Screaming, Here I Am!

As we know, the Navy, with absolutely no concept of operations (CONOPS) or any validation testing, is proceeding full speed ahead with the unmanned craze.  The plan, for a while, called for two unmanned surface vessels: a very small surveillance (ISR) vessel and a somewhat larger mini-missile barge.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise, the Navy’s thinking is changing again.  Here’s the latest plan, as best I can tell.
 

The U.S Navy is seeking a wide range of new medium and large USVs as part of its Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program … [1]

Don’t you love how everything has to have ‘modular’ in it, now, whether it makes any sense or not?  ‘Modular’ shows that it’s high tech, innovative, and cutting edge.  It also shows that it’s stupid but, I digress …
 

The MASC program looks to deliver three distinct USV types to the U.S. Navy … [1]

Okay, what are the three (instead of the previous two, I guess) types?
 

Vessel one is the baseline Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) which the U.S. Navy says addresses “the need for a fast, high capacity, embarked payloads platform”. MASC will carry two 40-foot ISO containers that consume 75kW of power each. The baseline range with a payload of 25 metric tons is set at 2,500 nautical miles, all while maintaining 25 knots up to Sea State 4.[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel two is a High-Capacity MASC with double the payload of the baseline variant. It will carry four 40-foot ISO containers each drawing 45kW of power while maintaining a “high endurance, high capacity” capability. A configuration of four such containers would allow a High-Capacity MASC to carry four reloadable Mark 70 launchers for sixteen single-packed missiles like Tomahawks or Standard missiles, or sixty-four quad-packed missiles like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel three is a single-payload USV, dubbed the Single Payload MASC, embarking a single 20-foot ISO container drawing 75kW of power. The documents explicitly state that the container should have no obstructions at the rear, likely for a towed array ASW capability or similar anti-submarine system like the Liberator concept, which Naval News recently covered. Liberator aims to pair heavyweight torpedo launchers to unmanned ships.[1] [emphasis added]

So, vessel types one and two will carry missiles inside 40 foot ISO containers with each container holding four large missiles or sixteen ESSM missiles in quad packs.  Let’s give some thought to the advantages and disadvantages of each vessel type.
 
Firepower. 
 
Vessel One type will carry two ISO containers with a total of 8 larger missiles and Vessel Two will carry up to four containers with 16 missiles.  Contrast that with a Burke’s 96 VLS cells or even a Constellation’s 32 cells.  The unmanned vessels carry very little firepower payload.  An individual unmanned vessel can’t successfully strike a target or defeat an attack.  To give some perspective, it would require 12 Type One vessels to equal a Burke and 6 Type Two vessels.  That’s not a very efficient or effective distribution of firepower given that each vessel adds to the complexities and difficulties of controlling, monitoring, maintaining, and refueling for the overall group.
 
In other words, these unmanned vessels are of no effective use individually and can only be useful in significant numbers which carries significant difficulties with it.
 
 
Communications / Stealth
 
As noted, each vessel must be controlled, monitored, positioned, maintained, refueled, and provided remote fire control data among other needs.  That’s a lot of time and effort on someone’s part and, more importantly, that’s a lot of communications going on.  While I’m sure we’ll attempt to use line-of-sight and various other low probability of detection communication methods, there’s no such thing as truly undetectable communications.  The only undetectable communications is no communications.  The more vessels we need to control (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more likely it is that we will be detected.  In essence, using unmanned vessels is the equivalent of continually screaming, here I am!  Come sink me!
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

RF (radio frequency) control is not inherently stealthy and this suggests that the Navy is looking to build and operate these vessels to commercial standards.  That’s find as a peacetime business case but not as a combat operation.  It’s bad enough to not be stealthy on the modern battlefield but to literally broadcast your location is pure folly.
 
Endurance / Logistics
 
As a general statement, small vessels are slow and will need to be refueled frequently.  Yes, it is possible to design a long endurance, small vessel by giving up combat payload for more fuel and decreased weight but that almost seems counterproductive relative to the intended combat function of the vessel.  The more small, unmanned vessels we have to operate (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more refueling we’ll have to conduct.  Given that we don’t have stealthy oilers, that means even more chance of being detected.  In addition, those oilers will have to be protected and escorted which is an example of the ripple effect of disadvantages of small, unmanned vessels.
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

 
Conclusion
 
All of this is not to say that there can’t be a valid, effective use for small unmanned ships but I have yet to see anyone articulate a viable CONOPS.  We’re pursuing the technology with no idea how to use them.  We’ve seen the disastrous consequences of that path, repeatedly, and yet, inexplicably, we’re doing it again.
 

 
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[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Family of Unmanned Ships”, Carter Johnston, 29-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-sets-sights-on-fleet-wide-family-of-unmanned-ships/

Chinese Prototype

Naval News website has an article about a Chinese experimental (prototype) unmanned, or optionally manned, small combatant surface vessel.  Here’s a description of the vessel:
 

The new imagery confirms a substantial vessel in trimaran configuration. The ship is armed with at least four vertical launch cells, equipped with multiple sensor panels likely for an electronically scanned array and additional sensors, and a sizeable aviation pad at the rear supporting a VTOL UAV. An organic UAV capability could support the USV particularly in over the horizon (OTH) -targeting for maritime and land attack-roles.
 
If previously shown models of a slightly different configuration are indicative, the design may contain further weapons in recessed bays, including an autocannon on the bow, and torpedo launchers at the sides. Forward of the four missile cells is a notable square area which may incorporate further missile cells.[1]

The vessel is an evolution or refinement of a previous version built in 2019. 
 
The article indicates that the manufacturer currently retains ownership of the craft and that the Chinese navy has not yet expressed any interest in procuring the design.
 
It is possible that the main purpose of the prototype is to assist in international marketing but, regardless, there is no better way to persuade your own government to buy your product than by building a prototype.
 

Chinese Prototype Combat USV

 

I’m not going to discuss the actual combat capabilities because that’s pointless without a CONOPS to reference against.  Still, there are a few noteworthy aspects to this.
 
Manufacturer’s Dime.  All indications are that the vessel was built by the manufacturer, at their cost.  This was once routine in the aviation industry and should be revived as standard practice.  Of course, there’s a limit to how much prototype cost a manufacturer can absorb.  A $20B prototype aircraft carrier, for example, is simply not feasible.  However, producing aspects of a $20B prototype carrier is perfectly reasonable.  For example, that new gravimetric warp launch catapult that is planned to replace the non-functional EMALS should be built and installed on a second hand cargo ship for at sea testing under realistic operating conditions.  That gravity-nullifying, instantaneous, matter transporter that will replace the finicky Ford weapon elevators should be installed on a used, throwaway cargo ship to prove it works before including it in a production design.  Those kinds of prototype costs are within the financial capacity of a builder who is steadily producing $20B+ carriers and, if they aren’t, that alone should be a giant red flag about cost, reliability, and scheduling. 
 
Testing.  It should go without saying but I’ll say it anyway since the Navy seems oblivious: prototypes are invaluable for both demonstration purposes and as a developmental aid.  Build, test, and feed the results back into the design before you commit to production.  China gets to see what works and what doesn’t without committing to something like a massive 55 LCS program before the first ship was even designed.  If/when the Chinese navy wants to build the vessel, both they and the builder will know what the strengths and weaknesses of the design are and can incorporate modifications into the design, as needed.  The LCS, by comparison, was already deep into the production run before the first lessons learned had a chance to feed back into the design process and the result is half a dozen or so LCSes have already been retired and several more are on the chopping block.
 
Cost Estimates.  A prototype hugely reduces the uncertainty about the cost of a new ship.  It should!  You just built it!  You now know exactly what it costs.  Now you can realistically work on cost reductions.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Again, it seems blindingly obvious but I’ll say it anyway.  There is nothing but good that can come from the routine construction of prototypes.  As noted, the use of prototypes provides the ability to wring out the problems from a design and develop very accurate cost estimates.  The manufacturer benefits from an increased likelihood of obtaining a production contract for an existing vessel.  The mere fact that the vessel already exists is a major selling point.  Manufacturers should be eager to build prototypes.
 
Of course, as noted, there is a limit to the amount of money a manufacturer can spend on a prototype with no guarantee of a production contract.  When a prototype gets too big and too expensive for the manufacturer to absorb the total cost, the government can provide partial payment (not full payment!).  The key is to force the manufacturer to put skin in the game.  This encourages higher quality to increase the likelihood of sales and reduce the cost of quality related reworks.  It also motivates the manufacturer to engage in ruthlessly efficient cost cutting and eliminates the practice of continuous change orders.  When you’re building a ship on your own dime, you suddenly become intensely interested in minimizing costs and getting the most bang for your buck as opposed to the perverse, reverse incentives we now have where the manufacturer gets paid more money for poor quality (via reworks) than they do for good quality (no reworks).
 
We should do this for every new ship class.  Build a single prototype, test it thoroughly, and then, and only then, consider a production contract.  The Navy will never do this so Congress should mandate this approach by law.with criminal penalties associated for failure to comply.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Chinese Experimental Aviation Platform And Combat USV Emerge In Detailed New Imagery”, Alex Luck, 7-Nov-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/11/chinese-experimental-aviation-platform-and-combat-usv-emerge-in-detailed-new-imagery/

Surface Drone Swarm

Russia just lost another landing ship to a Ukrainian drone swarm.[1]  The mind simply boggles at the degree of ineptitude being exhibited by the Russians.  Let’s use this incident to examine the use of surface drone swarms.
 
Let’s start by looking at the drones Ukraine is using and see how deadly they really are.
 
 
Magura V5
 
The commonly reported Ukrainian drone craft is the Magura V5.  There have been different versions produced so the specs vary, depending on the source and the referenced variant.  The drone is a relatively small craft (5.5 m long) with a low silhouette which would make them difficult to spot visually, however, at speed they leave a very visible wake.  Their shape is not notably radar stealthy although they are smooth and relatively free of protrusions so they may be somewhat radar stealthy.  Propulsion is said to be an electric motor or hybrid (gas-electric?) of some sort.  Presumably, the craft are readily visible in the infrared and should be easily detectable at the horizon, some 12 miles distant or so, depending on the height of the EO/IR sensor.  Range is variously reported to be 250-500 miles.  Control is via optical sensor and satellite (Starlink?) communication.  Drone weight is 1000 kg (2200 lb) with a payload variously reported as 300-400 lbs explosive.  Cruising speed is 20 mph with a terminal burst speed about twice that.
 

Magura V5 Drone

Magura V5 Drone

Acoustically, an electric motor running at high speed and a craft sailing at high speed should generate significant noise and be readily detectable at 10-25 miles, using passive sonar.  I would imagine the sound would be similar to that of a torpedo at speed.
 
I would assume that, like all weapons with a range, the reported range is much greater than the effective operational range.  Thus, the operational range is likely 50-100 miles but that’s just informed speculation on my part.  It does, however, greatly impact the overall effectiveness of the drone since it impacts the launch distance from the target.
 
This is a surface running torpedo, for all intents and purposes.  Like a torpedo, it can be deadly if not treated appropriately.  Unlike a torpedo which can be decoyed but cannot be destroyed, these drones are easily destroyed with appropriate weapons.
 
Now, let’s look at the Russian landing ship.
 
 
Ropuch Amphibious Ship
 
The Ropucha class landing ship is a medium size (369 ft long, 4080 tons displacement), lightly armed LST with either 2x 57mm dual guns (Ropucha I) or 1x 76mm gun and 2x AK-630 30mm CIWS (Ropucha II).  Either way, that’s not a lot of armament!
 
The ship has multiple fire control, search, and navigation radars.  I assume it has EO/IR sensors but that’s speculation.
 
Crew size is around 90.
 
 
Now, let’s consider some of the relevant operational factors.
 
 
Operational Factors
 
Launch Site.  The drone can be launched from shore or from a host vessel.  Either way, the drones must be close enough to the target to be within the range of the drone.  It’s not as if the drone can be safely launched from a thousand miles away.  One would think that a host vessel, meaning, potentially, any unidentified vessel within 500 miles, would be easily spotted and sunk before it could launch the drones.
 
Alternatively, if launched from shore, the launch operation would require trucks and handling equipment given the overall drone weight of a ton or more.  This is not something that one tucks into a backpack.  It’s a fairly major operation to transport, handle, and launch the craft.  One would think that surveillance of the likely launch areas and access roads would be effective in spotting and preventing launches.
 
Detection.  As noted, there are multiple modes of detection including visual, infrared, acoustic, and radar.  A semi-alert defender should have no trouble detecting the drones at a distance.  The use of swarms of multiple drones further increases the chance of detection.
 
Satellites.  Satellites (reportedly Starlink) are, apparently, being used to control the drones.  I assume Russia is attempting to disrupt the satellite communications although given the demonstrated degree of incompetence, this may not be true.  Satellite vulnerabilities include physical destruction in space, local signal disruption, cyber attacks at various points of the satellite system (ground control, master communications, local receivers, etc.).  If Starlink involvement is confirmed, Russia would be within their rights to conduct physical sabotage of Starlink facilities even in the US.
 
If Russia is attempting any of these actions, they appear to be having little or no success.
 
Targeting.  Targeting information is likely being gathered via satellites and UAVs, probably from Ukrainian-allied countries like the US.  Again, if confirmed, Russia could conduct attacks on the targeting assets with minimal risk of escalation.  The last several years have demonstrated that the US is highly unlikely to respond beyond speeches and warnings that are never acted on.
 
Lethality.  The drones reportedly carry around three hundred pounds of explosive which is a reasonably substantial amount of explosive.  However, it should be noted that the explosive is a non-penetrating effect as compared to a shell, bomb, or missile.  This lessons the extent of damage relative to the nominal weight of explosive since a significant amount of the explosive force is directed away from the ship.  A similar phenomenon occurred in the attack on the USS Cole.
 
Proximity.  The Ukrainian drones benefit greatly from the unique geography of this situation.  The operating area is a fairly small, constrained area as opposed to the open ocean that the US Navy would operate in during a war with China.  Of course, if the Navy opted to do something stupid, like operate near land with inadequately armed and sensored ships, as the Russians are doing, then the result could well be similar.
 
Damage Control.  The Russians appear to have had very little success in applying damage control to ships that have been struck.  Obviously, hard data on this is difficult to come by.
 
 
 
Analysis
 
To sum up the preceding, the drones are potentially damaging with a few hundred pounds of explosive but they are also small, highly vulnerable to destruction, and easily detected.  So, why are they having some success? 
 
Note:  We hear about the successes but we do not hear about the failures, if any, and I assume there are many.  For example, it could be that only one in a hundred drones succeed.  While that wouldn’t change the overall end result, it would certainly change the assessment of the efficiency of the drones.
 
There is simply no getting around the staggering degree of Russian ineptitude.  They are sending ill-equipped ships, unescorted, into known dangerous waters with, apparently, no aviation surveillance support such as helos or UAVs.  A handful of small, simple escorts with suitable sensors and weapons would end the drone threat.  Even submarines ought to be able to provide detection of drones, interdiction of host ships, if any (most hints suggest shore launches), and covert surveillance of possible shore launch sites..  Russia supposedly has seven Kilo class subs in the Black Sea and their sonars should be able to detect drones and provide early warning.
 
The operational stupidity is compounded by the lack of long range interdiction of the launch points and ships/trucks that are used to transport and launch the drones.  Russia should have air, land, and sea patrols dedicated to finding and destroying the transport/launch vehicles or ships.
 
If we consider the kill chain concept, there are several links in the chain where the Russians could take effective action to disrupt the chain (production facilities, storage facilities, transport, launch event, local detection, and local destruction).  Bafflingly, the Russians seem to be unwilling or unable to break the chain at any of those points.
 
In the hints we get from videos, the Russians appear unable to kill many (any?) drones with the weapons they do have.  This speaks volumes about the overhyped claims of Russian weapon performance (as we’ve seen throughout history and covering ALL Russian weapon systems) and/or the woeful state of Russian training.
 
Compounding all this is the Russian’s unwillingness to seek out and destroy targeting platforms.  The Russians could, simply, declare suitably large exclusion zones and then destroy any foreign (US) aircraft in the area.  Similar actions could be taken against satellite surveillance if, indeed, that is a source of targeting information.
 
As with all other aspects of this war, Russia is conducting the drone defense operations in the most inept manner imaginable. 
 
The Ukraine success is due almost exclusively to Russian ineptitude rather than any inherent capabilities of the drones which, as we’ve discussed, are not particularly formidable on paper.
 
 
Conclusion
 
So many naval observers want to jump on the drone bandwagon because of Ukraine’s handful of successful attacks but is this enthusiasm justified? 
 
An objective analysis suggests that drones are not a threat to an alert, suitably equipped defender who counters the threat with intelligent operations, doctrine and tactics.  The ineptitude of the Russians cannot be ignored and, therefore, trying to derive universal lessons from this is an exercise in futility if not downright misleading.
 
Like any threat, if one fails to treat the threat with the respect it deserves, it can be lethal.  The US needs to be aware of drone threats and train and equip to counter them but they are not, inherently, a serious threat.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Russia Loses Large Landing Ship to Ukrainian Drone Swarm”, streiff, 14-Feb-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/14/russia-loses-large-landing-ship-to-ukrainian-drone-swarm-n2170101

Ukraine-Russia Naval War

As I keep saying, we can’t draw any conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia war  …  and yet military observers continue to try to do so.  The latest batch of supposed lessons involves a burst of ‘naval war’ analyses following recent claims of a successful suicide attack by a Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel against a Russian Ropucha I LST landing ship.[1]
 
Previous reports claimed successful attacks on 29-Oct-2022 by USVs (and possibly UAVs) against a Russian Admiral Grigorovich class frigate and a mine countermeasure (MCM) ship.  It is also possible that the sinking of the missile cruiser Moskva was due to a USV as the apparent damage would be consistent with a waterline explosion caused by a USV.  There is also the 24-Mar-2022 sinking of a Russian Alligator class amphibious landing ship while docked in Berdyansk (see, “Port Seizure Example”).  The method of attack was never identified and a USV strike would fit the facts as well or better than artillery or missile strikes.
 
In addition to the successful attacks, there have been multiple reports of failed attacks.
 
From this, observers have concluded that the Ukraine-Russia naval war – to the extent there actually is one – is an asymmetric conflict between Ukrainian unmanned assets and conventional Russian ships.  Observers believe that the Ukrainians have demonstrated that the future of naval warfare involves small, unmanned assets and that large ships are no longer viable.  This is utterly incorrect but that’s not really the point of this post.
 
While we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, we can discuss certain aspects that have become apparent. 
 
 
Lethality/Effectiveness – One of the common misunderstandings is that unmanned assets are incredibly effective.  That is false or, at best, only semi-true. 
 
The actual sink rate for Ukrainian USVs against Russian ships is zero, as far as I know (excepting the possibility that Moskva and Alligator were sunk by a USV).  A few ships have, apparently, been damaged with the extent of damage unknown.
 
So, while the reported attacks have caused damage they have not been fatal (unless the Moskva or Alligator was a USV attack).  Thus, a single drone strike appears insufficient to sink a ship.  This is analogous to missile attacks which are not, generally, instantly fatal from a single hit.
 
The apparent effectiveness of the USVs (they have hit multiple ships) seems equally due to the appalling lack of awareness and tactical ineptitude of the Russians as to whatever effectiveness the Ukrainian USVs might have.  The Russians seem oblivious to, or incapable of, detecting USVs and seem to lack any organized defensive effort.
 
 
USV Detection
 
Why have Russian sensors failed to detect the USVs in time for effective countermeasures?  We claim to be able to detect periscopes at hundreds of miles.  This may reinforce one of ComNavOps recurring themes that all manufacturer’s/Navy claims are vastly overblown.  Unless one believes that Russian sensors are vastly inferior to those of the US, it would seem that sensors cannot reliably detect even speedboat size objects on the water.  Of course, it may well be that Russian sensors are vastly inferior or that Russian operators are insufficiently trained to use their sensors effectively.
 
 
Proximity – The attacks all seem to have occurred in port or very close to land which is understandable given the short legs and limited seaworthiness of an unmanned speedboat.  There are reports of some USVs attacking the Crimea bridge from a significant distance.  Of course, since we have no confirmed USV launch points, it’s impossible to say what the various attack distances were.  Regardless, relative to open ocean distances in, say, the Pacific theater, the attacks are limited to near land.  This suggests that USV speedboat type attacks are not a threat to ships operating in the open ocean.
 
 
Defense
 
There have been reports of successful defenses by the Russians against the USV drones.  This suggests that individual USVs are easily defeated – not surprising since they have no defensive weapons, whatsoever.  Reports also suggest that the drones have been used in bunches – a ‘swarm’ of sorts – which would increase the chances of one/some getting through the defenses.  Bear in mind that the defense has to be 100% effective whereas the USVs, due to their cheapness - only need an occasional success to be effective.
 
This suggests that effective defenses must be numerous, lethal, and rapidly responsive.  Small missiles, guided rockets, or CIWS-type weapons would be appropriate.  It also suggests that the defensive weapons ought to be harbor-based, controlled, and operated by a central harbor defense rather than depending on the individual ships to provide their own defense.  In other words, once a ship enters a port, the defense should be the responsibility of the port forces instead of the ship.  Ships come and go from a port but the port’s defenses ought to be consistent and on-going.  This provides continuity and consistency of defense regardless of the comings and goings of individual ships.  Sensors and weapons ought to be sited at the various approaches to the port and ought to be layered with multiple sensing and engagement zones.
 
 
Conclusion
 
There is no escaping the fact that the Russians appear utterly incapable or inept (or both) of detecting and defending against USVs.  They seem to lack any tactical doctrine for defense.  Given that, it is worse than pointless to draw conclusions.  This conflict seems almost totally inapplicable to a China-US war.  There is no more reason to believe that the naval aspects of this war offer valid lessons than do the ground combat aspects.
 
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone, ”Ukrainian Drone Boat Scores Direct Hit On Russian Warship”, Thomas Newdick, 4-Aug-2023,
https://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-drone-boat-scores-direct-093744246.html