Flat Out Lying

Occasionally, I delve into air force matters when warranted.
 
Hey air force (af), I understand spin and I understand differences of opinion but don’t flat out lie to my face and insult my intelligence.  

Air Force officials argue that the roughly $500 million required annually to maintain 32 Block 20 F-22s — which they emphasize are not equipped with the most modern weapons — would be better spent on developing the Raptor’s successor, the secretive Next Generation Air Dominance fighter. Lt. Gen. Richard Moore, Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, further estimated in April that making the Block 20 fighters combat worthy would take about a decade of effort and cost approximately $3.5 billion — a timeline that, ideally, would already see the NGAD system flying.[1]

 
Let’s look at the math on this.  The af is claiming that updating 32 F-22s would cost $3.5B.  Doing the arithmetic, that works out to over $109M per aircraft.  By anyone’s standard, that’s patently absurd.  You could tear the aircraft down to the wheels and rebuild it for that amount.  How stupid do you think I am, air force (I’ll capitalize their name and give them respect when they begin respecting me, the taxpayer)?
 
Liar.
 
Moving on … a decade to convert 32 aircraft?  Really?  Our entire industrial and military might could only convert 3 aircraft per year?  We can build a hundred brand new aircraft from raw materials but updating existing aircraft has a limit of 3 per year? 
 
Liar.
 
The NGAD will be flying in ten years?  Really?  The F-35 has been in development for over two decades and isn’t yet fully combat capable (Block 4 is required for that) and the automated logistics support system is non-existent in any useful, functional form.  But, we’re going to have the as-yet-to-be-defined NGAD flying in ten years?
 
Liar.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “‘Much better chance’ USAF can retire F-22s in FY24: Kendall”, Michael Marrow, 9-May-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/much-better-chance-usaf-can-retire-f-22s-in-fy24-kendall/

Naval Fighter – Weight vs Range

ComNavOps has stated that the role of a carrier and its air wing is to provide escort and protection for the Tomahawk cruise missile shooters, the Burkes.  Related missions include clearing lanes for Air Force bombers and establishing local air superiority for operations.  All these missions require a top end, pure, air superiority fighter.
 
One of the main characteristics of a useful carrier air superiority fighter is very long range/endurance.
 
Let’s look at existing and historical fighter size aircraft and ranges and see if we can project an achievable maximum range and aircraft size.
 
I’ve collected data on a variety of [mostly] fighter aircraft.  Obviously, range is a function of many factors including aircraft weight – and, of course, engine efficiency, flight profiles, weapon loads, fuel capacity, and so on.  However, weight is the factor we’ll examine today.
 
Range (combat radius, to be clear) and weight data are taken from Wikipedia and other sources and can vary widely.  I’ve tried to pick representative values.  I’m not going to debate specific data.  We’re looking at overall trends not exact values for a specific aircraft configuration and mission.  The overall trends are clear regardless of variations in exact values.
 
The graph below shows the relationship between aircraft range (combat radius) and weight, quite clearly.  The bigger the aircraft, the greater the range.  This is demonstrating that our desired long range, air superiority fighter is going to have to be big.  This is not really a surprise but the graph hammers the point home.
 

As we contemplate our desired fighter, we can see that the starting point is up in the F-22/14 area rather than the F-16.  Again, no big surprise.
 
It is noteworthy that the listed aircraft are all relatively old.  One hopes that aircraft engines have developed to a point that we can squeeze out additional range simply from having more modern, more fuel efficient engines in addition to emphasizing whatever other design characteristics might contribute to enhance range (shaping, maximized lift, reduced drag, conformal tanks, etc.).
 
One of the fortuitous benefits of a large fighter is potentially greater weapons carry.  Of course, we’re simultaneously trying to maximize both internal fuel and internal weapons so it’s a balancing act, to be sure!
 
We begin to see the outline of our desired fighter – it will be big and carry a large load of air-to-air weapons.  It’s going to be quite similar to an enhanced F-22 (see, “Long Range Carrier Fighter”) and may well be even larger.
 
As far as the actual Navy next generation aircraft, the only thing we can be reasonably sure of is that it won’t be a pure fighter and won’t have any of the characteristics that our analysis is indicating!

The Future Carrier Air Wing

The Navy is only marginally interested in the F-35 and, to their credit, they have never really gotten on board with that aircraft.  All indications are that they have been forced to accept the ones they’re purchasing.  Current plans call for only one squadron of F-35 aircraft per air wing.  It appears that the Navy is viewing the F-35 as a stopgap while they await the next generation fighter.  If true, this is a rare case of wisdom being demonstrated by the Navy.

 

ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that the primary mission of the carrier, today, is to escort Tomahawk shooters and Air Force bombers and to establish localized air superiority in support of other operations (see, “Aircraft Carrier – What Future?”).  Thus, the main function of the air wing is aerial combat and the main asset should be a very long range air superiority fighter. 

 

Long range strike is no longer a carrier mission because it can be better performed by cruise missiles.  Of course, this calls for a stealthy, supersonic, Tomahawk replacement but that’s another topic.  Carrier strike should be limited to short range, lower threat scenarios.

 

So, with that understanding of what the carrier’s proper role is, we can now begin to visualize the proper, future air wing as shown in the table below.

 

 

Type	No. of Squadrons	Squadron Size	Total Aircraft
Fighters	5	12	60
Strike	1	14	14
EW	1	10	10
Tanker	1	10	10
AEW	1	4	4
ASW	1	10	10
Total Air Wing =			108

 

 

 

The air wing is heavy on fighters since that is its role.  The strike aircraft are there for those occasions when a small, low threat strike opportunity arises.  Of course, the air wing composition could be adjusted, as needed, to fit the mission, and would likely consist of all fighters (72) most of the time.  Thus, a proper carrier group of four carriers could muster a fighter complement of 240-288 aircraft which compares favorably to WWII assemblies and is a vast improvement over today’s air wings of 40 or less semi-fighters for a 4-carrier group strength of around 140 semi-fighters.

 

It is also noteworthy that the proposed air wing has no helos.  The only use for a helo on a carrier is for the very rare search and rescue (SAR) of a downed pilot and SAR helos can come from the escort ships or a dedicated ASW/helo carrier (more on that below).

 

As noted, the WWII air wing of 90+ combat aircraft dwarfs today’s air wings of 40 or less combat aircraft and even surpasses the proposed air wing of 72 combat aircraft that we just discussed.  One of the problems is that the number of non-combat aircraft has increased from zero in WWII to near half the air wing, today.  Of course, when I say non-combat I mean non-direct combat.  Electronic warfare, AEW, and the like are vital supporters and enablers of the combat aircraft but the fact is that they take up precious space on the carrier.  What can be done about this?

 

Beefing up the air superiority numbers on a carrier cries out for transferring some of the non-combat aircraft to a dedicated ASW/helo carrier.  This would be a smaller carrier dedicated to ASW and helo operations.  This carrier would accompany the fleet carriers or any group that needed additional, intensive, ASW support.  It could also form the basis of an ASW hunter-killer group.

 

There you have it.  The future air wing composition is easily seen, as is the design of the future fighter.  It remains simply to build them (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

Naval Aviation Path

The Navy, as it often does, has flip-flopped in just a year or so on the viability of the F-18 Super Hornet. 

 

The Navy announced in its Fiscal Year 2021 budget submission that it would stop buying Super Hornets after that budget year, despite prior plans to buy more of the fighters in a multi-year procurement from FY 2022 to FY 2024. (1)

 

Now, you’re probably expecting ComNavOps to embark on a rant about the stupidity of Navy leadership, once again.  Well, I happen to agree with this move and, more surprisingly, I agree with some of the rationale and contingencies noted by the Navy.

 

RAdm. Andrew Loiselle (Director, Air Warfare Division, OPNAV N98) described the rationale this way,

 

Super Hornets are, “a 30-year airframe at 10,000 hours. So that takes us out to about 2055. And there isn’t a lot of analysis out there that supports fourth-generation viability against any threat in that timeframe. (1)

 

ComNavOps agrees completely with this.  The Hornet, in any of its guises, is a compromised aircraft that is optimized for nothing and sub-optimal is a good way of dying on the battlefield, current or future.  Terminating the Hornet production line is mandatory.  Of course, one can legitimately ask why, just a couple of years ago, the Navy thought that the Hornet could meet the future combat needs but now, suddenly, it cannot.  Well, that’s just more routine Navy incompetence.  But, I digress …

 

As you recall, the Hornet, in a misguided concept of epic proportions, was designed not with combat as the primary design requirement but with reduced operating costs as the primary driver.  This unavoidably led to a compromised design.  We’ve gotten away with it for several decades because there was no significant threat but that has now changed in a major way with the emergence of an expansionistic China.  We can no longer afford to depend on a sub-optimal aircraft whose distinguishing characteristic is reduced operating costs.  We need a true, optimized air superiority fighter aircraft.

 

Of course, this leads immediately to consideration of the next generation aircraft for the Navy and we have no idea when that will be ready for squadron service.  What do we do for aircraft in the meantime?  We have to have something, right?  Well, here’s a couple of answers:

 

1.     We absolutely cannot depend on the F-35 to be our future combat aircraft for the many reasons we’ve thoroughly covered in previous posts.  Any money spent on the F-35 from this day forward is money being poured down a black hole of uselessness.  Why spend money on an aircraft that is clearly not the answer to our future combat needs?

2.     We have a grace period of perhaps 5-10 years before the threat of a war with China becomes imminent.  It’s a risk, but we can bridge that gap with existing F-18 aircraft and the few F-35’s already on order while we develop the next generation aircraft.  Of course, that assumes that we don’t take 20+ years to develop the next generation aircraft and I’ve described how to field a suitable aircraft in just 5 years (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

 

 

RAdm. Andrew Loiselle (Director, Air Warfare Division, OPNAV N98) describes how to manage the gap years and potential aircraft shortages by adjusting the F-18 Hornet Service Life Modification (SLM) program,

 

Loiselle argued that investing in Service Life Modification upgrades for aircraft already in service provides the capability and flight hours the Navy needs, noting the service can pay for three upgrades for the same amount of money it would cost to buy one new fighter. If the Navy does need more Super Hornets in the future, Loiselle said he can add more aircraft into the SLM update program. (1)

 

RAdm. Loiselle is spot on.  The Navy has plenty of Hornets that have reached – or soon will - the end of their normal life spans but that can be revitalized to serve several additional years, if necessary.  Using the SLM program this way is prudent and wise.  Of course, this depends on being able to process Hornets through the SLM program expeditiously and that is by no means a given.

 

As we noted, all of the above depends on the next generation aircraft (Next Generation Air Dominance – NGAD) development to be timely, affordable, and combat focused.  So, what do we know about the NGAD program direction?  Not much!  Here’s what the USNI News article had to say,

 

The NGAD program is classified, so service officials have provided little details. But NGAD is slated to be a family of manned and unmanned systems that will work in conjunction with a fighter jet, also known as the F/A-XX, as the nucleus. (1)

 

It would seem the Navy is already heading off the rails.  What is needed is a very long range, air superiority fighter and, instead, the Navy is looking towards a multi-role (note the F/A designation which automatically means compromise) aircraft whose primary purpose is to hop aboard the unmanned, distributed fantasy train.

 

So, while I agree with and applaud some of the Navy’s decisions regarding the future of the F-18, I have to reserve a huge amount of caution because the Navy seems to already be screwing up the NGAD program.  This fixation with ‘families of families’, ‘systems of systems’, and unmanned is wholly (unholy?) without any analytical or empirical foundation and yet the Navy is betting the future of the country on it.  This is reckless, in the extreme.

 

Why has the Navy opted for this highly risky course of development?  Well, I don’t claim to be privy to the Navy’s innermost thoughts but it seems pretty obvious that much, if not all, of the motivation comes from budget considerations and the Navy has decided that ‘unmanned’ is the answer to out of control costs.  The rest of us would look at poor designs, horrific program management, reduced industrial capacity, and similar reasons for the out of control costs but self-blame and self-control is not the Navy way so Navy leadership merely rails against high costs with no acknowledgement that they, themselves, are the reason for the high costs.

 

Unfortunately, we have no Navy leaders who have ever experienced peer combat or even participated in complex, realistic exercises so they have no concept of what’s required.  Hmm … I said I wasn’t going to rant and yet …  Sorry about that.

 

 

 

So, the Navy is half right and half incredibly wrong.  They’re right about the need to terminate F-18 production but they’re incredibly wrong about the future of naval aviation.

 

 

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Questions Future Viability of Super Hornets; Recommends Against New Buy”, Mallory Shelbourne, 3-Aug-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/08/03/navy-questions-future-viability-of-super-hornets-recommends-against-new-buy

Navy Writing Off The F-35?

In the budget proposals currently being released, the Navy has abruptly changed direction and indicated that 2021 will be the last year that Super Hornets are purchased.(1)  The funding for Super Hornets that would have been purchased between 2022-2024 will be redirected to the nascent Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, sometimes referred to as F/A-XX.  Interestingly, there has been no concomitant announcement of increased F-35C purchases to compensate for the truncated F-18s.

The Navy has always been lukewarm, at best, about the F-35.  For example, former CNO Greenert often downplayed the importance of stealth and the Navy has delayed and minimized its F-35 purchases as much as possible.

Recognizing that China is the driving threat, the Navy may have realized that the F-35 is not ideally suited for the Pacific theater.  A 2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report points out,

… in order for a future carrier air wing to be effective in a major conflict with China, it would need to develop aircraft that could operate consistently at ranges of up to 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier. That’s double the effective combat range of an F-35C. (1)

That being the case, which ComNavOps happens to agree with, it makes no sense to purchase either Super Hornets or F-35s.

This is one decision by the Navy that I agree with wholeheartedly.  That may surprise some readers but the logic is inescapable.  It is silly and pointless to purchase aircraft that are not suited for the mission.

While the Navy has not announced any increase in F-35 purchases, neither have they announced any decrease.  I’d suggest applying the logic of the F-18 termination to the F-35 and terminating its procurement, right now, in addition to the F-18.  It makes no sense to continue to acquire more aircraft that are not suited to the mission and it’s not as if the lack of new aircraft for a few years will matter.  We have more than enough aircraft to equip the one or two carriers that we’re struggling so mightily to put to sea each year.  If we need more aircraft, we can always focus on repairing some of the 50% of the aviation fleet that is sitting idle, awaiting depot level maintenance.

Of course, the corollary to the decision to terminate F-18 production is that the NGAD has to be suited to the task and be affordable in the requisite numbers.  History suggests that the odds of those two conditions being met in a new acquisition program are quite poor.  The potential saving grace in this situation is that the Navy will not be tied to a monster, joint acquisition program that only partially meets their needs as was the case with the F-35.  If the Navy can keep the NGAD a purely Navy program, they may be able to keep the requirements focused on their needs.

Of course, this also assumes that the Navy even understands what the requirements are.  Given the debacles and poor decisions of the Ford, LCS, CMV-22 COD, MQ-25, and now the unneeded frigate, it is quite likely that the Navy won’t get the requirements right even without interference from other services.  Still, hope springs eternal and we have to hope that they can correctly define the requirements.  If they fail, they will have no one else to blame.

Disturbingly, the latest statements from current CNO Gilday suggest that the Navy doesn’t know what it needs from the NGAD.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said late last year the service was still thinking about how it would move forward with carrier aviation.

“I do think we need an aviation combatant, but what the aviation combatant of the future looks like? I don’t know yet. (1)

Seriously?  You’re the top guy in the Navy and you don’t yet know what you need from the next aircraft?  That’s pathetically inept.  Do you really not know or are you just scared to put yourself on record and are waiting for myriad studies to give you the cover you need for deniability if it fails?  Why don’t you take a lesson from the Marine Commandant?  Although I have misgivings about his vision, he has a very precise vision and it didn’t take him more than about an hour in office to flatly, fearlessly, and emphatically lay out that vision.  So, come on CNO Gilday, either demonstrate some leadership or step aside and let someone with more vision and courage lead the Navy.

Moving on … Cost is other aspect that has to be addressed.  A $100M NGAD is simply not going to be affordable in sufficient numbers.  Again, the Navy’s history of cost control in acquisition is stunningly poor and does not give rise to confidence that the Navy can control costs and produce an affordable aircraft.

Even so, this is a golden opportunity for the Navy to terminate the F-18 and get out from under the crushing F-35 budget weight before too many are purchased.  It’s a chance to reset the entire naval aviation component.  The F-18 can serve as a gap filler while the NGAD comes on line, assuming it happens quickly (and it can – see, “How To Build A BetterAircraft”), and the F-35 can serve as the stealthy sensor platform that the Navy has talked about while allowing the [hopefully] better suited NGAD to assume the workhorse combat role.

No matter how you look at this, one thing seems clear: the Navy seems to be abandoning the F-35 already although, to be fair, they never really embraced it.  It appears they’ll make the minimum number of purchases required by the program directors and move on to the NGAD.

Honestly, the possibility that the Navy could dodge the bulk of the F-35 debacle has me positively giddy.  Of course, leave it to the Navy to quash that feeling with yet another poorly executed acquisition program.  Still, as I said, hope springs eternal!

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Cuts Super Hornet Production to Develop Next-Generation Fighter”, Sam LaGrone, 10-Feb-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/02/10/navy-cuts-super-hornet-production-to-develop-next-generation-fighter

Air Force 5-Year Fighter Production Plan

The Air Force must be reading this blog since they’re copying one of ComNavOps’ posts almost verbatim.  The Air Force wants to build a new aircraft in just five years.  What?!!!  Five years?  How is that possible?  Well, ComNavOps explained how to build an aircraft in five years in a post a couple of years ago (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

Now, the Air Force is jumping on the bandwagon.  Presumably, the F-35 debacle has scared them to the point of recognizing that the current acquisition process is not viable.

The U.S. Air Force is preparing to radically alter the acquisition strategy for its next generation of fighter jets, with a new plan that could require industry to design, develop and produce a new fighter in five years or less. (1)

Build a new aircraft in just five years?!  Astoundingly, that’s exactly the time frame that ComNavOps put forth.

How will the Air Force accomplish this?  Why, the same way that ComNavOps has repeatedly stated should be done – by building with only existing technology and building in small batches!  To wit,

… the NGAD [Next Generation Air Dominance] program will adopt a rapid approach to developing small batches of fighters with multiple companies … (1)

Instead of maturing technologies over time to create an exquisite fighter, the Air Force’s goal would be to quickly build the best fighter that industry can muster over a couple years, integrating whatever emerging technology exists. The service would downselect, put a small number of aircraft under contract and then restart another round of competition among fighter manufacturers, which would revise their fighter designs and explore newer leaps in technology. (1)

… instead of trying to hone requirements to meet an unknown threat 25 years into the future, the Air Force would rapidly churn out aircraft with new technologies … (1)

This is exactly the process I’ve called for in both aircraft and ship acquisition.  Stop designing mega-programs that try to future proof platforms (not possible and hideously expensive) and, instead, build for shorter lifespans (see, “Ship Service Life Reduction”) and smaller batches of specialized assets.  The small batches and shorter lifespans allow future tech to be incorporated as it becomes available.  There’s no need to future proof that new aircraft because you’ll be building a new batch in a few years anyway and you can incorporate the future tech then.  This is just common sense on a cracker.

This approach also has the added and hugely important side benefit of keeping more industrial companies current and viable as opposed to the winner-take-all mega-project that ensures we wind up with just one or two companies.

I may have to sue the Air Force for plagiarism!  They are almost literally copying my posts.  Relax Air Force, it’s okay.  I don’t mind if you copy and adopt my ideas.  You should and you have my blessing!

Okay, Navy, the Air Force has seen the light of ComNavOps’ brilliance now what about you?  Get on board!  Let’s start building smaller, specialized ships with 15-20 year lifespans (you aren’t conducting maintenance so they won’t last long, anyway) and no need for future tech concurrency which has proven to be the downfall of the last several ship programs.

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(1)Defense News website, “The US Air Force’s radical plan for a future fighter could field a jet in 5 years”, Valerie Insinna, 16-Sep-2019,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/2019/09/16/the-us-air-forces-radical-plan-for-a-future-fighter-could-field-a-jet-in-5-years/

F-35 or Next Generation?

Consider the following seemingly unrelated points – or maybe they are related?

• The F-35 won’t be fully combat ready for several more years, if even then.  When ready, the F-35 will only be a mediocre aircraft with much of its technology obsolete or easily matched by other aircraft due to the extremely protracted develop period.

• A few lessons have been learned even by the military.  The Air Force has stated publicly that they have no interest in initiating another multi-service aircraft project.  The Navy has strongly suggested that an overemphasis on stealth may be inappropriate. 

• The next generation fighter has been under conceptual development for a year or more.

• We just recently discussed the concept of a five year development/production cycle and found it to be achievable if certain rules were rigidly followed.

Do you see the connection and the logical conclusion?

If we should be able to develop an aircraft and have it production ready in five years and the F-35 is still five-plus years away from being combat ready, logic suggests that if we terminated the F-35 today, we could still have a combat ready, useful, next generation aircraft ready in the same time frame as the F-35 or even a bit sooner.

Of course, the key is the definition of “next generation”.  If we do as we’ve been doing and try to make the next generation aircraft an anti-gravity, invisibility, laser armed, telepathic controlled fantasy wonder weapon then, no, it can’t be ready for production in five years.  But, if we thoroughly understand the aircraft’s mission, narrowly focus on just that role, use only existing technology, define our requirements well, insist on no change orders, limit the aircraft to just the Navy, and manage the project as I’ve described in previous posts (see, "Five Years or You Didn't Know What You Wanted") then there’s no reason we can’t have a formidable, reasonably priced, combat ready aircraft in five years.

We can still pursue the fantasy technology but only in the R&D world, not in production.

Think about it.  We could have a carrier combat aircraft that is superior to the F-35 in production in five years.  The F-35C will probably not be fully combat ready in five years and, even if it is, it won’t be suited to what the Navy really needs.

“… what the Navy really needs.”  That’s the next key, isn’t it?  It’s clear that the Navy doesn’t even know what it needs because it hasn’t got a guiding strategy that would tell it what kind of aircraft is needed.  Recognizing the Navy’s inability to define what it needs, ComNavOps has obligingly told the Navy what it needs.  The Navy needs a long range air superiority fighter and a long range attack plane with the fighter being the top priority.  Of course, there’s no reason the Navy can’t develop both aircraft simultaneously.  We’ve done it in the past and we can do it again by following the guidelines I’ve laid out.  That’s not really the point of this post, though.

The point of the post is that in the same time frame we’re looking at getting the F-35C combat ready, we can have a new and superior aircraft in production – one whose technology isn’t already obsolete after two decades of development.

F-35, Next Gen Fighter, and ISR

Setting aside the many problems the F-35 has encountered during its development and is still struggling to overcome, there remains a key, central fact:  the aircraft is not a fighter plane.  Its aerial prowess was always predicated on its stealth and superior situational awareness through the 360 degree sensor fusion and magic helmet.  As such, the aircraft is less a fighter and more of an aerial sniper.  There’s nothing wrong with that as long as the enabling characteristics of stealth and sensor fusion remain effective.  Absent those, the aircraft is a mediocre air-to-air performer and would match up poorly with the Chinese aircraft currently under development.

Unfortunately, time is slowly rendering the stealth aspect less powerful.  When it was conceived, two decades ago, the degree of stealth the aircraft possesses would have been quite effective.  Now, that moderate level of stealth is becoming less and less effective as advances in radars, data processing, multi-node sensing, and alternate detection methods (EO, IR, etc.) have occurred and continue to advance.

And, of course, the sensor fusion and magic helmet have, so far, failed utterly.  This technology may or may not ever come to fruition.

The Navy’s F-35, the F-35C, is slated to achieve initial operating capability in a few years.  What will the Navy have at that point?  Well, barring a major breakthrough with the sensor fusion issue, they won’t have a world beating, aerial supremacy fighter.  Instead, they’ll have a somewhat stealthier version of the Hornet – nice, to be sure, but limited compared to the enemy aircraft that will be appearing at the same time.

Side note:  Have you ever considered what would happen if two perfect stealth aircraft engaged?  Neither could see the other on radar and neither could lock its weapons on the other.  They’d be reduced to a WWI, eyeballs only dogfight!  Does that suggest anything to us about design characteristics?  But, I digress …

So, what can the Navy do with a mediocre strike fighter especially when it looks like the Navy won’t get anywhere near the numbers it needs.  Of course, the Navy gives every appearance of not even wanting the F-35 so the lack of numbers may not be viewed as a problem by the Navy!  So, again, what does the Navy do with a relative handful of mediocre F-35s?

Well, what capability of the F-35 is the Navy actually touting?  It’s the sensors, situational awareness, and communications.  It appears that the Navy may be planning on using the F-35 not for its combat capabilities but for its ISR and command/control (C²) capabilities.  Whether its collecting and relaying sensor images to other ships and aircraft, controlling UAVs, acting as a mini-AWACS, providing communications relays, or designating targets for other shooters, the F-35’s value to the Navy may be as a non-combatant.  In fact, given the Navy’s budget woes and inherent lack of interest, this may be the best use the Navy can make of the F-35. 

In order to continue the discussion, let’s assume that this premise is correct.

Now, what makes the F-35 successful in the ISR/C² role?  Well, sensors, obviously.  The plane has to have the ability to “see” things.  Beyond that, though, the answer is stealth.  In the postulated role, the advantage of the F-35 is that it can penetrate deeply into enemy air space, clandestinely collect data that other sensors could not due to lack of proximity, and transmit the data to other platforms.  Simply put, stealth enables the ISR.

We just discussed the next generation fighter which seems to be emphasizing ISR (the full spectrum dominance, assuming I’m correct about what CNO meant by that).  However, while CNO seems to be emphasizing ISR he is simultaneously de-emphasizing stealth.  That being the case, how can the next generation fighter collect its data if it isn’t stealthy enough to penetrate enemy air space?

Remember, there are only two ways to collect data deep in enemy air space:  either utilize stealth to penetrate the space and clandestinely collect the data or vastly increase the individual sensor ranges and collect the data from long standoff distances.  Short of creating massively larger aircraft to mount massively larger sensors on, we can’t significantly increase current sensor ranges too much more and certainly not by many hundreds of miles.  That leaves stealthy penetration and clandestine data collection.  That being the case, it’s reasonable to ask why the next generation fighter will de-emphasize stealth if it’s intended to conduct deep penetration ISR.  Of course, one answer is that it is not intended to do that – that it is truly just an air superiority fighter with a secondary strike role.  I think that’s unlikely but it’s certainly possible.  The F-35 is envisioned as a deep penetration ISR asset so why wouldn’t the next generation fighter have at least the same capability?

We previously touched on the cost of the next generation fighter.  It won’t be cheap!  When it’s ready for production we may remember the F-35 fondly for its “low cost”!  This means that the next generation fighter won’t be acquired in great numbers.  Again, as with the F-35, this points to a specialized ISR role rather than combat.    – so what aircraft will perform our combat?  But, I digress …

There’s an inconsistency in the logic of this.  If the Navy sees the next generation fighter as a pure air superiority plane then the requirements they listed don’t seem to fit.  If the requirements are what they want then how do they plan to get the aircraft into a deep penetration position to conduct its ISR work without significant stealth?  This sounds like yet another Navy project that is going to be started without an underlying, thoroughly gamed out concept of operations (CONOPS).

Next Generation Fighter

CNO Greenert and RAdm. Winter, speaking at the Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo, have provided a glimpse at the desired characteristics of the next generation fighter (1).

“Greenert said it must have manned and unmanned capabilities and carry a spectrum of weapons. Stealth and speed are not top priorities; in fact, ‘stealth may be overrated,’ he said.”

“The fighter must have full spectrum dominance, autonomous sensor and payload integration and next-generation advanced propulsion, Winter [Rear Adm. Mat Winter, the Navy's new chief of naval research] said. What is that? ‘We will let you know when we get it,’ he said."

That’s absolutely fascinating.  So, here’s the list of requirements, as they described them.

• Manned and unmanned
• Full spectrum dominance
• Autonomous sensor and payload integration
• Next-generation advanced propulsion
• Speed and stealth

Optionally Manned.  Frankly, I don’t get this one.  The concept of an unmanned aircraft is that it will be cheaper (that’s a highly debatable assumption that I think is false), somewhat simpler, and dedicated to long endurance or very high risk missions.  Making an aircraft that is optionally manned guarantees the full cost of a manned aircraft plus the added cost of the unmanned requirements (probably not much of an incremental cost, to be fair). 

While the ability to take the pilot out of the cockpit for extremely hazardous missions would be nice in theory, I really can’t see risking our absolute top of the line next generation fighter on the kind of suicidal missions that would warrant unmanned aircraft.  That’s what a simpler, cheaper, more expendable unmanned aircraft would be for.

Full Spectrum Dominance.  I assume full spectrum dominance refers to electronic warfare (EW) and represents a desire to move away from dedicated EW aircraft such as the Prowler/Growler and towards each aircraft providing its own EW support.  In concept, this is wonderful.  It addresses two issues related to dedicated EW aircraft:

Availability – there are very few EW aircraft in the inventory and there never seem to be enough when needed and where needed.  If EW is integrated into the fighter, we will have an unlimited number of EW aircraft (well, limited to the number of fighter aircraft) and they will always be on scene whenever a fighter is on scene.

Cost Effectiveness – EW aircraft are not only expensive in their own right but each EW aircraft represents one less fighter from a zero-sum budget perspective.  Combining the EW function with the fighter function would be highly cost effective.  Essentially, the EW electronics are the only thing that need to be paid for – the airframe is free in the sense that fighter airframe will exist anyway.  One airframe, two functions – that’s a great concept.

I also assume that full spectrum dominance goes beyond the traditional electronic warfare realm and includes cyber and communications warfare capability as well as intel and surveillance functions.  A full spectrum aircraft will be a mini-AWACS, mini-Reaper, mini-JSTARS, and, well, mini-everything.

Autonomous Sensor and Payload Integration.  I’m not quite sure what this refers to.  I assume it encompasses the F-35 360 degree sensor fusion concept as a baseline.  I further assume it goes well beyond that to include the ability to interface with any sensor on any platform, anywhere, and to seamlessly interface those sensors with the aircraft’s weapons. 

I also assume the autonomous portion of this requirement refers to the stated desire for an optionally manned aircraft.  When the aircraft is operating in unmanned mode, the control software will be able to select and use any appropriate sensor to best utilize any available weapon.

Advanced Propulsion.  I really have no idea what this is referring to.  My best guess is that it involves the Air Force’s adaptive jet engine technology efforts which are an attempt to produce a single engine that can operate in multiple modes such as high speed, high efficiency, or high endurance.  Wouldn’t it be great to have a single engine that can provide enormous range or high fuel efficiency or high speed, as desired? 

Speed and Stealth.  I find it fascinating that Greenert specifically addresses speed and stealth in the negative, in a sense.  It’s not surprising given his previous statements about stealth but to see it “codified” as a lesser requirement is, frankly, stunning given our obsession with stealth over the last few decades and the incredibly high value placed on the F-35’s stealth as the means to allow it to utilize its other magic capabilities.

OK, we’ve looked at the positives but what about the realities?

All of these capabilities are, essentially, non-existent.  We’ve seen what happens when we commit to production of non-existent technology – we get the LCS and F-35.  The lesson that the Navy should have learned is to pursue non-existent technologies as research projects, not as production programs.  If we repeat the mistakes of concurrent research and production we’ll wind up with a next generation fighter whose costs and delays will dwarf those of the F-35 or LCS.  It greatly troubles me that no one is discussing an interim, achievable, capable fighter to fill the gap until the next generation technologies are fully developed and ready for production.  We appear to be intent on repeating the F-35 and LCS fiascos.  I see another too-big-to-fail, no-other-option, fantasy aircraft program in the making.

Consider the desire to cram so many capabilities into a single airframe.  Expecting a fighter to be a fully functioning EW aircraft is analogous to wanting every infantryman to be his own artillery battery.  It’s a great concept but it’s just not practical with any technology we have or can foresee.  Further, unless the EW functions are completely automated, it’s asking too much of a single pilot to be an expert at air-to-air combat and an expert at EW, to say nothing of having to attempt to split time and attention in the middle of combat.

Finally, consider the cost of this aircraft.  Those fantasy technologies aren’t going to come cheaply, if at all.  We’re looking at a half a billion dollars per aircraft in today’s dollars.  What that means is that the numbers procured will be very small.  The last aircraft that cost that kind of money was truncated at around 20 units.  We’ve harped on this point repeatedly.  Numbers matter.  The logical extension of the path we’re on has us heading towards airwings consisting of one aircraft.  This path is a mistake. 

To sum up, there are some potentially good concepts associated with this next generation fighter but it depends almost exclusively on non-existent technology.  If we approach this as a research effort while fielding interim, capable aircraft, we’ll do fine.  If we turn this into another all-or-nothing production program before any of the technology is proven, we’ll produce yet another disaster.  It really is that simple.

(1) Navy Times, "CNO wants more high-tech assets, delivered quickly", Lance M. Bacon, 4-Feb-2015,

http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2015/02/04/greenert-future-force-expo-technology-priorities/22856343/