MCM – Speed is Everything

The LCS mine clearance capability was a very marginal capability from day one, even if it had worked perfectly.  The fundamental, inherent, problem was – and still is – that the MCM module simply could not clear mines efficiently or quickly and in combat mine clearance, speed is everything.  An amphibious assault that has to stand offshore for days or weeks while mines are slowly cleared is a disaster.  A carrier group that is forced to drift in one spot for days while a navigational chokepoint is cleared of mines is a disaster.

 

As an example, the WWII Normandy D-Day landing accomplished its mine clearance ‘in stride’ as the invasion fleet crossed the channel.  There was no delay and there was no pre-sweeping to give away the element of surprise.  The mine clearance was an ‘instantaneous’ event that occurred as the assault began.

 

So, what do we know about LCS mine clearance?

 

From LT Roxanne Sumanga (MCM Naval Mine Warfare school) commenting at the Surface Navy Association (SNA 2021) Virtual Symposium held in mid-January 2021,

 

“The time piece is a little bit more tricky.  So generally as MCM Officers, we’re always working against time.  So regardless of platform, regardless of systems, we can always finish faster. The question is how much risk are you willing to inter?  [Example] So we can take a channel [and] clear it in 10 days, [and do it] by 7 [days].  Are you willing to sail through a channel with 40% risk?  So the time piece is relative.

Compare the LCS to the MCM Avengers. If the Avenger acquires a mine via sonar, it can do a run to detonate the mine.  With an LCS using unmanned systems, the LCS sends out the drone, gathers the data, analyzes it, and if questionable, sends out the drone again, do a different pattern to gather more data and then analyzes it again, and then send out a system to neutralize the mine.  So, for an Avenger that can detect and destroy a mine in four hours, it might take the LCS an entire day and that is because the LCS cannot do a single sortie to detect and engage and relies on unmanned systems.” (1)

Let’s repeat … Combat clearance is all about speed.

 

Speed can be achieved via individual speed from a single platform, cumulative speed by using a lot of platforms, or a combination of both.  The worst situation would be what the Navy currently has which is neither individual platform speed nor numbers of platforms.

 

The Navy currently has 8 active Avenger class MCM.  There are no LCS with functional MCM modules and only 6 LCS – 3 on each coast – are designated as future deployable MCM vessels.  The Navy has discussed various MCM module procurement plans but it is unclear where any additional modules beyond the designated 6 would go.  Regardless, it leaves the MCM numbers woefully short of any useful speed and capacity.

 

In previous posts and comments, I’ve analyzed the LCS clearance process and estimated the LCS can clear one mine per hour.  Based on Lt. Sumanga’s comment, that estimate may be wildly optimistic.

 

In combat mine clearance, speed is everything and we have nothing.

 

 

 

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(1)Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Program”, Peter Ong, 4-Feb-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-program/

Navy Retires Three Avenger Mine Countermeasure Ships

Without even much debate, the biggest threat to the Navy is mines.  To counter that threat, the Navy has only a handful of Avenger class mine countermeasure (MCM) ships and some long past retirement age MH-53E helicopters (see, “MH-53E and MineCountermeasures”). 

Avenger Class MCM

As we all know, the Navy’s vision was for the LCS to replace both the Avengers and the MH-53E Sea Dragon helos and that plan has failed spectacularly.  There are currently no MCM-capable LCS ships and the MCM module is still years away from functional deployment, if ever.  Further, the module swapping concept that would have allowed for surges of MCM LCSes has also been abandoned in favor of two 4-ship squadrons of dedicated MCM-LCS, one on each coast (actually, only 3 of the 4 ships in each squadron are deployable with the fourth being a training ship).  Given that colossal failure, you’d think the Navy would be caring for the Avengers as if they precious, newborn babies, right?  So, what is the Navy doing?  They’ve retired three Avengers (1): 

• USS Champion
• USS Scout
• USS Ardent

We’re down, now, to 8 Avengers and probably around 12 flyable MH-53E helos.  That’s our entire, global mine countermeasures force. 

Note that the helo fleet became operational in 1986 is now around 35 years old and the Avengers are around 30 years old.  Both are long past retirement age and both are substantially unsafe to operate.

We’re headed right down to ZERO mine countermeasure assets.

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(1)https://www.militarynews.com/norfolk-navy-flagship/champion-scout-ardent-decommission-after-distinguished-service/article_41422842-e581-11ea-ba58-ab888ee329cf.html

A Harsh Mistress

As regular followers of the blog are all too aware, the US Navy’s mine countermeasure assets are few and dwindling.  Compounding this problem is that fact that the US Navy bet ‘all in’ on the LCS as the MCM platform of the future and failed resoundingly.  As of now, there are only plans for 6 LCS-MCM, three on each coast.  Two additional training LCS-MCM might or might not be deployable.

The Navy’s helo-based MCM, in the form of 28 MH-53E Sea Dragons, is ancient, long overdue for retirement, and scheduled to be retired without replacement (see, “MH-53E and Mine Countermeasures”).

The Navy also operates 11 Avenger class MCM vessels which, like the MH-53E’s, are past due retirement and have barely been kept seaworthy.

With this background, you would think that the Navy would treasure every MCM asset it has and the loss of any would be devastating.  That makes the Jan 2013 grounding and loss of the Avenger class USS Guardian (MCM-5) on a reef in the Philippines all the more tragic.  The only saving grace is that no one was killed.

USS Guardian On Reef

Let’s take a look at the Navy’s grounding report, provided by the Navy’s Freedom of Information service. (2)

The first sentence in the Executive Summary of the original report says it all:

The grounding of USS GUARDIAN was entirely preventable.

And,

The CO, XO/NAV, and ANAV failed to ensure consistent application and compliance with prudent, safe, and sound navigation principles and standards during navigation planning and underway execution.

Does this sound at all familiar?  Isn’t this almost word for word the findings in the Burke collisions?  The Navy has had repeated opportunities to correct its cultural and institutional leadership failings and has declined to do so.

Before we go any further, it is necessary to address the general belief that the cause of the grounding was a chart error which implies that the crew was not at fault.  This is factually only partially correct and the conclusion that the crew was not to blame is totally incorrect. 

The crew had access to multiple charts and sources of navigational data, only one of which had an incorrect location for the reef.  The Captain and navigation team knew about the chart discrepancy, opted to ignore it, and chose to rely on the incorrect chart in a mistaken belief that it was the more reliable one.  The report covers the chart issue in great detail and makes clear that the inaccurate chart was not the cause of the grounding. 

Now, let’s look at some specifics. 

The Navigation Plan was badly flawed.  From the report,

The CO-approved Navigation Plan for the transit from Subic Bay, RP to Makassar, Indonesia was imprudent, unsafe, and unsound.

So, disaster was baked into the plan.

The CO-approved Voyage Plan for the restricted waters transits inbound and outbound Subic Bay, coupled with corresponding log entries and crew member statements, indicate exclusive reliance on a single source of electronic navigation (Global Positioning System (GPS) from the AN/WRN-6 or Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR)) by the Bridge during the Sea and Anchor Details despite the availability of visual aids to navigation and RADAR navigation.

How many times has ComNavOps pointed out the Navy’s dependence on GPS and subsequent loss of basic navigational skills?  Further, the dependence has created an air of arrogance fostering the belief that GPS is flawless.  This arrogance has led to the abandonment of basic precautions like lookouts, radar fixes, etc.

… the CO-approved Voyage Plan plotted the Plan of Intended Movement (PIM) over the northwest corner of the South Islet of Tubbataha Reefs, nearly the exact location where USS GUARDIAN ran aground.

Seriously???  You plotted your own grounding!  This is incompetence and negligence on a staggering scale.

Ignoring the fact that the navigation plan intended to run over a reef, there were various alarms that attempted to point out dangers.

Based on a simulation ran by the Investigating Officer and the_ Technical Assistant on the CO-approved Voyage Plan used by USS GUARDIAN on VMS-3 [ed, Voyage Management System], when the ship approached Jessie Beazley Reef and Tubbataha Reefs the VMS-3 issued 12 dangers with associated visual and audible alerts prior to the reaching the location of the grounding.

… visual VMS alarms and dangers were available to the OOD, QMOW, and CIC watchstanders at various portions of the transit. However, based on witness statements, it is my opinion that the audible alarms were not heard because the Bridge and CIC either disabled the audible alarm feature or turned the VMS volume down on their respective VMS consoles.

You plotted your own grounding and you turned off the alarms that tried to save you????

Wait, it gets better.

Had USS GUARDIAN not ran aground on the Tubbataha Reef, the imprudent, unsafe, and unsound CO-approved Navigation Plan would have placed the ship directly over another navigation hazard with unknown depth at latitude …

So, they had a second potential grounding as a backup in case the first didn’t get them?  You’ve got to admire that kind of determination to self-destruct.

Guardian On Reef

Equipment operability was also an issue.

All equipment related to safe navigation was operable at the time of grounding with the exception of the Digital Dead Reckoning Tracer (DDRT) and the starboard Bridge-to-Bridge radio in the Pilot House.

Prior to LCDR Rice assuming command, the Digital Dead Reckoning Tracer (DDRT) had not been used. When LCDR Rice assumed command, he directed use of the DDRT for contact management in ere. The CO released a Category Two Casualty Report (CASREP) for the DDRT, and technical representatives had come onboard to repair/replace a faulty circuit card. The repairs were not successful, and the DDRT remained degraded at the start of deployment up until the grounding on 17 January.

This demonstrates a long seen pattern of degraded equipment and failure to repair in a timely manner.  The Navy is focused on new ship construction to the catastrophic detriment of existing ships.

Guardian Being Cut Up During Salvage Operations

The report offers a conclusion,

There is nothing more fundamental to a professional mariner than the safe navigation of his or her vessel. As this investigation shows, the U.S. Navy is "re-learning" painful lessons taught by the grounding of USS PATRIOT (MCM 7) near Chinhae Bay, Korea on 19 March 2005, and the grounding of USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) on 5 February 2009. Only this time the lessons cost our Navy the total loss of a commissioned warship, and nearly cost Sailors' lives.

We can and must do better. My recommendations address deficiencies and/or causal/contributing factors identified in the areas of shipboard leadership, crew readiness, navigation standards, manning, training, personal qualification standards, equipment and publications.

Did the Navy learn any lessons from any of these incidents?  The subsequent grounding of the Antietam and collisions of the McCain and Fitzgerald demonstrate that they did not.

On an interesting and possibly related note, the report shows that the USS Guardian had 59 at-sea days in all of 2012.  That is not much sea time and the lack of practical experience may have been a contributing factor to the grounding.  We are seeing the same phenomenon play out, today, in naval aviation with non-deployed squadrons getting barely enough flight hours to stay flight qualified let alone any advanced training.  Similarly, no LCS deployed in 2018.  How are Navy personnel supposed to get experience if they don’t operate?

As the old saying has it, the sea is a harsh mistress.  Arrogance toward the sea will kill you.  Refusal to learn lessons will ensure that disasters continue to happen.  Navy leadership is badly broken and incapable of fixing itself.  Congress and the Secretary of the Navy need to clean house and fire every Navy Admiral and start over.

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(1)Navy Matters blog, “MH-53E and Mine Countermeasures”, 17-Apr-2018,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/04/mh-53e-and-mine-countermeasures.html

(2)https://www.cpf.navy.mil/foia/reading-room/2013/06/uss-guardian-grounding.pdf