Industry Design

The recent book review post about Electronic Greyhounds noted that the Spruance class was the first ship designed wholly by industry instead of the Navy/BuShips.[1]  This was a radical departure from previous practice and has since become the Navy’s standard practice for ship design.  The subsequent evidence would seem to demonstrate that this is a very bad practice.
 
In theory, there are some potential benefits to an industry-design approach.  The primary advantage would be that industry might have a greater concentration of expertise.  Of course, until it was eliminated, BuShips had a concentration of expertise.  Expertise is simply a matter of ‘doing it’ on a regular basis.  There is no reason to believe that an in-house Navy design group would not be every bit as capable as industry and, indeed, BuShips proved that for decades.  In fact, since every ship would pass through the in-house group, they would accumulate more experience and expertise than industry which would only get to work on an occasional Navy project.  In fact, this ‘occasionality’ manifested itself in the LCS designs which saw not one but (if you can believe it!) two companies design and build warships despite never having done so previously.  Not exactly a concentration of expertise, was it?
 
On the flip side, a highly likely potential drawback is that there is no guarantee that industry will produce a good design (hi, again, LCS!), leaving the Navy to choose between a bad design or cancellation of the project which, given the budget implications, is assuredly never going to happen.  The Navy would much rather [irresponsibly] accept a bad design than risk losing budget money as would happen if the project were terminated.
 
There is also no guarantee that the design will be useful.  Admittedly, this is a shared responsibility between industry and the Navy with, perhaps, the bulk of the blame lying with the Navy which refuses to develop viable CONOPS prior to design in order to ensure usefulness.
 
In addition to risking a poor industry ship design, the loss of in-house expertise has resulted in the loss of institutional knowledge within the Navy about what makes a good ship.  This has resulted in NavSea having no ability to recognize flaws in a design, despite being tasked with exactly that responsibility.  Blindingly simple and obvious examples include the failure to provide cathodic corrosion protection (known and understood since the age of sail) and the omission of bridge wings (standard since … well … forever) in the LCS.  Slightly more advanced failures include inadequate stability and weight growth margins.  The Navy no longer possesses the ability to even recognize a good or bad ship design.
 
 
Examples
 
Let’s briefly consider a few examples of industry designs.
 
LCS.  The sheer number and severity of the changes made to both LCS variants attests to the lack of design expertise resident in both the Navy and the manufacturer.[2]
 
Ford.  The Ford catapult, arresting gear, elevators, weapons, toilets, dual band radar, etc. should never have gotten past the napkin stage of design.
 
Montford Point.  The Mobile Landing Platform is an example of a [apparently] technically decent design that is utterly useless with the ships having already been retired for all practical purposes.
 
Zumwalt.  The Zumwalt is a poor design (seakeeping, electrical system, hull design, non-existent close in weapons, etc.) which is also useless (no main weapon and no viable mission).
 
Burke.  The Early Burkes were barely adequate designs (insufficient close in weapons, no hangar, weak structure, etc.) that were improved somewhat in the Flt IIa and are now sub-par with the Flt III (inadequate margins, stability/weight challenges, sub-optimal radar, etc.).
 
Since some of you are already pounding out replies trying to put all the blame on poor Navy requirements, let me repeat, the poor designs are a shared failing and, depending on the specific case, the fault may lie more with the Navy than industry.
 
 
Spruance
 
In contrast to the preceding designs, the Spruance, as it turned out, was an outstanding design but there was no guarantee that would be the case.  It could just have easily been a poor design and the Navy would have had little choice but to accept it, having ceded all responsibility to the manufacturer.  The Navy gambled and got lucky.  However, depending on luck is not the way to design ships.  Unfortunately, the Spruance was the last good industry design and the Navy has had to accept a string of poor designs ever since. 
 
 
Conclusion
 
History and logic clearly demonstrate that ceding ship design responsibility to industry is a poor practice.  While the possibility of producing a good design exists, the long line of failures makes it clear that the odds of success are very poor.  To be fair, the Navy does everything they can to ensure a poor outcome with constant design changes, idiotic and conflicting requirements, absence of CONOPS, and utter lack of expertise with which to spot and correct problems at the design stage.  To be additionally fair, industry is responsible for basic failures such as inadequate structural strength, overly complex machinery (does anyone know how to design a functional combining gear????), unrepairable machinery (EMALS, for example), missing cathodic protection, stability issues, inadequate margins and allowances, incorrectly calculated weights and metacentric heights, toilets that don’t work, poorly located sensors, rampant stress cracks, and so on.
 
As we discussed, the inability of industry to produce a good design is just half the problem with industry being tasked with design.  The other half is the loss of the Navy’s in-house expertise to the point that they can no longer even spot a flaw in a design.  By ceding design responsibility, the Navy has rendered themselves deaf, dumb, and blind regarding designs.  The Navy has created a fatal dependency (addiction) on industry and are now trapped into accepting whatever garbage industry pukes out.
 
Finally, let me once again repeat, the Navy contributes heavily to poor designs with their idiotic requirements and constant change orders.
 
We absolutely must reconstitute BuShips and return ship design expertise to the Navy.  We cannot afford to keep producing failure after failure.  The Navy has become so gun shy about new ship designs that they would rather continue building obsolete Burkes and Constellation mini-Burkes than risk a new design.
 
Bring back BuShips!
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Capt. Michael C. Potter, USNR, Electronic Greyhounds, The Spruance-Class Destroyers, Naval Institute Press, 1995, ISBN 1-55750-682-5
 
[2]Military.com website, “Navy Engineers LCS Changes”, 27-Jun-2014,
https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2014/06/27/navy-engineers-lcs-changes

Submarine Shortfall

You’re probably heard, recently, that the attack submarine (SSN) force is declining in numbers and is projected to reach a low of around 40 (versus the publicly stated, desired target of 60-70) over the next decade and naval observers and Congress are suddenly worried.  However, this is not a new development.  The shortfall was predicted at least two decades ago.  For example, the 2014 Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan noted that the SSN level would fall from the 2014 level of 55 to less than 50 in 2020 and ultimately down to a low of 42 in 2029 and would not recover to 50 subs until 2038 and would stay at that level through 2043. 
 
The looming shortfall was not only anticipated but embraced by the Navy in 2005. 

The Navy announced in late March 2005 that it planned to reduce its attack submarine fleet to 41 from its current level of 55.[1]

Thus, the SSN shortfall was not a surprise event.  In fact, it was long anticipated and intentionally inflicted.  The Navy actually planned the shortfall !
 
In fact, given that we just noted that 18 subs are sitting in extended idle status awaiting maintenance (see, “SSNMaintenance Backlog”), the predicted low point could be closer to 30 deployable subs!
 
How did this happen?  It’s not a trick question.  For the last couple of decades we’ve been retiring subs faster than we’re building them.  For example, the 2014 30-year shipbuilding plan called for 52 retirements versus 47 launches.  That’s a net decrease of 5 subs over that time period … hence, a decrease and a shortfall. 
 
Despite anticipating the shortfall decades ago, the Navy allowed a several year gap in submarine construction between the last Los Angeles and the first Virginia.  The last Los Angeles class submarine was launched in 1995.  The first Virginia class submarine was launched in 2003.  That’s an 8 year gap.  Yes, there were two Seawolf class subs mixed in there but it was an 8 year gap between major submarine classes.
 
Even when the Virginia class began production, construction was limited to 5 launches, less than one per year, from 2003-2008, inclusive. 
 
So, facing a known shortfall, the Navy’s response was to program in an 8 year gap in production and build less than one per year for the 6 years subsequent to the gap.  Clearly, the Navy was unconcerned about the looming shortfall.  Now, however, the Navy is attempting to deflect by placing the blame and responsibility on industry for somehow failing to have adequate production capacity.
 
And still the Navy is not serious about mitigating the shortfall.  For example, the current 5-year plan calls for 10 retirements which is two per year.  Compared to the build rate of 1.2 subs per year, it’s obvious why we have a worsening shortfall.
 
According to industry, US submarine production capacity is currently limited to a theoretical maximum of two subs per year, however, the actual production rate is barely more than one per year.  The entire Virginia class has, thus far, seen 25 launches in the 21 years from 2003-2023, inclusive.  That’s a sustained production rate of only 1.2 subs per year.
 
In comparison, the Los Angeles class saw 62 subs built in the 22 year period from 1974-1995, inclusive.  That’s a build rate of 2.8 subs per year, nearly three per year!  Now, we’re down to barely one per year.
 
The Navy talks publicly about building three subs per year but that’s clearly a fantasy that’s entirely disconnected from reality.
 
The Navy had two decades to address the shortfall and consciously chose not to address it.  They are only now attempting to address it because a panicking Congress is beginning to ask questions and, even so, the only real effort the Navy is making is to try to place blame on industry instead of themselves.  That’s not addressing the shortfall, that’s addressing the public relations.
 
 
Options
 
So, what could have been done over the preceding two decades and what can we currently do to mitigate the shortfall?
 
Retirements - The obvious, immediate, short term solution is to stop retiring subs.  We early retired a dozen Los Angeles class subs with less than 20 years service (see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls and Retirements”)!  Many more have been retired with less than 30 years.  Even subs nearing the end of their scheduled service life can be retained in an idled status against the advent of war.
 
Operational Patterns – We could have, and still should, stop deploying subs on extended cruises.  Going to a home-port maintenance and training concept, as we’ve frequently discussed, would reduce the ‘dive cycles’ and full power nuclear use which depletes the nuclear fuel and would extend the life of the subs.
 
There is value in submarine missions that map out the underwater battlefield, determine water conditions (salinity, density, currents, thermoclines, etc.), monitor and collect intel on foreign submarines, monitor enemy ASW capabilities, etc. but they do not require full combat submarines.  A much reduced capability submarine could be built for the specific purpose of monitoring, as just described.  Non-combat SSKs would be a cheap and highly effective platform for the types of data collection just listed while the bulk of the SSNs remain in a home-port training/maintenance condition, preserving and extending their life spans.
 
Capacity – The Navy had two decades to promote and develop additional production capacity and, perhaps, an additional shipyard but opted not to.  Programming in an 8 year production gap followed by 6 years of one sub per year is the opposite of building production capacity.  Instead, the Navy allowed industry’s production capacity to decrease as shipyards adjusted to lower production demands and allowed skilled workers to retire without replacement.  As industry noted, 

The presidents of both shipyards [General Dynamics and Newport News] recently said they believed they could handle three SSNs a year but that they and their suppliers would only invest in the additional infrastructure, machinery and people if the Navy sent a clear demand signal and committed to higher shipbuilding rates for a long duration.[2]

The Navy’s haphazard production program does not give industry the confidence to increase production capacity.  You may recall the 29-boat Seawolf class that was truncated to just three?  Not exactly confidence-inspiring.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The incompetence and willful disregard by the Navy in addressing the shortfall has been nothing short of stunning and constitutes dereliction of duty by a succession of CNOs, each of whom should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.
 
Finally, let’s close this out with an hysterical lie by the Navy.  Referring to production capacity, Rear Admiral David Goggins had this to say, 

He said the Navy would not build the ships if they couldn’t properly maintain them … [2]

That’s hilarious!  Hey, Admiral … I’ve got some bad news for you.  The Navy isn’t properly maintaining any of their ships!
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/scn-sub.htm
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy Confident It Could Build 3 Virginia SSNs a Year, Though More Study Needed On Shipyard Capacity”, Megan Eckstein, 18-Nov-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/11/18/navy-confident-it-could-build-3-virginia-ssns-a-year-though-more-study-needed-on-shipyard-capacity#:~:text=The%20Navy%20has%20just%2050%20SSNs%20today%2C%20is,goal%20of%20as%20many%20as%2080%20by%202045.

Wartime Production Plan – Part 2

Continuing the theme of pre-war production planning …
 
We previously discussed wartime production planning (see, “Wartime Production Plan”) and noted that our war plans should not focus on the number of ships and planes we currently have but, instead, the ability to quickly produce more ships, planes, and everything else we need during a war.  Indeed, the pursuit of large fleets of ships and aircraft can easily become counter-productive as noted in the landmark Army Green Book series, 

… preparedness may take one of two forms. A nation may choose to maintain an aerial fleet-in-being or, as an alternative, it may choose to rely upon its capacity to build an air fleet in time of emergency. The fleet-in-being or "Big Stick" form of preparedness has certain advantages. It can be used as a diplomatic weapon to terrorize an opponent into surrender without a fight, as Hitler found. But at the same time, the fleet-in-being has serious limitations. Obsolescence in aviation is so great that large numbers of old aircraft rapidly become relatively vulnerable to fewer aircraft of newer design and superior performance, as France found to her sorrow after the outbreak of World War II. In the United States, officers of the War Department in general and the Air Corps in particular were firmly committed to a policy that emphasized the importance of capacity to build, the importance of industrial potential, the power to create and replenish an air force, rather than a fleet-in-being.[1, p.158-9] [emphasis added]

Consider a couple of example issues about pre-WWII planning, as documented in the Army Green Book report on pre-WWII planning for aircraft procurement and see what lessons it offers.
 
One lesson was that people get so caught up in the minutiae that they lose sight of the big picture.  The pursuit of minutiae then delays the effort to the point that the effort is no longer useful.
 
For example, 

In 1936 Air Corps officers were still computing the aluminum requirements for the 1933 mobilization plan … [1]

Those officers were given a task and were determined to pursue it to its bitter end no matter how irrelevant the passage of time rendered their task.  They were unable to see the larger picture and adjust.
 
Another lesson is that people tend to focus on the wrong aspects of planning.  For example, there was a pre-WWII mobilization plan but, 

War Department General Mobilization Plan," which was "based on personnel and not upon supply and equipment."[1, p.158]

This was a fundamental flaw since personnel are useless without equipment.  Planning has to be for both.
 
One of the best ways to plan for, and enhance the ability of, wartime production is to establish a set(s) of standardized construction programs that are fully detailed, fully resourced, and ready to go.  For example, a basic destroyer that has been prototyped, debugged, and is ready to put into mass production would be an invaluable aid to have on the shelf.  As the Green Book notes, 

An educational order is an order designed to familiarize a manufacturer with the item he will be expected to produce in an emergency.  In its simplest form, an educational order might involve little more than acquainting the contractor with the item he is to make. In its most complex form it might even include the construction of jigs and fixtures as well as tools and dies to be held on a stand-by basis.[1, p.159]

Another critical pre-war planning issue highlighted by the Green Book is that of expansion of existing industries to meet increased war demand versus conversion of industries from a non-war product to a war product.  An example of the latter would be the conversion of the auto industry to tank production.  As with most things, a mix of the two approaches is probably preferred. 
 
Regardless of the approach, pre-war planning is required.  A survey of industries to see which can be usefully and efficiently converted, and to what product(s) is required along with plans for doing so.  Sets of construction/modification blueprints for facilities should be maintained and resources should be identified.
 
And the list of issues and lessons goes on and on …
 
As in sports, you win because of the planning and effort you put in before the game.  We can win the war with China by putting in the planning and effort now, before the actual shooting starts.  Instead of directing our budget towards new ships – that lack CONOPS or usefulness and are being retired decades early – we should be budgeting the planning of industrial capacity and logistics.

 
_____________________________

 
[1]Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, “Buying Aircraft:  Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces”,
https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/CMH_Pub_11-2.pdf

“We’ve Run Out Of Ammunition”

Here's an exact quote from Joe Biden:

"We’ve Run Out Of Ammunition”

 
Yes, Joe Biden just confirmed that the US cannot win a peer war with China by stating, on camera, that the US has run out of ammunition.[1]  I know half of you don't believe me so go to the link and listen to the video for yourself.  It’s only a few seconds long.  Here’s the direct link to the video: https://twitter.com/i/status/1678012747513200640
 
This means that the US lacks the inventory of weapons to even supply a minor (not even regional, as it’s only two countries) conflict between Ukraine and Russia, let alone sustain a war with China.  Far, far worse, we’ve been draining our munitions inventories since the start of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and we’ve been unable to produce enough new munitions to even replace what we’re giving away.  At this point in WWII, we were well on our way to gearing up and factories were churning out vast quantities of weapons. 
 
The damning conclusion is painfully obvious:  we lack the infrastructure and industrial capacity to produce the quantities of arms necessary to sustain a war with China.
 
Just as we beat Germany and Japan by outproducing them, it would appear that China can outproduce us in a sustained war.  They’re already demonstrating on a daily basis that they have more industrial weapons production capacity than we do and we’re supposedly well over a year into gearing up for production.  In other words, China is outproducing us while we’re in the midst of stepped up production!!!!! 
 
Now, obviously, ‘running out of ammunition' doesn’t mean that every munition is we have is down to near zero levels but we’ve already heard, publicly, that many types are down to a third or less of their pre-Ukraine inventory levels.  One example is the ubiquitous 155 mm artillery shells, as noted below. 

Biden told Zakaria that the cluster munitions were being sent as a “transition period” until the US is able to produce more 155mm artillery.[1]

I’ve stated repeatedly that you don’t win a war with what you have to begin;  you win with what you can produce during the war.  Terrifyingly, it appears that we have only a very limited capacity to produce enough to win a war.  This isn’t really all that surprising.  We’ve been talking about it for years.  Consider our front line ships and aircraft.  When war starts, how many replacement ships and planes can we produce per year?  The answer is … almost none.
 
We did a post on how much our munitions orders have increased in the last year and it was … almost none (see, “2024 Weapons Procurement Increase”) – not because we don’t want to produce more and don’t want to fund more but because we lack the production capacity.  Manufacturers are publicly stating that their capacity is max’ed out.
 

The United States is no longer the arsenal of democracy.

This should scare the pudding out of us but there seems to be little reaction from the military or government.
 

 
Note:  This is not a post about the geopolitics of supporting Ukraine.  It’s about our industrial weapons capacity.  We’re not going to discuss politics.
 
__________________________

 
[1]Red State website, “Foreign Policy Genius Joe Biden Openly Proclaims 'We've Run out of Ammunition,' and That Seems Like a Problem”, Bonchie, 9-Jul-2023,
https://redstate.com/bonchie/2023/07/09/foreign-policy-genius-joe-biden-openly-proclaims-weve-run-out-of-ammunition-and-that-seems-like-a-problem-n773688

Wartime Production Plan

Over the last few decades, the US has meandered through a variety of military capability plans such as the original ‘2-1/2 wars’ plan[2] which was successively downgraded over the years and through various stages to the current ‘1 regional conflict and hold in another’[3].  The main factor in the successive downgrades was the recognition that the US was steadily losing military capability and, quite simply, couldn’t achieve the previous goals.  In other words, the strategic situations and absolute requirements didn’t change but the US military capability did and the downgrades were simple rationalizations of the reality that our military was growing steadily less capable.  This rationalization is absolute nonsense, of course.  If you believe that your national security depends on being able to win 2 wars and hold in another, you don’t downgrade the requirement just because you haven’t got the ability to achieve it – you keep the requirement and figure out how to achieve it.  You don’t rationalize away the requirement.  But, I digress …

 

What all those plans (and planners) failed to recognize is that they were all fundamentally flawed.  What was the fundamental flaw that rendered every plan invalid?  It was – and still is ! – wartime production.  It was the failure to recognize the fundamental truth that you don’t win a war with the capability you start with; you win a war with the capability you build during the war.  We won WWII with a 6,000 ship Navy but we started with just 233 carriers and surface ships and most of those were old, obsolete, and unfit for modern (at the time) combat.

 

Yes, you might win a small, single state conflict against a hapless foe, as happened in Desert Storm, with just existing forces (note, however, that we could not assemble the Desert Storm force today !) but not a war or even a real regional conflict.  Even existing forces may not be available.  For example, the 22 Marine MEU/ARG was unable to deploy in response to an urgent request early in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.[4]  The Marines, our crisis response force, was unable to respond to a crisis.

 

If you want to be able to win a full war, you need the capability to produce what you need in a very short time frame during the war … while the need is still relevant.

 

Thus, the previous goals stating a desire to be able to win X number of wars should have been a goal to be able to produce enough to win X number of wars.

 

Here’s a truism that planners fail to recognize:

 

The equipment you start the war with is, by definition, largely obsolete.

 

You need the ability to quickly produce modern, relevant, combat effective equipment.  Again, those Pennsylvania class battleships that we were so proud of the day before the war were already obsolete on December 7^th.  Now, that doesn’t mean that you can’t get some temporary, desperate service out of the existing equipment … you’ll likely have to!  But, it means that the equipment you win the war with won’t be what you start the war with.

 

In WWII, the United States was not the ‘Existing Army of Democracy’, it was the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’, in recognition of the country’s vast industrial capacity which is what actually won WWII. 

 

Frankly, our unceasing efforts to build large standing fleets of aircraft and ships are somewhat silly and ill-directed.  A mindless pursuit of larger fleets is counterproductive beyond a point.  We could have built 50 Pennsylvania battleships prior to the war but that would have just given us 50 obsolete BBs instead of the 15 or so we had and we would have had a lot less cash for the war. Every ship you build before a war is one more obsolete ship to start the war.

 

Existing equipment serves only to buy time for industry to gear up.  Thus, we should be sizing our existing military not for winning a war(s) but for buying adequate time to allow industry to gear up.  Of course, hand-in-hand with that is that we should be producing viable wartime production plans.  It’s pointless to buy time if you still can’t produce what you need.

 

As we contemplate wartime production, consider this:  today, we totally lack the rare earths needed for all of our sensors. We won't be able to make ANY sensors when war comes. Our computer chip supply is severely limited and we won't be able to make ... well ... anything when war comes because almost everything depends on chips.  And so on.  Worse, war inevitably brings on additional raw material shortages.  I have severe doubts that we can build much of anything during a war.  We simply lack too many critical items and raw materials.

 

If we'll need 6000 ships to win a war, the answer is not to build them before the war, it's to build our supply lines and industrial capacities while developing simple, easily produced, ready to go, ship/aircraft designs. We need F6F Hellcat designs ready to go, not some complex hybrid battlecruiser-helicopter ships with COGASDIESELWARP infinitely cross-connected propulsion drive that will fail every ten feet and that are going to soak up all our funding that should be going to supply line development.

 

Think I’m being overly dramatic about this?  Consider this current example of wartime production problems (and we’re not even in a war!):  having supplied a quarter of the US Stinger air-to-air missile inventory to Ukraine[5], we are now finding out that we can’t produce any replacements.[1]

 

Raytheon Technologies this week announced that it will take multiple years before the company is able to manufacture new Stinger missiles due to "a very limited stock of material.[1]

 

You don’t win a war with the Stingers you have on hand, you win with the tens of thousands of Stingers you produce during the war.  Unfortunately, having no wartime production plan, we now have no capability to produce more Stingers.

 

Similarly, for Javelins,

 

The U.S. already has provided at least 7,000 Javelins, about one-third of its stockpile, to Ukraine, according to an analysis by Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies international security program.[5]

 

And these are just partial supplies to an ally (Ukraine is not really an ally, they’re more an enemy of my enemy).  We’re not even in a war!

 

The Navy, and many naval observers, are focused on ever bigger and more multi-function ships such as the Burke flight 27 or whatever it’s at now, Ford, and Zumwalt.  Aside from all the problems inherent in those programs, the worst characteristic, arguably, is that they cannot be produced during a war in any useful time frame.  Even if they all worked perfectly, they’re unbuildable in any useful time frame.  Throw in the inevitable shortages of rare earths, computer chips, etc. that would occur during war, and it’s quite likely that we can’t produce any new ships.

 

In contrast, recall that we produced 157 Fletchers during WWII (laid down and commissioned during the war).  By comparison, it takes an average of about 4 years to produce one Burke.

 

One of the issues that we’ve all identified is the lack of shipyards in the US.  Without a doubt, that’s a problem and we need more.  However, the number of shipyards is a much lesser problem compared to raw materials, rare earths, computer chips, and other supply issues.  We could have a hundred shipyards but without large, assured supplies of raw materials, rare earths, computer chips, etc. those shipyards couldn’t produce a single ship.

 

 

Summary

 

We need to stop our obsession with quantifying how many wars we want to win and how big we can make our fleet and armies and start planning for how we’ll produce our way to victory.  We lack many critical raw materials and, worse, have no coherent plan to secure our raw material supply lines.  Now, during peace, is when we should be building our industrial capacity and supply lines.  We need to end our dependence on China for rare earths.  It’s beyond insane to depend on your number one enemy for your number one raw material !

 

Hand in hand with production capacity is the need for simple, basic ship and aircraft designs that have been prototyped, proven, and are ready to go.  All the raw materials and industrial capacity in the world is pointless if it takes us five years or more to produce a single ship due to its complexity.  We need Hellcats and Liberty ships, not Fords, Zumwalts, Burke Flt 27s, and next-generation-warp-capable-invisible-drones.

 

Yes, we need a standing fleet, and a highly capable one, but its purpose is not to win a war but to hold the line until production can gear up.

 

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Newsmax website, “'Years' Before New Stingers Made”, Theodore Bunker, 27-Apr-2022,

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/raytheon-stinger-missiles-supply-defense/2022/04/27/id/1067459/

 

[2]This set as an objective the ability for the US military to simultaneously win two wars and while holding in another, smaller, regional conflict.

 

[3] This set as an objective the ability for the US military to win a single smaller, regional conflict while holding in another regional conflict.

 

[4]Defense One website, “‘We Should Have Been There’: Marine General Laments the State of the Amphib Navy”, Caitlin M. Kenney, 29-Apr-2022,

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/04/we-should-have-been-there-marine-general-laments-state-amphib-navy/366314/

 

[5]Newsmax website, “Push to Arm Ukraine Putting Strain on US Weapons Stockpile”, 2-May-2022,

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/russian-ukraine-war-biden/2022/05/02/id/1068140/

 

New Aircraft Frequency

For generations, we’ve built multiple aircraft at a time and had many more waiting in the wings of industrial research and development.  Now, however, we’ve devolved to the point where we produce only one new aircraft every forty years or so.  Consider the frequency of introduction of new Navy combat [meaning fighter or attack] aircraft as demonstrated in the tables below.  I’ve tried to list them all but I’ve likely overlooked one or two.

 

 

 

	Introduced
F4F Wildcat	1940
TBM Avenger	1942
F6F Hellcat	1943
SB2C Helldiver	1942
F4U Corsair	1942
F7F Tigercat	1944
F8F Bearcat	1945
A-1 Skyraider	1946
FH Phantom	1947
F2H Banshee	1948
F9F Panther	1949
F7U Cutlass	1951
F9F Cougar	1952
FJ-2 Fury	1954
A-4 Skyhawk	1956
A3D Skywarrior	1956
F3H Demon	1956
F11F Tiger	1956
F8U Crusader	1957
A-5 Vigilante	1961
F-4 Phantom II	1961
A-6 Intruder	1963
A-7 Cosair	1967
F-14 Tomcat	1974
F-18 Hornet	1983
F-35 Lightning	2019

 

 

 

Now, if we take that data and tabulate the number of new aircraft introduced by decade, the declining frequency trend jumps out, as shown in the table below.

 

 

 

Decade	Number of New Aircraft
1940’s	11
1950’s	8
1960’s	4
1970’s	1
1980’s	1
1990’s	0
2000’s	0
2010’s	1
2020’s	0

 

 

And here it is in graphical form:

  

 

 As we can clearly see, the frequency of new aircraft introductions has dropped dramatically from several per decade in the 1940’s through the 1960’s to nearly non-existent now. 

 

Incredibly, stunningly, unbelievably, we’ve introduced only one new aircraft since the Hornet in 1983.  That’s one new aircraft in the subsequent 38 years.  One aircraft in nearly four decades.  I’m going to pause for a second to give you a chance to let that sink in …   …   …  

 

As a result of the reduced frequency, we’ve gone from having multiple aircraft to choose from and new technology introductions occurring on a regular basis to one mammoth aircraft program every 40+ years and with no possibility of significant new technology introductions.  All we can do is apply peripheral upgrades around the margins of obsolete aircraft in an attempt to keep them even a little bit relevant.

 

We’ve lost the flexibility and adaptability that came from having multiple aircraft types to choose from.  You say the F4U Corsair turned out not to be a great carrier aircraft?  That’s okay, we had other aircraft to choose from and we could make the Corsair a land based aircraft where it was better suited.  We had options.

 

Today, if we were to find out that the F-35 is not well suited for the anticipated Pacific theatre role (spoiler … it’s not!) we have no other choice.  Our next new aircraft is going to be 10-20 years down the road – if we fast track it ... longer if we don’t.

 

When we had multiple aircraft, the aircraft manufacturers engaged in internal research and development and developed new aircraft on their own dime because they knew that new aircraft would be purchased every few years and that they had a good chance of being a provider and making sales.  Now, with only a single aircraft purchased every 20-30 years, there is no incentive for the manufacturers to develop a new aircraft on their own.  The odds are that they won’t get any sales and, if they do, the quantities will, inevitably, be cut and they’ll be lucky to break even on their investment.

 

We’ve also lost the variety that comes from having multiple manufacturers developing multiple aircraft on their own.  Now, we get one aircraft and no variety.  This must change and I've described how (see, "How To Build A Better Aircraft").

There's also the issue of preserving a robust industrial base but that's a topic for another post.

Profits Versus Performance

This is an updated version of a previous post about the objectives of the defense industry.  I’ve recently seen a steady stream of offerings and advice from industry and they all have a common theme:  they’re good for industry.  Here’s a small sampling.

• Boeing is pitching upgrades to – surprise! – its F-18E/F Super Hornet.

• Boeing is pitching upgrades to – surprise! – its F-15, referred to as the F-15X (1). 

• Lockheed is proposing a new frigate based on – surprise! – its LCS.

• Austal is proposing a new frigate based on – surprise! – its LCS.

• Bell Boeing has proposed variants of – surprise! - its V-22 Osprey for

-          the Navy’s carrier delivery aircraft, CMV-22B

-          airborne early warning and control, EV-22

-          combat search and rescue, HV-22

-          anti-submarine warfare, SV-22

• Northrop Grumman Ship Systems has proposed variants of – surprise! - its LPD-17 for

-          ballistic missile defense

-          a hospital ship

-          the future amphibious ship LX(R)

• Raytheon has proposed upgrading – surprise! – its Tomahawk missile for the anti-ship missile role.

So, what’s wrong with upgrades and new variants?  Nothing, per se.  The problem lies in the fact that these companies are not suggesting the best military solution – they’re suggesting the best corporate profit solution. 

Is the V-22 the best military solution for an airborne early warning and control aircraft?  Almost certainly not.  Is the EV-22 the best corporate profit solution for Bell Boeing?  Absolutely!

Is the LPD-17 the best military solution for the LX(R)?  Almost certainly not.  Is it the best corporate profit solution for Northrop Grumman Ship Systems?  Absolutely!

Of course, it’s quite possible that a proposed upgrade/variant IS the best military solution in which case the military benefits to the maximum degree possible and the corporation profits.  Win-win.  Unfortunately, the instances of the military and corporate needs meshing like that are few and far between.

The problem is not just limited to upgrades.  New equipment is being proposed that follows the same model of maximum profits for the corporation.

For example, Raytheon is proposing a new concept in “Multi Domain Battle Management” for the military (2).  This would be a massive, integrated software decision making/assistance tool for military combat leaders.  The problem is that it’s highly likely that the proposed tool is not the best tool for the military but, instead, it’s the most profitable tool for Raytheon.

Bell is heavily pushing the V-280 tiltrotor for transport, gunship, and other roles.  Is it the best platform for each of those roles?  Unlikely.  Is it the most profitable for the company?  Certainly!

So, what does this all mean?

First, it means that the military needs to firmly understand that when industry proposes something, that something is, first and foremost, in the corporation’s best interests.  There’s nothing wrong with this.  In our free market system, attempting to maximize profits is what corporations are supposed to do.  As long as the military recognizes this they can make intelligent decisions about whether they want the proposed item.

Second, it means that the best military solution may never be offered by industry if it isn’t in some corporation’s best interest.  Thus, the military needs to understand what the best solution is before they entertain corporate proposals.  This is one of our major failings.  Having allowed so much of our in-house engineering expertise to lapse, the military often lacks the ability to know what the best solution is and depends on industry to tell them.  Of course, as we’ve just discussed, industry won’t provide the best solution, they’ll provide the most profitable solution.  The abandonment of in-house expertise is a major mistake and needs to be reversed.

For example, no one inside the Navy had the engineering expertise to recognize that the combining gear on the LCS was far too complex to be reliable or to be safely and reliably operated by standard crews.  As a result, the first several LCS’s all suffered very similar breakdowns related to the combining gear.

For example, no one in the Navy had the expertise to recognize that the Ford’s EMALS catapult was inherently flawed since, by design, the catapults could not be repaired individually.  Instead, the entire system has to be electrically “wound down” in order to service any one of the cats.  This is a major flaw in a combat system.

For example, no in the Navy had the expertise to recognize that the Zumwalt’s LRLAP munition for its gun was heavy on promises and very light on technical feasibility.

And so on.

To repeat, the Navy has to enter into industry discussions already knowing the best answer.  Anything less is heading down the path to failure.

CNO Greenert once stated that he was excited and couldn’t wait to see what industry would give the Navy in the future.  What an idiot!  You should know what you want and you should be telling industry what you want, not accepting whatever they’ll give you based on their bottom line.

We have got to stop depending on industry to lead our military development.  This means that we need to re-establish in-house technology and design expertise.  Failure to do so means we’ll be doomed to an unending succession of sub-par weapon systems.

___________________________________________

(1)DoDBuzz website, “Boeing Pitches 'F-15X' Fighter Concept to US Air Force: Report”, Oriana Pawlyk, 19-Jul-2018,

https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/07/19/boeing-pitches-f-15x-fighter-concept-us-air-force-report.html

(2)Breaking Defense website, “EXCLUSIVE: What Multi Domain C2 May Look Like: Raytheon’s Rick Yuse”, Colin Clark 19-Jul-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/exclusive-what-multi-domain-c2-may-look-like-raytheons-rick-yuse/