore, well beyond the range of our 5” guns.  Thus, today’s initial assault force will not only have no heavy weapons or armor, they will have no naval gunfire support.  That means no pre-assault bombardment, no suppressive fire on landing, and no post-assault fire support.  This simply makes a bad situation worse and is a recipe for defeat.

Close Air Support (CAS - using the term generically) will only be sporadically available against a peer opponent that will likely either own the skies or contest the skies, making for an aerial no-man’s-land in which neither side can muster any useful or sustained CAS.  Helicopters will die a quick death from ubiquitous man-portable surface to air missiles.

Setting aside aerial and naval gun support issues, the main weakness of the overall assault concept is that the follow on wave is only viable and survivable in a low/no threat environment.  Marine/Navy doctrine recognizes that the LCAC’s and LCU’s are large, slow, vulnerable targets that cannot survive a contested landing.  The implied doctrinal assumption is that the initial wave will be sufficient to secure a “safe” landing area for the LCAC’s and LCU’s.  If this does not happen, and happen with sufficient speed, the assault commander will be faced with the no-win choice of not reinforcing and resupplying the initial wave or attempting to reinforce and resupply using landing craft that are unsuited for contested landings and are likely to incur massive losses which would incapacitate our follow on supply efforts.

Let’s return to consideration of the initial wave landing craft, the AAV.  The major problem with the AAV is that it is incapable of executing the Navy/Marine’s doctrinal assault concept of starting the assault from 25-50+ nm offshore.  The AAV is only capable of swimming around two or three miles.  Beyond that, the troops will become incapacitated due to seasickness.  This, however, is a mismatch between doctrine and equipment and, for the purposes of this discussion, we’ll largely ignore the issue (just as the Marines/Navy have been doing!!!).

On the plus side, today’s AAV is actually adequate, as far as dispersal of risk, in getting troops ashore.  The AAV carries around 20 troops.  The problem with the AAV is that it is a one-use vehicle.  It swims ashore and stays ashore where it transitions to a kind of poor man’s Armored Personnel Carrier (APC).  There is no option for it to return to the amphibious ships for more troops or supplies.  Thus, the follow on waves are strictly dependent on LCAC’s and LCU’s.  If the beach has been secured, this is fine.  However, if the beach is not secured then the LCAC/LCU will be entering a contested combat zone for which they are not survivable, according to the Marines/Navy themselves.

So, we seem to be at an impasse.  An initial assault wave of AAVs simply lacks the firepower to definitively secure the beachhead which means the follow on firepower can’t be delivered.  We have a classic Catch-22, here.  We can’t secure the beachhead without firepower but the only way to get firepower is to secure the beachhead.

How can we get the firepower we need in the initial wave?  There are two ways to go about it.

• Develop small, reusable landing craft capable of delivering a single tank, artillery piece, or heavy equipment/vehicle.


• Develop an amphibious tank.

Tank Landing Craft

For the initial wave, we need to bring tanks and heavy vehicles/artillery ashore in individual landing craft as opposed to, say, a large LST.  The initial risk is too great for an LST and we would risk too many tank losses from a disabled LST.

There are some landing/transport craft available that somewhat meet the need to transport a single tank but they don’t really meet all the requirements.

Here are some characteristics of an ideal tank landing craft:

• Sized for a single tank or heavy vehicle/artillery and no more


• Two-way, reusable.  The assumption that we’ll be able to use LCACs and LCUs after the first wave is likely to be incorrect.  The beach will, quite likely, still be contested and inappropriate for the LCACs and LCUs.  


• Should ride low in the water and present as flat a topside as possible with as much armor as possible (think Russian Hind helo in the water).  Such an arrangement would present little target area and what there is would be so slanted, relative to the incoming round’s trajectory, as to greatly negate incoming rounds.  The craft should be able to rise for unloading as it beaches, of course.  


• As high a speed as reasonably possible.


• Active protection similar to the Israeli tank mounted Trophy system

We Need A Tank Version Of The Higgins Boat

Amphibious Tank

WWII demonstrated conclusively that tanks or some form of heavy gun must go ashore with the initial wave.  The history of WWII landings in the Pacific was a steady movement towards ways to get heavier firepower (tanks) ashore in the initial wave.  It was found that getting actual tanks ashore was a very difficult task and, as a stopgap measure, the amphibious Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) was developed and armed with heavy firepower.  Specifically, the armored versions, the LVT(A), were fitted with various guns and weapons including a 75mm howitzer (the M8 Gun Motor Carriage turret), 0.30 and 0.50 machine guns,  a turret mounted 37mm M6 anti-tank gun, and Ronson flamethrowers. 

LVT(A) Amphibious Light Tank

Thus, an amphibious light tank, the LVT(A) was created that, while lacking in armor, provided the immediate heavy firepower needed to defeat infantry, obstacles, and fortifications.  Being tracked, it was able to climb over the ubiquitous coral reefs that sometimes stymied other landing craft.

Conceptually, as discussed, we need a landing craft that can carry a single tank to shore.  Failing that, we need a modern fire support LVT(A).  The Marine’s AAVs could possibly be modified to mount heavy guns, howitzers, and mortars.  I don’t know if it can be done but it’s a straightforward engineering exercise and ought to be doable – we did it in WWII so surely we can do it today.

Beyond that, we also need an amphibious anti-air defense vehicle and, again, a suitably modified AAV could provide AAW and C-RAM variants.

Of course, all of this discussion is pointless given the nonsensical 25-50+ mile standoff doctrine.  The maximum time troops can be in a landing craft is an hour, and that’s pushing it.  Any longer and the troops will be rendered combat incapable.  So, unless we can develop a first wave, infantry landing craft that can travel at 30-50 kts, the starting point must be moved back in to the horizon or closer.  The Marines have tried for decades to develop a high speed landing craft and failed miserably.  The conclusion is that the requisite technology is simply unattainable, at this time although, notably, the Chinese have developed a 15-17 knot amphibious light tank very similar to the WWII LVT(A).

Up Close And Personal

We’ve discussed and noted many times that the Navy/Marine doctrine of conducting amphibious assaults from 25-50 miles off the beach is not feasible and is completely at odds with the need for naval fire support given that the Navy’s only gun is the 5” which has an effective range of 9-15 miles, depending on version.

We need to recognize that  the 5” gun’s limited range means that a fire support ship would have to be within a mile of shore to have any useful range beyond the immediate beach area.  That’s close!  That puts the ship within range of enemy artillery, rockets, and mortars as well as anti-ship missiles.

So, how will the Navy provide fire support?  The short and bitter answer is they can’t.  Even if the Navy wanted to bring its 5” guns (meaning Burkes) into range, they’d be risking high-tech, multi-billion dollar, capital, AAW ships to conduct low tech fire support – not a reasonable risk.  We’ve discussed the need for dedicated fire support ships of both larger caliber (8” – 16”) and small (5”).  Assuming the Navy won’t build such a ship, is there anything they can do to modify a Burke to allow it to operate near shore and give it a better chance of survival and success?

As it happens, there are a couple of simple modifications that would enhance the Burke’s chances.

C-RAM – The Army has adapted the naval Phalanx CIWS to the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) function, apparently successfully.  The addition of three or four C-RAM units to a Burke would enhance its near shore survivability.  Given that the CIWS is a self-contained unit, requiring only ship’s utility hookups, installation of multiple units should be reasonably easy.  This would provide the ship with a degree of protection from artillery, rockets, and mortars.

Counterbattery – Aegis is, theoretically, capable of counterbattery sensing and computing with appropriate software modifications.  This would provide the Burkes with the ability to conduct counterbattery fire against both artillery, rockets, mortars, and anti-ship missiles.

The major near-shore threats to a ship are artillery and small anti-ship missiles and the modifications noted above would go a long way towards providing enhanced protection from both artillery and anti-ship missiles.  Thus, it would be possible to operate Burkes near shore with an enhanced chance of surviving.

Burke DDG - $2B and 1 Gun, Not Exactly Fire Support

Now, this doesn’t mean that this is a good idea.  Risking multi-billion dollar ships that constitute our main AAW defense is still a bad idea but, since the Navy adamantly refuses to build a dedicated, simple, cheap fire support ship, this at least offers a viable, if still unwise, option.

Failing this approach, any Marine assault will be operating without any fire support whatsoever which is one of many reasons why I say that our amphibious assault doctrine is non-executable and pure fantasy.