High Tech Approach to Low Tech Problems

The Navy/Air Force are completing a five year test program of what appears to be the successor to the Counter-electronics High-Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) microwave based Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapon.

 

The High-Powered Joint Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Strike Weapon, known as HiJENKS, uses microwave technology to disable an adversary’s electronic systems.[1]

 

HiJENKS is the successor to the AFRL’s [Air Force Research Laboratory] Counter-electronics High-Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project [CHAMP], which completed testing a decade ago. Jeffry Heggemeier, chief of AFRL’s high-power electromagnetics division, told reporters during a June 24 visit to the lab’s Directed Energy Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico the program builds on CHAMP, taking advantage of new technology that allows for a smaller system equipped for a more rugged environment.

 

There is no designated platform for the weapon, as yet.

 

“We’ll start looking at more service-specific applications once we’ve done this test that demonstrates the technology,” he said.[1]

 

So, they developed a weapon with no delivery platform.  Okay … um …

 

The Air Force is also looking at a High Power Microwave (HPM) directed energy weapon (see, Ref [2] for a nice discussion of the technology).  I’m way out of my area of expertise here but it appears that the difference between CHAMP/HIJENKS and the HPM is that the CHAMP/HIJENKS is a releasable EMP ‘bomb’ that spreads its effect in an omni-directional, one-time burst whereas the HPM is a narrow, directed energy ‘beam’ that is transmitted via an antenna.  Please, someone correct me if I’ve got this wrong.

 

AFRL is also making progress on a more advanced version of its Tactical High Power Operational Responder (THOR), which uses HPM [High Power Microwave] technology to disable drone swarms that pose a threat to military bases. The next-generation platform is named Mjölnir as an homage to the mythical god Thor’s hammer. AFRL awarded Leidos a $26 million contract in February to develop the Mjölnir prototype and deliver it in early 2024.

 

Adrian Lucero, THOR and Mjölnir program manager, told reporters during the same June 24 briefing that counter-drone systems are becoming increasingly relevant as unmanned aerial vehicle technology advances.

 

“There are other effectors out there that are intended to go against drone systems like guns, nets and laser systems,” he said. “But what Thor brings to the table is it has a larger range to affect and it has a decreased engagement time.”[1]

 

The fascinating part of this is that the prototype has, apparently, been deployed for operational testing.

 

The THOR prototype returned last month from a year of operational testing overseas. While the system was in use, the program team was hard at work developing the Mjolnir upgrades to extend THOR’s range, increase its power by about 50% and improve its usability — recommendations from the Air Force Security Forces who were using it during the deployment.[1]

 

“We learned a lot of lessons from it being overseas, just working in that operational environment, having Air Force Security Forces airmen pulling the trigger and breaking it,” Heggemeier said.

 

I think it’s noteworthy that Security Forces are mentioned as having been the operational test unit.  This strongly suggests that the weapon is intended to counter small drones and drone swarms that would threaten bases or facilities in the field.

 

 

Low Tech Alternatives

 

I have no problem with developing EMP technology, whether as a single pulse ‘bomb’ or as a continuous, directed energy ‘beam’.  In particular, the use of the technology against drones and swarms seems a reasonable application.  The disturbing aspect of this is that it is yet another in an endless series of attempts to apply high tech solutions to low tech problems.

 

Drones, of the size and type used in swarm attacks, are a decidedly low tech problem.  They’re essentially hobby drones adapted for military annoyance uses.  They’re small, cheap, slow, physically weak, and have vulnerable communications.  That’s a low tech problem.

 

You’ll recall the flurry of ultra-advanced, high tech solutions to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in Iraq?  We spent untold hundreds of millions of dollars (billions?) attempting to develop futuristic detectors and neutralizers for IEDs while ignoring low or zero cost options that would have proven instantly and completely effective.  As far as I know, none of our high tech solutions ever worked reliably, all were hideously expensive, and none were ready when needed.

 

As an illustrative example, here’s some low tech solutions that could have effectively dealt with IEDs:

 

• IEDs were always planted on known US military transportation routes so STOP DRIVING ON THE SAME ROUTES ALL THE TIME.
• IEDs were always planted on roads so STOP DRIVING ON THE ROADS.  EVERY VEHICLE WE HAD WAS OFF-ROAD CAPABLE SO GET OFF THE ROADS.
• IEDs were generally planted at night so monitor the roads and KILL ANYONE APPROACHING A ROAD AT NIGHT

 

I can go on but you get the idea.  Effective solutions with no cost. 

 

We appear to be doing the same thing with the problem of very low tech drones.  We’re developing the most advanced, most expensive, least ready solution we can instead of applying low tech solutions.  What are some low tech solutions to drones?

 

• 0.22 cal machine guns with very high capacity, very high rate of fire, very small cost, easily transportable, and ready now
• ZSU-23-4 23 mm, 4-barrel, Self Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) type weapon
• Jamming – the type of drones we’re concerned about have low tech communications and control that are susceptible to simple signal jamming
• Foot patrols with shotguns

 

 

Conclusion

 

We’ve got to break our habit of automatically seeking the highest tech solution to problems instead of the lowest tech.  This is not some sort of anti-tech statement.  This is a rejection of high tech as the default response to problems.  The default response should be the lowest technology that solves the problem.

 

If someone can develop a high tech solution that costs next to nothing and can be made fully functional in a month … do it !   But, almost by definition, that can’t and won’t happen.  High tech takes time to develop and costs enormous amounts of money;  that’s why it’s called high tech !

 

 

 

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[1]Defense News website, “US Navy, Air Force running ‘capstone test’ of new high-power microwave missile”, Courtney Albon, 1-Jul-2022,

https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/07/01/us-navy-air-force-running-capstone-test-of-new-high-power-microwave-missile/

 

[2]https://www.electronicsforu.com/market-verticals/directed-energy-weapons-high-power-microwaves#:~:text=An%20HPM%20weapon%20essentially%20comprises%20a%20pulse%20power,weapons%20also%20include%20tracking%2C%20aiming%20and%20control%20systems.

LCS Hellfire Update

The Navy seems to be committed to mounting the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missile on the LCS for use against small craft.  Hellfire had previously been tested in March 2017 for launch capability and the Navy was working on problems with tip over – trying to get the missile to tip over from the vertical launch to horizontal flight and pick up the target.  That issue has apparently been solved, at least enough to allow further testing. 

USNI News website reports that the Navy conducted a live fire test in which four Hellfires were vertically launched from the USS Milwaukee, LCS-5, cued from ship’s radar and “other systems”, and hit small craft targets.  Thus, the test appears to have been an integrated launch using the ship’s combat control system.  The conditions of the test and the results are unknown although the Navy released footage showing one missile hitting a target.  Whether the other missiles hit is unknown.  The targets appeared to be moving although speed and range were not stated and it is unknown whether the targets were maneuvering.  The website article contains a brief video of the launch, if you’re interested. (1)

Just to refresh, here’s a few specs on the Longbow Hellfire, which is the Apache helicopter version of the missile.

Weight     100 lbs

Length     64 in

Diameter   7 in

Seeker     millimeter wave radar

Warhead    20 lbs

Range      ~4 miles with a minimum safe range of 546 yds

Hellfire missiles have a variety of warhead types (fragmentation, shaped charge, etc.) and it is unknown which type or types will be used by the LCS.

LCS Hellfire Launch

Range is less than for helo launched missiles due to the vertical launch.

The LCS launcher appears to be an adaptation of the Army M299 launcher in an embedded box mounted in the former NLOS weapon pit.  The launcher can hold 24 missiles. (2)

Recall the lineage of this LCS weapon. 

1. The original surface to surface missile for the LCS was to have been the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) networked munition

2. After cancellation of NLOS, the Navy looked to develop a custom replacement missile but dropped this project.

3. The Griffin missile was announced in 2011 as the next replacement but was also dropped.

Note that the Navy has still not officially committed to the Hellfire.  The project is considered developmental and is due to wrap up in 2019-20 at which point a decision will be made about deploying the system.

Successful integration of the Longbow Hellfire missile into the LCS will finally provide a credible anti-swarm capability.  Of course, the range is too short and the warhead too small to be a serious threat to corvette or larger size ships.  Thus, the Hellfire will offer a substantial improvement over the current, well … nothing, but still falls woefully short of the original anti-surface and land attack requirement of the ASuW module.

______________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “USS Milwaukee Launches Hellfires in LCS Surface-to-Surface Missile Module Test”, Megan Eckstein, 16-May-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/16/uss-milwaukee-fires-lcs-surface-surface-missile-module-developmental-test

(2)Navy Recognition, “Q & A with the U.S. Navy on Lockheed Martin Hellfire missiles for Littoral Combat Ships”, 17-Jul-2014,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/1900-q-a-a-with-the-us-navy-on-lockheed-martin-hellfire-missiles-for-littoral-combat-ships.html

New 57 mm Anti-Swarm Munition

ComNavOps has noted that the Navy’s LCS gun defense against small craft in the swarm scenario is ineffective.  It appears that the Navy has also recognized this because they deleted the LCS’ Mk110 57 mm gun from the Zumwalt class in favor of a smaller 30 mm gun which they claimed was more effective and more lethal.  Further proof of the gun’s ineffectiveness can be seen in early gun test videos intended to promote the gun but which actually show its ineffectiveness.

The main problem with the gun is the lightweight, airburst munition for the gun.  The round generates a lot of shrapnel which can kill unprotected crew but has little actual stopping power on a boat.  If a small craft is not stopped, the ship/gun cannot shift fire to the next target and while the ship/gun try to pound the target into stopping, all the remaining swarm boats continue their approach.  To be fair, guns, in general, are ineffective in such a scenario.  What is needed is a one-shot, one-kill weapon like a small, guided, fire-and-forget missile.

BAE Systems seems to have recognized the shortcoming of the Mk110 57 mm gun and has developed a new munition intended, specifically, for the small boat, anti-swarm scenario.  The new munition is the ORKA (Ordnance for Rapid Kill of Attack Craft) Mk295 Mod 1 57 mm guided projectile.

The projectile has a semi-active imaging seeker that can be laser guided or can seek its target autonomously by downloading an image of the target prior to firing (1).  The data sheet suggests that the target image is cued from a designating laser (2).  Guidance motive capability is accomplished via a system of four folding canards.

The round contains a bit over 200 g of PBX high explosive that delivers 1.4 kg of steel fragments (2).  Fuzing modes are timed, proximity, or point detonation (1, 2).

Maximum range is cited as 10 km (2) versus the claimed 17 km range using the current Mk295 Mod 0 projectile.

BAE Systems claims that the projectile will accomplish a one-shot, one-kill efficiency.  Note, however, that the burst mode is still the original weakness.  Presumably, the claimed increase in lethality is attributed to the guided nature of the round with the hope being that the round will burst in closer proximity to the target and thus prove more lethal.  Alternatively, the point detonation fuze mode might provide disabling hits but I don’t think the odds of hitting a small, high speed, maneuvering target are very great, even with a degree of guidance/seeking.

Without seeing a demonstration or some other proof, I conclude that the new, guided projectile will have only a marginally better performance and will still be totally ineffective in the anti-swarm scenario.  Still it’s small step in the right direction, I suppose.

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(1)Navy Recognition website,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2612

(2)BAE Systems website, data sheet,

file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/CDSS/My%20Documents/Downloads/baes_ds_Mk295%20ORKA_redesign_digital.pdf

UAV Swarm Attack

Technology marches on.  Is the small boat swarm attack still the best type of swarm attack for an enemy to use against the Navy (see, "Swarm Attack")?  As an alternative or complement, what about a suicidal UAV swarm attack?  Small UAVs are very inexpensive, much harder to hit due to their small size (though more susceptible to burst munitions), harder to detect and target, require no exposure of personnel (not necessarily a concern for Iran), are easier to apply from multiple angles, and can be massed in larger numbers.

On a related note, the Navy’s ONR (Office of Naval Research) is triumphantly demonstrating its LOCUST (Low Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology) UAV swarm technology.  Currently, the swarm consists of many 12-14 lb Raytheon Coyote mini-UAVs, each costing around $15,000.  The Navy sees this as the future of warfare.  The swarms are envisioned to be able to penetrate any defense due to sheer numbers.  The Navy is looking to conduct the same kind of swarm attacks that Iran is planning on!  The problem with this approach is that it’s too easy to counter and the Navy is not conducting realistic tests that would demonstrate this.

How will these swarms work?

"We'll launch large numbers of them, doing swarm operations, flying around, doing a number of different flight profiles, then doing a land recovery," Mastroianni [Lee Mastroianni, ONR's program manager for LOCUST]said. "We're flying them in different flight configurations where they're in very tight, and then they're going to change the relationship they all are to one another."

The swarming technology allows the drones to relate to each other spatially and fly their swarm formations with minimal human direction or intervention, which Mastroianni noted is key for practical and efficient unmanned technology that decreases the warfighter's burden.

"We have an operator that's monitoring it, keeping eyes on what's going on, and can reach in and change things if they want to," he said. "But the reality is, [the drones are] flying themselves, they're performing their mission and the operator's supervisory. So it tremendously reduces the workload to be able to control large numbers of UAVs." (1)

So, the swarm will consist of large numbers of relatively tightly packed UAVs maintaining their spatial separations from each other.  They’ll behave like a flock of birds.  The operator only needs to control one “leader” to control the movement of the flock/swarm.

What are the characteristics of an individual drone?

“The one meter long UAV was designed to be launched from a standard A-size sonobuoy tube of a helicopter or maritime patrol aircraft. After ejection, a parachute deploys and the UAV unfolds its X-wings to begin its electrically-powered flight.

Coyote can transfer full motion video up to 37 km (20 nm) using a 2 watt S-band transmitter. The vehicle has a 90 minute endurance at a 60 knot cruise speed and can operate at altitudes up to 20,000 feet. “ (2)

What is the impact of such a swarm?

“ONR wrapped up a series of land tests this week with an experiment atYuma Proving Ground, Arizona, where 31 of the 12-14 pound Coyotes were tube-launched in approximately 40 seconds and proceeded to conduct a series of swarm formations and maneuvers, Vice Adm. Rick Breckenridge, deputy commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, told an audience at the Pentagon on Friday.

"It's going to change some of the calculus of how we operate," Breckenridge said of the technology.” (1)

The idea is that sheer numbers will overwhelm any enemy’s defenses and if an individual drone is shot down the remainder will adjust to compensate.

Wow!!!!  A swarm that can’t be stopped!  What could be better?  Just for fun, though, before we change our calculus, shouldn’t we at least conduct some realistic tests?  Shouldn’t we fly these swarms against an enemy that fights back?  Shouldn’t we explore the kinds of defenses that might evolve to counter these swarms before we totally commit to them only to find out that the counters were so effective that the completely and cheaply negated our technology?  Shouldn’t we take a second look before leaping, lemming-like, off the technology cliff?

Coyote Swarm?

This is what is so dangerous about having people running the Navy who blindly lunge after the latest shiny toy.  I’m not an expert in this field, by any means, but the counters look all too obvious, cheap, and easy.  For example,

• Fragmentation shells are tailor made for a tight packed swarm.  A single bursting shell would decimate a swarm.  These 12-14 pound UAVs certainly have no armor or resistance to shrapnel bursts.  If we spread the swarm out to counter fragmentation shells then the single point of control is lost and each individual drone has to be controlled.  Even then, the individual drones are highly susceptible to burst munitions.  Remember, these 12-14 pound UAVs aren’t exactly going to be flying at Mach + speeds.  They’ll be very slow, target drones.  The slow rate of approach of the swarm allows the defender to target the drones in a leisurely manner.

• Electronic countermeasures can “cut” the communications and control cord to the swarm.  The problem with a swarm of this type is that if you lose the single point of control, you lose the entire swarm.  We’ve apparently seen lowly Iran disrupt (and take control?) our UAV comms to large, much more sophisticated UAVs. 

• Obscurants can blind the swarm.  The small drones can’t carry a radar and depend on simple optics that are susceptible to smoke and broad spectrum obscurants.

In addition to trying to anticipate countermeasures, has anyone asked about the effectiveness of these drones even if they make it to their target?  A 12-14 pound UAV would have, what, a 1 pound warhead?  That’s not exactly going to sink a ship or destroy an airbase.

Has anyone thought about the range of the drones?  A practical range looks to be around 60 miles.  A launching ship that is within 60 miles of the enemy has probably been under attack for quite a while.  Further, with a cruise speed of 60 knots, the swarm attack will take an hour or so to reach its target.  The launching ship will have long since been destroyed or will have destroyed the enemy through other means like an anti-ship cruise missile.

Now understand me clearly – there is nothing inherently wrong with drones or swarm attacks if we properly and realistically test them and develop realistic operational concepts (CONOPS) to employ them.  If we can do that and the results still look encouraging then, by all means, let’s pursue them.  However, the counters look obvious and easy.  Our refusal to develop viable CONOPS and conduct realistic tests sounds all too much like our failure to develop a CONOPS for the LCS and look how that turned out.  The Navy is so obsessed with the pursuit of technology for its own sake that they don’t even bother to examine whether it is actually useful. 

We simply must begin injecting reality into our planning and it starts with CONOPS and testing.

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(1)Military.com website, “Navy to Demo Swarming Drones at Sea in July”, Hope Hodge Seck, 24-Jun-2016,

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/06/24/navy-to-demo-swarming-drones-at-sea-in-july.html

(2)Naval Drones website,

http://www.navaldrones.com/Coyote.html

Swarm Reality

C'mon, people.  Think this swarm thing through.  If we are in an all out war with Iran which includes 20 mile free fire zones with no regard for civilian casualties and collateral damge, unlimited attacks on bases, ports, and small boat piers (again, with no concern for collateral damage), aerial sweeps for small boats, etc. then the swarm threat is no more than a minor nuisance - an afterthought.  A swarm attack won't even be able to get started.

Unfortunately, that's the least likely scenario.  Far more likely is that the US will either be ambushed with no warning or will allow itself to get sucked into a "limited" conflict with politically guided, proportionally graduated application of force coupled with extreme concern for collateral damage.  In these scenarios, we won't be identifying and engaging everything in a 20 mile radius - we'll be forced to wait for demonstration of hostile intent (we won't fire until fired upon) and we'll be forced to obtain unmistakable positive ID of enemy boats before firing.  Is that boat a civilian boat or does it have RPGs hidden under the usual piles of junk?  We won't know until someone shoots.  That swarm boat that we can see is beside a civilian boat - we won't shoot.

These are the circumstances in which swarm attacks will be effective.

I'm seeing way too many unrealistic assumptions about helos.  An LCS carries one helo (the -2 version may possibly carry two although that's highly questionable and has never been demonstrated to the best of my knowledge).  Helos are notorious for being down all the time for maintenance.  Even when operable, they're only airborne for a few hours each day.  The odds that a helo will be airborne, in the right position (not investigating something a hundred miles away), and appropriately armed at the moment of an attack is extremely poor.  

Further, a helo can carry 4-8 Hellfires.  So, a single LCS (or Burke) can, in theory, kill a maximum of 4-8 boats (realistically, probably only a couple) before it's out of weapons (assuming the boats have no shoulder launched SAMs which helos have been proven to be highly vulnerable to).  That still leaves the rest of the swarm to deal with.

Helos are not the answer.  At best, they may be useful as a small part of a layered defense.  Most likely, they won't be available.

Don't just match up individual weapons.  Instead, think through the overall scenario.  Yes, a helo can kill a boat but in a realistic scenario will not likely be all that effective or available.  Ask yourself what weapons the Navy actually has and what platforms would realistically be available.  There's nothing wrong with "what we ought to do" suggestions but recognize that those are different from "what we can do".  

Don't just spit out individual weapons.  Think through the scenario.  Reader GAB had a great comment about the perils of exposed personnel trying to operate anti-tank-ish weapons while receiving incoming rockets and shrapnel.  Yes, in isolation, a Javelin or TOW or whatever can destroy a boat but what is the reality of the overall scenario?  Can exposed personnel effectively aim a weapon from a high speed, pitching, rolling ship being showered with rockets and shrapnel?  Can you even target a boat that is hidden in the waves or spray half the time?  Sure, a weapon can pitch up to get a clearer view but it still needs an initial target lock.  What is the effective target lock range under those circumstances versus the Wiki specifications for weapon range?

Circumstances, rules of engagement, and practicalities are going to have far more impact than weapon specifications so let's think along those lines.  What I'm asking is that we think this through from a realistic perspective.

Iranian Swarm Craft and Weapons

We've discussed swarm attacks so it might be fun to see what some of the swarm craft look like and what kind of weapons they carry.  I'm not even remotely an expert on Iranian weapons so forgive me if I misidentify some equipment.

Here's a picture of several small craft presumably training as a swarm.  

Next, we see a nasty little craft, the Zolfaghar class, that carries two small Nasr-1 anti-ship missiles in cannisters and two torpedoes in the small bulges on either side of the cabin.

Here's a picture of a boat with what might be a ZU-23-2, twin cannon 23 mm gun.

Here is a boat firing a 107 mm rocket from a launcher atop the cabin and mounting a machine gun on the bow.  The rocket reportedly has a range of around 5 miles although in unguided mode against a relatively small target like a warship (compared to trying to hit somewhere in a city), the effective range is presumably much less.

Next we see an RPG being fired from a small boat.

For a bit more variety, small craft can also be used to lay mines.

Here's a Seraj class boat.  Note the rocket launcher atop the cabin.

Here's a nicely armed boat with rocket launcher, bow cannon, and stern machine gun.

Here's the same boat type shown launching a rocket from the launcher atop the cabin.

Here's a British made, very fast Bladerunner reportedly being reverse engineered for swarm attacks.

And, lastly, here's a Ya Mahdi high speed, unmanned boat.  Iran claims that it's radar evading due to its high speed.  I'm not sure they understand how radar works.

That gives you a feel for the variety of swarm craft and their weapons.  This is not meant to be comprehensive and I'm quite likely wrong about some of the identifications.  Feel free to jump in and correct me.

Bear in mind that these are the smaller swarm craft.  Iran, and other countries, also operate somewhat larger missile boats that would attack from much longer distances.  As one might expect, there is some overlap between the two broad categories of boats.  Of course, the problem with missile boats is that the missiles generally outrange the boat's sensors, requiring the boat to approach much closer than strictly necessary.  

Still, the variety of boats and weapons coupled with the purported numbers has to give a naval force pause for thought especially in the confined waters of the Gulf.

Swarm Attack

We often talk about how effective various guns or missile systems will be against a swarm attack but we never look at a swarm attack from the attacker’s perspective in order to get a more realistic idea of what a swarm attack will be like.  If we had a better idea of the characteristics of the attack, we’d be better able to evaluate our defensive systems.  That said, let’s take a closer look at how a swarm attack will be conducted.

I have to preface this discussion with the disclaimer that I have no inside information about swarm attacks.  The ideas put forth here are strictly my own based on what I might do.  Iran practices swarm attacks, to some degree, but I’ve never seen an authoritative write up on the methodology.

The entire crux of the swarm problem is one of dwell time.  Dwell is the time that a weapon must remain focused on a single boat before it can move to the next target.  Until the target can be definitely observed to be killed, the weapon must continue firing.  Otherwise, the target continues to close.

The problem is that a kill may occur without being obvious.  Consider a boat coming straight at us.  Suppose the first shot (be it gun or missile) kills everyone on board, thus rendering the boat mission killed, but the boat continues on its course, at speed.  How will we know that the boat has been killed?  The answer is we won’t.  To all appearances, the boat is undamaged and continuing its attack.  Thus, we’ll have to fire a second shot.  And a third.  And so on, until it becomes obvious that the target is killed.

How do we know a target is killed?  When it’s dead in the water it can be assumed dead.  Ideally, this would occur catastrophically – the boat would blow up leaving just a partial hulk floating motionless on the water.  More likely, the boat will gradually slow down and eventually come to a stop due to accumulated hits and holes from shrapnel.  The problem is that this can take several minutes per target.  Meanwhile the remaining boats are approaching at high speed.   The math on this is grim.  Take a reasonable number of attacking boats, apply a reasonable dwell time of several minutes per boat, and do the math of approaching speeds versus dwell time and you’ll see the problem.  It doesn’t end well for us.

For those of you who doubt the concept of dwell and believe that one shot will equal one kill, please take a look at the videos that are available of gunnery target practice against small drone boats.  There are only a few videos available that I know of but they are consistent in showing the lack of effects from the gun rounds.  The typical drone boat motors back and forth in front of the guns (always at very close range and on calm seas) and over the course of several minutes eventually slows down and comes to a stop.  That’s dwell time.  Fragmentation munitions, which is what almost all the guns fire, just aren’t effective at instantaneously stopping a boat.  A multitude of small shrapnel holes just won’t sink a boat in a tactically useful time frame.

Similarly, the idea of a gun firing a contact explosive munition is unappealing and unlikely to succeed.  For starters, the odds of achieving a hit on a small, fast, bouncing target that is frequently obscured in waves from a bouncing, high speed, maneuvering firing platform is very low.  Recall the Vincennes incident in which many dozens of 5” rounds were fired at boats and no hits were achieved.  Let’s face it, hitting a small, fast, moving target from a another moving target is a very difficult thing to do.

So much for the problem.  Now, the enemy can figure this out, too, so what are they likely to do that would enhance their chance of success?  What can they do to increase the dwell time?

Armor.  The most obvious tactic would be to add some simple Kevlar type armor around the cockpit to help protect the crew and increase their survival time.  We’re not talking about battleship armor that can shrug off 5” shells but, rather, simple flak armor to lessen the effect of shrapnel.  Flak vests for the crew would be another obvious addition.  Depending on weight, some simple armor could be placed around the engine and throttle linkages to minimize shrapnel damage.  Remember, the goal is not to make an invulnerable boat but to increase the dwell time to the point where some boats are assured to reach firing range.

Decoy Boat.  A lead, unmanned, decoy boat is another obvious tactic.  A heavily armored, remote controlled boat or two placed in the front of an attack specifically to absorb incoming fire for several crucial minutes while the remaining boats are closing would be very effective.  We would have no way of knowing whether the boat is a decoy or not and would have to honor the threat by engaging it until it is dead.

Remote Control.  Along the lines of a decoy boat, an entire attack consisting of several unmanned, remote control boats equipped as “suicide” boats would be effective and expendable.  Shrapnel would have no effect on the crew since there wouldn’t be a crew and sinking a boat via tiny shrapnel holes is a very time consuming exercise.  Such high speed drone boats already exist for very little cost. 

Obscurants.  Infrared, visual, and radar obscurants exist which could be dispensed by launchers and provide protection against missiles, in particular.  This would be a cheap capability and one readily deployed from small boats.

Active Protection.  Active protection involves destroying incoming missiles by automatic, point defense systems.  The best known example of this on a small scale is the Israeli Trophy system that is mounted on their tanks.  A system small enough to be mounted on tanks can certainly be mounted on a small boat.  On the other hand, this is a more complex and costly option and is probably less likely.

Flares/Chaff.  They work for planes and there is no reason they couldn’t be mounted on small boats and be effective.

Multiple Angles.  Attacking from around the clock is still an effective tactic, especially against smaller ships that may only have one or two weapons and have blind spots masked by the ship’s superstructure.  This would be challenging to achieve against an alerted ship but would be effective.

These are just a handful of ideas off the top of my head that could enhance the effectiveness of a swarm attack.  I’m sure Iran can think of others.  The point is that with some idea of how a swarm attack might occur, we can begin to intelligently assess the effectiveness of our defensive systems.  Here are a couple of obvious conclusions.

Catastrophic kills are required to minimize dwell time.  This strongly suggests the need for missiles.  Guns, especially with fragmentation munitions, are ineffective in the swarm scenario.

Fire and forget missiles are needed to allow rapid, multiple engagements and avoid the one-at-a-time engagement scenario which leads to high dwell times.

LCS Hellfire

As we all know, the current plan to beef up the anemic ASuW capability of the LCS is to incorporate the AGM-114L Longbow (Apache helo) Hellfire missile.  The Hellfire replaces the Griffon missile that the Navy briefly considered.  Here’s a few Hellfire specs.

Range:            500 yds – 5 miles (likely less with a sea level vertical launch)

Seeker:          millimeter wave radar

Speed:           Mach 1.3

Warhead:       20 lb, high explosive anti-tank (HEAT)

The missile’s active radar seeker gives it a fire-and-forget capability which, in turn, gives it the ability to engage multiple targets in a short time frame.  This is ideal for the small boat swarm scenario.  Hellfire is proven, lethal to small boats, and cheap enough ($100K+ per missile) to justify using for the intended purpose.

On the other hand, the Hellfire’s target set is extremely limited.  The target is strictly small boats that must close to a few miles or less to attack.  Presumably, this means small boats armed with RPGs and machine guns.  Larger missile carrying boats and fast attack craft (FAC) armed with small anti-ship missiles far outrange the LCS’ Hellfire and, thus, are not an applicable target set.

Still, assuming the Hellfire launch system does not wind up taking up too much deck space or internal ship’s volume, the missile is easily justified despite its limited target set.

The other question is whether the Hellfire will become part of the core seaframe capability or will be present only as part of the ASuW module.  Again, assuming the space and weight requirement is minimal, the missiles ought to be part of the seaframe although this is somewhat at odds with the Navy’s original intention of modular outfitting.  Of course, even the Navy has essentially admitted that the modular concept won’t work for the LCS.

Hellfire Missile

All in all, the Hellfire represents a good choice for the intended target set and can’t help but improve the LCS’ overall capability, at least to some small extent.  A small step in the right direction for the LCS!

Meggitt Hammerhead - Live Target Training

Continuing our mini-theme of training, one of the things I mentioned in a previous post was the use of unmanned small craft for use as drones in live fire exercises.  Well,  this is the small craft I had in mind – the Meggitt Hammerhead.




Meggitt Hammerhead - Unmanned Expendable Drone

 

The Hammerhead is a small, remote controlled, unmanned boat capable of speeds up to 40 kts.  These craft are designed to be expended in exercises thus providing as realistic training as possible.  Data collection and telemetry, including Miss Distance Indication (MDI) scoring, video telemetry, and radar augmentation allows the exercise to be recorded for later review.  Boats can be transported by ship and deployed as needed or launched from land and proceed to the training area in a unique “follow me” mode.



Here's a YouTube video of the Hammerhead in action.

One notable feature is that the boats can be operated in a swarm.  In a public demonstration, Meggitt operated 16 Hammerheads (Hammerhead USV-T) in a swarm over a seven hour period at the Esquimault Canadian Navy Base on 18-May-2010.  A company spokesman indicated that up to 40 boats can be operated at a time.

For the U.S. Navy, Hammerheads, individually or in a swarm, would be an ideal training exercise especially for the LCS which was designed for exactly this scenario.  The unmanned boats would allow the Navy to validate the LCS design and develop anti-swarm tactics under as realistic conditions as possible.



Hammerhead Swarm Trainer



Meggitt offers a range of surface and aerial training targets and is the world’s largest producer of unmanned target vehicles.  While declining to provide specifics of which Navies they’ve sold to and how many, a spokesman noted that over 200 Hammerheads have been sold.  The cost is comparable to a low-cost BMW automobile.

Disclaimer:  I have no connection whatsoever with Meggitt Training Systems. 

Meggitt Training Systems – Canada

Medicine Hat, Alberta, Canada

Email:  mtscanada@meggitt.com

Contact:  spencer.fraser@meggitt.com

Website:  http://www.meggittcanada.com/