Destroyer Escort Development

Destroyer Escorts (DE), or Frigates (FF/FFG), as they’re now known, have an interesting developmental history that illustrates many of the problems we’re dealing with today.

 

The modern DE, as we know it, came to be in WWII.  There are earlier possible predecessors but, for our purposes, we’ll say WWII was the starting point, as typified by the Buckley class.  The type continued to evolve throughout the war and the immediate post-war, eventually developing into missile and helicopter versions, changing names from destroyer escort to frigate and leading, ultimately, to the current Constellation class frigate.

 

In its early guise, the outstanding characteristics of the DE were:

 

Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

Cheap cost and large numbers

Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines

 

As post-war development took place, the ships grew steadily larger and eventually lost their ASW focus, becoming more multi-function (not a good thing!), expensive, and less numerous.

 

Consider the steady increase in size, as shown in the table below and the scaled silhouette drawings.

 

 

Destroyer Escort Size Growth
Class	Length, ft
Buckley	306
Dealey	314
Garcia	414
Knox	438
Perry	453
Constellation	496

 

 

 

 

 

Let’s take a look at several representative destroyer escort classes.

 

Buckley – This is the classic destroyer escort of WWII.  Weapons included 3x 3” guns, Hedgehog, 200x depth charges, 2x stern depth charge rails, 3x 21” torpedoes and assorted 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.  Sensors included Type 128D or Type 144 sonar in retractable dome.  The noteworthy aspect of this class was its ASW focus which set the pattern for subsequent DE classes.  This was a focused, efficient, cheap vessel whose cost allowed procurement in large numbers with around 150 being built.  The class had a clear primary purpose and contained nothing that did not directly contribute to that purpose.  The ship was as small as it could be, consistent with its function.

 

In this class, we see all the characteristics of an excellent ship:  small as possible, heavily armed, single function, cheap, simple and easy to build, and numerous.

 

Dealey – This was the first post-WWII DE.  Weapons included 4x 3” guns in two twin mounts, RUR-4 Weapon Alpha anti-submarine rocket launcher, 2x ASW triple torpedo launchers, 2x K-gun depth charge launchers, and 1x stern depth charge rails.  Sensors included the SQS-4 low frequency sonar.  USS Willis, DE-1027, operated a variable depth sonar from the stern.  The class was later modified for DASH operations.  The class was still focused on ASW but one can already see the beginnings of a decrease in ASW weaponry with smaller, lighter torpedoes and fewer depth charges and rails/launchers

 

Garcia – These ships typified the major jump in size that occurred due, primarily, to the incorporation of an aviation component (flight deck, helo, hangar).  Weapons included 2× 5 in guns, 1× 8-tube ASROC Mk16 launcher (16 missiles), 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes, and 2× MK 37 stern mounted fixed torpedo tubes which were later removed.  Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar.  The ship operated the SeaSprite helo. 

 

This class is an example of the beginnings of a fascination with technology over firepower and combat effectiveness as evidenced by an emphasis on aviation as the primary ASW tool rather than up close, volume oriented ASW firepower (depth charges and the like). 

 

The use of 5” guns illustrates additional loss of focus and the movement away from a single, primary function towards a multi-function philosophy.

 

Knox – This class further emphasizes the movement away from a strict focus on ASW and towards a broader, ocean escort role.  Weapons include 1× 5 in gun, 1× Mk16 8–cell ASROC launcher, and 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes.  Again, the on-board ASW weapons have been decreased in favor of the helo.  Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar and SQR-18 towed array.  The ship operated the SeaSprite helo. 

 

Perry – This is where the destroyer escort concept really went off the rails as the focus shifted to ocean escort and anti-air although ASW was still a mission.  However, the Perry’s SQS-56 sonar was considered only marginally capable although the SQR-19 towed array was useful.  This class also saw the near abandonment of ship-based ASW in favor of helo-based ASW with the ship acting as a helo-host rather than an active ASW combatant.

 

Constellation – This class doesn’t even pretend to be ASW-focused.  The ship lacks even a VL-ASROC.  It is a mini-Burke, pure and simple, trying to be all things and being good at none.  This is a class without a mission other than to be a cheaper Burke and not be a failure (see, “Constellation Class Frigate - Success or Just Not Failure?”).

 

 

From the brief history and description of the DE classes, we clearly see that the initial primary characteristics of a destroyer escort,

 

• Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
• Cheap cost and large numbers
• Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines

 

were altered, over time, to,

 

• Unfocused, multi-mission
• Expensive and few in number (only 20 Constellations are planned)
• No clear mission or CONOPS

 

 

Focus

 

The WWII DE was supremely focused on one task and one task alone.  It was sized and equipped for that one task and nothing else.  This resulted in the minimum possible construction cost/time and, hence, the maximum number of ships.  We’ve lost that over the years.  Today’s destroyer escorts – which we now call frigates – are multi-focused (multi-functional) which has drastically driven up size and cost, diluted ASW weapons, and drastically decreased the number of ships we can afford.

 

 

Helo-centric ASW

 

We need to address one of the DE trends and that is the adoption of helos as replacements for shipboard ASW.  When they’re in the air and over a contact, helos are quite effective and useful.  The problem is that helos are only sporadically available.  Helos are good for around two 3-hour missions per day.  Even with two helos per ship (an optimistic number) that provides only 12 hours of airborne coverage per day and even that will be sporadic in the sense that in combat there will be many false contacts that will have to be pursued.  Thus, the helo won’t be flying around searching broad areas, as so many people envision.  Instead, they’ll be tied to one contact location for an extended period, trying to prove/disprove a suspected contact.  That’s point coverage, not broad area searching.  Thus, by making helos the focus of our ASW effort, we’ve effectively reduced our coverage area.

 

 

Cost/Numbers

 

Destroyer escorts have, historically, been effective not because they were individually supremely effective ASW machines but because they were ubiquitous.  They were effective due to numbers!  Their presence forced submarines to alter course, miss intercepts, and abort attacks.  As the type has grown in size, complexity, and cost, the numbers have been reduced to the point that their main mode of effectiveness, a ubiquitous presence, is no longer viable.  Our entire supposed ASW force will now consist of 20 Constellations.  That’s not even remotely enough to be effective.  The Navy can claim that Burkes are ASW-capable but they’re not.  They don’t train for it and no sane commander is going to risk a $2B-$3B ship playing tag with a submarine.

 

 

Summary

 

By foolishly trying to make every ship a multi-function, do-everything, single-handed war-winning, mega-machine, we’ve lost all the positive attributes of the type.  We’ve taken a ship that was exquisitely optimized for its role and morphed it into a ship that has no defined role (or, maybe, every role!). 

 

Consider the Constellation.  We clearly do not have a CONOPS for the class other than ‘do everything’ which is another way of saying ‘do nothing well’.

 

The DE development history also clearly shows the relationship between size/cost and numbers.  We’ve gone from 150 Buckleys, at 306 ft long, to 20 Constellations, at 496 ft long.  Size equals reduced numbers.  It can’t be stated any plainer than that.  A 496 ft long frigate is an abomination and makes a mockery of the type’s traditional role while simultaneously reducing, nearly to the point of extinction, the numbers of ASW ships in the fleet.

Buckley vs. Constellation

As naval observers and analysts, we need a solid grounding in naval history.  The Navy is currently in the process of designing and building an ?ASW? frigate, the Constellation class.  Functionally, the WWII analog to the Constellation would be the Buckley class destroyer escort (DE), the iconic DE of WWII.  Let’s refresh our memory about the Buckley class DE and see how it compares to the Constellation.

 

The Buckley was an ocean going, anti-submarine (ASW) vessel.  As such, it was optimized for ASW and, more importantly, minimized for ASW.  Huh?  Minimized for ASW?  Yes!  This is another way of saying that it had a single, primary purpose as opposed to being a multi-function design.  It was built for ASW and nothing else (hence, the minimized statement!).

 

Here’s a brief comparison of the Buckley and the Constellation FFG.

 

	Buckley	Constellation
Length, ft	306	496
Displacement, tons	1740	7291
Speed, kts	26	26
Range, nm	5500 @ 15 kts	6000 @ 16 kts

 

 

USS Buckley

Role - DE’s were intended to be ocean-going ASW vessels, providing escort for convoys and acting as dedicated submarine hunters (often as part of escort carrier hunter-killer groups).  Notably, they were not normally carrier and battleship group escorts – that role being generally filled by destroyers.

 

Constellation is, presumably, intended to be the Navy’s main ASW surface ship although the limited numbers render that intent nearly irrelevant barring a massive wartime construction program.  Unfortunately, the Constellation design also attempts to be an area anti-air warfare (AAW) ship with VLS, Standard SM-2 Blk IIIC missiles, and SPY-6 Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) and an ASuW ship … in other words, it’s a do-everything, mini-Burke that is not specialized or optimized for anything.

 

Design Focus - As mentioned, the DE was a very focused, limited design.  Nothing was added to the design that was not absolutely required for the role.  One of the key aspects of the design was the recognition that the DE’s combat risk was limited due to the role’s reduced likelihood of combat.  The reduced combat risk allowed for reduced armor, reduced armament, and reduced sensors.  Contrast that with today’s attempts to include every capability, sensor, and weapon on every ship which, automatically, makes every ship over-spec’ed and over-priced.

 

Numbers – Because the DE was a focused, limited design, they were cheap and several hundred were built in WWII.  Enemy submarines will go to great lengths to avoid detection (translate:  mission kill) and the DE’s large numbers allowed them to be everywhere and hindered submarine operations by their mere presence as much or more than their actual combat actions.  In contrast, there are only 20 Constellations planned and they’re likely to cost $1B+.  History suggests that even this meager number of ships will be reduced.  Twenty ships – if that – are not going to be much of a hindrance. 

 

Range – It is noteworthy that the Buckley is half the size of the Constellation and has the same range.  We’ve forgotten what we were once capable of designing in a ship! 

 

Size – Buckley’s focused and minimized design allowed a much smaller size;  compare the Buckley to the Constellation’s much greater size which equates to much greater relative cost for what ought to be the same mission as Buckley.

 

Armament – A direct comparison between the Buckley and Constellation is meaningless as the weapons are from different eras but it is interesting to note the weapon density of the Buckley: 

• 3x 3"/50 guns
• 1x Bofors twin 40 mm gun
• 8x 20 mm Oerlikon AA guns
• 1x Hedgehog, 24 round, 144 rounds total
• 200x depth charges in stern racks and eight K-gun depth charge throwers
• 3x 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes in a triple mount

 

While we can’t directly compare the weapons of the two classes, it is, as we said, worth noting the weapon density of the Buckley and that density is hammered home by examining photos of the ship which show weapons mounted in almost every available space.  WWII ship designers understood that numbers of weapons mattered and Buckley had every weapon it needed and in sufficient numbers.  In contrast, the Constellation lacks one of the main ASW weapons, the VL-ASROC, and has only a single close in weapon, the RAM, with only 21 rounds per use.  The Buckley’s 3x 3”/50 guns (76 mm) put the Constellation’s single 57 mm gun armament to shame.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The Buckley class had the same speed, range, and role as the Constellation but was half the size, or less.  What’s wrong with this picture?

 

What’s wrong is that the Constellation is unfocused and, therefore, large and expensive (only building 20!).  Yeah, but it can fill multiple roles!  No, not really.  The area AAW role, for example, will be filled by the Burkes, not the Constellations so what’s the point of giving them an area AAW role?  It just increases the size, complexity, and cost of the Constellation.

 

The Buckley was an example of a focused design that was optimized for its intended role of ASW and, as a result, was cheap enough to risk in battle and cheap enough to procure in large numbers.  In short, the Buckley was an excellent example of intelligent naval force structure design.  It was everything it needed to be and nothing it didn’t.  We would do well to take that lesson to heart.