LCS Module Update

The original LCS program called for 55 LCS and 62 (if I recall correctly) mission modules.  As the program was whittled down, the number and type of modules was left in limbo.  Now that the LCS program is down to around 32 ships, here’s the latest on the number of modules that will be procured, courtesy of a USNI summary of a government report (1).

• 10 SUW
• 10 ASW
• 24 MCM

This gives a total of 44 deployable mission modules.  Here’s a more detailed breakdown of where/how the modules will be assigned and used:

• 24 modules (8 SUW, 8 ASW, 8 MCM) to outfit the focused mission LCS ships that make up the LCS divisions of 3 deployable ships and l training ship

• 3 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, l MCM) in Mayport, FL to ensure high operational
  availability (Ao) of the training systems for the training ships in the LCS divisions
  and to provide spare systems for each focused mission area

• 4 modules (1 SUW, l ASW, 2 MCM) in San Diego, CA to outfit the test ships (LCS l-4) and provide additional spare capacity for training ships and deployers

• 4 modules (4 MCM) to outfit LCS 29-32 to mitigate warfighting capability needs across the MCM mission area

• 9 MCM modules for use on other Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs) to meet the warfighting capability requirements and account for MCM maintenance cycles

There are a few interesting observations from this.

Note the 9 MCM modules that are for “Vessels of Opportunity”.  The Navy doesn’t actually need or want these modules and has no ships to use them but are required by law to procure 24 MCM modules.  From the article,

“An overall total of 24 MCM [modules] are required to comply with Section 1046 of the FY 2018 NDAA which prohibits the retirement of legacy MCM forces until the Navy has identified replacement capability and procured a quantity of such systems to meet combatant MCM operational requirements that are currently being met by legacy forces.”

Thus, the actual total of “wanted” modules is 35 for the 32 LCS seaframes.  This is the final, official nail in the coffin of swappable modules. 

Further, setting aside the 9 MCM modules that will be set aside on the Island of Misfit Weapons and discounting the MCM modules that are dedicated to the training ships, the total operationally deployable LCS mine countermeasure modules is 8 plus, potentially, 4 for LCS 29-32.

Let’s say that again because it’s incredibly important.  The total LCS MCM capability is 8 ships with an ultimate potential of 12.  That’s our total future U.S. military mine countermeasures capabiity.  We’re replacing 14 Avenger class minesweepers and two squadrons of MH-53E MCM helos (total inventory is 28 helos) with 8-12 LCS.

Does anyone really believe that’s adequate?  China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea each have hundreds of thousands of mines and we think 8-12 LCS are adequate to deal with that threat?  There goes any hope of conducting an amphibious assault.  On a larger scale, our Navy is going to be paralyzed by mine threats it can’t deal with.

I trust I’ve made my point about the inadequacy of our MCM force?

Moving on …

ASuW Module.  This module is currently a joke and consists of a couple of 30 mm machine guns and a helo.  The anticipated Longbow Hellfire missile which will provide some actual, though short ranged, firepower is scheduled for operation in 2019-20. 

Hellfire testing to date has demonstrated 83% success rate (1, full doc p.6) from 24 tests.  That’s surprisingly low given the scripted, simplistic, “designed to succeed” nature of such tests.  Real world performance is likely to be half that.

Current projected module purchase cost for the 30 mm guns, Hellfire, and RHIBs is $23.1M per module (1, full doc p.6).  The helo costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The ASuW performance is underwhelming, to say the least.  The Navy has established two levels of performance for the Key Performance Parameters (KPP):  a minimum threshold and a better, desired objective.  The ASuW module, even with the Hellfire missiles, will only barely meet the threshold requirements and will not even be remotely near the objective requirements.  The Navy’s graphic depiction of the actual and projected performance versus threshold and objective is so bad that they didn’t even include scales with actual values (1, full doc p.7).  Further, you know that the Navy’s projected performance is overly optimistic so the performance versus threshold/objective will be even worse than depicted.

ASW Module.  This module currently consists of,

• Continuously Active Variable Depth Sonar (VDS)
• Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA)
• Light Weight Tow Torpedo Defense (LWT)
• MH-60R Helo
• MQ-8 UAV

There is no realistic scheduled operational date for the module although the Navy is suggesting sometime around 2020-21.  As always, that will be delayed.

Current projected module purchase cost for the VDS, MFTA, and LWT is $19.8M per module (1, full doc p.14).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

As with the ASuW module, the performance when compared to the KPP threshold and objective requirements is barely adequate.  Further, the DOT&E testing demonstrates that the Navy’s reporting on performance results is “optimistic”, to put it politely.

The MFTA is the only individual component that has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  Overall module IOC is scheduled for late 2019.  It is certain that will slip.

MCM Module.  This module uses a cobbled together collection of components that seem to change daily.  Current components include,

• Knifefish UUV for buried or bottom mine detection
• AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) for near surface (top 30 ft) mine detection
• AQS-20 Sonar for suspended mine (volume) detection
• ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) – acoustic and magnetic
• DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) for beach and surf zone mine detection
• MH-60S helo
• MQ-8 Firescout
• EX64 Archerfish neutralizer

Additional components are being developed such as an unmanned surface tow drone for sonar and sweep components and the Barracuda system for near surface mine neutralization.

The various capabilities are expected to trickle in over the next several years.

The various module subsystems are not meeting their performance requirements and many are not even close (1, full doc p.22-23).

Current projected module purchase cost for the various non-helo components is $87M per module (1, full doc p.22).  The helo/UAV costs are not included.  It is not clear whether those are the individual equipment costs or the complete, packaged, installed costs.  It seems likely that they are just the individual component costs since the report also categorizes “common” costs as a separate item.

The Annual Report lists module development costs as totaling $2.6B (1, full doc p.28).  Of course, those costs will increase well beyond that before all development is complete!

The report lists total anticipated module procurement costs, including the separate “common” category as (1, full doc p.29),

Module  Qty    Tot Cost   Mod Cost

ASuW     10      $319M     $ 32M

ASW      10      $267M     $ 27M

MCM      24      $2.5B     $100M

Common   44      $576M     $ 13M

Total    44      $3.6B     $ 82M

The key column is the Mod Cost  which is the unit cost for each module of the indicated type.  Note that the costs don’t agree with the individual component costs described above.  The costs listed here are likely to be more accurate.

It is worth noting that the modules have been under development since sometime around 2003/4.  Now, some 14 years later, not a single module exists in an operationally useful form.  Operational modules are not expected for another few to several years and then another few years will be required to actually manufacture the modules.  We are burning through LCS seaframe life spans without any modules to equip them.  It is possible, indeed likely, that some LCS vessels will retire without ever having had a functional, useful module equipped!

LCS module development has been an embarrassment of staggering proportions and the fiasco continues.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Annual Report”, February 2018 Annual Report to Congress for the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules Program, 3-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/03/littoral-combat-ship-mission-package-annual-report

Full document:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4429096-Mission-Package-RTC-February-2018.html#document/p9

The Death of Modularity

The Death of Modularity

Modularity was always an impractical fantasy for combat platforms and the LCS in particular.  A cursory thought exercise makes clear that the concept is fundamentally flawed.  The odds that a given LCS would happen to have the correct module for a given tactical situation are poor – 33% to be exact.  Further, requiring the vessel to retire from the combat zone for a couple of weeks to get its module changed not only weakens the overall naval force for that period of time but presupposes that the tactical situation and need will have remained unchanged until the LCS returns.  That’s a degree of situational rigidity that naval warfare has rarely or never exhibited.  Further, the Navy’s concept that modules would be warehoused and available in only three locations around the world was another flaw which could only serve to increase the transit times for ships wanting to change modules.  Worse, these warehouses would have presented lucrative and vulnerable targets.

This blog has also debunked the modularity myth from a combat performance standpoint.  I won’t bother repeating the analysis.

Despite all those easily seen flaws in the concept the Navy was adamant that modularity was the way of the future.  Come hell or high water the LCS would be modular.  So, how has that worked out?

Well, due to cost overruns in the LCS program and general budget concerns, the Navy quickly dropped the idea of purchasing extra modules and limited the module buy to just about a 1:1 module to ship ratio.  There would be no extra modules to swap out.  Of course, there were other problems like the instability of the Freedom variant that was unable to move module weights around without very careful and time consuming weight compensation efforts so as to avoid exceeding the vessel’s incline limits.  The swap which was envisioned to occur in hours was found to require several days.  So much for quick swaps!

Regardless, even though the Navy eventually acknowledged that LCS would rarely, if ever, change their modules, modularity was still touted as proper approach.  The fact that budgets and a few unlucky physical characteristics of the ship precluded implementing modularity didn’t sway the Navy’s opinion about the benefits of modularity.

That brings us to the present day.  The new LCS’s will be built with no modularity whatsoever.  As USNI website reports (1), the new LCS will be a conventional, non-modular, multi-mission ship capable of performing surface and anti-submarine warfare simultaneously.

The Navy must be disappointed, huh?  Their vaunted vision of future combat platforms has been completely abandoned.  I’ll bet they still believe modularity is the right approach, don’t you think?  I mean, they were so adamant that it was the only way to design a ship, they must still wish they could implement it.

Or, maybe not  ………….

Huh?

According to the USNI report the Navy now claims that multi-mission is superior.

“Instead, he [Capt. Dan Brintzinghoffer, frigate program manager] said the frigate will be more lethal, more survivable, and will be able to conduct surface warfare and ant-submarine warfare simultaneously, whereas the LCS had to choose only one mission package to work with at any given time.”

So now the multi-mission capability of the frigate version of the LCS is a benefit?  Ah, wasn’t that what the LCS critics said years ago?  It’s certainly what ComNavOps has always said.

The Navy’s ability to positively spin either side of an issue is awe-inspiring to behold.  Really, though, what’s the alternative – to admit that modularity was an abject failure?  That would lead to some rather awkward questions about the continuing construction of modular LCS’s.  Say, now that I mention it, why are we continuing to build modular LCS’s when we’ve abandoned the modular swap concept and are now claiming that multi-mission is superior?  Only the Navy knows the answer to that.  Well, the Navy and ComNavOps.  The answer is that the Navy’s goal is not to build ships that are operationally and tactically useful.  No, the Navy’s goal is simply to get as many hulls in the water as possible in order to preserve their slice of the budget pie.  The fact that we’re continuing to build a ship whose operational premise has been abandoned and discredited does not matter to the Navy.  The only thing that matters is that the budget monies continue to flow.

You know, we should look at saving some money by seeing whether the LCS manufacturers would be willing to scrap the vessels as soon as they’re built.  That would be way more efficient and cost effective than having to wait 15 years or so and then find a company to scrap them.  It’s not like the LCS’s will do anything worthwhile while we wait.  But, I digress …

The Navy now officially recognizes what the rest of us have known all along – modularity in combat platforms is a bad idea.  Modularity is dead.

(1)USNI, “Navy’s Future Frigate Will Be Optimized For Lethality, Survivability; Will Not Retain LCS’s Speed”, Megan Eckstein, October 15, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/10/15/navys-future-frigate-will-be-optimized-for-lethality-survivability-will-not-retain-lcss-speed

Modularity Versus Weapon Modules

Today’s post involves a simple conceptual clarification concerning the difference between modularity and weapon modules.  Too often, the two terms are used interchangeably when, in fact, they are completely separate concepts.

ComNavOps has gone on record numerous times about the fallacy of modularity (see, "Payloads Over Platforms" or "The Myth of Modularity").  However, a friend reminded ComNavOps about the concept of weapon modules.  In this context, perhaps a better word than “module” is “pit”.  A weapon pit is a standardized and designated space for a single weapon system that is built into the design of a ship at the outset.  During the course of the ship’s lifetime the weapons that fit that pit can be changed as weapons are upgraded or as weapon requirements change.  The pit, then, is limited to weapons.  Of course, there’s no inherent reason why a pit couldn’t be devoted to some other function – a sensor pit, for example.

The modular pit is typified by the Spruance class which was designed with pits that could be upgraded throughout the life of the class.  The MEKO family is another example.

ComNavOps is fully supportive of the modular pit concept although there is nothing that inherently requires such an approach.  While the ability to swap out what’s in the pit is an attractive capability on paper, the reality is that ships very rarely do so.  In fact, off the top of my head, I can’t recall an instance of any warship from any nation actually doing so.  There probably is an example somewhere but the frequency of occurrence is clearly very low.  In the USN, at least, the combination of early retirements and diversion of funding to new construction effectively precludes pit level upgrades.  Thus, pits are pointless.  On the other hand, they cost little to include in the design and have no significant impact on design, hence, my support or, at least, lack of objection.

In contrast, modularity, as the term is used now, refers to the ability to completely change the function of the carrying platform by changing the module.  The LCS is the obvious example of this in the USN.  This topic has been thoroughly covered so I won’t rehash it.

As I said, just a simple exercise in clarification of terminology. 

The Myth of Modularity

Modularity. 

Payloads over Platforms. 

Ford pickups over Ferraris. 

Certain ideas get repeated so often that eventually discussion of their underlying validity (or lack thereof) gets bypassed and the discussion moves on to implementation.  Diversity is one example.  Despite absolutely no evidence that diversity offers any advantage, the national discussion bypassed the validity of diversity and moved straight into methods for achieving it.  Similarly, modularity has moved beyond discussion of its merits (or lack thereof) and straight into methods for achieving it.

CNO Greenert has been one of the biggest champions of modularity with numerous public statements espousing payloads over platforms but with little discussion of the actual merits.  Are modular payloads really the universal solution to all our tactical, technological, engineering, and budgetary challenges?  Navy leadership would assure that they are.  Are they, though?

Let’s consider a simple example.  We want to win a car race.  How do we do it given that we only have a pickup truck at our disposal?  Well, modularity would suggest we simply put a bigger engine (the module, in this case) in the truck.  Unfortunately, about half way through the first lap our truck would find its engine failing due to an inadequately sized exhaust system, its brakes overheating and failing because they aren’t properly sized for the power of the engine, the acceleration would be incapable of competing with the other true race cars because the gearing isn’t optimized for the engine, its tires would be shredding due to the high speeds, stress, and friction induced heat, and, worst, we’d crash because the steering and suspension couldn’t handle the high speed cornering.  In short, our modular pickup truck would get blown away by the specialized race cars whose every component was exquisitely optimized for racing.

What went wrong?  We had a modular approach and should have won, shouldn’t we?  The problem is that our module, the engine, was not tightly integrated with the rest of the truck (the platform) and to achieve maximum performance, it must be.

Now, if we want our modular truck to simply be as cost efficient as it can, we could add a more fuel efficient engine and we’d see improvement.  That’s an undemanding requirement that could be met by a module change.  Even there, we still wouldn’t achieve as good cost efficiency as a vehicle whose every component was designed for cost efficiency and tightly integrated to function together towards that end.

We see, then, that the weakness of modules is that, by their very definition, they are not tightly integrated with the carrying platform.  Lack of integration means, by definition, that performance must be sub-optimal.  That’s OK if the module’s task is undemanding.  Want to change a plane from a transport role to a cargo role by removing the modular seating?  No problem.  There’s no real penalty for the resulting cargo plane being a bit less efficient than a purpose designed cargo plane. 

However, when we start applying modularity to combat we run into the race car problem.  Asking an LCS to become an ASW platform by loading the ASW module (assuming it worked!) is asking a sub-optimal ASW vessel to go up against a dedicated, optimal submarine totally designed to kill ships.  Sub-optimal versus optimal.  The winner is going to be the submarine. 

In contrast to a generic, modular ASW platform, an optimal ASW platform should have quieting built into every component from the first rivet on up.  Every piece of machinery must be acoustically isolated.  The engines should be selected for acoustic and motive performance in the ASW operational speed range.  The sensors should be tightly integrated into the seaframe so that self-noise interference is absolutely minimized.  The hull, itself, should be sized and shaped to minimize self-noise and maximize maneuverability within the range of tactics that will be used.  That kind of integration and ultimate capability can’t be achieved simply by loading a module onto any old platform and, yet, that’s exactly what the Navy wants to do.  We’re intentionally developing a second tier fleet while our enemies are doing their best to develop optimized, focused, lethal platforms.

Modularity is fine for non-combat applications but has no place in combat.

The Future of the Surviving LCS's

The LCS buy has been truncated at 32 vessels.  It’s even possible that Congress will not fund that many.  The current budget markup has reduced the requested LCS buy for 2015 by one.  Regardless, the Navy has not yet addressed the impact of the truncated buy on the future roles of the surviving LCS’s and, in particular, the impact on the existing module procurement plan.  Presumably, the planned 60 odd modules will be reduced to around 32-35.  The next logical question is what mission sets will the reduced modules be?  How many ASW?  How many ASuW?  How many MCM?

At least one of the questions is easily answered.  There will be few, if any, ASuW modules purchased.  The ASuW module borders on useless.  The main weapon of the module will be either the tiny and very short ranged Griffon or the now out of production Hellfire.  I can’t see the Navy spending money on a failed module for a truncated class.

The ASW mission is needed but the module is struggling and has reverted to existing, off-the-shelf technology.  There’s no need to procure modules that simply duplicate existing capabilities with no improvement.  On the other hand, there’s nothing wrong with a competent ASW capability that simply duplicates existing technology.  The problem is that the hull, itself, is not optimized for ASW and that’s likely to make the LCS a better target than hunter.  Still, the Navy may see a need for an ASW LCS.

The MCM mission, on the other hand, is desperately needed.  The Navy, entirely through their own fault, has allowed the Avenger class MCM and other MCM assets to literally rot away in anticipation of the LCS taking over the role.  Ignoring the self-inflicted origins of the MCM crisis, the Navy must have MCM vessels and, at least in the Navy’s mind, there is no other option than the LCS.  ComNavOps knows there are other, better options but that’s a topic for another time.  I’m sure the Navy sees a need for at least 24 MCM vessels, if not more – that was baked into the original LCS class and module procurement plan.  Thus, at least 24 of the 32 surviving LCS’s will be MCM variants. 

At that point, with only 8 additional vessels, does it make sense to even bother with ASW and ASuW modules?  The ASuW module certainly makes no sense.  A weak case could be made for 8 ASW LCS’s, I suppose.  The logical course would be to convert all 32 vessels to MCM.  This would greatly simplify logisics, training, and maintenance.  Trying to maintain a logistics support system and training pipeline for only 8 ASW modules makes no sense.

Another plausible scenario is that the 32 LCS’s could be split along version lines with the 16 LCS-1 class dedicated to ASW and the 16 LCS-2 class dedicated to MCM.  This makes less conceptual sense and leaves the Navy’s MCM capability at a paltry 16 vessels but it may appeal to the Navy if the particular characteristics of the two classes dictate it.

We see, then, that the most reasonable use of the surviving LCS’s is as MCM vessels.  Of course, given the Navy’s demonstrated indifference towards mine warfare (truly baffling given the proliferation of mines in the inventories of potential enemies and the historical impact of mines) it is quite likely that the Navy will come up with some other course of action.

... Master of None

ComNavOps just finished reading yet another article extolling the versatility of a weapon system.  It doesn’t matter which one – the idea’s the same regardless.  The system is able to be adapted to perform a seemingly infinite variety of tasks according to the manufacturer.  So what’s the problem?  Who wouldn’t want a versatile system?  That’s cost effective, isn’t it?

Yes, it is, as long as maximum performance isn’t required. 

Consider the example of a car that’s designed for ultimate versatility.  It would have a large cargo bed, good mileage, moderate speed, decent handling and it would get utterly destroyed in a race against dedicated race cars.  It’s not optimized for anything.  It can do a lot but nothing well.  You know the saying for this:  jack of all trades, master of none.  If you want to win a race, you design a dedicated, optimized race car whose every feature and characteristic is focused on racing.

If you want to win an ASW engagement, you design a dedicated, optimized platform (helo, surface ship, submarine, fixed wing aircraft – doesn’t matter, the concept is the same) whose every feature and characteristic is focused on ASW.  This means that every nut, bolt, rivet, and weld is carefully evaluated for quieting, every sensor is tuned to anti-submarine use, the engines are carefully selected for the perfect combination of required speed and quieting, the hull is shaped to minimize self-noise and maximize maneuverability, and so on.  A generic, semi-commercial design that has an ASW module tucked in the modular cargo area is going to be marginally effective, at best, and sunk, more likely, because it will be a sub-optimal platform going up against a specialized enemy submarine that is optimized to kill it.

This doesn’t just apply to ASW.  The same concept holds true for any weapon system or mission.  Asking a generalized, combination strike fighter to go up against a purpose built, single function, optimized, air supremacy fighter is simply going to get the strike fighter killed.  For example, the JSF is badly overmatched against an F-22 or the enemy’s equivalent of an F-22.

Despite understanding this simple concept, the Navy is insisting on building non-optimized, multi-function ships that will someday have to go up against specialized enemy vessels.  China, for example, is building some specialized, lethal warships.  The Zumwalt has been given the versatility of an ASW capability but is not optimized for the mission and will become a multi-billion dollar target if it tries to play tag with modern submarines.

Having said all that, there is a role and a need for versatile platforms and systems.  The Perry class FFGs were a great example of a versatile platform (though they were reasonably specialized for ASW) that was adequate at multiple things but not outstanding at anything.  The JHSV looks to be adequate at generic transport of equipment and personnel but not optimized for any particular transport function.

If one thinks carefully about the platforms and systems that are acceptable as versatile but non-optimized versus highly specific specialized ones, it quickly becomes apparent that the quality of versatility is most acceptable in non-combat roles.  A platform or system that engages in combat against a technologically advanced enemy must either be optimized or it will be destroyed.

Versatility is fine for tasks that don’t require maximum, optimized performance.  A platform, whether sea or air, that swings between cargo, personnel transport, humanitarian assistance, anti-piracy, show-the-flag, international training exercises, etc. is perfectly acceptable because none of those tasks require maximum performance.  In fact, such a platform may well prove to be a cost effective way to carry out multiple tasks. 

Let’s recognize, though, that while the majority of the Navy’s time is spent on peacetime, non-critical tasks, the reason the Navy exists is combat.  For that, nothing less than perfectly optimized systems are acceptable.  Anything less is a recipe for defeat.

We know that the Navy is in the process of defining the replacement for the cancelled LCS.  [ Of course, it will be a revised LCS rather than a true frigate but that’s another topic ]  The salient point is that the Navy is probably about to design a versatile, master-of-none vessel that will be make up a significant portion of the combat fleet and will be expected to engage in combat against some pretty lethal threats.  We need to think very carefully about what degree of non-optimization we’re willing to accept.

Modularity

CNO Greenert likes to emphasize payloads over platforms.  We’ve already debunked that idea (see Payloads Over Platforms?) but that’s not the point of this post.  Let’s play what-if.  What if CNO is correct?  What if payloads are the only thing that matters?  What if the platform is immaterial and irrelevant?  Let’s look at the logic of the concept.

If the payload is the important part and the platform is irrelevant then we could and should be placing the LCS modules on commercial cargo ships that cost a tiny fraction of what an LCS hull costs.  It’s all about the module, right?  There’s a contradiction here.  The Navy insists we need a highly capable LCS vessel built to military standards.  Why?  It’s the payload that matters, according to CNO.  All sarcasm aside, if CNO is right and truly believes his own philosophy, why are we building the LCS?  What does the LCS hull provide in the way of capabilities that justifies its existence and can’t be obtained from a cheap commercial vessel?

We could place MCM and ASW modules on a cheaper cargo vessel and still carry out all the needed functions.  In fact, the cargo vessel would have greater room (multiple modules at the same time?), longer endurance, better crew accommodations, and lots of weight growth margins, among other benefits. 

There’s no requirement for self-defense.  The Navy has stated that the LCS is not intended to operate in a hostile environment without the protection of a Burke.  A cargo ship would be no more at risk than the LCS. 

According to the Navy, the ASuW module would work on any vessel.  The Griffon missile is being tested and used on Cyclone PCs so it’s clearly independent of the platform.  Why not mount a single 57 mm gun, two 30 mm guns, and a Griffon launcher on a cargo ship?

The entire fleet could be built on, perhaps, two sizes of cheap, commercial cargo vessels:  a small one for patrol, littoral, corvette, frigate modules and a larger one for destroyer and cruiser modules.  Perhaps we still need a specialized carrier although a cargo vessel with a flight deck module ought to work just fine.

What about aviation?  Using CNO’s logic we don’t need the JSF, we need cheap, C-?? whatever cargo planes with modules for strike, air-to-air, ASW, AEW, and surveillance. 

I think CNO is on to something here.  We can cut the Navy’s construction budget by 80%.  All I ask is that CNO lead the first combat mission aboard one of his platform-irrelevant, payload vessels or aircraft.

LCS Mine Module Status Update

The DOT&E 2012 Annual Report sheds some light on the status of the LCS mine countermeasures (MCM) module.

The MCM Increment 1 module includes both a manned airborne (helo) component and a remote controlled underwater vehicle component.

The airborne helo (MH-60S) component was intended to operate the following equipment.

-Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) for detection of shallow mines.  Testing demonstrated that the system failed to meet Navy requirements.

-A towed sonar (AQS-20) for detection of deeper mines.  Testing revealed that the MH-60S helo has insufficient power to safely tow the sonar and this function has been deleted from the module.  This is a real head-scratcher.  Wouldn’t you think somewhere around Day 1 of the module development someone would have thought to ask whether the helo could handle the load?  In any event, the sonar will now be deployed only by the underwater vehicle resulting in a significant reduction in speed of coverage and rate of detection.  If that’s not bad enough, testing also revealed that the sonar itself fails to meet Navy requirements.



AMNS - Archerfish Success



-A towed Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) for destruction of mines.  This is a towed, underwater frame carrying four Archerfish mini-torpedos which swim up to the mine using operator guidance via a trailing cable and detonate themselves and the mine.  This is a nice concept and the Archerfish portion appears to work.  The only drawback is that the helo can only destroy four mines and then it has to return to the LCS to be rearmed – a very time consuming process.

 

The underwater component is centered on the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) which tows the AQS-20 sonar.  Anyone who has seen film of the RMMV being launched and recovered will cringe at the sight.  The launch/recovery mechanism and procedure is a gimmicky, finicky, problem-prone system that requires near perfect weather and calm seas to have any chance of success.  This is the farthest thing from a robust, rugged system that can be launched and recovered under combat conditions and varying sea states.  The launch/recovery system is an abortion and should have been evident as such from the first back-of-the-napkin sketch.

In summary, the MCM module, despite being dumbed down from the original concept, is still very much a developmental system and is nowhere near ready for deployment.  Most of the equipment fails to meet Navy requirements.  The Archerfish component appears to be the one bright spot but it’s useless without reliable detection systems.  It’s clear that the LCS minesweeping operations will be a very slow process and very labor intensive.  This does not exactly fit with the concept of a forward deployed, combat minesweeper.

Eventually, future Increments of the MCM module hope to add the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) system to detect mines and obstacles in the beach and surf zones.  Even further down the road, an Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) is planned which will activate mines and cause them to self-destruct.  Given the numerous failures of the various MCM equipment tested to date, I wouldn’t count on these wish-list Increments to be successful.

Contrast this assessment with the Navy’s glowing PR statements about the MCM module.  I’m losing what little faith I have in the Navy’s integrity.

Payloads Over Platforms?

CNO Greenert had an article published in the most recent issue of Proceedings espousing “payloads over platforms” (1).  His premise is that the Navy’s future lies in modular payloads rather than in tightly integrated ships and weapon systems due to the ability to modify payloads faster and cheaper than entire ships.  This is not an entirely new concept and he acknowledges that point with examples of weapon systems being modernized over the years on existing ships.  However, Greenert suggests that the Navy of the future will take the modular concept to the LCS level in which the payload (module) is totally divorced from the platform (the ship) other than drawing electrical and other necessary utilities from it.

While this sounds good, initially, there is an aspect to modular payloads that was overlooked in the article.  Not all payloads can be made totally independent of the platform.  In fact, most will be significantly dependent on the platform’s characteristics to achieve full effectiveness. 

Take, for example, an ASW module.  For the foreseeable future, any realistic module will be heavily dependent on the platform for movement, if nothing else, and will probably need to interface with the platform’s other sensors and weapons.  This means the platform will, by definition, be part of the overall weapon system.  That being so, if the platform is not optimized for the payload’s function then the overall function will be negatively impacted.  Specifically, if a ship is going to carry an ASW payload and be part of the search and prosecution the ship had better have built in quieting technology such as engine mount isolation, Prairie/Masker noise suppression, etc. or else the platform and the payload will become the hunted instead of the hunter.  Those design aspects don’t come with a modular payload;  they have to be built in from the keel up.





MEKO - The Right Way to Do Modules?

Alternatively, consider an ASuW (anti-surface) payload.  While any type of gun/missile can be built into the module, the platform becomes, by definition, part of the weapon system and without stealth, armor, and other features that can’t be part of the module the platform will be at a significant disadvantage fighting ships that have that type of integrated design.  Maximum effectiveness comes from the very integration of payload and platform that Greenert proposes to shun.

Of course, if we ever get to the point that all kinds of futuristic technologies are invented that allow the carrying platform to stand well off and simply launch other vehicles (manned or unmanned) to perform the search and prosecution than the carrying platform truly doesn’t matter and, in fact, could be a commercial cargo ship since it wouldn’t be involved in the combat aspect of the payload’s function and would be simply a payload cargo ship.  However, as the LCS module development debacle has demonstrated, this kind of technology leap is still decades away, at best.

For the foreseeable future, CNO Greenert is failing to heed the lesson of the LCS and wants to continue designing inherently weak platforms under the assumption that future wishful thinking payload modules will totally compensate for the platform’s weaknesses.  Payload and platform can’t be uncoupled unless we are willing to accept sub-optimal performance.

On the other hand, a scaled down version of modularity wherein standard size “pits” are built into the platform to accept varying sensor or weapon packages is, potentially, a useful idea and, indeed, has already been implemented in various ship classes such as the MEKOs.  This allows flexibility and upgradability in weapon/sensor selection without sentencing the platform to mediocrity.

The Navy needs good, solid ship designs with the ability to easily incorporate reasonable upgrades.  The Navy does not need more LCS-type designs that attempt to leapfrog the technology ladder and are doomed to failure.

(1) USNI Proceedings, “Payloads over Platforms:  Charting a New Course”, Greenert, July 2012