Light Amphibious Warship / Landing Ship Medium Update

As you know, the key to the Marines idiotic missile sniping (and ASW!) concept is the Light Amphibious Warship, now being called a Landing Ship Medium (some admiral-wannabe probably got another star for that reclassification!) in the latest churn which attempts to look like progress.  The LAW/LSM is already a few years late as the Marines have already stood up their littoral regiments (they haven’t explained how they’ll transport those Marines since the LAW/LSM does not yet exist).
 
The Navy has seemed reluctant to embrace the Marine’s concept and has slow-walked the LAW/LSM program, as noted in the GAO annual report.[1]
 

… after years of delays and affordability concerns, the Navy shifted to a two-block acquisition strategy in December 2024 that reduces requirements for the ships in the first block and defers pursuit of a ship that will fully meet requirements to a later block.[1]

So, the Navy is going to purchase ships that they know will not meet the requirements?  Do you know what a ship that can’t meet the requirements is called?  That’s right, it’s a reef, paperweight, target drone, LCS, embarrassment .
 
Is the Navy at least moving quickly on the Block 2 version that fully meets the requirements?
 

… program officials said they have yet to start planning the details of the transition to the second block, such as the timing of the transition or the requirements of the next block.[1]

They haven’t even defined the requirements, yet? 
 
I can’t see anything going wrong with this program.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

My Marine Corps

 
ComNavOps has often criticized the Marine Corps for what it’s become.  A once proud and valuable fighting force has been reduced to silliness and irrelevance.  So, what would ComNavOps’ ideal Marine Corps look like?  What would its main mission be?  What forces would it need?  I’ve described some of this in passing in previous posts and comments but here is the collected and condensed summary.
 
As always, it starts with mission.  What is the Marine’s mission – its purpose? 
 
There are two answers to that:  legal (Title 10) and practical (what’s actually needed)
 
Mission – Legal Requirements
 
Title 10 [see Ref 1 for the text of Title 10, Section 8063] defines the purpose of the Marine Corps which consists of the following stated purposes:
 

• seizure or defense of advanced naval bases
• conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
• provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy
• provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases
• perform such other duties as the President may direct
• develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces
• responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war

 
Notice that it doesn’t actually say that the Marines must be the ones to conduct amphibious operations, only that they jointly develop the “tactics, technique, and equipment” for such operations.  Note, also, that there is no explicit mention of amphibious assaults, only “operations”, which can be any action initiated or enabled from the sea.  Again, that means that amphibious assaults, while certainly one example of an “amphibious operation”, are not the only possible action.  Thus, the claim that many make that the Marines must be capable of performing amphibious assaults is not true, strictly speaking.
 
 
Mission – Practical Requirements
 
Legal requirements aside, what missions are actually pertinent to US military operations, in general, and suited to the Marines, in particular?
 
Main Mission – Port seizure (a form of amphibious assault, thereby satisfying the legal requirement)

Secondary Missions – naval base defense, embassy protection, and the like
 
Regarding the more commonly envisioned amphibious assault, I’ve said, repeatedly, that I don’t see amphibious assaults as being strategically necessary in the foreseeable future so what does that leave?  As we’ve often noted, any ground action (adage:  the seat of purpose is on the land) requires a secure port for sustainment.  Over the beach supply cannot support a large ground action.  For example, Normandy was all about securing ports.  Thus, the Marine’s main mission should be port seizure.  I’d add airfield seizure to that except that the Army/Air Force once had that mission and, presumably, still do.  If not, that would also be part of the Marine’s mission.
 
Many would suggest that the Marine’s primary – or, at worst, secondary – mission is to be the nation’s first response force.  Once upon a time that was true, though not a legal requirement, but now the combination of Army/Air Force can respond faster and with more force than the Marines can.  Thus, first response is not a Marine Corps mission although they might assist in such a mission if circumstances warranted.
 
So, having defined the main mission as port seizure, what is needed to execute that mission?
 
 
Size
 
Two divisions (10,000 men, each) ought to be sufficient to execute a successful port seizure.  If you need more than that, you’ve probably bitten off too big a bite and should look elsewhere for a port to seize.
 
There is also the practical concern that 10,000+ men crammed into the relatively small area of a port is beginning to get too physically crowded to be practical and would offer an enemy too concentrated a target.
 
In addition, one brigade (3000 men) should be dedicated to specializing in the secondary missions.
 
Add in a 50% extra troop level for logistic support tasks and you get a total troop strength of around 34,500.
 
Division Unit Types
 

• 3x Assault Brigade
• 1x Construction Battalion (300 troops) specifically dedicated to port clearing and initial repair
• 1x Construction Battalion (300 troops) dedicated to road construction and repair to enable landed supplies and forces to quickly disperse outward
• 1x Harbor clearance and dredging unit (specialized vessels, 100 troops)
• 1x MCM – land (100 troops)
• 1x MCM – sea (100 troops)
• 1x Recon Drone Company

 
Equipment
 

• Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (think ZSU)
• Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile units
• Mobile C-RAM
• Mobile EW
• High speed landing craft with capacity for two squads
• Amphibious tank like LVT(A) for anti-personnel and anti-building and anti-fortification
• Small, very fast, very maneuverable assault helos carrying one squad each;  very fast insertion/unloading/departure (think Vietnam Huey) unlike current helos and V-22
• Specially designed, high speed attack transports
• Lots of self-propelled mortars for use in urban areas requiring indirect fire.due to high rise buildings
• Combat Engineering Vehicles for debris clearance

 
Note some of the things that are not listed as equipment, meaning that they are not useful or required under this concept:  AAV/ACV, fixed wing aircraft, ‘jeeps’, anything towed
 
 
Aviation
 
This is the big question.  Does a Marine Corps need its own air force?  For the port seizure mission, I see a need for a heavy helo component providing both attack and troop assault transport.  Helos are used for rapid insertion of troops at key locations in and around the port.  Attack helos provide the suppression and fire support needed to land the ground force from the air and sea.
 
I do not see a need for a fixed wing component.  Fixed wing aircraft are nearly useless for ground support in an urban area and are far too vulnerable to ground anti-air weapons.  Aerial supremacy is a fixed wing function but is a Navy responsibility so no Marine aircraft are needed for that.
 
A division should have a helo component of something on the order of 50 attack helos and 50 transport helos.  This would require the use of three big deck amphibious ships.
 
I’ve often stated that helos are not survivable over the battlefield.  Well, port seizure is an exception to that rule though only under this specific scenario.  The helos must be supported with ground forces applying relentless attack against the enemy’s anti-air assets.  Further, the helos do not fly overland to any great extent and thus avoid much of the enemy’s anti-air threat.  Finally, as described in the equipment list, the helos must be designed for very rapid insertion, which is the polar opposite of the MV-22 or any existing helo. 
 
The idea of helos spending time over a battlefield is, indeed, a non-survivable scenario as is trying to land in giant, open fields using snail-slow descents and takeoffs as MV-22s are required to do.  The helos in this scenario, as in Vietnam, would use a gut-wrenching drop, a five second unloading, and bounce back into the air heading directly away from the battlefield.  You might want to look at videos of Vietnam helo insertions to see just what we were once capable of.
 
One of the reasons helos had such high attrition rates in Vietnam was that we attempted to use them to insert troops directly into high threat areas.  In this concept, helos would be transporting troops around the periphery of the battle more so than directly into the threat.  We also attempted helo ops without much firepower support, depending on surprise to achieve survivability.  For this scenario, naval gunfire should be used to suppress enemy anti-air fire as the helos are inserting.  Of course, we have no naval gun support but that glaring weakness is another topic.
 
Another aspect of aviation is the role of the fleet carrier.  Many people believe that our carriers will supply ground support aircraft.  Setting aside the fact that we have no carrier based, ground support aircraft, that is not the role of the fleet carrier.  The carrier group’s job is to provide distant interdiction of enemy counterattacks.  That means preventing enemy naval response, overland troop reinforcement, cruise missile attacks, air attacks, etc.  Typically, this would be done at significant distances from the landing site and the carrier would not be in range to provide effective ground support.
 
 
Ships
 
Amphibious Aviation Ship – Looking at the equipment list, it is obvious that a new type of amphibious aviation ship, geared toward port seizure, would be needed.  The ship would carry 30+ helos (attack and transport) but not troops.  It would be purely an aviation ship – a landing support carrier.  As such, it would be, conceptually, half the volume and displacement of today’s big deck amphibious ships.  Troop insertion helos would be supplied and serviced by this ship but would pick up their loads from the attack transports, as needed, using the same combat-quick ‘bounce’ loading as for insertion unloadings.
 
Attack Transport – As we’ve previously discussed, WWII style attack transports would transport and land troops.  Landing craft would consist of around 30 reusable landing craft (think Higgins boat) as opposed to the sinlge use AAV/ACV.  While a well deck is an option, I would lean towards a WWII style attack transport. 
 
 
Basing
 
My Marine force would not function like today’s Marines.  There would be no deployments, no extended MEU-like cruises floating around, doing nothing, just waiting for something to happen.  Instead, the forces would embark from CONUS or, possibly, a central base such as in the Middle East or Pearl Harbor.  A port seizure is never going to be a spur of the moment operation so there is no need for deployments.  The force would be home based, training relentlessly – nothing else.
 
 
Mission Methodology
 
The key to the success of the port seizure mission is speed.  This means a rapid approach to minimize defensive reaction time.  For example, despite knowing pretty much where and when the Allies would invade Europe, the Germans were still slow to react and were unable to mount a rapid, coordinated counter attack.  Even if the enemy knows we’re coming, if we can hit fast enough and hard enough (shock), we can still be successful.
 
 
Command
 
This force would have little need for a top-heavy command structure.  Here is the envisioned command:
 
Commandant = General
Staff = Colonels, as needed
Division = General (1x per division, 2x total)
Brigade = Colonel
 
Thus, the entire force would have a total of 3 Generals and a handful of Colonels.  Hopefully, this would create a smaller, more focused force.
 
 
Missing
 
What are we currently missing in order to execute my vision of the Marine Corps?  Well, almost everything!  Setting aside the missing mission, organization, doctrine, operational planning, command and control structure, and mindset, we lack the following equipment (partial list):
 

• Large caliber naval fire support
• Amphibious aviation ship
• Attack transport
• Landing craft
• Anti-aircraft vehicles
• Self-propelled mortars
• EW
• C-RAM
• MCM
• Amphibious tank
• Transport helo
• Combat engineering vehicles
• Harbor construction vessels

 
In short, we lack everything.  Almost nothing we currently have is useful other than largely untrained bodies.
 
 
Conclusion
 
There you have it.  I’ve laid out a coherent rationale for the existence of the Marine Corps and a description of their mission and what is needed to execute that mission.  Contrast my vision to today’s Marine Corps vision – to the extent that they even have one.  Which one would you like to devote your taxes to supporting?
 
  
 
___________________________

 
[1] Following is the text of Title 10, §8063.
 
Title 10, §8063 United States Marine Corps: composition; functions
 
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
 
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.
 
(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Naval Marines

A reader recently suggested using detachments of Marines on Navy ships to conduct small land actions and, further, to supplement them with sailors who have been give some land combat training.  The reader noted that this was once a common practice.
 
The idea is intriguing and I’d like to run with it a bit. Is it a feasible idea, today?  Would it be effective?
 
Let’s do a brief review of some historical naval Marine actions to remind ourselves how they were used.
 
 
Sandwich – In May 1800, at Puerto Plata, Commodore Talbot, aboard the USS Constitution, sent a raiding party of 90 sailors and Marines under the command of then Lieutenant Isaac Hull to ‘cut out’ the Sandwich, a French privateer that had been plaguing the area and was being refit under the protection of the nearby Spanish fortress.  They quickly surprised and overwhelmed the Sandwich but needed time to prepare the ship for sailing.  Hull ordered the Marines to seize the nearby fort which they did with no casualties, ensuring the safety of the operation.  The Sandwich was successfully sailed out of the harbor.
 
Barbary Pirates – In Feb 1804, at Tripoli, Captain Stephen Decatur led a small unit of Marines in a clandestine night attack on the previously captured frigate Philadelphia, now being used as an enemy gun battery.  They successfully boarded the vessel and burned it, thus denying its use to the enemy.
 
Marquesas Islands – In Dec 1813, a detachment of Marines and sailors from the frigate USS Essex, Captain David Porter commanding, landed on Nukuhiva and secured the island to enable refit and R&R operations.  They established a small fort and mediated a cessation of a local tribal war.
 
Cape Antonio - On December 16, 1821, USS Porpoise, conducting anti-piracy operations under the command of Lieutenant James Ramage, located five pirate vessels and the merchant brig Bolina. Forty sailors were lowered into five boats and Ramage led an attack which burned the vessels and freed the Bolina.
 
Matanzas – In Nov 1822, near Matanzas, Cuba, USS Alligator, commanded by Lieutenant Allen as part of the Navy’s West Indian Anti-Piracy Campaign, launched small boats carrying 40 men to attack a group of three pirate schooners and five prizes.  The pirates were routed although Allen was killed in the action.
 
 
It is interesting to note that shipboard Marine detachments ended in 1998.  Beyond that, the Marines did, at one time, experiment with a Company Landing Team (CoLT) concept.  I don’t know what became of that.
 
 
Analysis
 
Now, let’s analyze the historical examples to understand why they worked and whether those same conditions for success would apply today.
 
In earlier times, the absence of timely long distance communications meant that ship’s captains had to act as an arm of the country’s diplomatic efforts, often creating policy on the spot.  This offered captains a great deal of latitude in the choice of options and force was often a preferred and effective choice.
 
Another major factor that allowed the success of these small naval Marine actions was the localized nature of affairs.  An enemy couldn’t respond quickly to bring reinforcements to bear.  Indeed, it would often be days or weeks before the enemy’s higher command or nearby forces even learned of the action.  Thus, if the naval Marines could overcome the local resistance, they and their host ship were assured of safety for days or weeks.  Today, with instantaneous communication, aircraft, missiles, long range artillery, etc., any local operation can potentially be countered with overwhelming force in a matter of minutes or hours.  A very lightly armed raiding force simply cannot withstand aircraft, armor, missiles, etc. and, further, the ship that they operate from is placed in immediate danger as well.
 
Today’s instantaneous communications means that the entire world will hear about an action almost on a real time basis which means that any action will have global political repercussions, good and bad.  This, among other factors, has made today’s leaders extremely reluctant to engage in the kind of ad hoc naval Marine actions we’re considering.  In earlier times, communication lags meant that it would takes months or years for an action to become known around the world and, by then, it was a past event and limited global consequence.
 
Along this same line, small actions generally mean small consequences.  A small naval Marine action would, almost by definition, have limited physical consequences – the political repercussions being a separate concern, of course.
 
Manpower was another reason why naval Marine actions were feasible.  Sailing warships carried large crews both for manning the labor-intensive cannons and to make up boarding and prize crews.  Thus, ships had an abundance of sailors and Marines available for off board actions.  Today, with minimal manning compounded be extensive at-sea billet gaps, there simply aren’t enough personnel to even consider such actions.
 
Yet another aspect of these actions is the defensive weapons that an enemy could bring to bear.  In earlier times, the attacking naval Marine force would face only weapons similar to their own with the exception of cannons which had limited, if any, mobility.  Thus, the attacking force could not be overmatched in weapons.  Today, with highly lethal, mobile, and often armored tanks and vehicles along with artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft, the attacking force, with only light weapons, is quite likely to face far superior defensive weapons.  Thus, even a small, local defense force may well possess superior firepower compared to a naval Marine force.
 
Finally, the most important factor in any potential naval Marine action is the willingness to take decisive, forceful action.  In earlier times, we were willing to use force as a part of war or as an arm of diplomacy.  Contrast that with today’s timid policy of avoidance and appeasement.  Even if we had naval Marine forces, we wouldn’t use them.
 
 
Potential Uses
 
Understanding why earlier actions were successful and the limits imposed on today’s potential actions, where/how could we use naval Marine forces, today, if we did have them?  Here’s a few examples.
 
Anti-Piracy – On any number of occasions, a naval Marine force could have used small UAVs to track today’s pirates back to their bases of operation and then conducted raids to eliminate them.
 
Anti-Small Boat – A raid against any of Iran’s swarm boat facilities would be a potential use for naval Marine forces.
 
Illegal Islands – As China attempted to build their illegal islands in the South China Sea, naval Marine forces could have conducted raids to destroy the island building efforts.
 
Cutting Out – Chinese vessels that violate allied nation’s territorial waters could be ‘cut out’ and seized.  China has repeatedly, and illegally, sent swarms of fishing vessels and “Coast Guard” vessels into Vietnamese, Philippine, and other waters.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Naval Marine forces for off board actions have been an historically useful and fairly common occurrence.  Today, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is timidity, this is no longer practiced.  There are, however, situations that could benefit from such actions if we had the mindset and wished to allocate the required resources.
 
Timidity aside, the main drawback would seem to be the potential for the attacking force to run into a level of weaponry that it cannot handle.
 
As an alternative, many of the contemplated actions might seem worthy of SEAL involvement although the need to transport SEALs to the action site would largely negate the benefit of having an organic action party always at hand.
 
It seems that there are situations that could benefit from a naval Marine force but the infrequency of such combined with the cost in additional manning and resources would seem to preclude the practice.  A much better alternative would be to make greater use of SEALs on carefully planned, small missions.  Of course, that assumes a level of fortitude we have not exhibited for many years.

This is Why I Provide References

I wouldn’t believe this stuff if I didn’t read it myself.  This is a bit of news I pulled from my own research archives and, no, it’s not an April Fool’s joke.  It’s real.
 
The Marine’s 3^rd Littoral Regiment [MLR] conducted a major exercise in late 2021 and early 2022 called Spartan Trident.  Okay, that sounds mildly aggressive and slightly belligerent.  Might be interesting.  Ought to involve some combat skills.  Let’s see what they did.
 
From the official Marine website, Spartan Trident was a three part exercise.[1]
 
Part 1
 

The first part of Spartan Trident consisted of a series of interactive discussions … This portion of the exercise took place from Dec. 6 to Dec. 10, 2021[1] [emphasis added]

Yes, you read that right.  Part 1 of the exercise consisted of discussions.  That’s not really an exercise, is it?
 
 
Part 2
 

The second part of the Spartan Trident Continuum took place from Jan. 11 to Feb. 11, 2022 and consisted of one week of planning … [1] [emphasis added]

Yes, you read that right.  Part 2 of the exercise consisted of planning.  Again, that’s not really an exercise, is it?
 
 
Part 3
 

The third and final part of the Spartan Trident Continuum took place from Sept. 12 to Sept. 30, 2022. This phase was focused on refining standard operating procedures … [1] [emphasis added]
 
During the scenario, the 3rd MLR organized into three command and control elements displaced across Marine Corps Base Hawaii to rehearse sustaining expeditionary sites, enabling fires, supporting maritime domain awareness, and supporting the joint campaign across the competition continuum.[1]

Apparently, some people ‘rehearsed’ procedures that supported the “joint campaign across the competition continuum”.  Seriously?  The ‘competition continuum’?  What is this, the rhythmic gymnastics event in the Olympics?
 
Did you also note that the activities were confined to the Marine base in Hawaii as opposed to out in the field?
 
I have no further details but this sounds suspiciously like a nine to five working day with some table top work to ‘rehearse’ procedures.  Don’t you ‘rehearse’ procedures out in the field, under enemy attack, for days on end as if you were … you know … in combat?

Conclusion
 
There you have it.  A major, 3-part exercise that consisted of talking and, apparently, some paperwork about standards.  You probably thought a major exercise required some degree of field work and combat simulations but you’d be wrong.  A little talking and a little paperwork is all we need.
 
How valuable was the exercise?  Incredibly so … according to the Marines.
 

… the unit has redesignated as an MLR and has proven its value as a joint force enabler. The progress is incredible.[1]

That’s all it takes to prove a unit’s value as a ‘joint force enabler’:  some discussions, some planning, and some standard operating procedures!  Do that and you’ll be incredible!
 
If I didn’t provide references for this stuff, you wouldn’t believe me, would you?
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/3180415/3rd-marine-littoral-regiment-concludes-spartan-trident/

MEU/ARG Issues

With the demise of informative DOT&E annual reports, we are left having to scratch around for breadcrumbs of information about the state of our military.  One such crumb is a Breaking Defense website article, undoubtedly intended as a praise-packed, puff piece, about the 2024 deployment of the 15^th MEU.  On the face of it, the deployment was a non-stop cascade of puppy dogs and kittens sliding down double rainbows and landing in pots of gold.  However, a careful reading between the lines reveals some surprising systemic problems that degraded the unit’s readiness and combat capability.  Let’s look closer.
 

Starting in January and spanning through most of 2024, the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron-5 completed nine major exercises; visited 11 foreign countries; responded to a typhoon that hit the Philippines; and completed 80 operations over the course of 10 months.

As an aside, why are we still doing 10 month deployments?  Does anyone remember the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP - 2014) of several years past that was going to optimize the deployment/training/maintenance cycle to ensure readiness and prevent extended deployments?  Yeah, that lasted about a day (see, “Deployments and OFRP”).
 
The deployment did not get off to a good start, losing one of its three amphibious ships, USS Boxer, almost immediately.
 

Just days after it initially deployed in April, the Boxer (LHD-4) was forced back to San Diego to fix a variety of maintenance issues.[1]

Even later in the deployment when Boxer eventually rejoined the ARG, ship maintenance issues continued.
 

But he [Capt. James Robinson, ARG commodore] did concede there was at least one “OAI” — an acronym short for “operations, activities and investments” — that was missed due to the ship’s maintenance problems.[1]

Ships were not the only equipment failures.  The ACV proved challenging, as well.
 

… MEU deployed with 12 ACVs in tow, and, he said, “it’s almost underwhelming to say that we learned a lot.”

There were challenges in understanding how to maintain the vehicles while deployed and concerns about corrosion prevention.[1]

This suggests that the Marine’s training with the ACV was significantly inadequate despite a decade or more of use and supposed thorough testing.  Corrosion prevention?  Seriously?  Aren’t these things designed to be immersed in salt water and be exposed to a salt-air environment for months on end?  How could corrosion possibly still be a problem and an unexpected problem, at that?
 

ACV - No one thought it would get wet or warm?

Another disturbing note was this,
 

The MEU also had to coordinate sending beach survey teams ahead of the ACVs to check that conditions were safe.[1]

The ACV is supposed to be able to handle less than perfect weather and physical conditions.  If not, if it can only be used in perfect conditions and hospitable locations then we have a nearly useless piece of equipment.  Combine this note with the history of ACV accidents and one can’t help but conclude that the vehicle is far less safe and effective than advertised.
 

At one point, even the water temperatures were cause for a concern. Dynan [Col. Sean Dynan, 15th MEU commanding officer] recalled that the waters in the Philippines were particularly hot, and there were questions about whether the vehicle’s cooling systems would cope.
 
“That was somewhat of a surprise,” he added.[1]

After all this time, water temperature effects were a surprise?  Really?  No one thought to test the vehicle in warm water?  The ACV’s first RFI dates back to 2011 and in the intervening 13 years no one thought to test the vehicle in warm water despite knowing that the Pacific would be a major area of employment?  What kind of geniuses were working on this program?
 
The ACV was not the only piece of equipment to experience challenges.
 

The MEU’s training and deployment also coincided with the Pentagon’s three-month-long grounding of the V-22 Osprey fleet, including the Marine Corps’ MV-22 variant.
 
… restrictions and intermittent V-22 Osprey groundings …
 
Due to where the MEU was operating, Dynan said the restrictions the Pentagon left in place after the Osprey fleets returned to flight didn’t affect operations. But the missed training time did mean that his flight crews had to work fast to regain qualifications and proficiency once the grounding was lifted in April.[1]

The MV-22 continues to be a problematic piece of equipment, useful only in very specific and restricted scenarios.  In any truly objective assessment, the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure.
 
 
Discussion
 
As noted, we have no hard data to work with and must, instead, attempt to read between the lines and look for patterns.  Doing so reveals that the MEU/AGR have serious equipment and maintenance problems and that testing and training has been woefully inadequate.  This is true for both the Navy and Marines.  I suppose it’s good that the Marines have declared themselves out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they floating around on endless deployments?) because they seem to utterly lack the ability to execute a successful assault.
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “One deployment, three ships and a whole lot of challenges”, Justin Katz, 5-Feb-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/one-deployment-three-ships-and-a-whole-lot-of-challenges/

Marine Light Amphibious Warship Debacle Continues

As you’re well aware, the Marines have come up with a poorly conceived idea to act as hidden anti-ship missile shooters.  The absolute key to the entire concept was the Light Amphibious Warship (now called the Landing Ship, Medium, LSM), a small landing ship which would ferry small Marine units among the first island chain islands, enable relocation, and conduct resupply.  The Marines were asking for something on the order of 30 such vessels although the Navy seemed to be in mood for around 18.
 
The LSM is envisioned as a small vessel with cargo carried on an open deck, a capacity for around 70 troops, no viable defensive weapons, and a transit speed of 14 knots.  Construction was to have started a few years ago but that hope quickly fell by the wayside due to lack of Navy interest and buy in.
 
Now, with the Navy finally ready to proceed, the program has suffered a resounding setback.
 

After receiving bids from industry, the Navy canceled the request for proposals for the Landing Ship Medium …
 
“We had a bulletproof – or what we thought – cost estimate, pretty well wrung out design in terms of requirements, independent cost estimates,” Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition Nickolas Guertin said at an American Society of Naval Engineers symposium last week.
 
“We put it out for bid and it came back with a much higher price tag,” he added.[1]

The LSM, the key to the Marine’s concept, has been abruptly halted due to being shockingly expensive.  Shocking to the Navy, perhaps, but to no one else.
 
This raises a few issues.
 
Cost Estimate – This demonstrates just how unrealistic and incompetent Navy cost estimators are.  I don’t have the exact number in front of me but the Congressional Budget Office, for example, estimated the LSM cost at over twice the Navy’s estimate and it looks like they were much closer to reality.  If this were just one isolated incident of a cost estimate failure we might write if off as a fluke but the history is that every Navy cost estimate is ridiculously, absurdly, laughably, stupidly, incompetently low.  That kind of a pattern isn’t bad luck, it’s intentional, systematic fraud on the Navy’s part.
 
Look at the mismatch between CBO estimates and the Navy, as documented below.
 

The Congressional Budget Office projected the lead ship in the class costing anywhere from $460 to $560 million, according to an April report. If the Navy buys the 18 to 35 ships according to current plans, each hull could cost $340 to $430 million. Initial plans in 2020 called for each ship to cost $100 to $150 million.[1]

The Navy believed the ships would cost $100M-$150M versus the CBO estimate of $340M-$430M with a lead ship cost of up to $560M!
 
Priority – The key to the entire Marine concept (setting aside the idiocy of the concept) was the LSM.  It was the first piece of the puzzle that had to be nailed down before anything else could proceed.  Without the LSM, you have nothing but a stupid idea on a piece of paper.  Did the Marines secure the LSM first?  NO!  Instead, the Marines (and by ‘Marines’, I mean Commandant Berger) proceeded to dump armor, tanks, artillery, and firepower and reshape their entire organization and focus with the assumption (when you assume you make an …) that the LSM would magically appear when needed.  This is program mismanagement of the worst kind.  Commandant Berger destroyed the Marines and now has nothing to show for it. 
 
Buy In – It doesn’t matter whether it’s the military or industry, when you attempt change, you have to get buy in from all affected parties or you won’t succeed.  Not only did Commandant Berger fail to get buy in from his own personnel, active and retired, he failed to get buy in from the party that would have to pay for the most important element of his concept, the LSM.  Berger simply issued commands and assumed everyone would see the brilliance of his idea and fall meekly in line.  Well, that worked internally with active duty Marines who were intimidated into silence but the Navy, being outside Berger’s chain of command, responded with indifference, to put it mildly.  Again, buy in from the Navy is something the Marines should have secured before tearing down their organization.
 
 
Future
 
The Marines seem determined to ride their ill-conceived concept down to combat-irrelevance, if they haven’t already gotten there.
 
Along with a stunning failure to deploy when requested at the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the Marines have lost their place as America’s crisis response force and are now relegated to an afterthought, if that, by civilian and military leadership.
 
Nothing is going to progress regarding the LSM for the foreseeable future.  For the immediate future, the Navy may obtain a used vessel for the Marines to play with while negotiations between the Navy, Marines, and industry resume and drag out.
 

For now, to quickly get the Marines a ship that can move them around the region, the Navy plans to buy a “non-developmental vessel” while it works on the requirements … [1]

The utter failure of the program and the cancellation of the RFP offers a way out for the current Marine Commandant.  The Marines can cancel the entire concept, claiming that industry and the Navy have made the LSM unaffordable, and that the Marines are going back to doing what they historically should have been doing.  Will the current Commandant, General Eric Smith, have the courage and wisdom to seize this opportunity?  Unlikely, but it’s there for the taking.
 
The more likely scenario is that the LSM will linger in negotiations for several more years and the Marines will wind up with a missile shooting organization that has no way to deploy.  What an embarrassment and a waste !
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Landing Ship Medium Program Stalled Over Price, Navy Cancels Industry RFP”, Mallory Shelbourne, 17-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/17/landing-ship-medium-program-stalled-over-price-navy-cancels-industry-rfp

NMESIS

The Marines have committed to becoming short range, island missile snipers in a poorly conceived and untested concept.  One of the missile-shooting systems is the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS – a contrived, convoluted, and ridiculous acronym if ever there was one) which will shoot Naval Strike Missiles from an unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) which will subsequently be called a Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE – oops!  I stand corrected;  this is an even more ridiculous and contrived acronym) vehicle (a glorified jeep). 

NMESIS batteries are composed of 18 launchers which are separated into two platoons of nine launchers each. The platoons are further subdivided into three sections of three launchers each. The USMC plans to field 14 batteries of which three batteries will be deployed to MLRs [ed. Marine Littoral Regiment] while 11 will be deployed to the CONUS in support of MEUs.[1]

Each launch vehicle can mount two missile launch cells giving an entire battery a capacity of 36 missiles.  Although I’ve seen no exact plan, my impression is that each Marine ‘hidden’ base will have perhaps 2-4 launch vehicles for a total capacity of 4-8 missiles.  Not exactly an overwhelming, saturation type striking power, is it?
 
As a mainstay of the Marine Corps’ new approach to warfare, the system has been thoroughly extensively robustly moderately somewhat barely tested. 

Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, conducted their first testing firing of a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). According to the press release, the test took place last month at Naval Air Station Point Mugu in California.[1]
 
This marks the third firing of the Raytheon-built NSM from the Oshkosh Defense’s Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires vehicle. The first live fire took place in November 2020, while the second took place in August of 2021 during Large Scale Exercise 21.[1]

Three test firings and we’re ready to make it “a centerpiece of the USMC’s Force Design 2030”[1]?  Anyone recall the WWII torpedo fiasco?  Let’s not extensively test the system;  let’s just anoint it as a mainstay of the Marines combat power and put our faith in manufacturer’s brochures and the Marine’s fantasy wishes.
 
Did you catch the part about just three batteries being assigned to the Marine Littoral Regiments?  That is a frightfully meager amount of firepower to base the entire Marine Corps combat concept on.

NMESIS

 

 
______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “US Marines Conduct First NMESIS Launch In Two Years”, Zach Abdi, 19-Jul-2023,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/07/us-marines-conduct-first-nmesis-launch-in-two-years/

Second Unmanned Squadron

The Navy plans to establish a second unmanned squadron this May.[1]  Why not?  The first has demonstrated absolutely no combat capability or enhancements to other asset’s combat capabilities so, sure, let’s get more.  This is a hot, steaming platter of stupid served on fine china to make it look appealing instead of putting it in the pile with the dog’s contribution to the lawn’s fertilization.
 
Adm. Samuel Paparo made the announcement and then, rather than describe any actual combat capabilities, immediately dropped into Secret Squirrel mode, saying,  

“A “principle element within warfare is the element of operational security. So, our most exquisite capabilities, if I’m doing my job, you won’t [know] about it.”[1]

Exquisite capabilities???  Someone’s been taking PowerPoint lessons for creative writers at their local community college. 
 
Remember when the Navy trumpeted the increase in air wing size which turned out to be one aircraft?  I’m betting these exquisite capabilities are on the same scale as that.
 
Paparo goes on to note that unmanned craft have participated in Integrated Battle Problems (IBP). 

… IBPs have seen unmanned vessels log thousands of miles at sea over a period of several months.”[1]

That’s nice.  Now, have any of those miles accomplished any useful purpose or demonstrated any actual useful combat capability?
 
Here’s more unmanned news: 

Separately, on Tuesday, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl told reporters his service would soon test a new unmanned drone designed to stealthily carry two Naval Strike Missiles to Marines ashore without attracting attention.[1]

A drone that can transport two missiles?  That’ll bring the Chinese navy to its knees!  The general neglected to describe how this drone – or any drone – can get within sailing range of a Marine unit deep inside enemy territory.  The host ship will, apparently, be invisible and undetectable by Chinese sensors.  Of course, that being the case, why do we need drones?
 
The degree of fantasy being applied to unmanned operations is staggering as is the corresponding absence of firepower.
 
 
 
_________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “US Pacific Fleet to stand up second unmanned surface vessel squadron this year”, Justin Katz, 14-Feb-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/us-pacific-fleet-to-stand-up-second-unmanned-surface-vessel-squadron-this-year/

Houthis and the Marines – Same Mission?

Reader ‘Robtze’ just thoroughly embarrassed me in a comment with an incredibly astute observation that I completely missed.  He observed/asked whether the Houthis were executing the same mission  the Marine Corps envisions with their island/coastal missile shooter concept.
 
To address his comment, yes, this is almost exactly the mission set.  Let’s take advantage of this remarkable similarity and examine how the coastal ‘missile sniping’ concept is working out.
 
Weapons.  One probable difference is the weapons.  While we have no definitive information on the missiles the Houthis are using, it’s likely that they’re smaller and shorter ranged than the missiles the Marines envision using.
 
Targeting.  From day one, this has been one of the unaddressed, major mysteries about the missile shooting concept.  The Marines have no ability to target beyond the horizon and, if they did, the size and scope of that effort would totally negate the ‘hidden’ and ‘small’ characteristics of the concept (using medium to large UAVs, for example).  We see that many of the Houthi missiles appear to be blind fired, being described by US spokesmen as having indeterminate targets. 
 
From this, we can infer that the targeting issue is a valid one that is not easily solved and will, indeed, be problematic for the Marines.
 
Logistics.  One difference is that the logistic (resupply) issue isn't present for the Houthis since this isn't an isolated island.  They can obtain supplies overland.  Of course, even in this case, the supply routes and methods present a vulnerability that could be targeted and disrupted by US forces.  It seems patently obvious that this logistic vulnerability will exist many times over for Marines on an isolated island in Chinese controlled waters.
 
One of the characteristics of the Houthi attacks is the scarcity of attacking weapons.  It would have been reasonable to expect that they would launch swarms of drones or saturation levels of missiles to try to increase the odds of getting a hit on a Navy warship.  That has not happened which leads one to wonder if their weapon inventories are significantly limited.  If so, this would, again, raise the logistic issue with resupply of missiles, despite being overland, being a weakness.  Again, this illustrates the difficulty (impossibility) of the Marines getting resupplies under their concept.
 
Survivability.  The US and UK have finally executed a counter-strike. 

The US and UK launched some 72 strikes against 60 targets in 16 locations.  The Pentagon described its targets as radar systems, drone storage and launch sites, missile storage and launch facilities and Houthi command and control nodes.[1]

This suggests that an isolated Houthi force, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability cannot prevent the enemy from locating and destroying them.  The Marines, of course, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability, believe that they’ll be able to operate undetected on tiny islands a miniscule fraction of the size of Yemen.  This incident would seem to suggest that the Marine concept is heavy on wishful thinking and light on reality.
 
Effectiveness.  The ultimate measure of the worth of anything is in the results.  The Houthis, due to targeting difficulties and, apparently, logistic (missile inventory) challenges, have been remarkably ineffective.  Some four dozen or more attacks have generated no sunk ships, no hits on a warship, and only minor damage to several ships.
 
The Marines, of course, can expect even less success.  Chinese ships merely have to remain beyond the 12 mile or so horizon and thus achieve total safety due to the lack of targeting.  In addition, there won’t be any Chinese merchant shipping in an active war zone so the Marines would be shooting at warships, not commercial vessels and the Houthi experience demonstrates that warships are, thus far, immune to damage from limited attacks by low end weapons and drones.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This Houthi scenario is offering us a rare opportunity to observe the Marine missile shooting concept in action.  The Marines were quick to jump on – and badly misinterpret – the Ukraine experience to justify their vision.  Will they be as quick to jump on this scenario which is a near perfect duplicate of their concept and is failing badly?  I suspect you know the answer.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “A 'Morning After' Look At the Strike on Yemen and What It Is Likely to Mean”, streiff, 12-Jan-2024
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/01/12/a-morning-after-look-at-the-strike-on-yemen-and-what-it-is-likely-to-mean-n2168651

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss

Marine Corps Commandant Berger’s term of office has ended.  While that is cause for celebration, the celebration is exceedingly short lived and subdued due to the fact that his presumed successor, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric Smith, is almost certainly a clone of Berger.  Berger’s number two is assuredly a near carbon copy of Berger or else he wouldn’t have been Berger’s number two.
 
I hope Smith will be a better Commandant but the odds on that are vanishingly low.  We’ll see …

Marines Are Now Totally Defensive

The changes the Marines have made over the last several years have all had one [unintended?] consequence;  they’ve converted the Corps from the forced entry, kick-down-the-door, offensive organization to a wholly defensive one.  Where once they were the tip of the spear, first-in combat force, they’re now a defensive, small unit, missile shooting, hold-the-line force.  Or, as the Marines now phrase it, a ‘stand-in force’.
 
The Marines even acknowledge their defensive nature.  From the Marine’s own website, 

Stand-in Forces are defined as small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary.[1] 

What a garbage collection of buzzwords!  Note, however, the key words and phrases:  ‘small’ and ‘defense-in-depth’.  There is nothing offensive about that.
 
As listed in a Marine Littoral Regiment graphic, the missions are:[2]
 

• Conduct air and surface defense
• Provide early warning to allied forces
• Set up FARPs for allied aircraft

 
There’s nothing offensive about those missions.  They’re purely defensive or service (gas station) oriented.  There’s no seizing ground.  There’s no forced entry.  There’s no attack.  There’s no hitting the enemy.
 
The Marines have also publicly and repeatedly stated that they are out of the frontal assault business (see, “TheFinal Nail”).
 
Aside from their own words, how else do we know the Marines have given up the offense and switched to purely defense?  From their actions, of course!  For example, the Marines have,
 

• Eliminated tanks
• Substantially reduced artillery
• Eliminated heavy mortars
• Eliminated bridging companies
• De-emphasized large amphibious ships in favor of small LAW (Light Amphibious Warfare) vessels

 
Does that sound like they have any intention of being an offensive force?  If so, they’ll be doing it without any armor, engineering, or firepower!  As it stands, they can be offensive against a troop of angry Boy Scouts, perhaps, but that’s about the extent of it.
 
If the Marines aren’t going to be our offensive tip of the spear, why do we need them?  The Army can defend as well as the Marines – better since the Amy hasn’t given up its tanks and firepower!
 
If the next Commandant doesn’t reverse direction and get the Marines back on mission, we need to abolish them.  As it stands, they’re an unnecessary duplication of effort and waste of budget.
 
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]https://www.marines.mil/news/press-releases/press-release-display/article/2858309/marine-corps-publishes-new-document-titled-a-concept-for-stand-in-forces/
 
[2]https://twitter.com/realaludiangov/status/1613791133515276290/photo/1 

Iwo Jima Class LPH and Vertical Assault

The Iwo Jima class carrier was the first purpose built vertical assault (helicopter) amphibious ship.  In this post, we’re going to take a look at its original design rationale, abilities, and limitations and examine whether those have remained relevant today.
 
Here are some basic specifications for the seven ship class, built in the 1960’s: 

Iwo Jima Class LPH

The amphibious assault helicopter carrier (Landing Platform, Helicopter - LPH) traces its origin back to a 1946 Marine Corps study on the effects of atomic weapons on amphibious assaults.[1]  Marine leadership, 

… concluded that a few atomic bombs could easily destroy the concentrated shipping and also the beachhead of any classical amphibious assault.[1]

As described by Friedman[1], the Marines settled on the helicopter as the means to achieve physical dispersion of both ships at sea and troops on land.  The greater range of the helicopter would allow the host ships to more widely disperse and would allow the troops to land at more widely dispersed locations thus avoiding the concentrations that an atomic bomb would easily destroy.
 
Their decision was strongly influenced by the belief that helicopters would quickly and markedly advance in capabilities (range, speed, lift capacity) – a belief that turned out, disappointingly, to be only partially met.  Friedman goes on to describe some of the helicopter development issues which is, itself, a fascinating topic but outside the scope of this post.  I encourage you to read it yourself, if you’re so inclined.  It’s well worth the time.
 
The Marines, while eagerly adopting the helicopter as the assault transport vehicle also recognized the vulnerability of the helicopter on the battlefield.  Regarding helicopter transport capacity, 

Even larger helicopters were proposed, but the Marines were reluctant to adopt one that could lift many more than twenty men in view of the high vulnerability of individual craft.[1][emphasis added]

The Marines recognized that concentrating greater numbers of troops in a vehicle that was inherently non-survivable would be a mistake.  In comparison, today’s MV-22 transport is rated for 24-32 troops which raises the concentration of risk issue that the Marines were afraid of.  To be fair, most sources state that the MV-22 troop capacity is not actually achievable in real world applications.
 
What did helicopter assault mean for overall requirements?  The Marines were focused on division-strength assaults, 

The Marines concentrated on the requirements of a divisional assault, which were considerable. For example, a January 1951 study envisaged lifting 10,000 men and 3,000 to 4,000 short tons of material.  Total lift, then, would be 520 HRSs [ed. Sikorsky H-19] or 208 HR2Ss, which in turn would require, in the former case, 20 escort carriers with 20 helicopters each, accommodating 150 to 200 tons of cargo, 500 to 600 assault marines, and a 200-man helicopter squadron.[1]

This focus on division level assaults was a far cry from our current MEU/ARG (3-ship Amphibious Ready Group) and disaggregated ARG which employs the three ships of the ARG separately.  Of course, in the event of a genuine assault operation, multiple MEU/ARGs would aggregate to form MEBs (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) and MEFs (Marine Expeditionary Force) although these aggregations are never exercised and constitute a theoretical capability, only.  Further, with the elimination of tanks, reduction in artillery, elimination of heavy mortars, and lack of anti-air vehicles it is highly debatable that MEBs/MEFs are even combat effective anymore.
 
The Marines also considered the tactical usage of the helicopter, 

Tactically, the Marines considered a flight of ten helicopters best for effective control, so that helicopter carriers were generally designed to accommodate multiples of that unit.[1]

We see then, that the Marines of the time were focused on getting large numbers of helos/troops on the ground quickly as opposed to our current concept of slow, drawn out, one-at-a-time MV-22 landings due to the 250 ft aircraft-to-aircraft separations and immense cleared areas required for landing.
 
To their immense credit, the Marines didn’t just come up with wild ideas and implement them without any proof of concept - as we do today - they conducted actual exercises.  For example, 

… May 1948, 8 helicopters from the Palau simulated a full helicopter attack of 184 aircraft flying from six CVEs, to lift a complete regimental combat team which would seize a strategic crossroads inland of the beach.  … each HRP [Piasecki HRP tandem rotor helicopter] carried six passengers about ten miles from the carrier under heavy fighter cover.[1]

Note the use of fighter cover.  The exercises were tactically realistic as opposed to the unrealistic, set piece theater performances we call exercises today.
 
Following tests, the WWII escort carrier USS Thetis Bay was converted for helicopter operations to further test out the concept.
 
At that point, the Marines seemed fully committed to helicopter assault.  A Sep-1954 report stated, 

… over the next ten to fifteen years most existing attack cargo and transport (AKA and APA) ships would be replaced by helicopter carriers.  “This will be occasioned by the VTOL aircraft becoming the principal means of placing personnel ashore under assault conditions.  Supporting personnel and heavy equipment will still be landed by water-borne means but the majority of assault troops will be air-landed.”[1]

Ultimately, a new design LPH, the Iwo Jima class, was built along with several Essex class conversions.  The purpose-designed Iwo Jima class, not surprisingly, offered several significant advantages over the Essex conversions.  Even so, the design was not without its flaws, 

The amphibious force commanders criticized the Iwo Jima design for its “complete lack of landing craft, so that it is of doubtful utility under non-flying conditions and must depend on other types with landing craft to give it an over-the-beach capacity.[1]

This flaw eventually led to the development of the LHA design which incorporated both aviation and  a well deck to support waterborne landing craft.  Interestingly, we have returned to exactly the original flawed design with the new America class variants which have no well decks.
 
 
Discussion
 
Let’s examine several aspects of the original vertical assault concept that birthed the LPH.
 
Rationale
 
As noted, the original rationale was dispersal of ships and troops in response to the threat of atomic bombs.  The original Marine thinking was dominated by the fear of atomic warfare.  With the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), that is no longer a concern.  Any use of atomic weapons would immediately escalate the war to a global nuclear war and eliminate the need for a localized amphibious assault.  In other words, no one is going to bother with an amphibious assault while waging a global nuclear war.  Thus, the original rationale is no longer valid and yet we have not modified our current thinking to account for it.
 
Strengths
 

• Helos allow the rapid transport of troops from a greater distance than waterborne landing craft.
• Troops can be delivered to safer or more strategically beneficial locations rather than to a central troop/beach concentration although safer locations also imply less operationally relevant and useful.
• The greater range of the helos allows greater separation of the helicopter carriers.

 
Limitations

• Bad weather may ground aviation.
• Lack of waterborne landing craft prevents any other means of assault.
• Helo assault is limited to troops and light cargo.  Heavy equipment, tanks, armored vehicles, etc. cannot be transported by air.
• Helos are extremely vulnerable to even modest anti-air defenses.
• Helo carriers have very limited wave transport capacity.  For example, 20 helos per wave x 15-20 troops per helo = 300-400 troops per wave and that’s just troops, no equipment.  It would require 5-7 waves, over many hours or multiple days, to get the full troop complement ashore and that assumes no helo attrition.  The reality is that any reasonable helo attrition would likely result in a portion of the troops never getting ashore and certainly not in a timely manner.
• Limited by the need/availability of suitable cleared landing sites; such sites can be reasonably anticipated by the enemy and become fire traps as demonstrated in Vietnam.

 
Sustainment

The original Marine leadership was focused on division level assaults.  What they failed to address was sustainment.  While simply moving troops ashore is easy (ignoring the extreme vulnerability of the helicopter and the potential lack of suitable landing sites), sustainment via helicopter is not.  In fact, it is impossible.  The logistic supply demands of a division in combat are staggeringly huge and the cargo carrying capacity of a helicopter is vanishingly small.  This remains an unexplained – and hand waved away – weakness in today’s various vertical assault concepts (helos, MV-22, well deck-less LHAs, etc.) as well as the Commandant’s dispersed, hidden, platoon size missile shooters concept.  It is not possible to sustain an assault using helicopters.
 
 
Summary
  
The original rationale for the LPH and vertical assault was dispersal due to the threat of atomic weapons.  As, discussed, this is no longer a valid concern.
 
It is noteworthy that the original Marines identified significant weaknesses in the concept including the extreme vulnerability of helos to anti-air defenses and the absence of waterborne landing craft as an alternative.  Other weaknesses included the inability to transport heavy equipment, the limited number of troops that can be transported per wave, and the impossibility of sustaining an assault using vertical transport.
 
We see, then, that vertical assault is an inherently flawed concept that was justified only by the extreme atomic threat.  With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re still pursuing the flawed vertical assault concept?
 
Where does this leave us today?  For starters, we’ve begun repeating the original mistakes such as the absence of waterborne landing craft in the early variants of the America class LHA.  Additional problems include the extreme vulnerability of vertical landing aircraft to anti-air defenses, first noted by the Marines back in the original concept development.  In fact, the threat to helos has increased markedly over the years with the advent of small, portable, shoulder launched, heat seeking, anti-air missiles of the Stinger type.  Vertical landing aircraft are simply not survivable over a defended battlefield as has been repeatedly demonstrated in the real world (Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, etc.).
 
The inability to transport heavy equipment by air continues, today, and is a serious weakness in the concept.  This limitation relegates any assault to a light infantry effort only and makes the enormous cost and resources dedicated to such a limited capability highly questionable.
 
The need for secure, cleared landing sites has only gotten substantially worse with the advent of the MV-22 which requires enormous cleared areas and huge separations between aircraft to the point that a massed assault is simply not possible.  Landings will have to be a very slow, one-at-a-time affair that is ideal for enemy defensive fire sequentially focused on each landing aircraft in turn.
 
Despite clearly and correctly identifying the inherent flaws in the vertical assault concept, Marine leadership pushed ahead with vertical assault in the belief that the atomic threat was more significant than the known weaknesses.  One can only speculate whether the Marines would have adopted vertical assault if there had been no perceived atomic threat.
 
With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re pursuing an inherently flawed concept?
 
Worse, we have taken the concept and reduced it from a full, divisional level effort and capability to a light infantry effort with no supporting tanks, armor, artillery, heavy mortars, or mobile anti-air vehicles.  Is the staggering cost to build and operate 30+ amphibious ships worthwhile to deliver light infantry ashore?
 
It would seem that vertical amphibious assault is an example of inertia.  The helo assault was established and continues just because it exists.  It exists because it exists.  We need to re-examine this 1940’s era concept in light of the known flaws and, especially, modern defenses which have rendered helos even more vulnerable than they were originally.  The cost/risk to benefit ratio does not support continued vertical assault.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Norman Friedman, “U.S. Aircraft Carriers, An Illustrated Design History”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983, p.359-370.