F-35 Congressional Testimony

The following is testimony provided June 23, 2026, on the F-35 aircraft program presented to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland.  Testimony provided by U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Masiello, Program Executive Officer F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office.[1]
 
Here are some illuminating quotes from the transcript.[1]
 
As you know, the readiness rates are abysmal.  Here’s a major reason why.
 

Gen. Masiello:  In this session, I think I can say one of our challenges, and you talked about it, is if I have over 1,300 operational aircraft out there.  I believe we have set and enabled a sustainment system for about 700 to 800.  So, there is our challenge in readiness. [p.10]

So, the military has sized the sustainment effort for only half the existing aircraft?????!  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 
As a result of the sustainment issues, readiness is in the toilet and the toilet is at the bottom of a deep pit.  Rather than acknowledge the problem, firing people, and then fixing the problem, the military is still engaged in accounting games trying to make it look less bad than it is.
 

Senator Kelly: Thank you.  So, the GAO [ed. Government Accountability Office]  FMC [ed. Full Mission Capable] rate is they said 25 percent.· Your office claims it's 56 percent. [p.18]

It’s 25% and even that is overestimated!
 
As a reminder, there are two sets of mission capable measurements:
 

• Mission Capable (MC) – The aircraft can perform at least one task.  Basically, this means the aircraft can get off the ground.
• Full Mission Capable (FMC) – The aircraft can perform any of its combat mission tasks.  This is what every aircraft should be.

 
One of the problems is low expectations.
 

Gen. Masiello:  We have a North Star for 80 percent MC across the entirety of the fleet, and we need to figure out how to do that. [p.11]

So, general, you’ve set a pathetically low MC standard (only 80% are even rated to be able to get off the ground) that you can’t meet and have no idea how to even achieve that low standard.  Wow.  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 

That's about as ready as it gets.

Sadly, these kinds of problems are not unique to the F-35 program.  For example, the Navy is building carriers and ballistic submarines without the dry dock capacity to support their maintenance.
 
Where is SecDef Hegseth?  How can he read this kind of testimony and not fire everyone connected to the program?  Hegseth has been a major disappointment and his lack of action is why this kind of problem persists across the military.

To be fair, how can Congress hear this and not fire people?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Testimony on the F-35 Aircraft Program”, staff, 1-Jul-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/07/01/testimony-on-the-f-35-aircraft-program

Discipline

No serious observer of US military forces can have failed to see the decline in training and readiness over the last few decades.  The following news article is testament to that decline by the fact that it is even newsworthy.
 

U.S. Army Gen. Christopher LaNeve, a commander known for enforcing strict discipline and later winning praise from President Donald Trump, is expected to become the Army's next top officer, according to U.S. officials.[1]

Isn’t enforcing strict discipline simply a given in a trained and ready military?  It should be!
 

Two years before joining War Secretary Pete Hegseth's inner circle, LaNeve built a reputation at the 82nd Airborne Division for rigidly enforcing rules, including banning cellphones during physical training and requiring troops to use only military-issued gear.[1]

Banning cell phones and insisting soldiers use military gear?!  What kind of nutcase is this guy?  More to the point, how far has discipline fallen if this is even a story? 
 
As you would expect,
 

The approach did not make him popular with many rank-and-file troops. Current and former members of the division said some soldiers booed LaNeve during All-American Week events in his final year commanding the unit.[1]

Anyone who booed should be instantly dishonorably discharged.  That they weren’t,  proves the depths to which discipline had fallen.
 
Fortunately, not all have bought into the fad of non-existent discipline.
 

However, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, a former 82nd Airborne commander who later recommended LaNeve for a senior Pentagon role, said the general restored discipline and traditional military values to the division.
 
"What he did, which I admired, he brought the 82nd — it had drifted away a bit — back to traditional training and traditional values," Kellogg said. "I think the Army had gotten away from the idea of traditionalism and what it means to fight and how to fight."[1]

Here’s where I fault SecDef Hegseth.  If the unit had “drifted away” from training and discipline, which is to say they drifted away from combat readiness, then the previous commander(s) should be promptly court-martialed for dereliction of duty and dishonorably discharged.  This is the kind of house-cleaning I had hoped Hegseth would implement and has not.  Very disappointing.
 
Please note that this post is not about Gen. LaNeve, specifically, but about discipline and training.  Indeed, LaNeve has some questionable actions he needs to be held accountable for.  For example,
 

In June 2023, LaNeve signed a Pride Month memo recognizing LGBTQ+ troops.[1]

The larger, main point is that military discipline has clearly deteriorated, badly, and needs to be reestablished immediately and forcefully.

 

__________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Gen. LaNeve Poised to Be Army's Next Top Officer”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 28-May-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/christopher-laneve-army-pete-hegseth/2026/05/28/id/1257791/

Ready! Ready? Not Ready …

It is the job of the military to have contingency plans for every conceivable scenario sitting on the shelf, ready to execute and to ensure that the force is properly trained, maintained, and equipped to execute those plans on a (figurative) moment’s notice.
 
When the Administration decided to strike Iran, it should have required nothing more than to pick a plan off the shelf and assemble the required assets.  We should have been ready and able.
 
Let’s digress for a moment.  How many aircraft carriers did we use during Desert Storm?  The answer is 6.  They were:
 

• USS Midway
• USS Roosevelt
• USS America
• USS Kennedy
• USS Saratoga
• USS Ranger

 
Compare that assemblage of power to the current Iran conflict.  How many carriers are active for this?  The answer is 2.  They are:
 

• USS Ford
• USS Lincoln

 
And Ford was at the end of a long deployment and overdue to return home.  We should also note that air wings during Desert Storm were larger than today’s air wings which makes the two carriers for Iran more like one and a half carriers!
 
An obvious question arises;  did operational requirements only need two carriers or were there only two carriers physically available?  Not knowing the detailed operational plan, we can’t say for sure but a common sense assessment sure seems to indicate that we needed more especially when we compare the needs of Desert Storm to this conflict.
 
Consider:
 
-We seem to lack sufficient air and naval coverage to keep the strait open.
-We clearly lack the air coverage to protect our bases and our Middle East allies from Iranian drones and missiles.
-USS Ford is approaching its one year deployment anniversary which clearly says that the vessel was used because no other carriers were available.
 
 
Were we ready or were we caught unprepared? 
 
A peripheral piece of evidence is the attempted deployment of a MEU during the early Ukraine conflict.  Despite having around 30 amphibious ships, the Navy was unable to form a ARG and provide ships for the MEU.  This suggests that the Navy is nowhere near combat ready and, further, has zero surge capability.
 
One might also ask why the Japan based carrier was not moved to the Middle East?  It’s not as if anyone believes that carrier serves any legitimated purpose in Japan.
 
I can’t offer any definitive answers but the circumstantial evidence suggests that the Navy is woefully unprepared for combat.

What’s A CNO To Do?

We have become an apologist society.  We excuse and rationalize every failure, often doing so even before the attempt is made.  For example, in past criticisms of CNOs (Chief of Naval Operations), I’ve encountered the apologists who say that the CNO can’t really do anything so I shouldn’t blame them.  ‘The System’ is at fault, not the individual. 
 
Nonsense!
 
From a comment I made a while ago to a reader who was apologizing for a specific CNO’s lack of accomplishments, comes this (note, I won’t identify the reader as I have no wish to embarrass them):
 
 
"is our current system such that even the best qualified CNO will be limited as to how much change they can affect?"
 
My answer … Of course not! A properly motivated and directed (meaning focused on the proper priorities) CNO could turn the Navy around in a heartbeat. Here's a few day one items that could be implemented with no input from Congress or anyone else:
 
1. Eliminate the use of waivers. Period. No exceptions. That, alone, would immensely improve training, safety, new ship completion, ship quality, and readiness by forcing actions to be completed instead of waived.
2. Mandate the elimination of rust on ships.
3. Move sailors from shore billets to sea to fill the at sea gaps.
4. Mandate that dry dock work be COMPLETED prior to leaving dock regardless of the consequences to subsequent scheduling.
5. Eliminate minimal manning and bring crews back up to full strength.
6. Reinstitute onboard maintenance capabilities (machine shops and trade skills).
7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
8. Enforce training standards and demand that individuals and ships fail when warranted.
9. Refuse delivery of incomplete, non-functional ships from industry.
10. Mandate physical fitness standards and separate all non-complying sailors.
11. Set ONE, identical standard of physical fitness for males and females.
12. Eliminate 80% of ship's paperwork and return the focus to combat training.
13. Stop building Fords.
14. End the obsession with unmanned.
15. Eliminate the zero-defect mentality.
16. Reinstitute old fashioned liberty.
 
Day two items that might require some input from others:
 
1. Fire 80% of flag officers
2. End deployments and say no to the Combatant Commadners incessant requests.
3. Obtain legislative regulatory relief or waiver on "non-green" corrosion prevention coatings.
 
I could go on endlessly but you get the idea. All it takes is a Trump-like CNO who has a clear, combat-focused mentality and has the courage to act.
 

Bringing Home the Fleet

In a recent post, a reader, referencing the current ‘3 ships to keep one deployed (3:1)’ model, asked this, 

Can we alter or change the maintenance, training, and deployable cycle we have into something better? Obviously with the shipyard logjam, we couldn't have all ships "up" at once, but could we somehow tinker, and maybe flip that to 2/3 ready, or more?[1]

My initial reaction was slight irritation and disbelief that after all the time I’ve spent advocating ending deployments and bringing the fleet home, people still didn’t understand the concept.  A few more seconds thought and I realized that the question was perfectly apropos because I’d failed to adequately explain the concept.  Yes, I’d talked endlessly about bringing the fleet home and some of the gross benefits that would derive from that (improved readiness, enhanced training, better maintenance, etc.) but I’d never bothered to explain exactly how all these benefits would come about.  What procedures would change to allow this?  What circumstances would change?  How, exactly, would these benefits occur?
 
I’d like to apologize to that reader and rectify my oversight, now, and explain how and why this would work.
 
 
Circumstances
 
Let’s look, first, at the change in circumstances that would result from a switch to home basing the fleet.
 
Miles – The most obvious change in circumstance would be that the ships wouldn’t deploy.  They’d be home based.  Okay, so how does this help?  Well, the home basing means that the ships wouldn’t be racking up endless miles which is another way of saying wear and tear.  A ship at home simply doesn’t wear out as fast as one on a 6-12 month deployment.
 
Support – Being home based means that every ship is within arm’s length of ready maintenance support.  That support takes the form of a ready supply of parts, repair technicians, machine shops, skilled trades, cranes, etc.  There would be no more delayed/deferred maintenance that piles up during an extended, many-month deployment.
 
It’s embarrassing for the Navy to even have to say this but the support would include corrosion control so that our ships don’t look like rusted out garbage scows.
 
Training – Did you know that a deploying group loses capability and readiness as the cruise goes on?  That’s because they don’t do what they’re trained to do while on a cruise.  They aren’t attacking or defending.  Instead, they’re just showing the flag and dozens of other utterly useless tasks.  A deployed group is less combat capable when they return from deployment than when they started.  How backward and unproductive – indeed, counterproductive! – is that!  A group that goes out should come back more combat capable than when they began.  After all, they were at sea and sea time should be all about high intensity, realistic training, not scut work (to borrow a medical term for pointless tasks).
 
The home base circumstance eliminates deployments and the associated, unavoidable degradation of readiness and, instead, allows continuous training.
 

Method
 
This is the key part.  Unless executing an actual mission, every home based ship is constantly doing one of only two things:
 

• Training
• Maintaining

 
That’s it.  Just those two things.  There are no other activities. 
 
In fact, even during maintenance, the bulk of the crew will still be training.  While a ship is in dry dock or tied up pier side for maintenance, the crew is still training (simulators, walkthroughs, courses, etc.)
 
So, what does this mean?  This is what I’ve failed to convey.  Every ship is always ready to surge to a real mission because there is no maintenance backlog because every maintenance item is attended to immediately.  If you haven’t deployed and developed a backlog of hundreds of maintenance items, there won’t be dry dock and pier side maintenance scheduling issues.  Every issue is addressed immediately.  Thus, at any given moment, no ship can have more than a single open maintenance item because every maintenance item is dealt with immediately.  That makes every ship continuously ‘ready’ and readiness is always 100% of the fleet.
 
Relax.  I know there are scheduled – and occasionally unscheduled! – major repairs or overhauls that are required and that results in a certain percentage of the fleet being hard down and unavailable.  We have something like twenty dry docks of various types so say twenty ships are always unavailable.  As of this writing, there are 296 ships in the Navy (includes various logistic and support ships that are active but not commissioned).  So, that leaves around 276 ships that should always be classified as ready and available.   That’s 93% of the fleet in a constant state of readiness. 
 
In contrast, currently, the Navy is attempting to achieve a state of around 75 deployable ships.  Out of a fleet of 296, that’s just 25% readiness and despite having been trying to achieve that for some time now, they’ve failed.  Fifty ships is the current readiness level and that doesn’t look to be changing anytime soon.  Fifty ships represents just 17% readiness of the fleet.  No wonder Lincoln only got three escorts!
 
Even ships that are undergoing some kind of pier side maintenance (tear down of a piece of equipment, for example) can be made ready almost instantly with a quick restoration of the affected equipment.  At most, the ship would have a single item in a degraded state which would still classify the ship as ready.
 
Today, ships routinely sail with long laundry lists of down or degraded equipment.  The Port Royal grounding, for example, saw that the ship’s navigation systems and many other systems were down or degraded despite having just come out of maintenance!  Every deployed ship has a long list of down or degraded equipment (casualties, as the Navy calls them).  A deployment is the worst possible thing you can do to a ship as regards readiness and maintenance and the longer the deployment, the worse the situation becomes.
 
With home basing, here’s what a typical ship’s month might look like:
 

• A week spent training for an upcoming exercise and/or general training.
• A week at sea in an exercise which includes 24 hour, intensive training leaving the crew exhausted each night and with no desire or energy to even think about video games, lounges, haircuts, weight lifting, movies, or any other crew comfort activity.
• A week spent debriefing and re-training the just completed exercise.
• A week spent performing preventive/routine maintenance.
• An occasional day sprinkled in addressing any emergent, unscheduled maintenance need.

 
Individual crew members might be sent to a shore training course at any time, subject to instant recall, if needed.
 
 
We see, then, that the keys to making this work are:
 

• Address maintenance issues instantly, as they arise.  No deferred maintenance.
• Constant training.
• Regular, short episodes of sea time conducting realistic exercises.  The short time frames eliminate the need for all but the most basic and necessary crew comforts.  Toilets? – squat over the stern!  Berthing? – hang a hammock somewhere!

 
 
Maintenance

Hand in hand with home basing is the requirement to return to ship-supplied maintenance instead of depending on contractors and shore support.  Yes, there will always be things that require a contractor (Aegis software or hardware support, for example) or shore support (specialized repair equipment, for example) but we need to return the majority of the maintenance responsibility back to the ship’s crew.  What better training is there for a crew than to maintain and repair their own equipment?
 
We need to include much more extensive machine shop facilities, electronic shop facilities, welding shops and equipment, etc. in our ship designs.  Let’s remove the now unneeded crew comfort spaces and replace them with ship maintenance and repair shops.  The crew can collect their mail, get a haircut, visit the bank, and watch a movie on shore since they’ll only typically be at sea for a few days or a week at a time.
 
Returning ship maintenance to the ship will also alleviate the burden on the shore maintenance support resources.  We shouldn’t need shore support to rebuild a pump, tear down a valve, replace seals, etc.  Those skills and capabilities should be inherent within the ship.
 
 
Benefits
 
So, to sum up, what do we gain from home basing the fleet?
 

• Constant training instead of just occasional pre-deployment training every year or so
• Constant maintenance instead of delayed/deferred maintenance at the end of a deployment
• 93% fleet readiness instead of 17% readiness
• No forward exposure offering an enemy a free ‘Pearl Harbor’ opportunity
• Maximum flexibility;  if all the ships are ready and available, our mission options are unlimited

 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Jjabatie, “Lincoln Escorts”, August 20, 2024 at 2:17 PM,
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/08/lincoln-escorts.html?showComment=1724188632892#c8797956642859824661

Submarine Readiness

As of this writing, the US Navy has 50 attack subs and is firmly on the downward trend which has been anticipated for decades.  With an imminent war with China looming (according to Navy statements), one would assume we’re taking good care of our subs and cranking out their maintenance availabilities with great haste.

 

The fleet attack submarine breakdown, by class, is : 

• Seawolf 3
• Los Angeles  26
• Virginia  21

So, how is the maintenance doing?

 

“We’re really struggling to get submarines out on time. Over the last ten years, 20 to 30 percent [came] out on time,” said Vice Adm. Bill Galinis … [1]

 

That means 70% to 80% of maintenance availabilities ran over schedule.  That’s not good.

 

As of Thursday, 18 submarines were in some type of maintenance, PEO Submarines Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker said … [1]

 

With only 50 attack submarines in the fleet, that’s 36% of the fleet in maintenance.

 

What’s causing the problem?

 

The earliest Virginia-class boats are among the hardest submarines to repair on time.[1]

 

“We’ve seen a significant growth in the amount of man days required in submarine availabilities, particularly in the Virginia class,” [Vice Adm. Bill] Galinis said.[1]

 

According to the Government Accountable Office, “Virginia class submarines have returned to operations almost nine months later than expected, on average; Los Angeles class submarines have taken four and a half months longer than scheduled, on average, to return to the fleet.[1]

 

What’s the problem with the Virginia class.  After all, they’re the newest submarines we have so they should have the least maintenance problems, right?

 

The Virginias were designed to operate closer to shore and with components that met rigorous NAVSEA standards for submarine safety, but were not as durable as some of the older components on the Los Angeles-class boats.[1]

 

“Where we were in the beginning of the Virginia class, we had a charge early on to build a design and build a submarine for an affordable cost to make sure we got the numbers we needed.”[1]

 

So, by their own admission, the Navy ‘cheaped out’ on Virginia class subs and now they’re suffering extended maintenance issues and, apparently, poorer quality components.  That’s what happens when you design to a business case instead of a combat case.

 

And now, let’s listen to the Navy rationalize away the problem:

 

“If you throw a rudder over on the Titanic, it takes a while for the ship to turn,” Rucker told USNI News.  “It’s going to take a little bit of time, just because there’s a lag and getting the resources or changing behavior or ensuring that we plan better for what we’re going to do.”[1]

 

The maintenance delays have been on-going for a decade, at least, admiral.  How much more time do you need to ‘throw the rudder over’?

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “NAVSEA: Navy ‘Struggling’ to Get Attack Subs Out of Repairs on Time as Demand Increases”, Sam LaGrone, 21-Sep-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/09/21/navsea-navy-struggling-to-get-attack-subs-out-of-repairs-on-time-as-demand-increases

Sorry, Can’t Do It

The Marine Corps, our national crisis response force, couldn’t respond to an emergency deployment request to deal with the Ukraine-Russia war.

 

As Russia prepared to invade Ukraine, the head of U.S. European Command asked for a Marine Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Ready Group to deploy early to Europe as a hedge against the conflict expanding.

 

But the Marine Corps couldn’t meet the request, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, told the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee today.[1]

 

The Marines couldn’t respond?!?!  Isn’t that their entire reason for existence?  Isn’t that why we have them around? 

 

According to Marine Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, crisis response is the Marine’s responsibility.  As he stated,

 

“Within force design is our ongoing requirement as a Marine Corps and by law to be the crisis response force for the nation.”[1]

 

So what happened?

 

According to Heckl, U.S. European Command chief Gen. Tod Wolters asked that the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group “sortie early to be on station as the Ukrainian situation evolved, or devolved. And we were not able to sortie the ship[s].”[1]

 

So, according to the Marine general, the blame lies with the Navy.  He further states,

 

The 22nd MEU was already prepared to go. However, the maintenance status of the three warships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group was “so bad” they were not prepared to leave then or after the invasion, Heckl told Defense One on Thursday.[2]

 

On March 16—a month and a day after the orders came down—most of the MEU departed Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge (LHD 3) and the amphibious transport dock Arlington.  The rest left aboard the dock landing ship Gunston Hall about a week or so later, Heckl said.[2]

 

The Navy owns 31 amphibious ships and the Navy and Marines are telling me that they couldn’t even muster 3 functional amphibious ships during a crisis?  If the three ships designated for the 22^nd MEU weren’t functional, are you telling me that the Navy couldn’t pick three other ships out of the remaining 28 amphibious ships in the fleet?  Is our amphibious fleet in that bad a shape that we can’t find 3 functional ships out of 31?  Or, is our Navy/Marine force so inflexible that only the three designated ships could be used for the 22^nd MEU and no other ships could be allowed to take their place?

 

If the Navy can’t even keep 3 amphibious ships out of 31 functional, why would we give the Navy any more new ships?

 

Whatever the answers are to the various questions, it looks very bad for the Marines and Navy.

 

Here’s what the Marine general had to say about the Navy’s readiness,

 

Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan, … assumes the ships have an 80 percent readiness rate, Heckl said Thursday.

 

“The 10-year running average for the amphib Navy is 63 [percent]. Last month, it was 46 [percent],” he said. “So the number is only valid if the readiness rates are achieved and maintained, which today is simply not the case.”[2]

 

The general threw the Navy under bus, big time.  The question is whether it was with good reason or not.  This is one side of the story – the Marine’s side.  We don’t know the Navy’s side.  Was it 100% the Navy’s failure, as the general claims, or were the Marines also not ready?  Unknown.

 

Regardless, this is a very bad incident.

 

The Navy’s vaunted and much hyped Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), which was supposed to solve the entire Navy maintenance and readiness problem and which failed instantly with the first aborted carrier deployment, by the way, was intended to prevent exactly this kind of scenario.  The OFRP has been a dismal failure.  The Navy has failed utterly and completely at ship maintenance.  Having ships ready to go is kind of like your only job, Navy.  You had one job and you failed.

 

 

Recommendations

 

Here’s my recommendations as a result of this embarrassing and humiliating fiasco:

 

• Cut the Marines down to one MEU.  Get rid of all the rest.  There’s no point having a bigger force that can’t be deployed.  There’s also no point maintaining a purely defensive, light infantry force – we’ve got the entire Army that can do that job better.
• Cut the Navy shipbuilding budget to zero until the Navy can prove that they can keep the ships they have functional.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet”, Mallory Shelbourne, 26-Apr-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/04/26/marines-couldnt-meet-request-to-surge-to-europe-due-to-strain-on-amphibious-fleet

 

[2]Defense One website, “‘We Should Have Been There’: Marine General Laments the State of the Amphib Navy”, Caitlin Kenney, 29-Apr-2022,

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/04/we-should-have-been-there-marine-general-laments-state-amphib-navy/366314/

F-35C Reality Check

Well, here’s a tidbit of information about the initial F-35C carrier deployment that you likely won’t see publicly acknowledged again.  Referring to the F-35C’s deployment aboard the USS Vinson, VAdm. Whitesell had this to say about the aircraft’s availability (readiness) rates.

 

“For that generation five fighter [ed. the F-35] to be fully full-mission capable, what was the percentage rate – which right now looks on paper starkly low, but now, what systems were not up? And how did it really affect – if we had to go into conflict, what would that be? And then what do we have to do to fix it?” Whitesell [Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell, Commander, U.S. Naval Air Forces] said.[1] [emphasis added]

 

As you recall, the F-35C just completed its first deployment aboard the USS Vinson.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise but the Navy’s, the F-35 had ‘starkly low’ availability.  The admiral did not offer a numerical percentage but given that the target full mission capable percentage is horrifyingly low (around 50%), ‘starkly low’ must be in the 20-30% realm.  That’s putrid and means the aircraft were barely operational.

 

What is the admiral going to do about the ‘starkly low’ availability rates?  Well, for one thing, he’s going to check on how spare parts impacted the situation.  Read this carefully,

 

“With our international coalition partners flying the platform too, when we ask for a part, did we lose out to another country when we were on deployment? Where were we on the pecking order? Right now, it looks like we fared well, but I need to talk to Lockheed Martin since they run the ASP [ed. Afloat Spares Package] and the global spares program – [Hybrid Product Support Integration],” he said.[1]

 

Did you catch the part about having to talk to Lockheed Martin ‘since they run the ASP and global spares program’?  So, it’s not the Navy that controls spare parts allocation for its aircraft … it’s Lockheed Martin. 

 

… GAO claims that “the government still has very limited control over the F-35 supply chain, including ordering, part procurement, and inventory,” with defense officials telling the GAO that Lockheed still maintains “substantial control” over areas like parts storage and transport, and maintainers describing constraints that keep them from repairing parts that are proprietary.[3]

 

How did we get ourselves into a situation where a civilian contractor controls whether or not a deployed carrier aircraft gets spare parts?  Having near monopolistic control over parts availability, Lockheed would never manipulate and restrict F-35 parts availability to subtly influence future production prices in their favor, right?  Right?  Still, does this sound like the way to run a war … hoping that Lockheed favors our deployed aircraft with parts?  On a related note, what if China cyber-hacks Lockheed and messes up the parts distribution system?  They could put our carriers out of action just by hacking the parts distribution computer program!  Is having Lockheed run the parts program really a good idea?

 

We’ve given up onboard maintenance ability to contractors and now we’ve given up spare parts management to a contractor?

 

In addition to spare parts shortages, here’s another one of the problems the F-35 encountered:

 

During the recent deployment, the F-35C squadron found that some seals on the aircraft did not function as planned in the at-sea environment.

 

“There’s already [a] new design coming out of Lockheed Martin for the new seals,” he said. “So there’s some learning that’s been done.[1]

 

The Navy declared IOC (Initial Operating Capability) for the F-35C on 28-Feb-2019.  That’s three years ago and we’re just now finding out that basic seals for a carrier deployed aircraft are a problem?  I guess that IOC wasn’t really operational, was it? 

 

On a related note, the seals issue once again highlights the difficulty in adapting a land based aircraft (which is what the F-35 is) to maritime use.  So many people want to point to some land weapon system and say, just bolt it to the deck of a ship.  Well, it’s a lot harder than that and this is yet another example of why most such efforts fail.

 

From the Navy’s announcement about the F-35C IOC,

 

The Navy added in its statement that “in order to declare IOC, the first operational squadron must be properly manned, trained and equipped to conduct assigned missions in support of fleet operations. This includes having 10 Block 3F, F-35C aircraft, requisite spare parts, support equipment, tools, technical publications, training programs and a functional Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS).[2]

 

I guess proper seals weren’t a requirement.  We also know that ALIS has never functioned properly.  Apparently, spare parts availability isn’t an assured thing.  So … how could the Navy have declared IOC?

 

The F-35C first flight was Jun-2010.  In the intervening 12 years, no one thought to test a carrier aircraft at sea or in a simulated saltwater environment to check things like seals?  They could have simply parked an F-35C on the deck of a deployed carrier, exposed to the elements, and then checked the condition at the end of deployment.

 

I know the Navy has never met a test they didn’t want to bypass but sometimes tests are good and necessary.

 

So, ‘starkly low’ F-35C aircraft availability persists and yet the Navy wants to get more F-35s into the air wings?  I think we need to back the availability truck up (and hopefully run over some F-35s!) and work on the readiness rates before we commit to placing the F-35 into the air wings and wind up further reducing our already hollow carrier force even more. 

 

Do we really want carriers going to war with aircraft that have ‘starkly low’ availability rates?

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “A Generational Change in Naval Aviation Has Begun Amidst Tight Budgets, Fighter Gaps”, Mallory Shellbourne, 24-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/24/a-generational-change-in-naval-aviation-has-begun-amidst-tight-budgets-fighter-gaps

 

[2]USNI News website, “Navy Declares Initial Operational Capability for F-35C Joint Strike Fighter”, Megan Eckstein, 28-Feb-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/02/28/navy-declares-initial-operational-capability-for-f-35c-joint-strike-fighter

 

[3]Breaking Defense website, “Pentagon wants $500M to get data to manage F-35 parts”, Valerie Insinna, 29-Apr-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/pentagon-wants-500m-to-get-data-to-manage-f-35-parts/

INSURV Annual Report

Congress, fed up with Navy attempts to classify and hide readiness data, put into law a requirement for the INSURV inspections to be summarized and submitted in a public, unredacted, annual report.

 

Title 10 USC Section 8674 requires an annual report not later than March 1 each year setting forth an overall narrative summary of material readiness of Navy ships, overall number and types of vessels and for in-service vessels, material readiness trends.[1, p.1]

 

By law, ships are required to undergo an inspection every three years, at a minimum.  However, as noted in the report,

 

As of 30 September 2021, there were 185 of 362 (51.1%) vessels, subject to inspection, that exceeded a 3-year inspection periodicity.[1, p.4]

 

Over half the required inspections have not been performed.  So much for the Navy’s adherence to the law.

 

If there are 362 ships subject to inspection once every three years then 121 ships should be inspected each year.  The reality is that only 79 INSURV inspections were performed in 2021.[1, p.4]

 

Inspections are required, by law, to be minimal notice inspections so as to assess true readiness rather than giving ships time to scramble and cross-deck equipment and personnel for inspections purposes.  In reality, the Navy has defined minimal notice as 30 days notice.[1, p.13]  That’s not exactly a surprise, come-as-you-are inspection, is it?  Again, this is the Navy working to hide readiness issues.

 

Without going into the gory details, inspections are now scored on a 0-1 scale which was presented numerically in the report as well as a color coded assessment of SAT/DEGRADED/UNSAT for ease of comprehension.  From the report,[1, p.14]

 

UNSAT (0.00 – 0.59)

DEGRADED (0.60 – 0.79)

SATISFACTORY (0.80 – 1.00)

 

The results are depressing for surface ships.  Of 17 surface ship inspections in 2021, the functional area inspections[2] were assessed as DEGRADED for 12 of the 20 areas, overall.  Bad as that is, it’s actually slightly worse than 2020 which ‘only’ had 11 of 20 areas assessed as DEGRADED.

 

On the plus side, for 11 submarine inspections, only 1 of 17 functional areas was assessed as DEGRADED.  Numerically, however, the 2021 results were an overall slight decrease in performance.

 

For carriers, the results were grouped across multiple years due to the small sample size.  The latest group (2018-2021) had 9 of 18 functional areas assessed as DEGRADED.  Overall, this is unchanged from previous years/groups.

 

The shining star of the inspections was the Military Sealift Ships.  From 21 inspections, only 1 of 11 functional areas was assessed as DEGRADED.

 

 

INSURV also conducted 23 ship trials of various types.

 

Based on these trials results, INSURV assessed that the following programs performed well on trials:

 

-INDEPENDENCE Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 2)

-SPEARHEAD Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF)

-LEWIS B PULLER Expeditionary Support Base (ESB)

-VALIANT Yard Tug (YT)

 

The remaining programs experienced significant deviations from OPNAV trials requirements or declining trial performance during this fiscal year. Three ships (CVN 78, DDG 1000, LCS 15) were unable to complete FCT requirements prior to their obligation work limiting date (OWLD). The VIRGINIA submarine program did not present any boats for CT in FY21 even though five boats, scheduled for delivery since 2019, have yet to be delivered. One craft (APL 67) had an unsuccessful AT and required a Retrial prior to delivery. Four additional vessels (LCS 17, LCS 19, LCS 22, and DDG 119) required Retrials because they had significant incomplete capabilities, uncorrected deficiencies, or unperformed demonstrations during FCT; two of these trials (LCS 17, 19) were not conducted. The LCS 1 program ceased new ship deliveries after LCS 23 because of a combining gear design flaw. The Ship to Shore Connector craft had propeller and cushion vane design flaws that limit its amphibious warfare capability. The DDG 51 program had continuing design concerns with its anchor windlass. The National Security Cutter program delivered a ship without two warfighting systems because of procurement delays.[1, p.9-10]

 

 

One of the things that stands out in this report is the number of failed inspections and trials that required retesting and yet were not performed.  Waivers are handed out like candy.

 

Another thing that stands out is the number of ships that have been delivered physically incomplete and yet accepted by the Navy.

 

This report is an excellent assessment of the state or our fleet readiness.  In this age of suppressing information, it is refreshing to see Congress step up and insist, via law, that basic oversight information about the taxpayer’s Navy be made available to the taxpayer.  I thank and commend Congress for this.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Navy Department, Board of Inspection and Survey, INSURV Annual Report, 1-Mar-2022

 

[2]Functional Areas are things like navigation, damage control, main propulsion, etc.

F-35 Readiness Failure Lessons

It’s no secret that the readiness of the F-35 (and most other US aircraft) is abysmal.  We’ve documented it multiple times including just recently (see, “The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates”).  Well, here are some additional data points provided by Ellen Lord, undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, that paint an even worse picture, if that’s possible.(1) 

 

 

	Rate	Target
Mission Capablea	69%	80%
Fully Mission Capableb	36%	50%

 

^a able to perform one of the F-35’s assigned missions – lowest level of readiness

 

^b able to perform any of the F-35’s assigned missions – highest level of readiness and the only one that is meaningful and useful and indicative of combat readiness

 

 

Aside from yet again demonstrating the fraudulent nature of Navy readiness reporting, the data demonstrates that the F-35 has consistently had atrocious readiness rates from the very start of the program until now.  Readiness has not generally or significantly improved and this is with an abundance of manufacturer’s assistance, clean bases, and ample parts (in most cases).  This does not bode well for war when all of those things will be in short supply.

 

What is causing the abysmal readiness rates?  According to Lord,

 

Lord attributed the low percentage of fully mission capable jets to ongoing issues with the F-35′s canopy and the F135 engine’s power module.

 

Although she did not elaborate, the program has grappled with a longstanding problem with “transparency delamination,” where outer layers of the canopy begin to peel away from the base. (1)

 

Other sources cite other problems affecting readiness.

 

The GAO noted that spare parts shortages had contributed to the F-35 not being able to meet readiness objectives.

 

“Specifically, the F-35 supply chain does not have enough spare parts available to keep aircraft flying enough of the time necessary to meet warfighter requirements,” the GAO stated. “Several factors contributed to these parts shortages, including F-35 parts breaking more often than expected, and DOD’s limited capability to repair parts when they break.” (1)

 

Okay, so the Navy is falsifying readiness reports and the F-35 is inherently difficult to maintain.  However, rather than beat up on the F-35 yet again, let’s focus on a few things that jump out from the data.

 

 

Targets – It’s bad enough to fail to achieve readiness targets but the larger issue is just how low the bar has been set on those targets.  A fully mission capable rate target of only 50% is absolutely pathetic and demonstrates just how far our definition of a good aircraft program has been dumbed down.  The same is true of the mission capable rate.

 

For any aircraft, the mission capable rate (the ability to perform just one of the assigned missions – which basically means the ability to take off) should be on the order of 95%+ while the fully mission capable rate (which is the only measure of a combat readiness) should be 80%.

 

This dumbing down, this lowering of expectations, is symptomatic of the mindset of the entire military.  Instead of demanding high performance and combat ready standards, we’ve lowered the bar in just about every area.  We’ve lowered the bar for boot camp and physical fitness requirements in order to accommodate women, we’ve instituted routine use of waivers to allow sailors with lapsed certifications to continue operating ships, NAVSEA has hugely reduced (essentially eliminated) the requirements for completion of a ship prior to delivery and acceptance, the Navy has attempted to bypass ship shock testing, and so on.  The list is nearly endless.

 

Quantity vs. Quality – While there is a well known axiom that quantity has a quality all its own, that pearl of wisdom only applies if the quantity is functional.  A thousand aircraft that can’t fly have no quality whatsoever.  We currently have something on the order of 400 F-35 concurrency orphans that are incapable of being cost effectively upgraded to actual current combat standards.  Yes, we’ve got quantities of the F-35 but we haven’t got functional quantities.

 

Our military leadership has emphasized numbers over readiness.  They would seem to prefer 100 aircraft with 40% readiness than 40 aircraft with 100% readiness.  Our military leadership would seem to prefer fifty useless LCS than much fewer ships that are actually functional and useful.  And so on.

 

K.I.S.S. – The failure to achieve even the minimal readiness targets points to an issue of over-complexity.  It stands to reason that the simpler the system, the easier it is to maintain.  The flip side of that coin is that complex systems are more capable …  in theory.  The reality is that overly complex systems fail to perform because they can’t be maintained.  We’ve often cited the fleet wide Aegis degradation as an example of this.  We have to readjust our thinking from trying for the most complex system we can to simpler systems that can actually operate at 100% of designed capability and can be maintained at that level.  We have to adopt the K.I.S.S. principle (see, “K.I.S.S.”)

 

Schedule-Induced Obsolescence – The failure to get the F-35 fielded in a timely manner guaranteed that the program would struggle with spare parts issues.  The parts that were readily available 20 years ago when the F-35 was being spec’ed are, of course, unavailable now, twenty years later.  This, alone, demands that we change our approach to design and acquisition.  We have to stop making weapon systems so complex that they require multiple decades to reach service.  All weapon systems struggle with maintenance after twenty years of service – it’s unavoidable.  Parts suppliers have gone out of business during the intervening decades or have moved on to different or upgraded parts that are not backward compatible.  We have simply got to field new systems in a much faster fashion.  I’ve laid out exactly how to do that (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

 

 

The F-35 fiasco offers many design and procurement lessons for us but we continue to steadfastly ignore them.

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “The Defense Department still isn’t meeting its F-35 readiness goals”, Valerie Insinna, 20-Jan-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/01/20/the-defense-department-still-isnt-meeting-its-f-35-readiness-goals/

The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates

I’m sure you all recall the memo issued by then Secretary of Defense Mattis in Sep 2018 that mandated that F-35 and F-18 aircraft would achieve readiness rates of 80% or greater by the end of 2019 (see, “You Will Comply”)?  How did that work out?  Well, in a miracle for the ages, less than 6 months after that memo was issued the Navy reported that Super Hornet readiness had jumped from the 50% mark, where it had been mired for several years due to parts shortages, personnel shortages, and other systemic problems, to as high as 76% despite all the same problems still existing.  Did that seem plausible?  Of course not.  Systemic problems don’t disappear in less than 6 months and huge backlogs of idled aircraft don’t suddenly become ready.  It was obvious that someone was playing reporting games and manipulating the data.

 

Still, the Navy continued to report high readiness rates, claiming to have exceeded the 80% mark.(2)

 

Here’s what I posted when the Navy announced their miraculous improvement:

 

Years of maintenance manpower shortages, higher than expected corrosion and problems, chronic spare parts shortages, depot backlogs, funding shortages, etc., all cured in less than 6 months by a single memo. 

 

Do you think readiness is unchanged and we’re just pencil-whipping and gun-decking the readiness reports?  Before you answer, consider all the Navy fraudulent statements and practices (lapsed certifications, acceptance trial waivers, fraudulent shock trial success claims, and hundreds of other examples) that we’ve exposed on this blog alone.  Now, let me repeat the question … Do you really think readiness surged that much in 5 months or less or is it unchanged and the Navy is just pencil-whipping the readiness reports? (1)

 

 

The GAO has now come out with a report on military aircraft readiness and it confirms what ComNavOps knew to be true – that the Navy was falsifying readiness reports.

 

The table below shows the GAO’s data for readiness of Navy aircraft during the 9 year period FY2011 - FY2019, inclusive.  GAO assessed readiness by comparing the aircraft’s mission capable rate (MCR) to the MCR goal established by the Navy.  Unfortunately, the MCR goals for each aircraft have been withheld from the GAO report as the information is considered sensitive.  Typically, MCR goals are on the order of 70%.

 

Note:  Mission Capable is the ability to perform any one of the aircraft’s notional missions.  This is the lowest possible form of readiness.  Fully Mission Capable is the highest level of readiness and the only one that we should be using – an aircraft is either ready to fly any mission or it is not ready.  MCR is often little more than the ability to take off and is of no use in assessing true combat readiness.

 

 

Aircraft	Number of Years Readiness Goal Was Met
F/A-18A-D (Navy)	1 of 9
F/A-18E-F (Navy)	0 of 9
F-35C (Navy)	2 of 7
F-35B (Marine)	1 of 7
F/A-18A-D (Marine)	0 of 9

 

 

 

 

Note that the Navy claimed that the Super Hornet readiness had exceeded 80% for the Super Hornet which would have likely easily surpassed whatever its readiness goal is.  Despite this, GAO, with access to real data, found that the Super Hornet never exceeded its goal. 

 

From the GAO report which addressed the SecDef Mattis memo and the Super Hornet and F-35 readiness,

 

We found that none of these aircraft had achieved the 80 percent mission capable  goal … (3, p.11)

 

The Navy publicly reported in late September 2019 that it had met the Secretary’s 80 percent mission capable goal for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler. Our analysis showed that mission capable rates generally did improve for these Navy systems over the course of fiscal year 2019, including meeting the 80 percent mission capable rate at particular points of time in fiscal year 2019. However, we found that none

of these aircraft achieved the mission capable goal when mission capable rate data were averaged for each day in fiscal year 2019. (3, p.12)

 

 

There you have it, the real readiness rates and they’re the same as they’ve always been – not ready!

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)Navy Matters blog, “You Will Comply”, 10-Apr-2020

 

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Surpasses 80% Aircraft Readiness Goal, Reaches Stretch Goal of 341 Up Fighters”, Megan Eckstein, 25-Sep-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/09/25/navy-surpasses-80-aircraft-readiness-goal-reaches-stretch-goal-of-341-up-fighters

(3)Government Accountability Office, “Weapon System Sustainment”, GAO-21-101SP, Nov 2020