The ongoing drone and missile attacks by the Houthis against
shipping in the Red Sea ought to offer many lessons. However, unfortunately, we have almost no detailed
information about the attacks and defensive efforts which makes lessons and
conclusions difficult.
To summarize, as best we can glean, the Houthis are using
very low end aerial drones and cruise/ballistic missiles to target commercial
and naval vessels. It appears that some four
dozen or so drones and missiles have been fired at various targets with a
couple of hits reported on commercial vessels.
The US Navy claims one or two dozen shoot downs.
That’s all the information we have. Will that stop us from applying some analysis
and drawing some conclusions? Of course
not! Let’s see what we can learn.
Strategy. You cannot win a defensive war/battle. Only offense wins wars. The attacker only needs an occasional success
whereas the defense needs to be 100% successful and, long term, that’s
impossible. This is even more true when
the disparity between the attacker and defender is so great. Despite dozens of failures, a single Houthi
hit on a US warship makes their entire effort an overwhelming success.
By opting for a purely defensive posture, we’re putting
ourselves in a no-win position where failure is assured. It’s only a matter of when, not if.
Military Cost Curve. All indications are that we are using
Standard missiles to shoot down very low end drones and missiles. That puts us on the wrong side of the cost
curve. Depending on the specific variant,
Standard missiles cost $4M-$5M each. Low
end attacking drones and missiles cost on the order of thousands or tens of
thousands of dollars.
While it is perfectly valid to say that we’re spending $5M
Standards to protect $3B warships, that kind of economic exchange rate can’t be
sustained. We’re winning the battle and
losing the economic war.
There are some vague hints that a CIWS may have engaged a
target(s). While that would be much more
economical, it would also be very disturbing news: that a low end attacking weapon could close to
CIWS range against Aegis. Note, this is
far from verified.
Ill-equipped Ships. Our ships are simply not suited for
fighting a very low end war. They’re equipped
for high end combat (and not well, either, but that’s a separate topic) and
lack effective, low end weapons.
Targeting. The Houthi attacks are, presumably,
directed towards specific targets although some of the descriptions of attacks strongly
suggest that some portion are being nearly blind fired toward general
areas. Regardless, one of the often
overlooked aspects of combat is counter-targeting. The enemy can’t target what they can’t detect. It is vital to understand how the enemy conducts
their detection and targeting and then deny them that process. There is no indication that the US is
applying any counter-targeting effort.
Drone Effectiveness. Despite the desire of the Western military
world to jump on the unmanned fadwagon, the reality, as evidenced by these
attacks, demonstrates that drones are, essentially, totally ineffective against
a prepared and capable defender. This
should come as no surprise as we’ve repeatedly documented and discussed the
lack of effectiveness of drones in combat situations in the pages of this blog.
Summary
It is clear that the US is approaching this situation
unwisely by opting to adopt a defensive, appeasement stance. It is delusional to believe that we can
maintain a 100% success rate no matter how unsophisticated the attacking
weapons are. We must either leave the
area to avoid the inevitable defensive failure or shift to an offensive posture
and eliminate the threat.
It is also clear that our ships are ill-equipped to deal
with low end threats in an economical but effective manner. We need lower end vessels such as frigates,
corvettes, or patrol vessels
Perhaps the major lesson from these attacks is that drones
are not the all-powerful, invincible threat that so many make them out to
be. This mini-conflict is the perfect
counter to the perceived (but incorrect) success of drones in Ukraine. This is a warning to us not to make drones a
major element of our force structure.
Caution: As stated at the beginning, we have almost no
detailed information about these attacks and defenses so be very cautious
drawing lessons and conclusions. The
points I’ve made are general, based on the situation, rather than specific,
based on details. I would very much like
to believe that the Navy actually recognizes these points and is taking
appropriate action and just not making it public but there is no reason to
believe that is the case.
Just imagine if we had a Corvette Skipper who knew Yemeni Arabic, had served as a Naval Attache there for several years, and had patrolled the the coast of Yemen and knew every village chief in every fishing port along the entire coast.
ReplyDeleteHe could make a few phone calls and get this resolved in a few days. Naval Diplomacy works. We just don't want to do it.
Biden doesn't want another Afghan war.
ReplyDeleteGoogle web to find out Saudi's war with Houthi then things will be clear.
Saudi had enough thus signed ceasefire deal with Houthi after re-established diplomatic relation with Iran last year.
During past 9 years, Saudi (supported by US such as air fueling) has struck everything deemed worthy to strike.
DeleteThen they failed to identify worthwhile targets.
Delete"We need lower end vessels such as frigates, corvettes, or patrol vessels."
ReplyDeleteTrue. But, the frigate we're planning to build nowhere near the lower end of the scale. And, we have no plans to build corvettes or patrol boats.
We also need to invest in cheap interceptors. Back in the early 2000s there was a New Zealand tech blogger named Bruce Simpson who built an (extremely) low-cost cruise missile as a backyard project using commercially available tech. His budget was $5000. Bruce wasn’t (and isn’t) a terrorist & his skill-set was quite a bit more advanced than your average DIYer but his was a pretty impressive effort nonetheless.
DeleteBruce’s missile was about 2.5 meters long, was designed to carry a 10 kg payload & used pulse jet technology to reach an intended top speed of about 650 km/hour. Range was about 100 km, I believe. He used some sort of commercial GPS system for guidance & kit-bashed a control system using PS2 parts, among other things. I don’t remember how far he got into testing before the Kiwi gummint shut him down.
At the time Bruce said his main goal was to try & alert the world to the threat of cheap drones & missiles. He definitely got the attention of the New Zealand authorities.
I just keep thinking that something very much like Bruce’s homebrew missile system would be a pretty good option for countries looking for low-cost drone interceptors if it works. Pack a bunch of ‘em into box launchers that could be mated with a naval Typhoon RWS (or something similar) & those Houthi drones become a much more financially managable problem.
The only other (defensive) options I can think of for dealing with cheap drones are an increased investment in electronic warfare and/or making like the US Navy during the last couple years of WWII when we bought up all the dakka in the Bofors inventory…
"I just keep thinking that something very much like Bruce’s homebrew missile system would be a pretty good option for countries looking for low-cost drone interceptors if it works."
DeleteYou're glossing over a host of factors such as marinization materials of construction, g-force hardening, fuel stability/safety, guidance comms, sensor, fuze, cyber security, EW resistance, and so on. After you add all that to a 'simple' DIY missile, you'd wing up with something very similar to the existing Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) which has an 11 kg warhead and costs around $900,000 if I remember correctly.
This certainly brings the argument for a low tech gun-centric ship back to the forefront. Somthing along the lines of a Dealey-class. Small, with no helo facilities. A double ender with two 5in guns (maybe revisit twin mounts?), and 4 Phalanx, or Goalkeeper for better range. Suggest mods for increased magazines, water cooling, or whatever is required for drone or missile, even small boat swarms. Harpoon or similar being the only long range weapons. No Aegis or other high end radar. The CIWS would actually be the main armament, with the 5in there for more robust targets, possibly even ashore.
ReplyDeleteCheap and built en masse, where squadrons of them could operate together. Possibly the escort we need for these low intensity third world/terrorist/pirate adventures?
If only the Zumwalt worked, this is the scenario is was designed for. The RN it did use "guns" to destroy some targers, they didn't specify if it was the 4.5 or Phalanx.
DeleteThey are sending HMS Richmond, a SeaCeptor ship, so cheaper missiles, HMS Diamond's SeaVipers.
We make a nice corvette/patrol vessel that would be great for that area. The Ambassador class. Convert one of the out of work amphibs to a mother ship for support, or just operate out Dejibuti (sp).
DeleteThat seems like a ship that would have very cost-effective self-defense capabilities but would not be able to effectively protect a convoy from an ASCM/ASBM threat, given that even the larger caliber Goalkeeper has a maximum effective range of 1 nm. You would need essentially one escort per ship.
DeleteFor the sake of argument, let's say you can fit 4 ships into the safety box on the lee side of each escort. There's about 80 ships/day through the Bab-el-Mandab on a typical day, so you'd need 20 active. Dealey class ship cost $12 million each in 1955, which is $125 million today. Phalanx is about $10 million/unit ($FY2023). Ballpark $150 million per ship; one in port for every two deployed means 30 active. Total program cost: $4.5 billion assuming no new R&D work is required. That's a lot of money for something that, in all reality, will likely leak the occasional ASCM and will be mostly unable to respond to the ASBM threat.
Phalanx, Goalkeeper & similar CIWS systems just don’t have enough range to be useful for anything other than self-defense. And if the weapon bearing down on you his an actual missile with a decent amount of mass & velocity you’re likely still gonna get hurt by blast & fragments. As far as sensors go it’s true that you don’t need to stick AEGIS on everything but you will need a decent system. The Houthis have been using drones, cruise missiles AND ballistic missiles.
DeleteDuring the last couple years of WWII when Japan went all in on the kamikazes the US & UK started ditching a lot of their short-range 20 mm AA systems & leaning harder on their Bofors mounts. The Oerlikons just didn’t have enough range or stopping power to knock down kamikazes (the world’s most effective guided missiles at the time) & cause them to explode or break up before they hit the ships. The 40 mm Bofors was the smallest effective anti-kamikaze weapon we had. Heavier 4.5” & 5” DP guns were preferable.
"Phalanx, Goalkeeper & similar CIWS systems just don’t have enough range to be useful for anything other than self-defense."
Delete????? That IS their purpose!
"you’re likely still gonna get hurt by blast & fragments."
We've covered this. Close in weapons are called that for a reason. They're the last chance, which means close in. Of course there's a risk of debris hitting the ship from a successful intercept but would you rather get hit by a fully functional missile or by missile debris? I know which one I'd choose!
Close in weapons are absolutely vital because there will always be leakers.
Having little to no information I would like to point out that maybe a low end missile or extra cannon on the ships might be what's needed to counter these cheap drones. I'm thinking twin 5 inch guns on the next destroyer ( I know not on the table) and maybe something similar to the Israeli iron dome missile to counter these slow and low threats.
ReplyDeleteThis comment was meant for this post
I don't believe the conclusion that "drones are not the all-powerful, invincible threat that so many make them out to be."
ReplyDeletefollows from the facts you've stated, which include
"we must either leave the area to avoid the inevitable defensive failure or shift to an offensive posture and eliminate the threat.
It is also clear that our ships are ill-equipped to deal with low end threats in an economical but effective manner."
This is two sides of the same coin. So long as we cannot economically respond to the threat, the drones and cheap missiles, are, in fact, invincible.
There's basically no way to do much to the Houthis. I'm sure we bombed whatever patch of sand we thought they were sitting on into... a patch of sand. They just move to another patch of sand, and will keep getting shipments of missiles from Iran.
Sending in troops might be effective, but would be an even more expensive, bloody affair than lobbing Tomahawks. Because our people are valuable. In the narrow, military sense, our offensive tools are even more expensive and it would be wasteful to throw them at the Houthis.
If you want to stop it, you have to stop the missiles from Iran. This doesn't have to be an overt attack. They're waging a proxy war, and the proper signal is a proxy right back. Maybe a few of their pipelines or oil rigs go offline or their ships start to go missing until they see the connection. Unlike the US administration, they aren't morons. Just jerks. We tried making nice with them, and this is the thanks we get.
Note that that's fundamentally an offensive response, but a political one. There's no avoiding that. Just like in the Cold War, we calibrated our responses to change our enemy's behavior. We didn't nuke the USSR because one of their clients acted up (with a wink and weapons from the USSR), but we didn't just pretend it wasn't happening either.
"follows from the facts you've stated,"
DeleteYou've drawn an incorrect conclusion. The success rate of the attacks, so far, is something like 2 out of 48 against all vessels and 0 out of 48 against warships (noting that the 48 or so attacks were split in some fashion between warships and commercial vessels). That's an exceedingly poor success rate and more than proves my conclusion about drones not being the all powerful weapons so many believe.
Leaving the area, as one option, is just the simple recognition that, no matter how poor a weapon a drone is, it only takes one success to result in an overall defeat for a navy. That's a political and PR defeat, not a military one.
"There's basically no way to do much to the Houthis. "
Not even remotely true. In fact, you, yourself, offer proof of your mistaken statement by noting that we can/should stop the flow of weapons to the Houthis from Iran! Other options include ground forces (spec ops would be ideal), persistent surveillance UAVs, establish a land counter-battery fire unit, determine and cut their logistic, food, and financial support, and so on. Contrary to your statement, there are myriad ways to effectively deal with them.
By now I'm sure the Houthis are building their own drones & missiles underground. All Iran needs to give them is the knowledge. If Hamas could do it then the Houthis definitely can too
Delete"sure the Houthis are building their own drones"
DeleteLocating those facilities and tracking their supply sources would be a perfect mission for special forces. Hand in hand with that should be financial tracking and termination. There are so many ways to disrupt Houthi attacks both short and long term.
"would be a perfect mission for special forces", only if there are relatively few of them. But if they have a large scale operation going spec ops won't cut it as they can't hang around. They need to attack & leave but there are still another 99 underground facilities churning them out.
DeleteNot every truck can be inspected or destroyed.
The main job of special forces is surveillance not engagement. They locate the various facilities supply routes, storage buildings, etc. which enables strikes at the appropriate time.
Delete"Not every truck can be inspected or destroyed."
You seem not to understand how to conduct this type of 'war'. A thousand trucks are useless if you cut off the supply source. All the facilities in the world are useless if you block the components from entering the country.
Every shoestring operation has a few key vulnerabilities upon which the entire operation depends. This is the kill chain or, in this case, the manufacturing chain. Identify those few key points and eliminate them and the entire operation halts.
This is analogous to attacking an airbase. There may be hundreds of targets on the base and the runways can be repaired in hours but if you hit the one key vulnerability - fuel - you put the base out of operation nearly permanently. Had the Japanese hit the fuel storage at Pearl Harbor, it would have been useless as a base for years.
Find the vulnerability and destroy it. An ideal task for special forces. It's what they were made for.
"You've drawn an incorrect conclusion. The success rate of the attacks, so far, is something like 2 out of 48 against all vessels and 0 out of 48 against warships (noting that the 48 or so attacks were split in some fashion between warships and commercial vessels)."
Delete8 commercial vessels have been hit & 3 hijacked.
That aside, what I find concerning is its been reported HMS Diamond had to use either its CIWS or cannon to engage some leakers that made it thru.
This and some other things being reported on, our operation in the Red sea gives the impression of being Ad Hoc & poorly ran.
"8 commercial vessels have been hit & 3 hijacked."
DeleteIf you trace back the thread, it was referencing drones, not cruise or ballistic missiles. I'm aware of two successful drone hits. The number of attempted drone attacks is far from certain. Maybe you have better numbers?
"had to use either its CIWS"
I wish I knew the circumstances of the engagement. Was it an intentional close range engagement or was it an undetected penetration? For example, I could easily imagine a Captain allowing a slow flying drone to approach fairly closely to see where it was going and what it was doing before opting to fire on it. We simply lack details.
I'm sure if it were that easy Russia would have done that to all the supplies that enter Ukraine from the surrounding countries, mostly Poland. Their spies blend in perfectly with the locals in Ukraine but they still can't do that. Not as easy as it looks.
DeleteAbove comment relates to comment about sending in spec forces to take out supply lines
DeleteThe Houthis don’t have to score that many hits to do a lot of economic damage. Insurers are increasing their rates. Some major shipping companies are diverting their ships from the Red Sea and sending them around Africa. That’s a lot safer but it’s also screwing up supply chains & adding A LOT to fuel costs. This drives up prices for consumers.
DeleteI’m more of a “shoot the archer, not the arrow” kind of guy. The US has been overly cautious in its response to the attacks, IMO, at least until the last few days when he started going after radar sites & military infrastructure. America never invests enough in HUMINT but we’re still the kings of satellite surveillance & modern satellite tracking programs and AI analytics are pretty damn effective. The Saudis haven’t been very effective at dealing with the Houthi problem but the Saudis have far fewer eyes in the skies than the US does. Plus they’re kinda idiots.
It’s tricky these days to hide large scale industrial projects. And building drones and cruise missiles in quantities qualifies as a large scale industrial project. This is the kind of operation where our SSGNs really shine. Each of the four tactical Ohios pack enough Tomahawks to badly damage the infrastructure of a medium-sized country if it doesn’t have a decent integrated air defense system. And most of the countries in the sandbox don’t. Using a Standard Missile to blow up a cheap drone is a bad trade. Using a Tomahawk to wipe out missile guidance radars, warehoused missiles, assembly plants & whatnot is a much better investment. USS Florida is having a nice little moment now that the gloves are at least starting to come off.
The US is overstretched. There's too much world to police and we can't afford to do it on our own. Part of strategy is making decisions, choosing what not to do as much as what to do. Our focus should be China, China, China. That is the real challenge, and we are struggling with it. We should leave the Red Sea mess to those for whom it is more important: Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
ReplyDeleteInternational trade through the Red Sea is not CRITICAL to the US. Avoiding the Red Sea means longer shipping routes, higher shipping costs, and less shipping capacity. A lot of Asian, European, Middle East shipping goes through there, but not a lot of US trade (we have the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans). US involvement here is the equivalent of China bombing Venezuela to protect freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Mexico! We should step back to FORCE these parties to step up and solve the problem.
Again, we can't do everything. And we certainly aren't willing to commit to really solving the problem! Why? Because we know it's not a critical threat to us. Our current strategy is the worst of all worlds. Walking away would be a low risk / low impact (to us) way to wake up some other international actors (Europe???) and get them to start sharing the burden of international peace and security.
"International trade through the Red Sea is not CRITICAL to the US. "
DeleteIt most certainly is! ALL shipping is, ultimately, US shipping because ALL shipping, ultimately, impacts the US economy. The country is currently reeling under inflation and shortages. Adding to that IS critical.
You're absolutely correct that other countries should be stepping up and we should be pressuring them - hard - to do so but, ultimately, if we want to protect our economy we need to protect ALL shipping.
"The US is overstretched."
Are we? Are we really? For example, we have 11 carriers but only two are currently deployed. Is that overstretched? We have 80 some surface Aegis ships but only a dozen or so are currently deployed. Is that overstretched? We have some 70,000 special forces of various types plus an entire Marine Corps. I have no idea how many are currently on active missions but I'm sure the number is a tiny fraction of the total. Is that overstretched? The Air Force has thousands of aircraft and almost none are engaged in any active missions. Is that overstretched? And so on.
The problem is not that we're overstretched, it's that we're inefficiently deployed and utilized. The Navy is sailing in circles around the world instead of being specific mission-focused on active trouble spots. Of course, that presupposes that we would do anything in those trouble spots which we seem reluctant to do. If we're not willing to do anything then sailing in circles in the ocean is as good a way to waste time as any.
Overstretched? No. Stupid-stretched? Yes!
Part of the issue, of course, is that the USN is only about half the size it was 30-35 years ago. It’s also rather a bit older because most of our more capable naval combatants are Cold War vintage and/or based on Cold War-era designs. The only post-war naval warships we’ve designed & built that haven’t completely sucked are the Virginias, the Ohio conversions & the Ford—It’s ludicrously expensive & isn’t notably more capable than a Nimitz-class carrier but at least it can do super-carrier things. The US has 280-290 or so major surface combatants & submarines and about a third of them are usually available. That leaves us with less than 100 warships to sort shit out across the globe. That’s not a lot.
Delete"Part of the issue, of course, is that the USN is only about half the size it was "
DeleteThat's only a very small part of the problem. The much larger problem is that we refuse to use what we have effectively. We have plenty of ships if we'd use them wisely.
" The US has 280-290 or so major surface combatants & submarines"
No. We have around 180 surface combatants and submarines If you discount the LCS, we have around 160 surface combatants.
We have around 300 total ships but 120 or so are amphibs, patrol vessels, logistic ships, etc. They're important but they're not combatants.
See the Naval Vessel Register website for the up to date fleet numbers and type lists.
China? It would be the height of insanity to go to war with China over Taiwan. Our military is not in anyway capable of fighting a peer opponent, particularly in their own backyard. When is the last time we actually won a war? The US population would not support a war like this. Our military in general and Navy in particular is a joke (with some notable exceptions). Our supply chains run through China; 80 to 90% of our pharmaceuticals or their precursor chemicals are made in China. Moreover, our national debt is now over $35 Trillion and the structural deficit is $2 to 2.5 trillion per year. The Taiwanese spend Less than 2% of their GDP on defense, they don’t seem to have any urgency. I don’t care about Taiwan or Ukraine, I do care about our border with Mexico. In any case, this country’s almost $1 trillion defense budget is a sewer f corruption and corporate welfare. We should stay out of China’s backyard and mind our own business concerning Taiwan.
DeleteNearly all these drones are small, cheap and fragile with the power of a hand grenade. They wouldn't harm a ship with just one-inch of armor, but can bust through our current ships and cause problems.
ReplyDeleteThe War Zone has the Petersen's Field Guide to Houthi
DeleteBirds. Some are of substantial size.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/the-anti-ship-missile-arsenal-houthis-are-firing-into-the-red-sea
Good link. Thanks.
DeleteQuestion. Are the houthis executing the same mission set that Berger wants the marines to do?
ReplyDelete*stunned* *dumbfounded* *embarrassed*
DeleteWow. What an astute question/observation. I didn't even see it. I'm humiliated and embarrassed.
To address your observation ...
Yes. This is exactly the mission set. The only difference is that the Marines want to use larger, longer range missiles. Of course, we don't know what missiles the Houthis are using but, presumably, they're smaller, shorter range missiles.
We're seeing the targeting issue play out in front of our eyes and it isn't going well.
One difference is that the logistic issue isn't present since this isn't an isolated island.
I can't believe I missed this. I may have to do a post on this. Or ... I may have to retire in shame and have you do the blog!
Thanks for pointing this out!
We need to look at the glass-half-full side of this.
ReplyDeleteAt least our systems are finally getting live-fire testing.
Lutefisk
So is the other sides too of course
Delete