Northrop B-21 Financial Loss

Northrop has, so far, totaled more than $2B in losses on the B-21 program.[1]
 
Can no one estimate a program anymore?  Are the people running industry and the military really as stupid as the evidence demonstrates?  It would appear so.
 

 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop logs new $477M loss on B-21 bomber due to higher manufacturing costs”, Valerie Insinna, 22-Apr-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/northrop-logs-new-477m-loss-on-b-21-bomber-due-to-higher-manufacturing-costs/

Stupidity Abounds!

The Boeing KC-46 tanker woes and resultant financial devastation should have been a cautionary tale for defense industries.  The lessons are myriad and obvious.
 
Now, we learn that Northrop Grumman (NG) has crafted its own aircraft production debacle with the B-21 bomber.  Grumman has officially taken a $1.6B loss and the production is just barely beginning! 

For several quarters, the defense contractor has disclosed in earnings reports that due to a fixed-price contract for the B-21 Raider’s low-rate initial production (LRIP) phase that was signed in 2015, a loss of up to $1.2 billion could be possible amid high inflation and workforce disruptions. That loss is now realized in a pre-tax charge of $1.56 billion, or $1.17 billion post taxes, according to the company’s 2023 year-end earnings report.[1]

Before you weep for Grumman and begin sending them donations, note that the fixed price contract isn’t actually fixed. 

The Pentagon so far has provided $60 million to offset some inflationary impacts for the B-21 program … discussions are ongoing for more …[1]

Sure, $60M is a drop compared to a $1.6B loss but I’m sure this is only the beginning of the financial assistance from the government.
 
Can Northrop Grumman learn any lessons from this stupidity-birthed disaster? 

As Northrop Grumman absorbs the losses associated with B-21, the aerospace giant is heeding lessons learned by other contractors about the pitfalls of fixed-price contracts. Since bidding on B-21 in 2015, “we certainly have changed our view on bidding of contracts where we did not have a mature design at the point of bid and yet we committed to fixed-price options into the future,” Warden said. “And we have, to my knowledge, not done that again.”
 
Northrop Grumman has “passed on high-profile programs” due to its apprehension around fixed-price contracts, according to Warden, and been more cautious in its bids.[1] [emphasis added]

So, by their own admission, NG knew what they were doing was stupid and yet they did it anyway.  In essence, they offered a fixed price bid on a fantasy wish list of a product.  A junior high school student would know not to offer a fixed price on an undefined product.
 
At least they now seem to realize that fixed price bids on immature product designs are stupid.  Of course, that’s closing the barn door after the $1.6B horse is out.
 
The military, of course, loves the idea of fixed price contracts on ill-defined products!  What they fail to realize is that, ultimately, they’re hurting themselves because it causes companies to refrain from bidding or to bid exceedingly high to cover anticipated cost overruns.  What the military should be doing is finalizing product designs before requesting bids.  That way, the companies know exactly what they’re bidding on and can make realistic cost estimates and bids.  In the end, both the manufacturers and the military win from that approach.  Unfortunately, that would require intelligence from the military and, like so many shortages today, there seems to be a severe shortage of intelligence in the military.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop Grumman logs billion-dollar charge on B-21 stealth bomber”, Michael Marrow, 25-Jan-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/01/northrop-grumman-logs-billion-dollar-charge-on-b-21-stealth-bomber/

Passive Hawkeye

Without a doubt, the most important aircraft in the carrier air wing is the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management aircraft, the E-2 Hawkeye.  The problem with the Hawkeye is that it is mostly an active sensor and reveals its position when it operates.  Yes, the aircraft flies offset from the carrier group because of that but it still tells the enemy that there’s a carrier in the area and where to begin looking for it. 

 

We’ve also noted that in future combat the E-2 will be forced to operate much farther back than desired due to the threat of very long range air-to-air missiles (see, “Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye”).  The Chinese VLRAAM reportedly has a range of 300 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  Hawkeyes are not survivable against such a threat.

 

What is needed is a stealthy, passive version of the Hawkeye.  A passive version of the Hawkeye would use:

 

• IR/IRST (Infrared/Infrared Search and Track)
• EO (Electro Optical)
• SigInt (Signals Intelligence)
• TCS (Tactical Camera System)

 

Being passive, there would be no aircraft sensor emissions for the enemy to locate and track.  In addition, if the airframe were stealthy the aircraft could operate much closer to the enemy thereby compensating for the reduced sensor range, resolution, and field of view compared to active radar.

 

A partial – and successful ! - model of such an aircraft is the old electronic version of the S-3 Viking, the ES-3A Shadow, which used signals analysis to provide situational awareness for the carrier group.  By all accounts, the ES-3A was quite effective and was phased out only as a [badly misguided] cost savings measure.

ES-3A Shadow - Passive Hawkeye?

 

Operating multiple such passive AEW aircraft would allow triangulation location of targets and increased coverage area.

 

Alternatively, we’ve discussed a stealthy active radar AEW aircraft based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”).

 

The main point is that the E-2 Hawkeye is no longer survivable on the modern battlefield.  We need a fast, stealthy version of a Hawkeye, likely based on the B-21.  The aircraft can be either passive or active (ideally, both!) or an air wing could have a mix of the two.  We've got to stop simply repeating the past because it was once successful.  Building more and more Burkes just because they were once successful and screwed up every design since is wrong.  Building endless upgrades to an ancient, prop driven aircraft because it was once successful is timid and wrong.  Instead, we have to start thinking about what future combat will be like and start designing equipment and operating concepts to fit that future.

B-21 Hawkeye

A recent comment about using a B-1 bomber as a sensor/guidance asset, working with missile truck aircraft, triggered some thoughts about the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye. 

The E-2 Hawkeye is the Navy’s long time aerial battle management and situational awareness asset for carrier groups.  The Hawkeye typically operates offset from the carrier and many miles away so as not to give away the carrier’s location.  The problem with the Hawkeye is that it is no longer survivable.  Chinese and Russian Very Long Range Air to Air Missiles (VLRAAM) are now in service that can reach a large, slow, non-stealthy target like a Hawkeye from two hundred or more miles away (see, “Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye”).  The Hawkeye’s lack of speed, stealth, and maneuverability all but guarantee that, if targeted, the Hawkeye will be destroyed.  Even the mere threat of VLRAAMs means that the Hawkeyes will have to operate much farther back than previously.  Situational awareness will be greatly reduced and aerial battle management will be rendered much less effective due to simply being unable to see the battle from so much further back.

E-2 Hawkeye

We’ve kicked around the idea of a stealthier, faster version of the Hawkeye but there’s been no getting around the obstacle of the giant radar system perched on the back of the aircraft.  This totally negates any stealth and hugely impacts speed and maneuverability.  Even the more advanced ‘fin’ type radars are still extremely large and negatively impact stealth, speed, and maneuverability.

Even if we could, somehow, defy physics and create a stealthy, fast, maneuverable Hawkeye with a giant radar on its back, the radar itself precludes stealth and survivability.  The powerful radar broadcasts continuously and loudly announces its location to the world and, specifically, to VLRAAM-carrying aircraft.

Chinese VLRAAM

So, what’s a battle management/situational awareness aircraft designer to do?

Enter the B-1/2/21 …

The B-1/2/21 bombers were designed as stealthy, fast, penetrating aircraft.  The B-2, in particular, was, apparently, originally designed as a high altitude, penetrating bomber, with a ceiling of 60,000 ft.  Operational requirement changes for a low level penetrating capability implemented late in the design process are claimed to have reduced the B-2’s ceiling to under 50,000 ft. (1)  The Drive website’s Tyler Rogoway speculates that the B-21 will return to a high altitude bomber. (1)

If we’re willing to consider a radical change in operational methodology regarding how we perform aerial battle management and situational awareness, we can immediately see the possibility of a new approach using large, fast, high flying, stealthy ‘bombers’. 

For the moment, let’s focus on the B-21 since it’s the only one that could currently be built although existing aircraft could be modified.  However, given the limited numbers of existing bombers, that would seem unlikely.

We’ve noted that the requirement for a giant radar on the back of the aircraft precludes stealth, speed, and maneuverability.  Why do we need such a large radar?  We need it to provide the power, sensitivity, and performance necessary to operate hundreds of miles from the actual aerial battlefield which is a necessary requirement to ensure the survivability of the Hawkeye, given its non-survivable characteristics.  However, think about it … what if we didn’t have to stand a hundred-plus miles off from the battlefield?  What if we could stand essentially in, or on top of, the battlefield?  If we could, we wouldn’t need such a large radar.  We could get by with a much smaller one.  Well, that’s exactly what a B-21 would give us:  a high flying, stealthy, fast, survivable aircraft that could bring a much smaller radar much closer to the battlefield – essentially, on or in the battlefield.

The B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ would be mixed into the battlefield and, using a low probability of intercept AESA radar combined with its inherent stealth, could monitor and control the battle up close.  With Mach+ sprint speed to escape and evade when threatened, the aircraft’s survivability is further enhanced.

Of course, the entire concept comes down to whether or not a sufficiently capable radar exists, or could be developed, that could fit internally on the B-21.  If it could, the concept is viable.  If not, ignore this post!

There is one other requirement for a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ and that is a large crew.  With all due respect (none) to the people who suggest that the F-35 will perform battle management, that’s just nonsense.  True battle management, not just guiding a single missile that someone else launched, requires computers, displays, and manpower.  Fortunately, a suitably modified B-21 would have ample room for a battle management crew.  I note that the preceding sentence may not be accurate given the B-21’s flattened airframe.  If sufficient space for crew and work stations can’t be fit into the B-21 then it would be necessary to design a somewhat modified aircraft though still along the same lines we’ve been discussing.  That’s an engineering issue and without detailed B-21 blueprints none of us are qualified to assess it.  We’ll stick to the conceptual design and leave the physical design to the designers.

B-21 'Hawkeye' ?

If the concept appears viable, it would be easy for the Navy to tap into the upcoming production of the B-21 and purchase a number of aircraft for conversion to a ‘Hawkeye’ variant.  Taking the concept a step further, it would also be an opportune moment to design a ‘Hawkeye’ variant based on the B-21 but incorporating more extensive, specific modifications intended to enhance mission performance such as greater altitude, increased internal space (if needed), enhanced bottom aspect stealth, enhanced self-defense electronics, greater sprint speed, etc.  Of course, this would drastically drive up the cost of what will, undoubtedly, be an already expensive airframe but the capability offered would justify the cost.  Effective battle management and situational awareness is a force multiplier of priceless value.

One final aspect to consider is that a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ doesn’t need to be a carrier based aircraft and, likely, wouldn’t be.  Given the 6,900 mile range of a current B-2, a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ could easily be land based and cycle to carrier/naval operations, as needed.  Carriers could, in fact, maintain on-board E-2 Hawkeyes for routine operations and call on B-21 ‘Hawkeyes’ when necessary although this may be an overly costly redundancy.

In summary, if we’re willing to adopt a completely different approach to situational awareness and battle space management, a B-21 ‘Hawkeye’ may be the answer to the carrier’s current E-2 vulnerabilities while still accomplishing the function.  With upcoming B-21 production run, the Navy has an opportunity to acquire some very advanced capabilities without having to pay for the basic airframe development costs although the ‘Hawkeye’ modifications would still be significant.

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(1)The Drive website, “The B-21’s Three Decade Old Shape Hints At New High Altitude Capabilities”, Tyler Rogoway, 6-Oct-2017,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14919/the-b-21s-three-decade-old-shape-hints-at-new-high-altitude-capabilities