We’re Doomed

China has announced its UAV mothership/carrier, a UAV capable of launching 100 drones.  Well, that’s it.  We’re doomed.  I don’t know about you but I’m starting right now to learn to speak Chinese because I’m certain this means the US will be conquered within a year or two.  The Chinese can’t be stopped and this proves it.
 

The world's first drone mothership, Jui Tian, took to the skies for its first-ever flight on December 11th, 2025, in the Pucheng region of Shaanxi province in China. The massive remotely piloted jet carries up to 100 drones, which it can launch while airborne to reach faraway targets. Able to take off with a payload over 13,200 pounds and with a wingspan of 82 feet, Chinese military aviation analyst Fu Qianshao noted that it can carry more weapons and equipment than modern fighter jets and bombers. It has designated hardpoints for guided missiles and bombs on top of the 100 drones.[1]

Some Chinese reports suggest an endurance of 12 hours and a range of 7,000 km.
 

No doubt about it.  This is a weapon system that is absolutely invincible.
 
The fact that it is large, slow, non-maneuverable, and not particularly stealthy, all of which are the definition of a target drone, should in no way diminish the awesomeness of the aircraft.
 
Similarly, the fact that the hundred UAVs it carries would each be on the order of a foot or two wingspan and something around a one pound payload which makes them incredibly short ranged and of no significant lethality relative to a ship should in no way diminish the sheer terror these tiny UAVs inspire.
 
And, of course, none of these miniature UAVs can mount any sort of useful sensor so, unless they have a very close controlling/sensing aircraft nearby (how does a controlling aircraft survive near a combat ready ship?), they’re blind and helpless but that doesn’t diminish the fearsomeness of the system, at all.
 
Being that small and with that small a payload, they certainly can’t have any defense against electronic warfare but that doesn’t lessen the war-winning capability of these tiny machines, in the least.
 
As I consider all this, I can only conclude that we should preemptively surrender.
 
 
 
[1]Redstate website, “China's Giant New 'Flying Aircraft Carrier' Completes Debut Flight”, Ward Clark, 30-Dec-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/12/30/chinas-giant-new-flying-aircraft-carrier-completes-debut-flight-n2197616

Same As Us

There is a large segment of naval observers and commentators who believe that all of our shipbuilding woes could be solved by contracting our construction to foreign shipyards.  The claim, with almost no supporting evidence, is that foreign builders build ships faster, better, and cheaper.  ComNavOps has refuted that belief, repeatedly, and pointed out that when all the ‘tricks’ of production and accounting are considered, foreign ships are not cheaper, have similar quality issues, and are not more likely to be on time.  The Belgian-Dutch new mine countermeasures ship program (see, “Dutch-Belgian MCMMothership”) provides yet another example.
 

At the request of Belgium Naval & Robotics, a Naval Group-Exail consortium, the delivery schedule of the first four of the twelve ships acquired in 2019 has been updated. The lead ship, BNS Oostende (M940), was originally expected on December 23, 2024. The Belgian Navy will have to wait eight more months.[1]

The delay is not just for the first ship of the class.  The next three will also be delayed.
 

The Dutch Navy’s first ship, the BNS Vlissingen (M840), was to be delivered in June 2025. Dutch sailors will to wait five to six more months. The BNS Tournai (M941) and BNS Scheveningen (M841) will arrive respectively one and two months late.[1]

So, a simple MCM vessel will be delayed nearly a year (and you know it will be later than that!).  Perhaps foreign shipyards/builders are not the miracle workers so many of us want to believe?  Perhaps they’re not really any different or better than we are?  Perhaps they do some things a bit better and some things a bit worse but, overall, they’re no different from us?
 

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

Every time I’ve looked into foreign shipyards and builders in any detail, they come up no better than us.  You might recall a recent post citing many examples of foreign shipyard failures similar to ours (see, “Foreign Ships AreMagnificent”).
 
I have nothing against using a foreign shipyard under certain, limited circumstances but I doubt it will produce any real improvement in quality, faster builds, or cheaper costs.  On the plus side, it would add an element of competition which is conspicuously absent and that alone might spur some small degree of improvement.
 
 
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[1]Naval News, “Belgian-Dutch RMCM Mine Warfare Program Facing Delays”, Nathan Gain, 13-May-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/05/belgian-dutch-rmcm-mine-warfare-program-facing-delays/

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

The Dutch-Belgian mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership project offers a glimpse at one vision of future mine countermeasures.  MCM motherships have been frequently discussed and proposed for US Navy mine clearance efforts.  In fact, the original purpose of the Afloat Forward Staging Base was supposed to have been to act as an MCM mothership.  However, that usage appears to have fallen by the wayside as the ship searches for a new mission (see, “AFSB – Looking For Something To Do”).  Regardless, let’s take a look at the Dutch-Belgian MCM mothership project and see if there are any lessons from the project that are applicable to US Navy MCM needs.

 

In no particular order, here are some observations, good and bad, collected from a YouTube promotional video[1] narrated by the program manager:

 

Ship Size – The mothership is 82 m long (269 ft) with a displacement of 2800 tons.  Maximum speed is 15 kts and range is 3500 nm (speed basis unknown).  Base crew is 33 with a capacity of 63.  Contrast this with the Freedom class LCS MCM which is 378 ft long with a displacement of 3500 tons and a maximum speed of 40 kts.  Clearly, in the quest for multi-mission modularity, the LCS was grossly overbuilt for the MCM role.  Overbuilt means wasted money and resources.

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

 Buzzwords and Graphics – The mothership project managers refer to the MCM equipment as the ‘toolbox’ which is, presumably, a marketing buzzword suggesting modularity.  This kind of buzzword fascination serves no beneficial purpose and contributes to a feeling of undeserved superiority and arrogance.  In other words, when exposed to buzzwords on a daily basis, people begin to believe the hype and fail to ruthlessly examine the concepts and execution, believing that the system is inherently superior.  We’ve seen this with the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, F-35, etc.  …  all abject failures due, in large measure to a failure to ruthlessly examine and critique the projects at early stages.  The projects were protected by their buzzwords.  No one wanted to be seen contradicting or criticizing the magnificent buzzwords.

 

Similarly, today’s digital public relations graphics are hugely detrimental to programs.  Again, they convey an awe-inspiring sense of superiority and accomplishment that blinds program personnel to the flaws in the product.  It may not seem like it but glitzy graphics are one of the causes of project failure.

 

Hosting – The mothership can host two UAVs, two RHIBs, and two unmanned surface vessels (USV).  While that technically meets the definition of a mothership, in that it plays host to a smaller craft, it is a very small complement for a mothership.  I would have preferred to see a mothership capable of hosting a dozen USVs and a dozen UAVs (although I’m dubious about the value of small UAVs for MCM work).  That would make the mothership a significant MCM asset. 

 

Hosting merely two USVs and two UAVs of dubious utility is a very minimal capability. The two RHIBs are, presumably, for personnel movements and, perhaps, diver platforms for addressing single mines which serve no useful purpose in combat mine clearance operations.  That leaves just two USVs which are far too few to be effective in combat mine clearance.

 

Launching – One decidedly positive feature is the presence of two separate davit based USV launch mechanisms, port and starboard.  This provides redundancy and speed of operations as opposed to a single launch point.  One of the major failings of the LCS MCM variant was the installation of only a single UUV/USV launch point which has become a logistic and efficiency choke point with individual launches and recoveries requiring one to two hours per evolution.

 

Communications – The program manager emphasized that the mothership needed extensive communications with the various unmanned vehicles.  The concept of operations calls for a stand off distance of 12 nm from the minefield and the UAVs are intended to act as communication relays as well as providing surface mine visual detection.  The downside of all the communications is that it provides the enemy with a positive location.  Extensive, continuous communications will be detected regardless of any claims of line-of-sight or low probability of intercept.

 

Sonar – The mothership has a mine and obstacle avoidance sonar in recognition of the reality of operating near a minefield and never being 100% sure that you’ve avoided all mine threats.  This is lacking in the LCS MCM, I believe.

 

Shock Testing – The mothership was tested for resistance to nearby explosive shocks although no details were provided as to test conditions.  As you recall, the LCS failed its shock testing quite badly with the explosive loads having to be reduced and the final tests cancelled due to anticipated damage.  Being shock resistant is just a common sense requirement for a MCM vessel.

 

Mine Hunting – The mine hunting concept involves at least two to three passes.  The individual steps are:  detection, identification, and destruction.  This is a very time consuming process and is, essentially, a one-at-a-time process as opposed to sweeping.  The process is suitable for small area clearance with no time constraints but would be unsuited for combat clearance of large areas in short time frames.

 

 

Additional information is available in a Naval News article [2]

 

 

Conclusion

 

So, what does all this offer the US Navy in the way of lessons?

 

There are aspects to like about the Dutch-Belgian MCM mothership such as multiple launch mechanisms, mine detecting sonar, limited size, limited speed, and single function.

 

There are also aspects that are detrimental such as the very limited vessel capacity, the inclusion of UAVs that serve no real MCM purpose, the limited number of launch/recovery stations, and the need for incessant communications.

 

Considering the benefits and detriments, it is possible to design a conceptual MCM mothership for the US Navy.  An MCM mothership should have the following characteristics:

 

• Host at least a dozen USVs capable of conducting sweep operations as opposed to one-at-a-time hunting.
• Speed should be limited to around 15 kts which is sufficient for the task and avoids over-building and unnecessary costs.
• Physical dimensions should be minimized to the extent possible.
• No aviation capabilities beyond Scan Eagle type UAVs and even that should be justified by a CONOPS that can actually benefit from them.
• Very long endurance and range.

With the demise of most/all of the Freedom class LCS, the Navy is  woefully short of MCM assets and the LCS is not even a capable, effective MCM asset if it was available in numbers.  We desperately need a new MCM ship and a mothership, as described, would be a good start.

As a reminder, the Allies used over 250 minesweepers for the Normandy assault.

 

 

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[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCrfvHAKJwg

 

[2]Naval News website, “This Is What The Future Belgian & Dutch MCM Motherships Will Look Like”, Xavier Vavasseur, 27-May-2019,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/05/this-is-what-the-future-belgian-dutch-mcm-motherships-will-look-like/

Motherships

In recent years, there have been many proposals suggesting that the US Navy employ and forward deploy small missile boats, non-nuclear submarines (SSK’s), small patrol boats, the LCS, and many variations on the theme.  All have in common one major shortcoming and that is relatively limited range and/or speed which either rules out their use or requires forward bases local to the vessel’s operating location.  Without forward base support the vessels would have too little time on station to be worth the effort.  In some cases, such as the Middle East, forward bases are somewhat available.  In other cases, such as the South China Sea and Pacific region, forward bases are few, scattered, and a long way from the actual operational areas.

Worse, in many cases the US doesn’t own the bases it uses and must seek permission to use the bases for staging or supporting actual combat operations.  We have seen many instances of “allies” refusing permission for the US to conduct combat operations from foreign bases.  What is the point of having a forward base if it’s not available when needed for combat?

Singapore, for example, is unlikely to allow US combat operations in a conflict with China, choosing, instead, to try to walk the narrow path of neutrality.

We see other countries operating small, short ranged vessels and wonder why we can’t do the same.  China, for example, operates the excellent Houbei class missile boat which carries an immensely powerful anti-ship missile weapons fit on a very small hull.  Iran, NKorea, Russia, and China all operate small, silent, deadly non-nuclear submarines (SSKs).  Russia operates several small, powerful corvette/frigate classes.

Why can’t the US operate such vessels?  Well, the factor that we overlook is that those countries are operating the vessels in their own home waters, near their own ports.  Thus, range, endurance, and ready maintenance support is not an issue.  In contrast, the US operates on a forward deployed basis, generally far from friendly bases.  Small vessels have limited range and endurance.  For example, if a small missile boat has an endurance of one week and it takes 4 days to get from the nearest base to the operating area and the same to return, there’s no operating time left for the actual patrol.

So, if forward bases are not the solution or, at best, only an occasional or peacetime solution, what alternative is there?  The answer comes from our dim and distant past and is, of course, motherships.  Motherships, or tenders as they were referred to in WWII, were commonly used in times gone by but have been abandoned by the Navy over the last few decades.

During WWII, tenders were used to support PT boats, submarines, and destroyers, among other applications.

Let’s take a closer look at some of the WWII tenders and refresh our memories about their functions and capabilities.

Dixie Class (AD) – This was a five ship class of destroyer tender built during the pre and early war years.  USS Dixie (AD-14), for example, spent 1942-1944 supporting operations in the Solomons before moving to Ulithi during late 1944 and early 1945 and then finishing the war at Leyte.

Dixie Class Destroyer Tender

Otus Class (AS-20 / ARG-20) – This was a single ship class built as a submarine tender in 1940 and later reclassified as an internal combustion engine repair ship near the end of the war.  Otus operated across the Pacific, as needed, and provided submarine, mine, and small craft tender services as well as engine repair.  She received one battle star.

USS Otus

USS Argonne (AS-10) – The Navy operated several submarine tenders during WWII though not a purpose built class.  Argonne was typical of the type of commercial or general ship obtained by the Navy and converted for use as a tender.  The ship operated in the Solomons, Palaus, Leyte, and the Marshalls.

USS Argonne

We see, then, that the Navy has operated both purpose built tenders and tenders converted from commercial vessels.  There is no reason why the same couldn’t be done today.  Tenders are not combat vessels and could be built to non-military standards based on cheap commercial vessels.  Alternatively, existing commercial vessels could be easily and economically converted.

The Navy operates squadrons of Cyclones and MCM vessels which could greatly benefit from tenders in terms of time on station.  The LCS has always been intended to operate in squadrons although what the Navy intends to do with them now is anyone’s guess since they have no useful mission modules.  Tenders would also open up the possibility of acquiring and using SSKs.

Aside from the obvious benefits of tenders in terms of support, replenishment, repair, and maintenance, tenders can be repositioned as needed which allows flexible locating of operational areas.

Motherships are also highly useful for supporting mine countermeasure operations.  This application is obvious enough that I won’t bother describing it.

Currently, the Navy has the Afloat Forward Staging Base ship which could be a mothership, though it seems a bit oversized, but seems to have no actual, specific use for it.

The Navy is so fixated on building the high end, ‘sexy’ ships that it is ignoring the various auxiliary ships that are the actual backbone of any fleet.  Motherships/tenders are a force-multiplier, allowing other types of vessels to operate effectively in forward areas.  We need to abandon of obsession with multi-billion dollar ships and begin building the support ships that will actually keep the fleet operating in war.

Motherships

Commenters (and ComNavOps!) have often stated the desire for motherships in various roles.  Most people view a mothership as a vessel that provides fuel, munitions, maintenance, and supplies for a group of otherwise short-legged vessels thereby allowing the smaller vessels to operate at greater distance from ports or operate for longer periods of time without returning to port.  For example, a common suggestion is for a mothership to support squadrons of LCSs.  Another example is a mothership to support small MCM assets.

The mothership concept can be further extended.  Not only can the mothership provide sustainment support for smaller vessels but it can also provide active combat capabilities that support and enhance the capabilities of the ships it’s supporting.

For example, an ASW mothership and a group of ASW configured LCSs (assuming they ever get a functional ASW module!) can complement each other while acting as an ASW hunter-killer group.  The mothership, presumably a small amphib type, could provide more capable radar and sensors and host several ASW helos to augment the LCS’ limited aviation capabilities.  The LCSs, in turn, could provide expanded reach for the mothership allowing longer range prosecutions at no risk to the mothership.  In addition, a modified LCS could provide more robust, layered AAW protection for the mothership.  Thus, in addition to providing sustainment support, the mothership and its group can complement each others combat capabilities.

Another interesting example might be an LCS, suitably modified for extended range, better sensors, and medium range AAW, acting as a mothership to a group of Cyclone type patrol vessels.  The patrol vessels act as the hands of the LCS and conduct extended range patrols and boarding activities while the LCS provides a small degree of aviation support and superior sensor awareness to guide the smaller vessel’s operations.

I’ll leave it to you to imagine other mothership combinations that could prove useful.

Without getting into specific design concepts, motherships operating in the type of role outlined here would generally take the form of small ampibs, like the old LSDs and whatnot, and would mount enhanced AAW, sensors, and whatever else makes sense for their specific role.

The point is that motherships can perform more than just simple resupply and the Navy should begin to think of them as force multipliers.

LCS Aviation

In a discussion awhile back, a commenter stated that the helo and hangar might be the only thing the LCS got right.  My first reaction was that the statement might be right but the more I thought about it, the more I think the opposite is true.

Before we go any further, let’s set the record straight on the aviation capabilities of the LCS.  Most people think the large flight decks (and they do have that!) mean fairly extensive aviation capabilities:  the ability to operate several helos of any type, the ability to act as a lily pad for any number of any type of helos, and, possibly, the ability to operate MV-22s.  The reality, however, is quite a bit less.  Ignoring UAVs, here’s what the LCS can handle.

LCS-1 – (1)SH-60 (hangar)

LCS-2 – (2)SH-60 (hangar) or (1)H-53 (flight deck only)

As a lily pad, the LCS can, presumably, accommodate any helo up to the weight of an SH-60 or SH-60/H-53, depending on the LCS class.  That’s tempered, though, by the fact that the flight decks are structurally weak.  I’ve never seen actual data on the flight deck weight limits or total capacity but LCS program engineers I’ve spoken to suggest that the structural weakness greatly limits the flight deck capacity.  My best assessment is that the flight deck can’t handle much more than the one or two helos the ship’s are credited with operating.

Thus, the LCS-1 class can operate a single helo and the LCS-2 class can operate one or two helos.  That’s not a lot.  Add to that the maxim that if you have one helo, you have none, in recognition of the helo’s extensive maintenance requirements and you begin to recognize that the helo is not as useful in practice as it would seem on paper.  Further, unlike, say, a ship’s gun which is ready 24 hours a day, a helo can only be used for several hours, at most, before it must return to the ship to rearm and refuel – a lengthy process even assuming a relief crew is available and, given the high maintenance requirements, the helo is only available for several hours out of 24.

Assuming it’s mechanically “up”, what can a helo contribute to the ship’s three main missions of ASW, MCM, and ASuW? 

ASW is the helo’s forte and the MH-60R is well suited for it.  The only drawback is the lack of numbers and limited endurance.  A single LCS can only operate one or two helos which provides pretty spotty coverage.  A helo can only operate for a few hours before it must return to the ship to rearm and refuel – a lengthy process that leaves gaps in the ASW coverage.

MCM was intended to be performed in large measure by helo towed or mounted MCM equipment.  Unfortunately, apparently no one checked to see whether the the -60 helo could safely tow the equipment.  As it turned out, it can’t.  Further, some of the helo mounted MCM systems have failed to pan out.  It looks like the helo is going to operate the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) which uses a remote controlled (fiber optic link) “torpedo” (Archerfish or similar) with a camera and explosive charge to relocate a target mine and destroy it.  It appears that a helo can neutralize up to four mines before returning to the ship to rearm.  Thus, a maximum of four mines can be neutralized over the course of several  hours, at best.  Further, unlike the MH-53E, the MH-60S cannot conduct MCM operations at night and has less endurance.  Overall, the helo is going to play a much smaller MCM role than originally intended. 

ASuW is a potentially useful role for the helo armed with up to 8 Hellfires, however, operational constraints greatly decrease the usefulness.  Aside from the spotty availability, the helo will only be useful if it happens to be airborne and armed with the proper weapons at the exact moment of an attack.  Given the probable short range and short warning of engagements, the odds of getting a helo into action are not great.  Add to that the vulnerability of the helo to Stinger-type missiles and the ASuW role begins to look a bit suspect.

Some of the LCS’s aviation limitations could possibly be alleviated by operating the ships in squadrons so that they can pool their helos.  Of course, that requires that the ships stay in fairly close proximity so as to maximize mission time.  If that’s the case, it would probably make more sense to simply operate a single amphibious ASW or MCM mothership, at least from a helo operations and support point of view.

So far, the discussion has been straightforward and the conclusion is that helos on the LCS are of much more limited usefulness than would appear on paper.  Add to that the fact that each LCS has to be its own helo support and maintenance center and it quickly becomes apparent that LCS helos are somewhat useful, though limited, and inefficient to operate. 

Now, let’s go a step further.  Recognizing both the potential usefulness of helos and operational inefficiency of the LCS, what about deleting aviation capability from the LCS and, instead, operate non-aviation LCS squadrons centered around amphibious motherships (retired Tarawas, for example)?  The LCS, now much cheaper to build and operate, and suitably modified for this new role, would provide the ASuW and AAW protection for the mothership, extended reach for MCM and ASW remote underwater vehicles (assuming they ever pan out), and extended area patrol, boarding, and other “peacetime” activities.  In addition to being able to operate more helos than a squadron of LCS’s, the mothership would provide the centralized support and maintenance that would allow for more efficient helo operation, a degree of materiel and maintenance support for the LCS squadron, and centralized command and control.

So, quite the opposite from the helo/hangar/flight deck being the one thing the LCS got right, I submit that it’s a serious failing in the ship design and concept of operations.  That’s not surprising, really, since the Navy, by their own admission, never had a concept of operations in place when the LCS was designed.  The proposed concept of operations offers the opportunity to salvage a degree of usefulness from the LCS while enhancing MCM and ASW capabilities in the fleet.

USS Ponce - Afloat Forward Staging Base

Navy Times has posted a short article (1) describing the initial deployment of the USS Ponce which is the amphibious ship that was converted into an afloat forward staging base.  Among other possible uses, the ship will provide mine countermeasures support, SOF support and command facilities, area surveillance via UAVs, mothership maintenance support to smaller vessels, and so forth.  This is still a somewhat experimental concept in terms of opertional concepts and usefulness but it is good to see the Navy get more use out of an older amphibious ship rather than retire it.



USS Ponce Recovering UAV



 The most interesting aspect of this is that the ship is largely crewed by civilians with roughly ¾ from the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the remaining ¼ from the Navy.  Given that the ship is intended to operate close to the action, that raises the likely possibility of combat operations by a civilian crewed ship.  MSC has operated supply ships for the Navy for a long time and I’m sure the legal aspects of potential combat have long since been dealt with, however, this is the most extreme example of a civilian crewed ship intended to be very near the action that I’m aware of.

I wonder how combat, damage control, command, and discipline are handled?  I know little about this aspect of the Navy but it’s a fascinating area.

(1) Navy Times, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/09/ap-navy-floating-base-gets-workout-092212/, Adam Schreck, Sep 22, 2012