Monday, April 12, 2021

Missile Escort

The US carrier task force slid silently through the calm night waters as the Admiral on the flag bridge of the carrier looked out into the darkness.  He could just make out the distant silhouette of one of the three other carriers in the group.  The carriers were spread out in a box formation with around five miles separation between them.  The task force – the first thing the Admiral had done upon assuming command was to jettison the modern terminology and return to WWII descriptions, like ‘task force’,  feeling that it conveyed a more no-nonsense, combat focus – had an immense escort group of 8 Ticonderoga class cruisers, 18 Burke class destroyers, and 6 of the new frigates.  This was, the Admiral reflected, a group worthy of being called a task force.  The Navy was finally getting serious about this war but it had required the abject failure of the Virginia submarine attack on Hainan to shake the Navy out of its delusional comfort zone.

 

The Admiral had been briefed on the results of the Virginia missile attack – the Navy’s first combat operation of the war - and it hadn’t been pretty.  Hainan had been a priority target both to relieve pressure on the Taiwan operations and to open up the southern approach to China that Hainan guarded.  The Navy had confidently assigned seven Virginia class submarines with a combined load of 280 Tomahawk cruise missiles to attack Hainan from the south at a standoff range of several hundred miles.  The 280 missiles were deemed sufficient to destroy the facilities at Hainan even with some expected attrition of the missiles.  After all, Tomahawks were relatively slow and non-stealthy so some were bound to be shot down.

 

What hadn’t been expected was that the Chinese would present a layered defense that decimated the Tomahawk missile stream.  The missiles had been detected at almost their firing points – Navy communications and centralized computer planning were nowhere near as secure as believed - and the Chinese had immediately begun cycling fighter aircraft loaded with air-to-air missiles to start reducing the incoming stream of Tomahawks.  With about 800 miles to work with, the Chinese were able to cycle a constant stream of fighters against the Tomahawks for the duration of the 1.5 hour flight time of the missiles.

 

The 130 or so defending aircraft, launched from Hainan and various bases scattered around the South China Sea and carrying around 10 air-to-air missiles each, were able to bring 1300 missiles against the Tomahawks.   As it turned out, the Tomahawks were nothing more than drone targets for the Chinese fighters; the cruise missiles couldn’t maneuver or evade and had no countermeasures that mattered to the Chinese aircraft.  It was like sharks feeding on a school of fish.

 

Once the sharks were done feeding and the remaining missiles neared Hainan, the ground SAM defenses had taken over.  Again, the slow, non-stealthy Tomahawks had fared poorly against China’s modern SAM systems.  Of the original 280 Tomahawks, the Navy estimated that only around 50 had reached the Hainan area and, of those 50, 2/3 had been shot down by SAMs.  Only around 16 missiles had actually struck a target and the damage inflicted was minimal and quickly repaired.

 

All in all, it had been a colossal wasted effort.  The only good to come of the attack was that the Navy had learned lessons and was now serious about conducting the war.  This task force was going to apply those lessons and finish the job the first attack had failed at.

 

The task force was sprinting towards the initial launch position – not the launch position of missiles but, rather, the launch position of its aircraft.  The task force’s mission was to fly escort for the Tomahawk missiles which would be launched from four SSGNs. 

 

One of the lessons the Navy had learned was that overwhelming force was needed to penetrate modern defenses.  Thus, the Navy would use 600 Tomahawks in this attack.

 

The other lesson the Navy had learned was that Tomahawks were obsolete and non-survivable on the modern battlefield.  The carrier task force’s mission was to provide fighter escort for the cruise missiles during their long flight to the target.  The carrier’s fighters would engage the Chinese interceptors and attempt to keep them from engaging the missiles.

 

As the task force reached its launch point, the group’s 160 F-18 and F-35 aircraft began a leisurely launch process.  Just as the Chinese would cycle aircraft to attack the cruise missile stream, as they had done before, so too would the carriers cycle escort aircraft to meet them.  The idea was to maintain a constant rotation of new aircraft timed to arrive at the ever moving engagement point so that fresh, fully armed aircraft would be continually arriving to engage the fresh, fully armed Chinese interceptors. 

 

As the task force continued its leisurely launch cycle of several aircraft every few minutes, the ships continued on a course which followed the path of the missile stream.  This shortened the travel time for the aircraft, facilitated aircraft recovery, and allowed the task force’s E-2 Hawkeyes to maintain some degree of awareness of the moving battle.

 

As the Chinese fighters arrived and met the defending Hornets and F-35s some 30 miles in front of the leading edge of the trailing missile stream, both sides began to launch missiles at beyond visual range.  The handful of stealth fighters on both sides were immune to target locks at that range but the Hornets and Chinese Flanker/MiG copies were not.  Missiles crisscrossed the sky as fighters launched and then began their own evasive maneuvering.  The initial exchange brought relatively little result as nimble fighters maneuvered violently and dumped chaff.  A handful of fighters on both sides were downed but the majority pressed on and the fighters merged to visual range dogfighting.

 

It was then that the US Navy learned another lesson.  The pre-war concept of F-35s loitering outside of the immediate battle and leisurely targeting enemy aircraft was quickly found to be unworkable.  The F-35s were unable to distinguish friend from foe in the intertwined aerial mess and the F-35s that tried to launch into the tangle actually hit a few friendly aircraft as the AMRAAMs were immediately sidetracked by the chaff, flares, and multitude of targets that filled the sky and locked onto any signature that appeared.  The F-35s had no choice but to join the giant dogfight.  Unfortunately, eyeball dogfighting was not what the F-35 was designed to do and it proved to be a mediocre performer – able to hold its own but nothing more.

 

The combat slightly favored the Chinese with the F-18 being slightly outperformed by the Flanker/MiGs.  While the F-18/35s failed to sweep the skies, they were able to force the Chinese fighters to honor the threat and use up their air-to-air missiles which kept them from attacking the cruise missiles.

 

As the initial wave of aircraft emptied their loads of air-to-air missiles and began to retire, the next group of escort fighters showed up and the process repeated itself.  For the next hour, the cycle continued.  Occasional individual Chinese fighters broke through and attacked the cruise missiles but the attrition was minimal.

 

When the missile stream approached the Hainan SAM defenses, the Chinese fighters broke off to clear the way for the SAMs.  At the same time, the final, larger wave of escort fighters appeared.  In addition to fighters, this wave also included EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft and Hornets loaded for radar suppression.  Their job was to blind the SAM radars long enough for the cruise missiles to penetrate the layered SAM defense and strike home. 

 

Being at the extreme of their range, the escort aircraft could not linger.  The Navy had failed to develop the extreme long range fighter that this war demanded.  This degraded the radar suppression effort with the result that the SAMs were more successful than they should have been but still far less successful than in the first SSN missile attack.  Of the 600 attacking missiles, a bit over 500 survived to strike their targets.  The targets were not runways, which could be quickly repaired, but, instead, were fuel storage, hangars, maintenance facilities, weapons storage, command facilities, etc.  These were the elements vital to a functioning air base and their destruction could not be quickly repaired and replaced.  Similarly, the naval facilities were also targeted with dry docks, piers, submarine tunnel entrances, etc. being heavily targeted.  By the time the strike was over, Hainan had ceased to exist as a viable air and naval base and would remain non-functional for many months to come.  The road to the South China Sea had been opened for the operations to come.

 

 

 

Lessons and Considerations From the Story:

 

Real war operations will involve quantities of ships, aircraft, and missiles that we, today, cannot imagine and have not been seen since WWII.  That being the case, why are we training in ones and twos instead of tens and hundreds?

 

The primary purpose of the carrier should be to escort Tomahawk shooters, missiles, and Air Force bombers as well as provide local air superiority.

 

Carriers must operate in groups of four to mass sufficient aircraft.  The steady shrinking of the air wings is a profound mistake as is the loss of WWII and Cold War carrier operating doctrine.  The further reduction in aircraft squadron size from 12 to 10 when the F-35 reaches service will only exacerbate this misguided trend.

 

The Navy desperately needs a very long range air superiority fighter.  Strike aircraft are a distant, secondary need, if even that, and have no role in a modern peer war. 

 

The Navy desperately needs a modern, supersonic, very long range cruise missile.  The new cruise missile should include variants dedicated to penetration aids, anti-radiation, and electronic warfare.

 

 

 

Disclaimer:  As always, this is not a realistic combat simulation.  It is simply a more entertaining way to illustrate the various concepts and how those concepts might link together.

105 comments:

  1. Can't help but feel that the USN today is blind to reality just like the USAF was during the Vietnam war with the result that like the USAF during Vietnam the USN is going to see horrendous losses in it's next major conflict.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "blind to reality"

      You're not wrong but there's more to it than that. The military prior to Vietnam was not totally blind to reality. They recognized warfare was changing but they drew the wrong conclusions and made the wrong assumptions about that change. So, it was less a case of ignoring reality and more a case of making a lot of wrong conclusions.

      That's a bit of a semantics debate, I know, but there is a subtle difference. The Navy today, for example, IS blind to the reality of a looming war with China. They're just ignoring the reality. They truly are blind to reality. The Marines, in contrast, are well aware of reality at the highest strategic level - they acknowledge war with China - but are drawing all the wrong conclusions about how to wage that war because they're ignoring reality at the operational and tactical level.

      Again, not disagreeing with you, just fleshing out the explanation a bit!

      Delete
  2. Good story. i like these types of posts.
    However, if the US fighters were able to push back the Chinese fighters as the missiles advanced, why would the last wave have had to fly at the extreme of their range if the previous waves of fighters hadn't been?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "if the US fighters were able to push back the Chinese fighters as the missiles advanced, why would the last wave have had to fly at the extreme of their range if the previous waves of fighters hadn't been?"

      ??? I'm missing the thrust of your question. The carriers launch from what is, essentially, a fixed position in terms of relative speed of advance of missiles and aircraft compared to the carrier group. Thus, every aircraft launched has to fly further and further as the missiles advance towards their target. So, the last aircraft launched have the farthest to fly. Am I missing what you're asking?

      Delete
  3. “Real war operations will involve quantities of ships, aircraft, and missiles that we, today, cannot imagine and have not been seen since WWII. That being the case, why are we training in ones and twos instead of tens and hundreds?”

    Maybe because we have doubts about our ability to get tens and hundreds underway, or to operate them safely without running them into each other? I think that suggests a significant need for training on a scale that we haven’t seen since the Fleet Problems between the World Wars.

    Or maybe because with the runaway costs of the gold-plated ships that we insist on building, we can’t afford enough of them to be able to operate in those numbers? We need a high-low approach to spread the cost over more platforms. As the Russians say, quantity has a quality of its own.

    “The primary purpose of the carrier should be to escort Tomahawk shooters, missiles, and Air Force bombers as well as provide local air superiority.”

    We need more shooters, and the shooters need to be shooting something better than Tomahawks.

    It seems to me that in a potential conventional peer war, our most valuable naval assets will very likely be SSGNs armed with that something better. They could almost certainly get in closer to China (or Russia, or for that matter, Iran) than surface units. So we have only 4, they’re getting really old, and other than some Virginia VPMs, the Navy doesn’t appear in any hurry to replace them. My proposed fleet has 20 SSGNs (based on Ohios rather than Columbias--we already have them, they seem to work really well and be really quiet, and they would be lots cheaper) and 30 VPMs. That gives us 4,280 sub-launched guided missile slots (20x154 + 30x40). Half for Russia and half for China is probably on the order of what we need.

    Add to that my idea of 8 battleships based on the 1980s battlecarrier concept, with 288 missile slots (battlecarrier had 320)--32 larger for some combination of SRBM, IRBM, and something like the Russian Shipwreck anti-ship missiles and 256 Mk41s for a combination of NSM, VL-ASROC, Standard, and ESSM quad-packs. I also have 20 cruisers with 192 Mk41s (HI), 40 AAW destroyers with 128 Mk41s (HI), 60 GP escorts with 64 Mk41s (LO), and 80 ASW frigates with 32 Mk41s (LO). That gives the surface fleet 256 SRBM/IRBM/Shipwreck slots and 17,408 Mk41s, spread among NSM, Standard, VL-ASROC, and ESSM quad-packs. Half for Russia, half for China, should be enough for a reasonable attack on either. People have argued against so many missile slots, but I think that many are needed. Now we need to get missiles for them.

    Send SSGNs into the SCS first, to wreak as much damage/havoc as they can, then surface units under long range air protection from carriers stationed outside the A2/AD envelope (and perhaps some long range air strike if China succeeds in putting any assets on the first island chain), and finally carrier based air strike once we have degraded the A2/AD system enough to bring the carriers inside it. If they are shooting something better than Tomahawks with a reasonable chance to get through A2/AD, then we could mount an effective operation.

    (continued)

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. (continuation)

      “Carriers must operate in groups of four to mass sufficient aircraft.”

      Agree. For a 2-1/2 war scenario, we probably need 6 such groups (2 for China, 2 for Europe/Russia, 1 for the rogue/terror threat, and 1 home in reserve/surge) and from a cost standpoint, they simply cannot be 24 Fords (even if we ever make them work). An updated Nimitz and a conventional carrier (like Kitty Hawks) can probably be had for about the cost of one Ford, and they work, so would be a far better bargain. Since it’s going to take those Kittys a while to get designed and built, and since the LHAs/LHDs are really of little use to get anything more than light infantry ashore in an assault, I would convert the LHAs/LHDs to interim Lightning Carriers (their service lives probably expire at about the times that the Kittys would come in) and redesign an amphibious fleet of cheaper, smaller, and more expendable ships.

      Going fairly conservatively, I would figure 80 aircraft for a Nimitz (48 VF/VA, 12 S-3 or replacement [6 ASW/patrol, 5 tanker, 1 COD], 6 AEW, 6 EW, 7 helo, 1 V-22), 60 for a Kitty (36 VF/VA, 10 S-3 [5/4/1], 4 AEW, 4 EW, 5 helo, 1 V-22), and 40 for a Lightning Carrier (24 VF/VA, 16 helo/V-22). A 2 Nimitz-2 Lightning CTF would have 240 (144 VF/VA), a 2 Nimitz-1 Kitty-1 Lightning CTF would have 260 (156 VF/VA), and a 2 Nimitz-2 Kitty CTF would have 280 (168 VF/VA), with possibilities for additional loading in all cases (or adjusting the mix to provide more VF/VA as the mission dictated).

      “The Navy desperately needs a very long range air superiority fighter. Strike aircraft are a distant, secondary need, if even that, and have no role in a modern peer war.”

      And the F-35 isn’t either one. Conceptually, the best use I can think of for the F-35C would be to turn the space for the F-35B lift fan into a space for an NFO, and convert the bomb bay to additional fuel (to give it longer legs) and electronics, and make it the successor to the EF-18. Somebody with more detailed knowledge than I have would have to figure out if it would work or not, but conceptually that seems to be the best use. As for the fighter/strike side, those need to be two different airplanes. You can have each with a secondary function as the other, but that needs to be decidedly secondary both ways. I do think we need both, but with the fighter as the definite first priority, and in larger numbers.

      “The Navy desperately needs a modern, supersonic, very long range cruise missile. The new cruise missile should include variants dedicated to penetration aids, anti-radiation, and electronic warfare.”

      And have needed one for a long time. I have a story from the early 70s that I wish I knew the classification status of it, because it truly indicates how little the Navy has cared about cruise missiles in seemingly forever. All I can say is that when I was on an LST steaming around the eastern Med with nothing more than two twin 3”/70s, surrounded by Russians bristling with missile launchers during the Yom Kippur war, I did a lot of wishing that the Navy had made a different decision.

      Obviously, we would need strategies, war plans, and CONOPS to drive final decisions, and we would need to PRACTICE those war plans, but I think this is how things could work.

      Delete
    2. "For a 2-1/2 war scenario, we probably need 6 such groups (2 for China, 2 for Europe/Russia, …"

      Setting aside the wisdom of planning for a 2-1/2 war capability, the odds of such actually happening are vanishingly small - as close to non-existent as you can get. Thus, carriers (or any other forces, for that matter) are NOT going to be uniformly distributed around the world. Instead, they'll be concentrated on the main war effort.

      If we were to have a war with China and Russia decided to step in, the logical strategic response would be to leave Russia to Europe to handle while we concentrate almost ALL our resources on China. As a historical precedent, the US Navy concentrated most of its forces and almost all its carriers in the Pacific during WWII rather than even distribute them against Germany, Japan, and Italy.

      You concentrate forces where they can do the most good. For carriers, that isn't Russia. A war with Russia would not be a carrier war. A war with China most assuredly would. You might want to reconsider your equitable carrier distribution philosophy and factor in a good deal more military strategic allocation. That might, in turn, impact your proposed fleet structure.

      Delete
    3. "make it the successor to the EF-18."

      I have no conceptual problem with that, however, the one main drawback of the F-35B is that it has substantially shorter range due to the reduced fuel capacity, as I understand it. The former Ford program director stated this explicitly in his video presentation. Thus, swapping the 'B' lift mechanism for a second seat would retain the limited range and probably render it unable to accompany long range strikes which is the whole purpose of a combat EW aircraft. Just something you might want to investigate before you propose the EW variant.

      Delete
    4. "Thus, swapping the 'B' lift mechanism for a second seat would retain the limited range and probably render it unable to accompany long range strikes which is the whole purpose of a combat EW aircraft."

      The concept is to fill the bomb bay with additional fuel and electronics. It's a concept, and somebody with more knowledge of the aircraft would have to determine wheter that gets you long enough legs.

      Delete
    5. "Setting aside the wisdom of planning for a 2-1/2 war capability, the odds of such actually happening are vanishingly small"

      And being able to fight and win that is the best way to make sure that small goes to zero.

      Sure, we would redeploy as needed. But having enough to redeploy is part of the plan.

      Delete
    6. ComNavOps,

      Your proposed fleet would get us to the same 6 CTFs with 3 CVNs left over. So although we get there different ways, we end up in pretty much the same place.

      Delete
    7. "we end up in pretty much the same place."

      Not even a little bit! Completely different uses.

      Delete
    8. "Not even a little bit! Completely different uses."

      Actually, I think quite a lot. But no point in semantic arguments. We end up with about the same number of carriers. We end up with air wings that are predominantly long range air superiority fighters/interceptors. I'm not sure how that is completely different.

      Delete
    9. "Conceptually, the best use I can think of for the F-35C would be to turn the space for the F-35B lift fan into a space for an NFO, and convert the bomb bay to additional fuel (to give it longer legs) and electronics, and make it the successor to the EF-18."

      Shouldn't the weapons bay retain space for antiradiation missiles, so this hypothetical EF-35 can destroy enemy radar stations?

      Delete
    10. "2-1/2 war capability"

      Here's something to give some serious thought to … your 2-1/2 war requirement is not even possible! I don't mean our ability to wage 2-1/2 wars (we can't!) but the ability of the world to conduct 2-1/2 wars. Consider …

      There are only 4 state actors that constitute a credible threat of war:

      1. China - a valid, full war

      2. Russia - a 1/2 war that can be handled by Europe with no involvement from the US whatsoever, other than logistics to supply weapons when Europe's weapons run out in a week.

      3. NKorea - NK talks big and tries to look formidable on paper but they have no depth, no economy, no serious training, no quality, and no commitment from the rand and file. This would be a 1/4 war, at most. Messy but not a serious war. In fact, by now, SK should be able to handle it by themselves.

      4. Iran - not a war, just a live fire exercise.

      So, if we tally up the 'wars' we find the maximum requirement is China 1 + Russia 1/2 + Korea 1/4 + Iran 0 = 1-3/4 wars.

      Thus, the maximum warfighting requirement is 1-3/4 wars not 2-1/2. That should impact your force structure.

      Delete
    11. "2. Russia - a 1/2 war that can be handled by Europe with no involvement from the US whatsoever, other than logistics to supply weapons when Europe's weapons run out in a week."

      As demonstrated via American outrage over the Nord Stream pipelines between Germany and Russia, parts of Europe will more like declare neutrality in a Russo-American war, so they can continue trading with both sides.

      Russia learned from the Soviet Union's mistakes during the Cold War; they know saying, "If you're not with us, then you're against us," risks driving potential allies to the other side. Sadly, America has not.

      Delete
    12. China - agree that's 1.

      Russia - probably not a full 1, at least not for Navy, and I rankly think we would do well to triangulate Russia against China diplomatically, but no harm in being over-prepared, or having resources that could be re-allocated to China.

      NK - If we are ready for China, we can handle NK.

      Iran - that's my half war.

      2-1/2 > 1-3/4, but it is nice to have some excess in reserve.

      My best case is the biggest, baddest military in the world--stronger than at least the next two combined--but never have to use it because nobody dares pick on us and we don't go around picking on them.

      Delete
    13. "no harm in being over-prepared,"

      Yes, there is. If there were truly no harm in being overprepared we'd have a thousand carriers, ten thousand cruisers, and so on. Of course there's harm! There's economic harm. There's manpower harm. There's strategic harm. And so on. You don't want to underestimate an enemy but neither do you want to overestimate, either. That leads to runaway costs and inappropriate allocation of resources.

      Delete
    14. "2. Russia - a 1/2 war that can be handled by Europe with no involvement from the US whatsoever, other than logistics to supply weapons when Europe's weapons run out in a week."

      Who in Europe can stop Russia?

      Germany's military readiness is a joke. They're putting up single digits on military readiness.

      The UK is looking at retiring more armor units and downsizing what's left of their Military.

      The only serious European counterweight is France, and I'm not convinced they'd care enough about eastern europe to even mobilize...

      Due to that, and NATO obligations, direct US involvement would be required. A situation China likes...

      Delete
    15. "Yes, there is. If there were truly no harm in being overprepared we'd have a thousand carriers, ten thousand cruisers, and so on. Of course there's harm! There's economic harm. There's manpower harm. There's strategic harm. And so on. You don't want to underestimate an enemy but neither do you want to overestimate, either. That leads to runaway costs and inappropriate allocation of resources."

      Well, I'm clearly not talking about anything even remotely in that range and we both know it. I would just rather miss over than under on being prepared. And instead of Fords and Zumwalts and LCSs and F-35s and $3.8B LHAs/LHDs and $5B Virginia replacements, we can afford to be over-prepared by doing it right.

      Delete
    16. "Who in Europe can stop Russia?"

      Not who, but all. I said Europe, not one specific country. The combined militaries of UK, France, Spain, Poland, etc. more than overmatch Russia. Of course, if Europe opts not to cooperate then they deserve their fate. The point is that the US is not needed. We've become a crutch for a patient that is fully healed but wants us to keep taking care of it.

      Go through the lists of ships, aircraft, artillery, armored divisions, infantry, etc. and Europe significantly overmatches Russia. The US needs to make it clear to Europe that they are on their own so that they begin addressing their many issues.

      Delete
    17. Do we really have any idea what it would cost to build new Ohio's today? Remember, we haven't built one in about 25 years, so the existing production lines (and probably the companies that made some of the equipment) are all gone and would have to be reconstituted. And it is about the same size as the Colombia. Are we sure that new Ohio's wouldn't be nearly as expensive as just building more Colombia's?

      Delete
    18. The Columbias, which only have 16 missile tubes, are set to cost about $9 billion each. And, they're the only game in town.

      Delete
    19. "Ohios, Columbias"

      Post coming.

      Delete
    20. "Who in Europe can stop Russia?"

      Apparently, Ukraine can. A country with a population of 35 million has stopped a country with a population of 150 million.

      I see no reason why numerous other countries couldn't do the same and no reason why a united Europe couldn't easily defeat Russia.

      Delete
  4. ComNavOps I think that you need to be challenged on this "very long range air superiority fighter" that you have been talking about for a while, not that I disagree with the need but I have reservation about the feasibility of the concept that you hinted at.

    My starting point is your requirement for stealth and your dislike for the way the Super Hornet tried to achieve efficiency and affordability simultaneously. I am not sure that level of stealth you seem to be thinking of is compatible with your range requirement. The number I have for fuel fraction for the F22 is 28% (International Air Power Review Vol. 5), the nearest heavy fighter in terms of design date and size is the Mirage 4000, it had a fuel fraction of 38% on a similar mission (Prototypes expérimentaux Dassault 1960-1980, sorry it's in French), the payload is very similar in both cases (2 Super 530, 6 Magic 2 which in weight is very similar to 6 AMRAAMs and 2 Sidewinders). The Dassault aircraft number are only design so they are probably optimistic but Dassault has a very good record of keeping its word, unlike Lockheed Martin since the departure of Kelly Johnson and his successor. This fuel fraction number is backed up by the other information that the F22 is going back to the tanker at a similar interval as an F15 or a Rafale, i.e. 60 to 90 minutes.

    The reason for this isn't that Lockheed engineers are not good enough but because when you put everything inside, especially weapons then you have less space for fuel, and this has consequences.

    What can be done about it ? You can always increase the size of the fighter and therefore its weight and its price but this has consequences :
    - You will need more power, this will generate more heat and make your aircraft more detectable, the temperature of the exhaust isn't going to be higher but the volume of hot gases will be. FYI this is about image processing, the algorithms behind this rely on two things : thresholding, i.e. pixel values, this won't change but the number of pixels above the threshold will be bigger, this will help detection considerably.
    - Your aircraft will be bigger and the good old mk1 eyeball likes this.
    - You will end up at some point having to increase your fuel load just to carry more fuel, this has limits.

    Maybe something can be done with zip fuels. These were well studied in the 1950s for strategic bombers but as far as I am aware this got nowhere (this is what Wikipedia says, I don't have more than that, sorry).

    Then there is the more promising approaches :
    - Variable cycle engines. GE has been working on this since the YF120 and seem to be moving forward. This may lead to serious improvements. It would be great to have an engine that has similar specific consumption as a Gulstream G700 engine in cruise mode and pushes as strongly as a low bypass turbofan at high altitude in combat mode (the M53 being a good example). This might give a range value close to what Gulfstream G500 gives, provided the aerodynamics are good enough, i.e. that you can achieve something close a bizzjet while still having the stealth and speed capabilities. NB: I use the bizzjet comparison because when you look at it from a weight/size point of view it fits, the human payload of a bizzjet is very close in value to the missile + gun ammo + human payload of a large fighter jet.
    - Smaller AAMs. But considering that you advocate for carrying more of them I don't think that the gains are going to be large.

    So you have to rely on tankers. But are aircraft like the KC46 or the A330 MRTT capable of being sent in the South China sea. I doubt it for the following reasons : size, 2 engines only ...etc. Maybe the idea of a stealthy tanker UAV is a good one but how do you control it ? How do you get to the RdV without detection ?

    I reckon I am quite pessimistic on the feasibility, to that I will add the history of stealth aircraft development, by that I mean that only the F117 achieved its original aims in terms of costs and numbers built.



    D614-D623

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hey, I encourage contrary views as long as they're based on data and logic. It makes the blog more interesting and more useful. Your comment was nicely written although you didn't really dispute anything I've said. You cited some current examples of aircraft that don't meet the desired range but you didn't really offer any reason why an optimized design couldn't achieve the range. I also very much like that you offered some potential solutions to what you see as the difficult. That's excellent! Too many people offer criticisms with no solutions. There's value in that but there's far more value when a solution is offered, too!

      Now, rather than just considering existing aircraft that don't meet the criteria, let's consider what historical aircraft came the closest to meeting the criteria and work from there.

      For example, the A-6 Intruder had a combat radius of 878 nm WITH MAX PAYLOAD, according to Wiki. That max payload is 18,000 lb again according to Wiki. So, with modern, more fuel efficient engines and a redesign of the aircraft 'shell' to incorporate some stealth and reduce drag, we'd have a very long range fighter. Not enough range, yet, you say? Well, the A-6 was 8 ft shorter than the F-22/F-18 so if we increased the fighter derivative of the A-6 by 8 ft and allocated a significant portion of that to fuel, we'd have a substantial increase in range. So, with the starting point of 878 nm we'd jump to, say, 978 with modern engines and a shell redesign. Adding 8 ft of mostly fuel would add another, say, 200 nm for a total of 1178 nm combat radius.

      Is this possible? I don't know because I'm not an aeronautical engineer but it certainly seems plausible, doesn't it?

      As I continually say, we've forgotten what we were once capable of and have come to believe that today's very mediocre aircraft designs are good … they're not! We had better designs decades ago.

      Don't hesitate to offer a contrary view. We'll discuss it and either you'll either be even more confident in your opinion or you'll modify your view. The same holds true for me. That's good either way.

      Delete
    2. Well I wanted to offer suggestions but there is a length limit on posts and I was close to overstepping it.

      Coming back to your answer I'm not sure about the Intruder example : it wasn't supersonic, the warload was carried externally and I don't know what the load factor is, probably lower than for a fighter aircraft. A better example might be the F111 (or the Mirage G8) but those things were not good at turning and, which disqualifies them.

      My main objection to your long range air superiority concept is the mix of stealth and range, together with the affordability issue. It has never been done (the F22 was a failure on range as I showed and on cost as everybody knows). I highlighted some avenues of improvements that might make it possible but I am worried that the Navy (or the Air Force for that matter) are going to fall in their usual trap of gold plating and end up with another F35. I agree with you on the issue that aircraft manufacturers have forgotten that they used to do it, can this be changed in the 2020s context ? Maybe ...

      So in my view you need to lower the requirements a little, either by reducing the level of stealth you want or reducing the range requirements.

      Reducing the level of stealth gets you to an F35, which is still costing a fortune in maintenance. So you need to reduce it more or hope for a miracle, we do not know what is going on in Groom Lake or elsewhere so let's assume for now that it is the only way.

      Reducing the range might allow for an F22 type fighter with high levels of stealth and speed but with a lower range. That is manageable with stealthy UAV tankers but the objections I mentioned above are still valid, and the cost could be an issue, together with the space they take on a carrier. So I am dubious here as well, although I accept the fact that I might be wrong.

      The other solution I see is unconventional for people used to the American way of doing things. It consists in looking at some strategic points and their solution : if the objective is to stop China from owning the South China Sea and partly invading its neigbours then we are into a purely defensive war. This could be addressed with conops like the Bas90 concept from Sweden. i.e.use motorways and roads as runways, make short sorties, never fly back to where you took off from, have easy to maintain aircraft (FYI the Gripen can be serviced by a team of 6 people, 5 of which being conscripts, the biggest tool is something called the fishing rod which is used to change the engine). You can't have high level of stealth coatings and their problems in this situation but you can have networks at least until you start taxiing (with cables), and you can use EW to compensate for your lack of stealth.

      The first weak point in my eyes is the fact that to keep up with the EW improvements the other side is going to make (they have brains too) you need to have the ability to analyse what they are doing faster than they can improve it. This relies on a possibly large number of software specialists that you need to feed with data and protect from attack. So we are running into an issue you raised in your "what if" post lately, i.e. the fog of war (in the EW field), I hope this could be solved with satellite laser links otherwise you need to keep them close to the front line.

      The second weak point is logistics, how do you supply those fighters in weapons and fuel ? The only solution I see is to keep it local, have the stores well protected in country (Taiwan, Korea, Philippines) so that they can be moved relatively safely.

      I know all this is very unAmerican and it relies on having local allies, which I know you don't like but it may help getting a large number of aircraft in play, which the concept of long range stealth fighter may have trouble achieving

      D614-D623

      Delete
    3. "I'm not sure about the Intruder example"

      I'm not suggesting an exact duplicate of the A-6 but with Sidewinders. I'm suggesting that if we could package almost 900 nm of combat radius into an A-6 size aircraft back in the 1960's, we ought to be able to construct at least as good a fighter today and with the various modifications I mentioned, we ought to be able to significantly improve on that range performance. An aeronautical engineer can deal with all the specific design details. The point is that the concept seems quite plausible, bordering on guaranteed. Just the details need to be worked out by designers.

      You'll also recall that the A-12 Avenger was intended to be a thousand mile combat radius. It never came to be but, clearly, some design company thought they knew how to do it.

      Also, the current examples you're citing that don't meet the spec are not examples of trying and failing to meet the range spec … the range was never a goal of those designs so why would they meet the spec? You're citing them as examples of the inability to meet a spec that they never tried to meet!

      "My main objection to your long range air superiority concept is the mix of stealth and range"

      Why do you think stealth and range are linked? Stealth is just the shaping of the shell (he said in a gross oversimplification!) and nothing about stealth shaping negatively impacts range. The F-35 has less stealth than the F-22 AND less range so decreasing stealth didn't help with range. How are they linked?

      Delete
    4. I didn't explain myself correctly in the case of the F35. What you said seems right, i.e. that it has less stealth and probably less range than the F22, what I meant in this example was that lowering the stealth spec didn't reduce the maintenance costs. Lockheed Martin talked quite a lot about affordable stealth in the design phase but as far as I know the European air forces who bought it and are going through the IOC are worried that the maintenance workload and costs are going to overwhelm them.

      To answer your other point about stealth and range not being linked I beg to disagree : if you put your weapons inside you cannot use the space for fuel and therefore your fuel fraction will be reduced. Maybe you can use external drop tanks but these are not supposed to be stealthy. If you can accept a lack of stealth during the approach flight that may be okay but can you afford it above the South China sea ?

      D614-D623

      Delete
    5. "I didn't explain myself correctly in the case of the F35. What you said seems right, i.e. that it has less stealth and probably less range than the F22..."

      IIRC, the F-35 engine is designed for greater efficiency at lower speeds and altitudes, meaning the F-35 has a longer range than the F-22 if the former is flying "low and slow," the latter "high and fast." Of course, this will minimize the F-35's range if it tries to fly "high and fast," in consequence.

      Delete
    6. "weapons inside"

      Ah, you're referring to internal carriage. That's fair. One of the paradigms we've suffering from in aircraft design is the internal/external weapons carry. We think it needs to be one or the other. I see no problem with a combination as long as we develop accompanying tactics. For example, there's nothing wrong with carrying several very long range A2A weapons externally IF WE FIRE THEM BEFORE CLOSING TO MEDIUM/CLOSE RANGE. The Air Force has half proposed this concept with their arsenal bomber.

      That aside, we're already seeing aircraft designs that incorporate a moderate number of internal A2A weapons. The Chinese J-20, for example can carry 6x A2A weapons internally (plus 4x external hard points that can carry several weapons depending on type). The Su-57 is similarly configured. The F-22 carriers 6x AMRAAM plus 2x Sidewinder internally. Manufacturers are supposedly working on ways to fit more weapons in the internal bays by better packaging. The point is that no one has yet made maximum internal carry a design requirement so we don't know what's possible other than to say it's likely more than we can do now.

      Also, bear in mind the need for stealth: it's only during the period when detection is possible. For example, on a thousand mile (yes, we developed a thousand mile combat radius fighter, let's pretend!) transit to the combat zone, how much of that trip requires stealth? Only the final hundred miles or so! The rest of the transit, we can easily carry fuel drop tanks, if we wish, and drop them when we approach the operating area. We get so focused in on specific details that we often fail to see the overall picture about how a weapon/platform would actually be used.

      Delete
    7. I think one thing that comes out of this is just how good an airplane the A-6 was. It wasn't the most graceful or beautiful--we used to say it looked like a pregnant guppy--bit it was a heck of a workhorse.

      Delete
    8. I only have wiki as a source...but the F22 appears to have similar range to the F14 and is of comparable physical size.

      It looks to me to have stealth, speed, dogfighting ability, and the necessary radar capabilities.

      It's expensive as heck, but air superiority fighters are going to be expensive.

      I'm just not understanding the dismissive view of the F22 for naval adaptation.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
  5. ComNavOps, I like your story but I think that you left off the ending - where the 4 carrier task force (roughly 1/2 of the USN) is chewed up by a mass of long range ASM missiles as their on-board SAMs are insufficient to protect them and all of the USN fighters are protecting the Tomahawks and not shooting down the Chinese recon aircraft spotting for the missiles. So we will lose the task force and one half of our carriers in the hope that (1) 500 1,000 lb bombs (Tomahawk warheads) can destroy all the above-ground military capability (not any sub pens) of Hainan island and (2) this exchange will have some meaningful contribution to the war.

    Wouldn't this strike be comparable to the USN massing the Pacific Fleet in early 1942 to attack the Japanese Truk island navy base? We lose the fleet to knock out an important, but not critical, navy (but not submarine) base?

    ReplyDelete
  6. This makes me wonder what parameters the chinese use when doing their war sim studies. How aggressive do they make the US, how competent do they asses the Us to be etc. You'd think they would want to have a fairly big margin of safety, to win a war, so they have to assume a fairly proficient US military, and fairly aggressive, and that's what they have to comfortably beat to warrant getting into a war.

    ReplyDelete
  7. In this scenario, what if a few dozen stealthy unmanned aircraft armed with jammers, antiradiation missiles, and other electronic weapons, proceeded the launch of the cruise missiles? Some could be armed with hard weapons to attack aircraft on the ground or make runways inoperable for a short time.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I've got a handful of paragraphs to work with. I can't possibly include every aspect of a real operation. Of course there would be other, supporting measures taken. I'm illustrating a concept, not an actual battle simulation.

      As noted in the disclaimer that no one ever reads:

      "Disclaimer: As always, this is not a realistic combat simulation. It is simply a more entertaining way to illustrate the various concepts and how those concepts might link together."

      Delete
    2. I read the disclaimer and only offered a possible measure to improve the effectiveness of such a strike.

      At the same time, operating 7 out of 10 Virginia Block Vs (the number planned anyway) in a single operation would be quite a feat for the Navy. Which underscores the Navy's need for more Tomahawk firing platforms.

      In this scenario, the 7 subs would have to return have to return to Pearl or elsewhere to be reloaded and refitted before they could deployed again. All of which could take a month or more before they are available.

      Delete
    3. "In this scenario, the 7 subs would have to return have to return to Pearl or elsewhere to be reloaded and refitted before they could deployed again. All of which could take a month or more before they are available."

      Ships always have to return to base between missions. That reality aside, the reload time 'loss' of subs is eminently worth it if they can knock out a major enemy base. After all, we have sixty some subs (ignoring the looming shortfall that will drop us to around forty!) so who cares if several are busy reloading for a few weeks? Did you think they would put to sea at the start of a war and stay there for years on end?

      Alternatively, think operationally! We could send several subs to carry out a missile attack and then, with no return to base, have them switch to their main mission and anti-surface and anti-submarine. Tremendous efficiency!

      Delete
    4. A comment was deleted for being unproductive and argumentative. See the Comment Policy page.

      Delete
  8. "1.5 hour flight time of the missiles."

    Good case for a supersonic missile of Mach 2 or more. The Chinese will have less than half that time to intercept.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Bingo! One of the key lessons from such a scenario.

      Delete
  9. While I appreciate it's not the point of the scenario, it is likely that 1 or more carriers could be lost in such an action which means that it's only repeatable a couple of times. The loss of Hainan would be inconvenient but it is not a war winner nor would it force China to a peace table. So - what's the big picture?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "likely that 1 or more carriers could be lost in such an action"

      Actually, no. While possible (anything is possible), launching from hundreds of miles away from any actual danger greatly reduces the threat to the carriers to very low levels. Chinese subs are not, currently or for the foreseeable future, open ocean going subs and constitute little threat.

      "The loss of Hainan would be inconvenient but it is not a war winner ... So - what's the big picture?"

      Did Guadalcanal win the war? No, not all by itself but it opened the path to eventual victory. Similarly, Hainan is the main Chinese southern base and its loss opens the way to the South China Sea for subsequent operations. You'll recall this passage from the post:

      "Hainan had been a priority target both to relieve pressure on the Taiwan operations and to open up the southern approach to China that Hainan guarded."

      No one battle wins a war but with the proper follow up operations to take advantage of the one battle, wars are won.

      Your question reflects the constant tendency so many of us have to view everything in isolation; one A-10 versus one S-400 SAM system, one ship versus one sub, one battle versus total victory. We need to think strategically and operationally. We fight joint, not one on one. We conduct multiple, strategically linked operations not one isolated battle.

      Delete
    2. Actually my point was exactly the opposite. Perhaps it's for a different post another time but my overall question is 'What does winning look like?'. We don't have the troops (without a chunk of allies) to take and hold significant Chinese territory; we won't use nukes first so we can't kill enough troops to win that way - so that either leaves a long war of attrition to starve them of resources, regime change or some sort of destruction of civilian infrastructure to damage morale. How do we tailor our Navy to achieve this? Do carriers in the SCS fit in this mix even?

      Delete
    3. 'What does winning look like?"

      I've posted on this. See, China War

      Delete
  10. "With about 800 miles to work with, the Chinese were able to cycle a constant stream of fighters against the Tomahawks for the duration of the 1.5 hour flight time of the missiles."


    That assumes the Chinese simultaneously detected the launch of the cruise missiles and were immediately able to scramble and vector fighters to the inbound Tomahawks. How likely is that?

    At the same time, I would think there would be a few major Chinese warships protecting the approaches to Hainan that would be in a better position to blunt such an attack.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "That assumes the Chinese simultaneously detected the launch of the cruise missiles and were immediately able to scramble and vector fighters to the inbound Tomahawks. How likely is that?"

      You say you read the disclaimer so I can only assume you're just looking to argue minor points for the sake of arguing. Apparently, you missed the following passage:

      " The missiles had been detected at almost their firing points – Navy communications and centralized computer planning were nowhere near as secure as believed - and the Chinese had immediately begun cycling fighter aircraft"

      By all public accounts, the Chinese have thoroughly penetrated our networks today so why would we think that they won't be aware of our plans in a war? Our communications diarrhea along almost assures that any operational plan will be well known by the enemy ahead of time. Our vast AI-assisted, networked, centralized command and control systems all but assure enemy intel penetration.

      "At the same time, I would think there would be a few major Chinese warships protecting the approaches to Hainan that would be in a better position to blunt such an attack."

      Good grief, yet again. You say you read the disclaimer. I have a just a handful of paragraphs to work with. I can't present a complete battle simulation with every conceivable alternative. I'm illustrating some concepts, nothing more.

      These comments are unproductive. Discuss the concepts or cease commenting.

      Delete
    2. If the Navy assigned "seven Virginia class submarines . . . to attack Hainan from the south at a standoff range of several hundred miles," how did the Chinese have "about 800 miles to work with" as described later?

      Several hundred miles is a 30 minute flight for a Tomahawk.

      Delete
    3. Tomahawks are subsonic and cruise at around 500 mph. Therefore, A 30 min flight would be around 250 miles. If you're going to be pedantic, at least try to get your basic arithmetic correct.

      Delete
  11. I think that the point of the story was that you were proposing a new mission for carrier-based aircraft - protecting launched cruise missiles on their long run to the target (like P-51s escorting B-24s in WWII) - as opposed to their existing mission - protecting their own launching task forces/bases from missile/air attack (like Hawker Hurricanes defending their own bases and factories in the Battle of Britain). The new mission implies that either (1) ship self-defense SAM capabilities have improved so much that they don't need to have their air groups defend them anymore (I don't think that this has really happened as you have described in many air defense-vs-attacker articles) or (2) it can be more important to defend a single attack on a single objective than it is to protect the launching task force so losing the entire task force is acceptable. I think that you are postulating the latter. The problem the readers are having with this is that would you think that this "new mission" would happen often enough to train for since you are likely to lose your entire task force each time that you perform one of these missions.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "I think that the point of the story was that you were proposing a new mission for carrier-based aircraft"

      Yes.

      "The problem the readers are having with this is … you are likely to lose your entire task force each time that you perform one of these missions."

      No! Unfortunately, you missed two key points:

      1. The carrier launch point is far away from the actual danger zone (emphasizing the need for very long range fighters!) so the risk to the carriers is minimal.

      2. The carriers don't launch their entire air group all at once. They launch in a continual, slow, staggered pattern so that only a portion of the total aircraft are in the air at any given moment. Until it's their turn to launch for escort duty, the remaining aircraft are available for carrier defense. Similarly, returning aircraft are available for defense once they've returned. This also emphasizes the need to return to the 90+ air wings that used to be standard. This would increase the available aircraft by 50% or so.


      From a carrier perspective, this would actually be a fairly low risk mission since the carriers would stand well off from any danger.

      "The problem the readers are having with this"

      The problem readers have with any type of new proposal is paradigms. They're used to something and, human nature being what it is, have a hard time even contemplating something different.

      Delete
    2. I would see this as a proposal to adapt the 'strike' mission of carriers to current realities. If Tomahawks are a preferable strike tool to aircraft (there's a whole separate post on that), carriers still have a role creating the air superiority needed for the strike to be successful. That doesn't preclude self-defense any more than in past carrier missions.

      Said differently: Same carrier mission as in the past, just replace "A-6" with "Tomahawk" and don't worry when the strike package doesn't return.

      Delete
    3. "I would see this as a proposal to adapt the 'strike' mission of carriers to current realities."

      Congratulations on being one of the few to grasp the main concept!

      "That doesn't preclude self-defense any more than in past carrier missions."

      Very well said!

      "Said differently: Same carrier mission as in the past, just replace "A-6" with "Tomahawk" and don't worry when the strike package doesn't return."

      Succinctly and adroitly put!

      Delete
  12. So, the basic lesson: Tomahawk without escorts are dead meat.

    What if next time (they learn their lesson too) China sends up 2X interceptors to strip our F-18/35 escorts (I mean, what good is our task force full of SAM defense but deplete of its fighters). Also, Hainan is only about 15 miles from the mainland. There is no 'whittling down' of Chinese force like ww2 Guadalcanal, the Mariana turkey shoot, etc. With such proximity to mainland, it's almost 0 to 1 with no in between.

    Also, there is a Chinese saying: you fight your fight, I fight mine. Would they be willing to trade 'Hainan' (which doesn't sink thus repairable) for a 4-carriers task force (like Midway's opposing bombers/escorts went for the ships, not each other).

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "So, the basic lesson: Tomahawk without escorts are dead meat."

      No, that's A lesson but not the main one. The main lesson is that the role of the carrier has changed to escorting the strike assets.

      "What if next time (they learn their lesson too) China sends up 2X interceptors"

      What if they send 4x? Or 10x? Or 100x? Because … they have a limitless supply of aircraft ready at a moment's notice, right?

      There's an American saying, there's no such thing as a dumb question. You just proved that saying wrong.

      Delete
    2. Which one is more valuable? 600 Tomahawk missiles, or 160 fighters of a 4-carriers task force?

      Last I counted (from this Netherland site, www.scramble.nl) there are 80+ airbase within 1000 miles of Hainan, 18 within 2-300 miles, and 8 almost on top of it. And we have 4 floating ones.

      Delete
    3. @Tim, I can't wait to hear about Chinese counter attack, yes, 4 carriers and all the escorts are a big challenge BUT at the same time, isn't this a little like Midway? 4 MASSED carriers at your "front door" might just be a little too much of a juicy target to let go...especially if they just fired 600 CMs at Hainan, China military will have to go after the carriers,IMO.

      Delete
  13. Oh sure, as if the United States can 'man' four aircraft carriers, four airwings and all the escorts and logistics such an enterprise would require. Fuggetaboutit. We couldn't 'man' two and send them out fully mission-capable. Not a chance.

    ReplyDelete
  14. This post illustrates three ideas for a modern peer conflict: that Tomahawks should replace strike aircraft, carriers should focus on air superiority, and carriers need to operate in groups of four to be effective and survivable. I don't know why this is controversial. But the pushback shows how hard it is to change military culture (carriers vs. battleships anyone?)

    I liked the comment above: "Same carrier mission as in the past, just replace 'A-6' with 'Tomahawk' and don't worry when the strike package doesn't return."

    ReplyDelete
  15. Here is an article on an Air Force simulation of war with China.

    https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/04/12/a-us-air-force-war-game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-off-or-win-against-china-in-2030/

    To make a long story short - F-22 is not involved. Why?!?

    There is a lot of other interesting things that are said, but it is curious indeed that the Raptor is not taking part in the sim.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. @Anon. I thought some of the information USAF released was interesting, not all related to USN or CNO scenario but some of it was pertinent, IMO. USAF seems to at least acknowledge that they have a range issue, finally!, something CNO has been talking about for years now.

      Anything below F35 Block 4+ is virtually useless, one has to wonder that if an F35 can't survive, do regular Tomahawks make it? Will even a mass saturation attack of Tomahawks present much of challenge to Chinese, even with escorts they might not make it. So does USN develop a better escort or better CMs?

      I noticed that USAF pretty much assumes that Pearl Harbor/Hickam is gone, anybody else notice that? What does that say about Guam? What does that say about USN capability to replenish,resupply, repairs,etc rapidly, should we factor in no bases left between the combat zone in SCS and San Fransisco or San Diego? That's a long way to go back and forth... forget Japan or other allies, I bet they don't factor in US war games, they all stay pretty much on the side lines. It's Godzilla vs King Kong, nobody in the region will get into the middle of that.

      AS for F22 not being talked about, could be a couple of reasons, too classified, also has a range issue, if F22 is too successful, doesn't put much pressure on Congress to fund NGAD, USAF doesn't want that, it wants to scare Congress into releasing funds, can't put the F22 in too good of a light, also, it's a very low volume high value asset, there's just not enough of them maybe to have a big impact? Probably a whole bunch or reasons F22 is talked much about...

      Delete
    2. The F-22 is constrained by having to operate from landbases. Number of landbases the US has access to in SE Asia right now is 0.

      Delete
    3. @Dead1. Yes, in previous scenarios, RAND think tank one I recall, F22s need quite a lot of tankers to operate out of Guam. Maybe USAF just went away from that scenario, tankers are just dead meat?

      Delete
    4. As you discuss the AF game, keep firmly in mind that the US military has a very poor record of running realistic war games. It is far more likely that the AF ran a skewed game designed to deliver a desired outcome so as to garner more funding or whatever their purpose for the game really was.

      For example, the destruction of Pearl Harbor is impossible in the near to moderate future. China has no ocean going navy, no air force that can reach that far, no SSGNs that are open ocean. In fact, the only weapon that might reach Pearl Harbor is a ballistic missile and, for all you alarmists who quail at the thought of an unidentified ballistic missile being mistaken for a nuke and plunging the world into nuclear destruction, China would have to think long and hard about using a ballistic missile to attack a US state.

      So, solar system size grain of salt with this game.

      Delete
  16. Just playing around with your story, if the Navy

    1) builds more SSGNs as well as Virginia VPMs,
    2) develops long range air superiority fighters/interceptors,
    3) develops long range supersonic/hypersonic cruise missiles, and
    4) builds more and cheaper carriers (mix of CVNs/conventional CVs), with larger air wings per carrier,

    then this story has a chance to have an even happier ending.

    ReplyDelete
  17. " . . . had an immense escort group of 8 Ticonderoga class cruisers, 18 Burke class destroyers, and 6 of the new frigates."

    An escort group of 26 Burkes and Ticos fields probably 600 to 650 Tomahawks, meaning your escort group could launch its own barrage of Tomahawks with the carrier's fighters providing escort.

    ReplyDelete
  18. Thanks to nuclear weapons, even mid scaled war between US and China is very unlikely even though China has far less nuclear weapons than US. A nuclear war between US and China would bring Russia to rule the aftermath. There was no direct war between US and Soviet Union.

    There is an orthodoxy - if US suspects a nation has weapons of mass destruction, it had better do have them.

    ReplyDelete
  19. I'm a big fan of these stories. It presents some of the best recently discussed concepts in a comprehensible format and allow for further discussion.

    I think that there are a lot of concepts that is worth reiterating or even expanding on:

    The US carrier task force - a return to the WW2 concept (the only concept really) of covering carriers. The biggest hurdle to this I would say is actually returning the Ticonderoga to service. It seems like the Navy is set on retiring them in obscurity. A possibility that we should consider is replacing them with a larger amount of Burke class (Maybe a mix of Flight III and IIA)

    Always wanted to ask what's your ideal composition of a carrier group, I guess I got my answer :)

    The failure of the submarine strike force - I think this is the more fascinating one, it actually got me out of nowhere. I have always believed that a submarine strike force is the premier form of strike with little disadvantage (The size of the strike group?). You offered the reality of a largely useless missile strike (which hasn't really been talk much about).

    - The change of purpose of a carrier air-wing: Even further than that, you offer a solution to the high casualty rate of Tomahawks by using the airwing that lost its edge in striking and use them for escorting the missiles. I have seen you hinted at this through comments and posts but I did not think that one could take advantage of such strike and eliminate HVT. I would actually envision this could be a poorman's replacement to create the conditions for a raid by the USMC.

    "The idea was to maintain a constant rotation of new aircraft timed to arrive" - This is an interesting one, it kinda contradicts your envision of an air-wing before. In the post examining the Ford Carrier, the carrier was designed to constantly deploy and "cycle" fighters (sortie rate) and not the WW2 "pulse" that you seems to favor. Maybe there are some details I'm not seeing here but your proposed requirement would favored the new concept.

    The big takeaway from all this is our desperate need for a modern cruise missile replacement. Oddly enough, we do have a stealthy replacement for the Tomahawk in the form of the AGM-129 ACM. I see little reason why we couldn't adapt this for the VLS.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Ford Carrier, the carrier was designed to constantly deploy and "cycle" fighters (sortie rate) and not the WW2 "pulse" that you seems to favor."

      Not quite. The Ford was designed for MAXIMUM sortie rates which is a useless design characteristic because carriers don't operate that way. They operate in cycles or pulses.

      In this particular scenario, instead of a cycle/pulse, the carriers operate in a leisurely, drawn out series of launches as opposed to a maximum effort sortie rate.

      Do you see the difference?

      With a new role for carriers may come a new method of launching (leisurely, spaced out mini-pulses). Of course, fighter sweeps (as were done in WWII) would still require pulses.

      "Oddly enough, we do have a stealthy replacement for the Tomahawk in the form of the AGM-129 ACM. I see little reason why we couldn't adapt this for the VLS."

      My understanding is that this missile was retired several years ago. Of course, it could always be brought back. That aside, its diameter appears too big to fit in VLS cells. Also, if it needed a launch booster then it might be too long to fit in a VLS cell. Still, it would seem to provide a solid basis for designing a modified version for VLS launch.

      Delete
    2. "AGM-129"

      The Tomahawk booster motor is 2'3" long so, add about that length to the AGM-129 which is 20'10" and you get a total length of around 23'1". The strike length VLS is 25 ft long so, on the face of it, the AGM-129 could fit lengthwise. There's still the issue of the diameter.

      Delete
    3. I looked through the comment section expecting several more mentions of the AGM-129 and the general need for a tomahawk replacement. To be clear, we have a bunch of tomahawks and I like CNOps' tactics for using them.

      That said, a redeveloped AGM-129 designed to fit strike length VLS - alongside some long-range penetration aids and an air-launched variant that is identical save for the booster - could go a long way to eliminating the need to escort our cruise missiles into the enemy IADS zone. This would free up NavAir for a greater focus on fleet defense and sea control, while primarily launching cruise missiles from SSGNs, VPMs, and bombers will allow the CG/DDGs to focus on AAW/ASuW/ASW fleet defense. As you noted, submarines can still perform ASW/ASuW with their torpedoes after launching cruise missiles, so they're going to be a preferred launch platform regardless of what missiles we acquire.

      The one issue with the AGM-129 - particularly as a primary strike platform - of course is the cost per unit. A big part of the ~$4M (1990 USD, 8M in 2020 USD) unit cost was the truncated buy, plus stealth coating and high-efficiency turbofan technologies have matured somewhat and we can aim for a ~1000 mi range rather than 2000, but the W80 warhead weighs less than a tomahawk's at only 290 lbs so a lot of that range loss is going to come from putting in a bigger warhead rather than reduced size/cost. Realistically, if we went all-in on making this our main strike cruise missile and bought thousands, we could probably get them for $4M each in today's dollars, the same as the LRASM... wait, this is starting to sound a lot like the LRASM:

      - Stealthy
      - Conventional 1000 lb warhead
      - 1000 mi range*
      - Fits Mk41 VLS
      - Also Air Launched
      - Large block buy
      - ~$4 Million a pop

      One problem - the 1000 mi range version is hypothetical and would have a lighter warhead, the actual LRASM has 300 mi range. It's probably designed pretty close to optimally so we can't get a better missile out of Mk41 VLS cells - we've got to choose between payload and range.

      Enter, the JASSM-XR:

      - Stealthy
      - 2000 lb payload / 1000 mi range variant
      - 1000 lb / 2000 mi variant
      - Fits Strike length Mk41 VLS (~7 m with tomahawk-size booster, just barely - see next link)
      - Also Air Launched
      - Large block buy
      - $1.5 Million a pop

      size estimate from relevant blog discussion with sources: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/jassm-extreme-range-jassm-xr.30782/

      Not sure what business the Navy has buying $4M LRASMs instead of these.

      Delete
    4. "AGM-129". The Advanced cruise missile may make a good inspiration, but the platform itself is dead. Except for museum pieces (almost all carry and maintenance trainers) the last one was shredded at Hill almost 10 years ago. I worked on them in the early aughts. The -129 was also very weirdly shaped. it had an oval cross-section, and a 'beaver-tailed exhaust annulus tail-cone meant to help hide the exhaust from infrared detectors aimed from 6 o'clock High. No way you could have conveniently added a booster to push it out a VLS.

      The stealth coating were developed during the early 80s, and never saw the upgrades the B-2 did. It was a massive maintenance hog. the AGM-86 fleet was (is) 5 times bigger, and both missiels broke even on maintenance time and money, inspite using the same engines, fuels, and warheads.

      AGM-86 got a conventional variant conversion for the older missiles, 129 never did. the juice wasn't considered worth the squeeze, not even for a super-long ranged stealth strike missile that made the JASSM-ER look like a slow whistling bottle rocket. AGM-129 was never internally carried inside the B-52, because the shape was just to weird to stick on a rotary launcher in the bomb-bay.

      That being said; a similiar weapon with similiar parameters would be a great idea. THere is nothing wrong with reinventing the wheel if you scrapped the wheel over a year ago, and have nothing left like it. THe transfomationalist want hypervelocity SCRAMjet telephones from God. A reimagined AGM-129 would do the job for much cheaper.

      Delete
    5. " if we went all-in on making this our main strike cruise missile and bought thousands, we could probably get them for $4M each in today's dollars"

      What we lack is a cheap, decent strike missile that can be procured and expended in very large quantities. Once upon a time, large caliber naval shells filled that need but the Navy has abandoned cheap firepower.

      Expensive, highly capable missiles certainly have their place but, at $4M a pop, we can't afford the quantities needed to fight a peer war. Worse, the build time is far too long to replenish them in a useful time frame. We need to be able to produce thousands per week, not hundreds per year … or, we need the aforementioned simple, cheap missile.

      A simple, cheap missile would be only moderately stealthy (shape only, no coatings), have a simplistic guidance mode, would not be all that accurate, and we would expect that the enemy would shoot them down in some numbers. The missiles would be the saturation missile. Each individual missile might be only moderately effective and survivable but, like a massive naval bombardment, the total effect would be decisive.

      Can we build such a missile? Certainly not if we gold plate it like we always do but if we identify the MINIMUM requirements and stick to them fanatically, maybe we could.

      Delete
    6. Agreed about the LRASM cost and the retirement/cost of the -129, but what are your thoughts on a naval VL-JASSM-XR?

      At only 1.5 million (say $2M for a canister with booster) they seem like an improvement over tomahawk's low survivability. I would pair them with penetration aids that resemble your saturation missile concept, but for very long range strikes the cost of a minimal platform to deliver a payload is already high enough (nominal tomahawk at $1M) to justify some investment in survivability - the question is at what point that investment becomes pointless "gold plating". It's hard to put numbers on it, but if we can cut missile attrition in half (or better) with a missile that costs twice as much, we're breaking even financially and able to deliver comparable strikes with less VLS cells - or we can spend the money and get more strike power period.

      For shorter range engagements and assault type scenarios I definitely agree on the preference for "dumb" munitions with very good cost ratios, but for standoff-range strategic strikes into heavily defended IADS zones I just don't think you can effectively deliver those types of weapons.

      Delete
    7. "VL-JASSM-XR"

      The wings fold, so that's okay. Someone would probably have to figure out how to fold/package that tail for VLS cell fit. Assuming that could be worked out, I'm all in favor of the cheapest weapon that effectively meets the mission requirements. If that's the JASSM-XR, that's fine.

      It concerns me that I've never heard a word about a vertical launch JASSM. That suggests that there's some good reason why it can't be done (the tail?) but it's certainly worth someone's time to look into the option.

      Delete
    8. https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2016/07/21/Lockheed-demonstrates-LRASMs-surface-launch-capability/3651469110002/

      They did it 3 times as a demonstration (with little cost increases) so I believe it could work. They are also competing in the OASuW Increment 2 (And won OASuW Increment 1) against the NSM so the Navy is pursuing this option. Although the timeline is not exactly exciting, they are aiming for Initial Operational Capability in FY28-30. That's really way too long for a critical capability.

      Delete
    9. Nevermind, disregard that. I somehow instantly thought of the LRASM when somebody mention JASSM. Although it is often said that the LRASM is a JASSM-ER with a new seeker, so who knows? The same logic may apply! :)

      Delete
  20. OT - sorry. But just caught news of just how expensive the operating cost on the LCS are

    https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/04/12/high-operating-costs-cloud-the-future-of-littoral-combat-ships-budget-data-reveals/

    Really It costs almost as much as a Burke to run. Sorry again if this old news but somebody needs to be fired for this and Congress needs to open its eyes. I don't care how divided the country might be politically. I would think everyone and anyone on the Hill can see the LCS fiasco needs to be killed.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " I would think everyone and anyone on the Hill can see the LCS fiasco needs to be killed."

      Unfortunately, the Navy has spent and wasted all the good will and trust it ever had with Congress. Right now, Congress is balking at funding unmanned ships, retiring cruisers, etc. because they flat out don't believe the Navy about anything. The Navy, for their part, wants Congress to believe that they know how to manage ship construction programs. So, if the Navy were to suddenly admit/announce that the LCS has no value and is too expensive to operate, Congress would take it as yet more proof that the Navy is totally untrustworthy and incompetent and would restrict funding even further. Therefore, the Navy will absolutely not admit that, regardless of what they might think internally. A sad state of affairs but it's the reality we have right now.

      Delete
  21. From your excellent thread on attrition several years ago, ComNavOps:

    "The Navy has made the conscious decision to travel the path of quality over quantity. For a short term conflict that’s a viable path. For a protracted war that’s the path to defeat."

    The only thing you missed (we all did) was that the quality the Navy sought did not materialize. The Fords' catapults, arresting gear, weapons lifts--and toilets--don't work properly, and all are pretty essential for a proper aircraft carrier.

    I think in retrospect we can say that the Navy made the choice of expensive over quantity. And in the process they have glossed over some really cost-effective ways of doing their jobs--cruise missiles, ASW, mine warfare, NGFS, off the top of my head.

    If we had built a combination of Nimitzes and Kitty Hawks instead of Fords, and had applied the cost savings to those other areas, how much better off would we be today.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Nice to be quoted in one's lifetime although I'm not sure which post you're quoting as I've done several on various aspects of the topic.

      Here's a good post on attrition warfare: Attrition Warfare

      Delete
    2. Protracted War, 3 Dec 2014, last paragraph.

      Delete
  22. In 1971, McD pitched a navalized F-15 Sea Eagleto the navy.

    With the Tomcats euthenized, it might be the time to resurrect the concept.

    A Silent Sea-Eagle with conformal weapons bays wouldnt be as stealthy as an F-22, but it would be better than a Rhino with weapons on the wings.

    Once air dominance is established, the eagle can do a pretty impressive A-6 impression.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Might be more worthwhile to pitch a CATOBAR KF-21 Boramae, as a replacement for the F/A-18E Super Hornet and a way to reinforce ties to South Korea. The KF-21 is already designed to accommodate stealthy features as future upgrades- unlike the idiots who forced concurrency upon the F-35 program, Korean Aerospace Industries engineers are aware of their own limits, and restrained themselves from trying to build a "Raptor Killer".

      License the design as a "stopgap," with components from the F-22's proven internal weapons bays, until the USAF and USN have sixth generation fighters ready for production.

      Delete
    2. "KF-21"

      This is a slightly stealthy F-16-ish aircraft that lacks internal weapon bays and won't be produced in any significant numbers until 2030.

      In addition, in order to make it a carrier aircraft, it would need folding wings, beefed up landing gear, arresting gear, different materials of construction (for corrosion protection), etc. All of this is doable but would add weight and complexity, negating some of whatever level of speed and maneuverability it has. A good example of what navalizing a land based aircraft does to an aircraft is the F-15N Sea Eagle proposal which, when fully navalized would have added 10,000 lb and negated all its useful advantages.

      Finally, let's also bear in mind that it exists only as a mockup, at the moment, as far as I know. As we've seen with every aircraft we've built, there will be problems revealed when testing occurs and that will increase costs and delay schedules even further.

      This is not the answer and not even a stopgap, at least not for the Navy. As a stealthier F-16 for the AF, perhaps there is some possibility but, again, it wouldn't be ready until 2030.

      Delete
    3. A prototype exists; Korean Aerospace Industries plans to have its first flight in 2022.

      Delete
    4. "A prototype exists"

      Do you have a reference? I've seen vague descriptions of a 'prototype' but no mention that it's capable of actual flight. There is a full scale static model and the plan is two build two ground models and four flying prototypes but I've seen nothing that indicates the fully functional, flying prototypes exist yet. Have you found something?

      Delete
    5. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2021/04/09/south-korea-unveils-prototype-of-homegrown-kf-x-fighter-jet/

      "KAI said the plane will undergo ground testing this year before its maiden flight scheduled for July next year."

      It's admittedly not yet flight capable. I guess I misinterpreted the journalist who, in turn, failed to distinguish between ground test articles and actual prototypes.

      Delete
    6. Fair enough. What I find disappointing is that the aircraft won't reach significant service numbers until 2030 and that's if testing goes perfectly with no problems - and that never happens. For a stripped down plane made of existing technologies and pretty pedestrian specs, that's very poor progress.

      You would think that one solid year for flight testing ought to do it, not 5-10 yrs.

      Delete
    7. The F-22 and F-35's infamous problems, and the delays they caused, probably scared the Koreans into restraining their expectations and their declarations to the press.

      Delete
    8. Per Defense News, "KAI said the plane will undergo ground testing this year before its maiden flight scheduled for July next year." They also report that "40 KF-21s will be delivered to the Air Force by 2028 and 80 more jets will enter service by 2032."

      In addition to what you pointed out that needed fixing, like the F-35C, the KF-21 would also need larger wings to enable lower landing speeds.

      I hope they succeed as that would put some pressure on China.

      Delete
    9. Any pressure will be indirect, i.e., prevent North Korea from diverting forces meant to "deter attacks from Imperialist puppets" (South Korea), against US forces in theater. South Korea will likely declare neutrality in a Sino-American war, unless China stupidly attacks it first; trying to force Seoul to join the US in such a war, will just piss off Korean nationalists.

      Delete
  23. "Real war operations will involve quantities of ships, aircraft, and missiles that we, today, cannot imagine and have not been seen since WWII."

    My humble opinion is that future's war has moved into information center - the one can control spectrum (imply press enemy's), has upper hand. As both side use radars to detect others' whereabout, the one can jam enemy's but keep its own function wins. There is a slogan - as soon as we find, we can destroy immediately. The one can control spectrum just need to shot 1-2 missiles to a target and ensure its destruction. Lots of guns and missiles but fire control radars are all jammed are next to useless.

    It was Soviet Union which first developed anti-ship missiles. Before end of the Cold War, Soviet Union had developed long range anti-ship missiles but Navy was not afraid of them. There was one big problem for Soviet Navy -- guidance of long range missile as ship's radar, due earth's curvature, cannot see very far. Soviet's solution was to use strategic bomber to perform intermediate guidance. Since these bombers were slow and no match to F-14, Navy didn't pay too much attention. Today, China's long range anti-ship missiles (DF-26, DF-21D, YJ-18, etc.) have revolutionized guiding system (their advanced satellites play a great role). They don't need to send an aircraft to fly around. Even if they need, the WZ-8 displayed in the Oct. 2019 parade caused serious attention from Pentagon. Originally, I thought that it had no big deal but later, after red something and then understood why Pentagon is so concern about it.

    Can't remember which year (you can Google online to find out), in recent years, in an Army drill, commander decided to fly an AC-130 to test Army's function under strong electronic interferences. Commanders were shocked that a whole Bradgate's communications all reduced to yell. Years of anti terrorisms made Army ignored electronic warfare as their enemies don't have any.

    ReplyDelete
  24. If the Navy limits itself to only using cruise missiles for strike, they'll be out of the strike business real soon in a major war. The 880 missiles used in this story amount to nearly six SSGN's worth (we only have four), or 22 Virginias, or 17 DDG-51s if half of their cells are devoted to strike.

    And that's just to strike one island twice. China is a big place.

    Cruise missiles are good for surge strikes, but not good for sustained combat. Just run out of them too quickly.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hmm … good point. If only there were a some kind of … oh, I don't know … maybe a building or something where people could go to assemble small pieces of seemingly unrelated things and the end result would be a new missile and they could do it on a continuous basis so that there would always be new missiles available … hmm … Oh well, just wishful thinking, I guess.

      Delete
    2. Even if you build more (a lot more). Still need something to shoot them. Requiring your entire fleet to return to port after each strike to reload doesn't seem like a viable way to win a war. The Chinese will have weeks between Navy strikes.

      Oh and before you say it, good luck with at sea reloading. Never been able to get that to work safely or quickly. And even if you do, still talking many days to reload enough ships for another strike.

      Delete
    3. "Requiring your entire fleet to return to port after each strike to reload doesn't seem like a viable way to win a war."

      Have you ever studied WWII? That's exactly how naval campaigns are fought. Go out, execute a mission, return to port to reload, replenish, repair, and plan the next mission.

      "The Chinese will have weeks between Navy strikes."

      ???? You do know that we have a couple hundred combat ships/subs, right? There would always be some at sea, executing missions. Again, you should study WWII naval operations.

      One of the requirements to comment on this blog is a fundamental understanding of how navies operate.

      Delete
    4. "Have you ever studied WWII? That's exactly how naval campaigns are fought. Go out, execute a mission, return to port to reload, replenish, repair, and plan the next mission."

      In WWII, we really didn't use the Navy for strategic strikes much. That was primarily an Army Air Corps mission.

      I can only think of one strategic strike mission in WWII where the Navy went out, executed one strike and went home - the Doolittle raid.

      Every other time they were executing a campaign that lasted days or weeks or months, involving many sorties, hitting many targets.

      There were naval battles like Midway that were fought over a day or so, but that's different from strikes.

      We have 68 DDG 51s, if we need 17 per strike, the Navy can execute a grand total of four strikes with ALL of its DDGs before needing a few weeks to reload. Pretty pathetic rate. SSNs and SSGNs won't add much more.

      Can we really dedicate EVERY warship and submarine? Might we not need to deter the Russians, Iranians and North Koreans at the same time? Some ships will be down for maintenance.

      A carrier can deliver a smaller strike every day at long range. Two or more at closer range. Bombers can deliver a sizeable strike every other day or two.

      Ship-launched cruise missiles are good for surge strikes, but not good for sustained combat.

      Delete
    5. "In WWII, we really didn't use the Navy for strategic strikes much."

      You really need to study your naval history. Every island that was seized was a strategic target! In addition, every attack on Rabaul, Truk, or any other major base was a strategic strike. My goodness, you've got a lot to learn!

      "A carrier can deliver a smaller strike every day at long range."

      Of course it can't. As demonstrated off Vietnam, a carrier can sustain small strikes for a matter of days and then has to cease operations and resupply. Unlike Vietnam where carriers could leisurely resupply in the forward area, in a peer war carriers will have to pull hundreds or thousands of miles back, generally to a port.

      "Bombers can deliver a sizeable strike every other day or two."

      Again, no. We have around 15-19 operational B-2 bombers. They can conduct one, maybe two, missions per week for around two weeks and then they'll be down for long term maintenance. B-1/52 bombers are not capable of strategic strike because they're not survivable in enemy air space.

      I say this gently, you need to study how campaigns are actually fought before you continue commenting.

      Delete
  25. "Might we not need to deter the Russians, Iranians and North Koreans at the same time?"

    If we're embroiled with China, Id expect the Japanese to be involved, since our forward-deployed ships there would be too juicy of a first strike target to pass up. Also possibly the Brits and Australians. Since wed be operating "in the neighborhood", I dont think NK would need much dissuading. Europe can deal with the Russians, and frankly, the Iranians as well. They should be anyway. At the first true signs of an impending Chinese conflict, our diplomats should be talking to the Nato/European countries and letting them know that its their turn to fully police the Persian Gulf, as we will be massing everything we can elsewhere. That would also give us the opportunity to not return to the endless deployments and world-policing afterwards. That might be the tiny silver lining to a WestPac conflict, since continued peacetime will never see us changing how we do things...

    ReplyDelete
  26. "This is a modern version of the old "ships vs forts" problem."

    This comment was deleted as there was nothing factually correct in it. This is not the blog for people who do not have a basic grasp of naval and military operations.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Coming in late but a few points I’d like to make.

    Europe cannot defeat Russia unilaterally.
    If we ignore the complete imbalance between the russian armed forces state of readiness to that of all European nations,
    At the outbreak of hostilities, Russia would simply turn of the gas and oil pipelines to Europe causing an energy crisis in the euro block. Then by airbursting munitions among the European wind farms and solar farms, Russia would bring Europe’s war economy to a screaming halt.
    From there Russia’s 14,000 tanks and their dismounted infantry under Russia’s 4,200 strong airforce air cover would simply walk into Germany, Poland and beyond.
    The uk and French nuclear deterrent will not be enough to make a stand against Russia alone.

    As for China, any operations in the SCS will come later in the war. China has built an asymmetrical missile defence system coupled with enough air and naval power that will prevent any large scale assaults on China from the SCS. There will be no attack on China from here at the outbreak of hostilities. There will most certainly be no amphibious adults throwing marines ashore from LHDs and LPDs either. At best containment of China from breaking out into the greater Pacific and Indian Ocean will be the primary role for the USN and her allies.

    Amphibious operations will happen in the Bay of Bengal and the western beaches of south east Asia and a ground campaign of taking and consolidating ground will ensure but to do this first the bases on Sri Lanka and coastal Myanmar will need to be neutralised.

    On the topic of further development of technological aircraft and stealth, the west is currently repeating the mistakes made by Nazi Germany. Nazi germany went to war commuting vast precious resources to developing wonder weapons such as the jet fighter and the v2.
    Day and night the allies bombed Germany and its war infrastructure into the ground with lancasters and fortresses, and Germany did not have a long range bomber to do the same to the allies. The results of this was that Germany could not sustain and supply its war effort which bought about her demise.
    What the west is doing today is akin to the same.
    We are so focussed on developing stealth weapons and platforms that have huge unsustainable operating costs, that we are then penny pinching on the proven weapons and platforms we have today that more than bring a match to any enemy. I’m not saying we shouldn’t innovate but that innovation should not come at the expense of maintaining current strength.

    The f22 is a marvel of an aircraft that they say has a cross section signature of a small bird but that small bird will be flying at 700 miles an hour. Do we really think that a sophisticated radar installation will not flag that anomaly to it’s operator?
    Like stealth ships. You do know a ship is in broad daylight for 14 hrs a day. If one was to go on planet labs website you could look to the SCS and clearly make out both the American and Chinese fleets operating in the area. By knowing the ships specs (eg flank speed), and by measuring the wake to ferret in speed at the time of the photo, one could overlay a grid over the photo (say the ship has a top speed of 30knts), one could make each square 30nmls, and you could then determine where that ship would be over the time elapsed from when the photo was taken. If you had air and sea assets in range, you could send out 2-4 assets to search that block and destroy the ship. No amount of stealth architecture can prevent this. You can’t hide a ship from the sun and the satellites above. We are likely pouring billions of dollars into a gavel project when we should be focusing on further hardening our existing platforms and improving the lethality of our current weapons systems.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Europe cannot defeat Russia unilaterally."

      Ukraine has proven that to be a false statement!

      Delete

Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.