EMALS and AAG Reliability Data

Here is the only data to appear in the entire 2022 DOT&E annual report:  It’s for the Ford EMALS and AAG.

 

EMALS

 

During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), EMALS achieved a reliability of 614 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF) during 1,841 catapult launches (where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF, EMALS showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (460 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the fi rst underway of IOT&E in September 2022, EMALS reliability appeared to regress …

 

Thus, the most recent reliability is only 15% of the requirement.

 

 

AAG

 

During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), AAG achieved a reliability of 460 MCBOMF during 1,841 aircraft recoveries (where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF, AAG showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (115 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults).  However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, AAG reliability appeared to regress …

 

Thus, the most recent reliability is only 3% of the requirement.

Ford Reliability

The nearly worthless DOT&E annual report has been released and one of the very few sets of actual data is for the Ford EMALS, AAG, and elevator systems.  Let’s take a look at the data.

 

Note: Reference is made in the quotes to ‘ISE’ which is an abbreviation for Independent Steaming Event which is part of a series of at sea, post-delivery tests and trials.  It’s basically one of a sequence of test periods at sea.  The number indicates which test/event it is in the sequence.  So, for example, ISE 12 would be the twelfth at sea test period.

 

 

EMALS

 

DOT&E reports this data for the Ford EMALS,

 

During the 8,157 catapult launches conducted through ISE 18, EMALS achieved a reliability of 272 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft.  This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF. [1, p.144]

 

Compare this to the preceding year’s report,

 

During the 3,975 catapult launches conducted post PSA through ISE 11, EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one [2, p.137]

 

What is not clear is whether the phrase ‘through ISE 18’ refers to the total since the beginning of the program up through ISE 18 or whether it refers to the incremental change since the last DOT&E report (2020) which was ISE 11.  If it refers to the cumulative lifetime total then the results are skewed by the initial higher failure rate.  If it refers to the incremental number since the previous report then we can get a good feel for the current performance.

 

My interpretation is that the numbers are cumulative.  This means we can, therefore, take the difference between the current (2021) figure of 8,157 launches and the 2020 figure of 3,975 launches, do some simple arithmetic and get the performance for the last year (ISE 13 through ISE 18) which, presumably, should show substantial improvement over the initial performance and give us a good look at the current status.

 

Simple arithmetic gives us the actual number of failures and allows us to assemble the following table of data.[3]  Calculated data is indicated as such.  Remaining data is from the DOT&E report.

 

 

Launches	Failures	Actual MCBOMF	Required MCBOMF
8,157 (through ISE 18)	30 (calculated)	272	4,166
3,975 (through ISE 11)	22 (calculated)	181	4,166
4,182 (calculated - 2021)	8 (calculated)	522 (calculated)	4,166

 

 

We see, then, that the performance for last year (2021) showed substantial improvement from the initial failure rate of 181 to 522, however, it is still woefully short of the required 4,166.

 

Okay, it’s still very bad but if it keeps getting better we’ll be okay, right?

 

Unfortunately, no.  As with any developmental effort, progress and improvement is rapid in the initial stages and then slows quickly as the easy improvements are made and progress becomes increasingly more difficult.  Even if progress were to continue in a linear fashion at the current rate – say, improving from 181 to 522 each year – it would take just over 12 years to get from a failure rate of 522 to 4,166 … but, as I just explained,  that’s not how it works.  Barring a developmental breakthrough, I just don’t see EMALS ever being able to meet the failure rate (MCBOMF) or even come close.

 

 

Advanced Arresting Gear

 

For the AAG system, the current DOT&E report gives,

 

During 8,157 recoveries, AAG achieved a reliability of 41 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF. [1, p.144]

 

And, from the previous year’s DOT&E report,

 

Through the first 3,975 recoveries, AAG demonstrated an achieved reliability of 48 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls

well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF. [2, p.137]

 

Treating the data as was done for EMALS,

 

 

Traps	Failures	Actual MCBOMF	Required MCBOMF
8,157 (through ISE 18)	199 (calculated)	41	16,500
3,975 (through ISE 11)	83 (calculated)	48	16,500
4,182 (calculated - 2021)	116 (calculated)	36 (calculated)	16,500

 

 

The data shows that we can only recover around 40 aircraft before experiencing an operational failure.  So, if we were to launch a full air wing strike, only half the aircraft could recover!

 

There are two things that are absolutely stunning about this data:

 

1.     The failure rate has barely changed from the initial data.  For practical purposes, there has been no improvement from the start until now!  In fact, the previous year’s failure rate is actually slightly worse than the initial rates!

2.     The difference between the actual MCBOMF of around 40 and the requirement of 16,500 is staggering.  No amount of further development is going to eliminate that gap and, as with EMALS, the easy improvements have already taken place and progress from now on will be slower.  Yikes!

 

 

Elevators

 

For the Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE), we have only one set of data.  From the DOT&E report,

 

Therefore, only preliminary reliability estimates are available to compare to the requirement of 932 hours between operational mission failure. Through the first 14,842 elevator cycles, 68 operational mission failures were reported. [1, p.145]

 

Again, simple arithmetic gives us the following:

 

cycles = 14,842

failures = 68

failure rate = 218 versus that target of 932

 

While this tells us that the performance is still well short of the requirement, it is at least numerically conceivable that the gap can be closed with further development.  On the other hand, with the amount of effort and man-hours that have already gone into this, it is hard to imagine that there is much more improvement left to be had.

 

 

Summary/Conclusion

 

The basic function of a carrier is to arm planes (weapon elevators), launch planes (EMALS), and recover planes (AAG).  The Ford is currently unable to perform those basic functions at anywhere near the required level of reliability which means the Ford is unable to perform its basic function.

 

How do we get from where we are to the requirement?  Disturbingly, for the reasons discussed, it likely can’t be done.  We’re well into the diminishing returns portion of the development curve.  In other words, we’re entering the flatter portion of the development curve and improvements will be fewer and less impactful. 

 

So, what’s the alternative?  What can be done?  Well, we could rip out the systems and install something proven like the Nimitz systems but that’s almost prohibitively expensive and difficult since the Fords are not designed for those systems.  Instead, I’m going to predict that the Navy will do what they always do when they can’t meet a specification … change the requirement!  I predict the Navy will accept the current performance and simply change the specification.  And just like that, they’ve met the spec!

 

As bad as all this is, the really scary part is that we’re in the process of building three more identical carriers with, presumably, the same problems.  We are building an entire class of carriers that can’t perform their basic function.

 

The only slight hope is that the engineers have learned from the Ford and significantly modified the equipment for the subsequent carriers so that they will be able to perform their basic function.  Unfortunately, this is yet another example of concurrent construction.  We’re building multiple ships before the first one is complete and working properly so the EMALS, AAG, and AWE for the subsequent carriers were ordered long ago, before there was time for the development feedback loop to function and, therefore, the equipment is almost certainly identical, for all practical purposes.  Same equipment … same problems.

 

Of course, given DOT&E’s new practice of concealing almost all data, it’s likely that we’ll never see any data for the other carriers so we’ll have only the Navy’s official statements to inform us … and those will be glowing, without a doubt, as the Navy’s official pronouncements about the Ford have been.  In fact, I’m quite surprised that DOT&E exposed even this data.

 

On the plus side, China has committed to EMALS for their carriers so they’ll likely have the same problems!

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 2021 Annual Report, Jan 2022

 

[2]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 2020 Annual Report, Jan 2021

 

[3] Launches / failure rate = number of failures

8,157 / 272  = 30 fails

3,975 / 181  = 22 fails

 

Taking the difference between those two data sets

4,182 / 522  = 8 fails

Ford Update

The Navy has, essentially, stopped releasing any data or information on the Ford, even to DOT&E which has noted that the Navy is no longer providing EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) and AAG (Advanced Arresting Gear) performance and reliability data.

 

That leaves us to infer the state of the Ford so …  let’s do some inferring!

 

EMALS

 

How is EMALS coming along?  Well, you’ll recall that the last data we had from DOT&E, before the Navy stopped providing data – which should, itself, infer something negative about the system - , showed that the system was failing at a staggering rate.

 

Out of 747 shipboard launches performed with the EMALS, ten had suffered critical failures. The target reliability average was one critical failure per 4,166 launch cycles. The launch system is over 50 times less reliable than the target failure rate. Every time they try to launch the full complement of airplanes they will have a critical failure.

 

The landing system also fails every 70-75 times it is used. This is over 200 times less reliable than planned. General Atomics engineers made it impossible to repair the AAG landing failures without shutting down flight operations. The AAG power supply can’t be disconnected from the high-voltage supply while flights continue. (3)

 

Is the EMALs doing any better, now?

 

Ford’s EMALS experienced a crash over the summer [June 2020], prohibiting the carrier from performing flight operations for five days. (1)

 

… the ship’s Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) suffered a failure that prevented the carrier from launching planes for five days …

 

On June 2, the crew discovered a fault in the power handling system that connects the ship’s energy-generating turbines to the EMALS power system.

…

 

 “After several days of troubleshooting and assessing a fault in the launch system’s power handling elements, embarked EMALS experts and Ford’s crew restored the system to enable the safe fly-off of the air wing on Sunday morning, June 7… (2)

 

As we have previously noted, the interconnected nature of the catapults assures that if one goes down, they all go down and this was case in this incident.  It is also noteworthy that it required several days of troubleshooting to restore the system enough to fly off the air wing.  The wording seems to suggest that the restoration was a temporary fix although that is far from clear. 

 

It is also worth noting the presence of ‘embarked EMALS experts’ which would not normally be present during routine operations.  This has two implications:

 

• That the troubleshooting and repair was likely beyond the capabilities of the Navy crew.  This does not bode well for combat damage repair efforts.
• That the presence of embarked experts absolutely indicates that the EMALS is still not working correctly and reliably or else the experts would not need to be on the ship three years into its commissioning and during pre-deployment workups and trials which should be about training for naval operations rather than still struggling to get the EMALS system to perform at basic, contract-mandated levels of reliability.

 

The inference from the above is that EMALS is still woefully short of contract-mandated levels of performance and reliability.

 

AAG

 

Okay, what about the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system?

 

Capt. Josh Sager, the commanding officer of Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW-8), said Nov. 17 that Ford had all three of its AAG wires operating with no issues for the preceding four to six days. (1)

 

Cummings [Commanding Officer Capt. J.J. Cummings] described the reliability for both the Dual Band Radar and AAG as getting better throughout every at-sea period. (1)

 

The fact that Capt. Sager thought it noteworthy enough to publicly state that the AAG had worked for ‘the preceding four to six days’ suggests that this level of performance is exceptional and should be noted.  Proudly noting that the landing gear worked for a few days in a row is extremely worrisome.  It suggests that this is not the norm.

 

That Capt. Cummings described the reliability of the AAG as ‘getting better throughout every at-sea period’ again strongly suggests that the AAG is a major problem, though slowly improving.

 

The inference, here, is that the AAG is still woefully short of contract-mandated reliability levels and is at a barely functional level. 

 

Overall, how is the Ford doing with launches and recoveries?

 

Since the beginning of 2020, Ford has conducted 5,000 launches and recoveries of aircraft – most of which the crew has done in the last eight months — and is slated to achieve 6,000 by the end of this calendar year, Cummings said. (1)

 

The question, of course, is not how many total launches and recoveries have been performed but how many have been done between catapult and arresting system failures.  What is the failure rate?  The evidence suggests that the failure rate is still far greater than specified and is likely to continue to be a problem for a few more years, at least.  This is extremely worrisome if the Ford should ever be called to combat.

 

The evidence suggests that the Ford is not capable of reliable, sustained open ocean launch/recoveries, meaning that the ship has to stay within reach of land divert bases so as not to lose aircraft when EMALS and AAG failures occur.  Three years into commissioning, this is inexcusable and everyone associated with this program should be fired.

 

Weapon Elevators

 

So much for launch and recover.  What about those disastrous weapon elevators?

 

With the seventh of 11 weapons elevators slated for certification before the end of this calendar year, … the remaining four will be completed by the end of April 2021. Newport News Shipbuilding has 200 shipyard workers aboard the carrier to aid in finishing the elevators … (1)

 

How bad are these elevators that 200 specialist workers are working on them 24/7 and the best projection is that they’ll be ready by the middle of 2021?  What does this suggest for battle damage repair when the Ford doesn’t have 200 weapon elevator engineers on board?

 

 

 

Summary

 

Ford is in bad shape with major systems failing to meet specification.  The worst aspect of the Ford’s launch and recovery issues is that the design is fundamentally and irrevocably flawed from a maintenance perspective.  The individual catapults and arresting gear cannot be electrically isolated and worked on.  The entire carrier must be powered down to work on any single component.

 

The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Subsystem inverters on board CVN 78. The process for electrically isolating equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1.5 hours by itself. The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations. (4)

 

The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations. (4)

 

This issue will continue to plague Ford throughout its service life since it is not correctable.  This also renders the Ford highly suspect as a viable combat unit.  If this design flaw has been continued into the subsequent ships of the class, we are building a class of carriers that has very poor damage repair capability and can be rendered combat incapable by minor battle damage or even simple, routine electrical or mechanical failures.

 

Absent any information from the Navy, we are left to quite reasonably infer that the Ford is a floating pile of hot, steaming excrement.  If the Navy would have us believe otherwise then they need to resume releasing performance and reliability data to DOT&E and the public.  The clamp down on data pretty much tells us just how bad the situation is and is reminiscent of the Navy’s response to the epidemic of INSURV failures which led to the Navy classifying the results instead of fixing them.

 

 

 

______________________________

 

(1)USNI News website, “USS Gerald R. Ford Making Steady Progress Ahead of Deployment”, Mallory Shelbourne, 24-Nov-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/11/24/uss-gerald-r-ford-making-steady-progress-ahead-of-deployment

 

(2)USNI News website, “USS Gerald Ford EMALS Launching System Suffers Fault During Testing Period”, Sam LaGrone, 8-Jun-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/06/08/uss-gerald-ford-emals-launching-system-suffers-fault-during-testing-period

 

(3)Next Big Future website, “Ford Carrier is a Failure With Huge Radar, Elevator, Launch and Landing Problems”, Brian Wang, 31-Oct-2019,

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2019/10/ford-carrier-is-a-failure-with-huge-radar-elevator-launch-and-landing-problems.html

 

(4)DOT&E FY 2019 Annual Report, 20-Dec-2019

Navy Admits AAG Failure

The Navy may be forced to abandon the Advanced Arresting Gear system for the Ford class carriers after huge cost increases, schedule delays, and continuing technical challenges.  As reported by USNI News website (1),

“…SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] laid out a pattern of cost increases from about a $476 million in costs for research development and acquisition in 2009 for four systems to a 2016 cost estimate of $1.4 billion – about a 130 percent increase when adjusted for inflation.”

A 130% increase – sounds about right for a Navy project!

USNI suggests that the Navy will replace the AAG in subsequent Ford carriers with a traditional arresting system.

“Ultimately, USNI News understands, the goal is to have the planned AAG systems on the ships that follow carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) – John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) and Enterprise(CVN-80) – replaced with a more traditional but enhanced version of the current Mk-7 MOD 3 arresting gear.”

At least the Navy recognizes the problem as evidenced by the following statement.

“Last year Program Executive Officer for the Navy’s carrier program told reporters that the service and General Atomics discovered the water twister – a complex paddlewheel designed to absorb 70 percent of the force of a landing – was under engineered and would be unable to withstand prolonged use without failing.”

“ ‘The Advanced Arresting Gear has become a model for how not to do acquisition of needed technology,’ a senior Navy official told USNI News on Tuesday.”

The issue is not the AAG, per se, but the concurrency of attempting to develop a non-existent technology while also initiating production.

Aside from the excess costs and schedule delays, a larger issue is what to do with the Ford.  We can put conventional arresting systems in the subsequent carriers but what do we do with Ford?  If the AAG is installed, it becomes a one-of-a-kind system that will prove difficult or impossible to maintain and eliminates any commonality between Ford and any other carrier in the fleet.  If we retrofit a conventional system to Ford, the costs to remove the AAG system, re-engineer a conventional system into place, and actually procure and install it will cause further cost overruns and schedule delays. 

This is a classic no-win situation.  The Navy’s foolish insistence on concurrent development and production has bit them in the ass once again.  You’d think the Navy would learn but they remain incapable of learning lessons.

This is why you don’t begin production that depends on non-existent technology.

The lesson can’t be any simpler or clearer.  Even the Navy’s mentally challenged leadership should be able to grasp it by now.  But, of course, they won’t.

____________________

(1) USNI News website, “Navy May Back Away From Advanced Arresting Gear for Ford Carriers”, Sam LaGrone, May 24, 2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/05/24/19801

Ford Update

The 2014 Annual Report from Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) has been released.  As a reminder, this is the gold standard for what works and what doesn’t as opposed to manufacturer and Navy claims.  This is the straight story when it comes to weapon and system performance.  We’ll be taking a look at several systems in the near future.  Today, we’ll start with the new aircraft carrier, the Ford.

According to the report, the Navy has reneged on its plan to conduct shock testing.  Shock testing (Full Ship Shock Trial – FSST) was to have been performed on CVN-78, however, the Navy has postponed that testing until CVN-79, at the earliest.  As the report states it,

"The original Alternative Live Fire Strategy prepared by the Navy and approved by DOT&E on December 9, 2008, stated the FSST would be conducted on CVN-78. The Navy unilaterally reneged on the approved strategy on June 18, 2012."

You’ll recall that the Navy has opted not to perform shock testing on the LCS, at all.  This is a standard test that has been performed on every ship.  The suspicious among us might suggest that the Navy is trying to avoid shock testing because the construction and acquisition standards have slipped to the point where shock testing would be embarrassing and Navy ships are no longer capable of passing the tests.

The report discusses the new EMALS catapult and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) systems,

"Reliability for the catapult and arresting gear systems have not been reported on in over a year. Before the Navy stopped tracking/reporting on catapult and arresting gear performance, both systems were performing well below their projected target to achieve required reliability."

Now what do we make of that?  The Navy has stopped reporting reliability data??  I guess that’s one way to avoid looking bad.  This kind of action combined with the refusal to perform shock tests sure suggests an attempt to cover up bad news rather than report it and correct it.

Here’s some more EMALS news.

"The testing discovered excessive EMALS holdback release dynamics during F/A-18E/F and EA-18G catapult launches with wing-mounted 480-gallon EFTs. Aircraft dynamics are considered excessive if they exceed stress limits of the airframe, internal, or external stores. This discovery, if uncorrected, would preclude normal employment of the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G from CVN-78. There is no funding at this time to correct this deficiency."

No funding?!  It’s kind of a big deal to leave unfunded.

It’s not just advanced technology that is suffering.  The ship has been found to have insufficient berthing for the crew!

"The ship will not be delivered with sufficient empty berthing for the CVN-78’s Service Life Allowance (SLA)."

Come on, now!  Who messed up with a simple count of the crew and a corresponding count of the berths? 

One of the major selling points for the new carrier was that it would supposedly increase sortie rates significantly.  This was always a dubious claim and of highly questionable value given that carrier ops aren’t sortie rate limited and that shrinking air wings make sortie rates irrelevant.  The report had this to say,

"It is unlikely that CVN-78 will achieve its Sortie Generation Rate (SGR) (number of aircraft sorties per day) requirement.  The target threshold is based on unrealistic assumptions including fair weather and unlimited visibility, and that aircraft emergencies, failures of shipboard equipment, ship maneuvers, and manning shortfalls will not affect flight operations."

Reread that last sentence.  It’s clear that the sortie rate claim was never valid and was a fraudulent attempt to promote the program.  The Navy’s honesty and integrity are taking some serious hits over the last decade or two.

You’ll recall that we’ve repeatedly discussed the pitfalls of concurrent development and production.  Here’s an example regarding the ship’s Dual Band Radar (DBR).

"The Navy planned to begin testing in January 2013; however, the testing has slipped repeatedly, and to date, no live testing with the full production DBR has been completed."

So, we’re going to install a radar system that is untested. 

Here’s an interesting tidbit that is undoubtedly budget driven.  JPALS [the automated landing system] has been deferred until the F-35 or unmanned aircraft require it. 

"The Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) is no longer funded for CVN-78."

The Ford is a clear cut case study for how not to run a new construction program.  Of course, so was the LCS and the LPD-17 and he Navy failed to learn any lessons from those so I doubt they’ll learn anything from this one, either.

EMALS and AAG Status

The new Ford class carrier will be introducing several new technologies, among them the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG).  The Navy insists that the EMALS and AAG systems will work as advertised and points to extensive land based testing as proof.  What the Navy isn’t pointing out is the failure rates.  Fortunately, DOT&E has provided that data (1).

EMALS is the replacement for the old steam powered catapults.  The system will use electric motors rather than steam to launch aircraft.  As DOT&E reports,

“At the Lakehurst, New Jersey, test site, over 1,967 launches have been conducted and 201 chargeable failures have occurred. Based on available data, the program estimates that EMALS has approximately 240 Mean Cycles Between Critical Failure in the shipboard configuration, where a cycle represents the launch of one aircraft. Based on expected reliability growth, the failure rate is presently five times higher than should be expected.”

Thus, the system looks perfectly capable of launching aircraft but the reliability is highly suspect at the moment.  I’m also not quite sure about the numbers.  If 201 failures have occurred in 1967 launches, that’s a failure every 10 launches – not great odds for the pilot!!!  I’m not sure how the 240 cycles between critical failure is calculated unless some of the 201 failures weren’t considered critical?  Regardless, that’s a severe reliability issue.

Similarly, the AAG replaces the older style arresting system.  Again, the report states,

“At the Lakehurst, New Jersey test site, 71 arrestments were conducted earlier this year and 9 chargeable failures occurred. The Program Office estimates that AAG has approximately 20 Mean Cycles Between Operational Mission Failure in the shipboard configuration, where a cycle represents the recovery of one aircraft. Based on expected reliability growth, the failure rate is presently 248 times higher than should be expected.”

As with the EMALS, the system appears functionally capable but highly unreliable.

The problems are not unusual for new technology and are fixable given enough time.  This, however, demonstrates the problem with concurrent research and production, as we’ve pointed out many times.  The Ford’s delivery, already way behind schedule, will slip still further, barring an unlikely miracle.

There would have been absolutely no penalty or problem with building one more conventional Nimitz carrier while the new technologies were undergoing development.  The carrier construction schedule could have been maintained, a new functional carrier could have joined the fleet, and a great deal of concurrency construction penalty costs avoided.  The Ford will have to sit idle for months or years after delivery while the bugs are worked out, anyway.  Frankly, it’s hard to believe that Navy leadership could be this irresponsible.

(1) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Annual Report, 2013

EMALS And AAG

A new GAO report (1) discusses, among other things, the progress of the Ford class Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) systems which have been beset by technical problems and cost overruns.

GAO has this to say about the EMALS and AAG costs.

“Since 2008, EMALS-related costs for the first-of-class Gerald R. Ford [CVN 78] have risen by 133.7%, from $317.7 – $742.6 million. AAG costs have also spiked, though its 124.8% jump is only from $75 – $168.6 million. This is so despite the Navy’s 2010 firm fixed-price contracts to produce these systems for CVN 78. Even with cost caps, however, late delivery and testing means that changes have to be made to a partially-complete ship. EMALS configuration changes have already forced electrical, wiring, and other changes within the ship; and instead of just being hoisted into place, the Advanced Arresting Gear will now have to be installed in pieces via a hole cut in the flight deck. AAG continues to undergo redesigns, most recently to its energy-absorbing “water twister,” and limited EMALS testing with the delayed F-35C risks forcing further changes after the ship has been built.”

As we’ve noted in previous posts about Navy contracts for other programs, the fixed price contract is anything but fixed.  The term “fixed price” is just a public relations phrase intended to sound good to the public and Congress but it has no actual meaning.



EMALS



Also, note the concurrency being demonstrated in this development.  The unproven AAG, having encountered problems and having failed to meet the schedule, will be installed out of sequence by cutting holes in the flight deck.  That’s construction money being spent at least three times over:  the initial flight deck installation, demolition of the flight deck, and rebuild of the flight deck.  That’s my tax dollars you’re throwing away, there, Navy!

The report goes on to note the following cost growths for EMALS and AAG.

                                    EMALS          134%

                                    AAG                125%

The GAO report has this to say about the development of the AAG.

“Developmental test failures led to system redesigns. Navy is presently executing the first phase of land-based testing concurrent with system production and installation on CVN 78. The system is scheduled to arrest its first aircraft in June 2014.” [emphasis added]

Note the phrase, “concurrent with system production and installation”.  Thus, we see that the same “build and buy before you test” approach is being used for the AAG acquisition as was done for the LCS.  We’ve seen the spectacular failure that resulted from that approach for the LCS and, yet, the Navy continues to use this badly flawed practice.

As an aside, weight margins are becoming a problem even before the ship has been completed. 

“To date, evolving information about the attributes of these technologies has produced a weight/stability configuration for CVN 78 that leaves little margin to incorporate additional weight growth high up in the ship without making corresponding weight trade-offs elsewhere or compromising the future growth potential of the ship.”

“According to shipbuilder representatives, additional weight growth to the advanced arresting gear was of particular concern and could trigger a need for future structural and space modifications around the installed system.”

We’ve already seen the impact of non-existent weight margins on the LCS.  It would be most unfortunate if the same were to happen to the Ford.  Again, this is due entirely to beginning construction prior to having a stable design from which weight calculations can be performed.

I have no doubt that the problems associated with EMALS and AAG will be solved but the cost in time, money, and growth margins will be steep.  Most of this could have been avoided by simply having a complete design and mature subsystems prior to construction. 

What’s the definition of insanity?  - Repeating the same actions and expecting a different outcome.  The Navy has seen the LCS debacle that resulted from having no design and immature technology and yet is doing the exact same thing for the Ford class and expecting a different outcome.  Granted, the Ford is not as immature as the LCS but the concept is the same, differing only in degree.  The Navy seems adamantly unwilling to learn from experience.

(1) Defense Industry Daily, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/emals-electro-magnetic-launch-for-carriers-05220/, Sep 8, 2013