Where Are The Troops?

This is not a land combat blog but, sometimes, I’ve just gotta dip my toe into that world. 
 
We’ve repeatedly seen the US get attacked (with very little success) in the Strait of Hormuz by a drone or a speedboat and then we retaliate by striking combat related facilities.  The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly, we know where they are?  What kind of idiot commander allows known enemy combat facilities to exist during a war?
 
Now, here’s the land combat portion.  Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep, say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait?  As best I can tell, that would eliminate every remaining speedboat and most of the relevant combat facilities (weapons warehoused, radars, command and control facilities, troop housing/hideouts, etc.
 
Oh, but what if Iranian troops confront us?  Oh no!  What will we do?  Well, how about we thank them for revealing themselves and gathering together in one place so that we can more easily and efficiently kill them?
 
A sweep would remove most of the remaining ability of Iran to harass shipping in the strait.
 
Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk soldiers?  If so, then this war isn’t very important.  If it is important, then ground troops are justified.  This would be a training exercise for a WWII battalion.  
 
We started the war with a good approach but it’s devolved into a decidedly half-assed affair the last couple of weeks.

MEU vs. Army/Air Force Rapid Response

MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) currently deploy without tanks, artillery, or heavy mortars.  Thus, they are no different than light, air mobile infantry in terms of firepower and, barring dumb luck that a crisis just happens to break out right next to them, are much slower to respond to a global crisis, requiring days or weeks to reach the area of concern.
 
One of the limitations of a MEU is that, contrary to popular impressions, a MEU cannot conduct an opposed landing although, presumably, they could deal with minor resistance.
 
Now, consider the Army’s global crisis response units which are supported by Air Force transports and can deposit troops anywhere in the world in 24 hours. 
 
A common objection to the Army as the global crisis response force is that they must have a secure airfield to land and that is not a sure thing and might even be considered unlikely.  However, it should be noted that the airfield requirements are pretty minimal with dirt strips being adequate.  From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example, 

The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).

 
In addition, the Army does have the capability to seize an airfield.  The 2^nd Ranger battalion, 75^th Ranger regiment is specifically tasked with airfield seizure.  Of course, an airfield is not even absolutely necessary as troops can be parachuted in.
 

In fact, once upon a time, the Army had some fairly significant airborne armor support with the ability to air-unload M551 Sheridan tanks using the LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) method (an impressive operation readily viewable on Youtube!) or medium altitude multi-parachute drops.  Similarly, I’m aware that the Army conducted Stryker air drops, at one time.  I don’t know whether the Army still maintains such a capability, or not.
 

LAPES - Sheridan Air Drop

Stryker Parachute Drop

 Up until around 2014, airborne forces also included artillery.  From Wiki, 

1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field Artillery Regiment maintained a full capacity to provide 155mm howitzer fires anywhere in the world within 18 hours in support of the 82d Airborne Division and while supporting other global responsibilities. The unit had the unique ability to employ 155mm howitzer platforms through a "Howitzer Heavy Drop Package" capability which essentially allowed for the weapon system to be dropped from an aircraft while its paratroopers would then place the weapon into action.

Again, I don’t know whether the Army still maintains airborne artillery capability.
 

Air Dropped 105 mm Howitzer

The following units are considered to be rapidly deployable.  I don’t follow Army matters that closely so there may be others.
 
- XVIII Airborne Corps 

• 3rd Infantry Division
• 10th Mountain Division
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 101st Airborne Division

- 75th Ranger Regiment - Can deploy can deploy one Ranger battalion within eighteen hours of alert notification.[1]
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Army/AF can provide firepower and numbers equal to, or greater than, a MEU and with much quicker response times.  Given the Marine’s elimination of tanks and a great deal of artillery and mortars, one can’t help but wonder why we don’t eliminate the MEUs and use Army units as our crisis response force.
 
One of the key aspects of this discussion is armor.  At one time, the MEU deployed with tanks which offered a justification for the use of MEUs.  Unfortunately, the Marines eliminated their tanks several years ago – along with heavy mortars and much of their artillery - and that justification has now vanished.
 
In light of the Marine’s ill-advised move away from being a medium weight combat force and toward being a light infantry force, we need to re-evaluate the rationale for MEUs.  Add to that the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a fleet of amphibious ships to give the MEUs something to ride around on and the rationale looks very suspect.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
Note:  I’m trying to assemble a current list of the combat equipment of a deployed MEU.  As best I can tell, this is the current list: 
 
7 to 16  Light Armored Vehicle  
15         Assault Amphibious Vehicle      
6          155mm howitzer: M777 
8          M252 81mm mortar       
63         Humvee           
 
That’s not much in the way of firepower.  Anyone have any modifications to the list?  In particular, I’m very unsure that MEUs deploy with any artillery, today.  Anyone know?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (Fourth ed.). MacDill AFB, Florida: Joint Special Operations University. June 2015. pp. 78–82. ISBN 9781933749914. Archived from the original on 28 March 2017. Retrieved 27 March 2017.

Dumbing Down ... and down ... and down

The dumbing down continues.

 

 

The Army is tossing its mandate for potential recruits to have a high school diploma or GED certificate to enlist in the service … [1]

 

 

Nothing else to say.

 

 

 

 

 

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[1]Military.com website, “Army Drops Requirement for High School Diploma Amid Recruiting Crisis”, Steve Beynon, 24-Jun-2022,

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/06/24/army-drops-requirement-high-school-diploma-amid-recruiting-crisis.html

Army LCUs and Marine LAWs

Naval News website has an absolutely fascinating article on Army Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels and Marine Light Amphibious Warships (LAW).[1]  The article is an interview/feedback from Army LCU Vessel Masters (I guess that’s what the Army calls a ship captain?) with their comments about the Marine LAW.

 

The Army LCU can transport 350 short tons of cargo over a range of 6,500 miles at 12 knots without refueling.[1]

 

… the Army LCU can carry up to five M1 Abrams tanks, and all the other vehicles listed above; however, they are not meant for troop transport.[1]

 

Army LCU

 

Here’s some points that jumped out from the article/interview:

 

Purpose – The LCU is not a combat vessel.  It is purely a logistic asset.  The two functions are radically different and should not be confused or conflated.  This is exactly the risk the Marine LAW concept runs.  The Marines seem to be heading down a path that wants to utilize the LAW as a maneuver/combat asset and that will only lead to failure.  As the Army Vessel Masters state,

 

The LCU is not a maneuver asset; it is a logistical asset for moving large quantities of supplies and materials to include equipment.[1]

 

If the Marines desire a maneuver/combat vessel then they need a vessel designed for that purpose.  For example, such a vessel would need speed, stealth, extensive sensors, and defensive armament, among other requirements.  Fast APDs (see, “High Speed Transport”) would be a much better model for the role than a slow, unarmed LAW.

 

 

Weather – We’ve foolishly and naively come to believe that our technology has allowed us to rise above the effects of weather.  We assume that our sensors, our people (seasickness!), our aircraft, and our ships are immune to the ravages of weather.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Small vessels are still susceptible to wind and wave and the LCU and LAW are small vessels.  We forget this at our peril.  If the Marines envision using the LAW to clandestinely dart (you know, at 14 kts as specified for the LAW transit speed) from island to island, totally befuddling the Chinese, then we need to account for, and factor in, weather.  What happens when it’s time to ‘dart’ and the sea is not calm?  As the Army warns,

 

The Army LCU … relies heavily on the weather to cooperate; these vessels can handle 10ft waves on the bow and stern, but only 5ft waves on the beam.[1]

 

I can say from experience that 12ft waves in an LCU is not fun and is really hard on the crew.[1]

 

Helicopters – ComNavOps has repeatedly criticized the Navy’s obsession with helicopters on every vessel from carriers to canoes.  Placing a helo on a LAW is a bad idea for so many reasons not the least of which is that helo facilities consume huge amounts of space on board the ship, to the detriment of the main function of the ship.

 

From what I can tell looking at the model drawings, the overall LAW design is good; however, with a landing pad it will limit what the “LAW” can carry as far as containers and may be limited to vehicles.[1]

 

Complexity – As this blog has repeatedly demonstrated, complexity is the enemy of reliability and, in combat, you desperately want reliability.  The LAW should be simplest possible design.  Landing vessels that utilize complex bow designs are failures waiting to happen.  Mechanical monstrosities where the nose of the ship lifts up and over, or some such, as some of the LAW designs envision, can’t help but be prone to failure.  This was one of the criticisms of the Newport class LST with their over-the-bow, swinging ramp design using two derricks.

 

From the drawings and models, there are two very different concepts, one with a stern ramp [Sea Transport Solutions] and the other with the LSV design “Kuroda class” enabling the nose of the vessel to be lifted and a ramp to unload vehicles along with other cargo [Austal’s design]. I think that it is best for the vessel master to be able to see the payload while maneuvering the vessel to ensure proper placement on a beachhead or port ramp. It is a lot easier to control the vessel moving forward than while backing in.[1]

 

Just to show that the Army is not perfect, either, consider this tidbit:

 

The biggest issue that we [the Army] have is the inability to communicate with Navy vessels on a non-civilian maritime frequency. These vessels are built for commercial operations and all of the communications equipment is set up for that purpose.[1]

 

 

Ironically, the Army seems to have a much better handle on what a LAW is and is not than the Marines do.

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Army Japan’s LCU Vessel Masters Discuss U.S. Navy LAW”, Peter Ong, 23-Apr-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/u-s-army-japan-lcu-vessel-masters-discuss-u-s-navy-law/

 

Army Admits Abject Failure

I know this isn’t a Navy matter but this is too important to ignore.  Here’s a stunning admission of failure from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

 

In addition to reaching something of a stalemate, where the Taliban can’t conquer the U.S.-backed Afghan security forces, and the U.S. can’t bring the Taliban to its knees, Army Gen. Mark Milley said Wednesday during a Brookings Institution event, the U.S. has probably done all it can do.

 

“We believe now that after 20 years, two decades of consistent effort, that we he have achieved a modicum of success,” he said.

 

Since the first boots hit the ground in October 2001, more than 2,400 American troops have died and nearly 21,000 have been injured, along with close to $1 trillion spent on trying to stabilize Afghanistan enough that it won’t again become a training ground for terrorist groups.

 

 

Are you kidding me????  Twenty years of effort and we have achieved a ‘modicum of success’?  And you know he’s spinning that in the best possible way.  The reality is much less rosy than even that marginal claim.

 

2400 deaths

21,000 wounded

$1 trillion

 

A ‘modicum of success’?

 

Let’s consider some of the issues this raises:

 

• Why are we pursuing high tech when we couldn’t even beat a bunch of goat herders with no technology?  How would even more technology produce a better result?  What’s going to happen when we go up against China?
• Is this an example of our misguided focus on technology, networks, and data at the expense of actually killing people in the most efficient manner possible – meaning with the greatest degree of overwhelming firepower?
• Is 20 yrs and a ‘modicum of success’ the standard of success for our professional military leaders?  Shouldn’t heads be rolling by the dozens?
• Why are we continuing to jump into conflicts that have no possible successful outcome?
• Do we have the will to win these types of conflicts or has our military (and, to be fair, our civilian leadership) become so feminized that we no longer have the stomach to do what has to be done to achieve victory? 
• Has avoidance of casualties, both ours and the enemy’s, become so ingrained in our military that we can’t be brutal enough to win?  What will happen when we fight China?
• Why are we entering conflicts without clear victory conditions?

 

 

This reprehensible abomination of a result would be beyond the comprehension of our WWII military leaders.  They would be in total shock over this.  They won a world war in a few years and today we can’t even defeat goat herders in 20 yrs.

 

We’re paying for a standing military that can’t even defeat third world terrorist goat herders.  We spend $700B/year to maintain a military that is, by the admission of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manifestly incompetent and incapable.  We could have abolished the military, saved all that money, not gotten involved in Afghanistan at all, and wound up in about the same place.  What did our investment in the military get us?

 

We need to either drastically downsize the military or drastically upsize our standards and clean house of all current flag officers and then start demanding actual performance from the next group of leaders.

 

If Gen. Milley had an ounce of integrity he’d fire every flag officer and then resign in disgrace and embarrassment.  That he doesn’t is symptomatic of what’s wrong with our military.  This man disgusts me.

 

 

 

(1)Military Times website, “Military’s top officer says we’ve had a ‘modicum of success’ in Afghanistan”, Meghann Myers, 2-Dec-2020,

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/12/02/militarys-top-officer-says-weve-had-a-modicum-of-success-in-afghanistan/

The Bare Minimum

In a recent post, we noted that the Army seems to be beginning to understand what a future war will entail (see, “Army Gets It”).  In particular, the Army seemed to recognize that, in combat, communications and networks would be significantly degraded and that equipment design should focus on the bare minimum rather than the ultimate possible.  This is an incredibly important point and I give the Army full credit for recognizing it (we’ll see whether they act on it, or not!).

As described by Maj. Gen. Peter Gallagher, head of the Army’s network Cross-Functional Team in a Breaking Defense article,

“Instead of optimizing the network to provide the best user experience in normal circumstances — the current standard — you optimize it to provide acceptable performance in extreme circumstances.” [article’s emphasis] (1)

This is worth restating …  We need to design for the bare minimum acceptable performance and design it in such a way as to ensure that minimum level is met regardless of circumstances.  We need a bare minimum baseline level of performance that the enemy cannot hinder.

Yes, we can also design in greater performance and, if circumstances permit (the enemy’s countermeasures aren’t present or aren’t as effective as anticipated), then we can enjoy the enhanced performance.  The point is that we can’t train to, and become dependent on, a higher level of performance.  We need to train to the bare minimum.

Hand in hand with designing to the bare minimum acceptable performance, we need to test our designs to the maximum extent possible.  ComNavOps has harped on this and will continue to do so.  The typical scripted, simplistic tests that currently pass for operational testing have to be dropped in favor of the most difficult tests we can devise because that’s the level of difficulty we’ll face in combat.

We need to make every effort to break our own designs so that we can learn how to build them so that the bare minimum acceptable performance is available no matter the circumstances.

That networked cooperative engagement type of capability sounds great on paper but will it function in combat?  Let’s get our best electronic warfare aircraft to plan and execute an attack on a Navy surface group.  Let’s give them access to every spec and secret of our networking so that they can take advantage of weaknesses.  You can bet China has all our specs and secrets and will do exactly that.  Let’s see if the group can establish and maintain a coherent tactical picture and a functional network in the face of that kind of attack.  If not – and I doubt they can – then we need to define the bare minimum acceptable performance and ensure that it is so secure that nothing can disrupt it.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Can’t Stop The Signal: Army Strips Down Network To Survive Major War”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 26-Mar-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/cant-stop-the-signal-army-strips-down-network-to-survive-major-war/?_ga=2.141421307.876968781.1522068204-689266911.1437082743

Army Gets It Again

In a past post, ComNavOps stated that the Army seems to be beginning to understand what a future war will entail (see, “Army Gets It”).  That recognition is belated, to be sure, and still incomplete but at least aspects of reality are starting to be recognized by the Army.  Here’s the latest demonstration of the Army’s slowly dawning recognition via a Breaking Defense website article about combat communications as put forth by Maj. Gen. Peter Gallagher, head of the Army’s network Cross-Functional Team (1).

“Instead of video, the screens will show minimalist messages and abstract icons on digital maps, updated by telegraphic bursts of data designed to avoid detection. Instead of constant micromanagement, there’ll be a taut silence broken by terse litanies of codewords, soldiers getting on and off the radio before the enemy can trace the transmission. Instead of direct uplinks to bulky, vulnerable satellites high in geostationary orbit, signals will bounce from low-orbiting mini-satellites to relay drones to ground antennas, following dozens of possible paths, too many for the enemy to block them all. Instead of specialist soldiers and contractor field service reps laboriously configuring and reconfiguring the network, artificially intelligent software will adapt autonomously to avoid jamming, hacking, and interference.”  [emphasis added]

The full featured, video-intensive, real time documentation of military operations that our leadership has come to assume as normal will be impossible.  Electronic countermeasures, jamming, signal disruption, equipment destruction, cyber attacks, etc. will ensure that we’ll have sporadic communications, at best.  The article sums it up nicely.

“Instead of optimizing the network to provide the best user experience in normal circumstances — the current standard — you optimize it to provide acceptable performance in extreme circumstances.” [article’s emphasis]

This demonstrates that the Army has at least a glimmer of understanding about a future peer war and is beginning, just beginning, to prepare for it. 

Gallagher noted,

“in a high-intensity, fast-moving fight against a great power adversary, he said, the network will be under attack, so you have to prioritize to ensure that at least three essentials get through:

• secure voice, so troops can talk to each other, because typing a text message under fire isn’t always practical, and nothing tells you whether a subordinate is confident or cracking up like his tone of voice;

• Position Location Information (PLI) that’s not reliant on the Global Positioning System, so you know where your people are even when GPS is jammed; and

• telegraphic updates on each unit’s status and enemies spotted so you can populate your digital map with what the Army calls a Common Operational Picture.”

All of this is fascinating and worth a tip of the hat to the Army but what does it have to do with the Navy since this is, after all, a Navy blog?  Well, it should be obvious – the Navy will face the same attacks on its communications and networks and, therefore, should be working towards the same goals as the Army.

The really disturbing aspect to this is that far from working towards minimal, but assured, communications in recognition of the reality of peer combat, the Navy is actually increasing its dependence on highly suspect and even more complex and “bulky” communications such as Distributed Lethality, Co-operative Engagement Capability, Third Offset Strategy, unmanned vehicles, Navy Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA), etc.

Did you note the use of the term “bulky”?  This means that communications and data are becoming ever more demanding of increased bandwidth, signal strength, and signal duration.  It takes a LOT of bandwidth and time to transmit video as opposed to a couple of word text transmission.  Enemy electronic countermeasures are going to ensure that our communications and network data transmissions are interrupted, degraded, and sporadic.  This is the antithesis of the path the Navy is on.

Here’s an example.  The LCS was designed to self-monitor its machinery, instrumentation, and condition and transmit all that data back to a shore station so that the shore support group could anticipate maintenance and repair needs and have the proper personnel and parts waiting when the LCS arrived back in port for its all too frequent maintenance visits.  However, during the first two Singapore public relations deployments the reality was that the LCS lacked the communications bandwidth and fidelity to transmit the monitoring data and the entire system broke down and this was during peacetime when communications were unchallenged!  How much worse will the situation be during war when communications are contested?

Those high resolution videos of terrorists from overhead UAVs that we’ve all grown so accustomed to on the news are simply not going to be possible in a peer war - of course, neither will UAV survival over the battlefield so the inability to transmit video won’t really be that big an issue, I guess!.

The point is that the Navy needs to take a lesson from the Army and begin reducing its reliance on communications and networks rather than increasing it.  We also need to greatly increase the robustness of our communications but that, in turn, depends on reducing the demands, complexity, and bandwidth requirements.  In other words, we need to train to fight silently and isolated.  If we find that our communications and networks perform better than we anticipated, all the better but we must not count on it.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Can’t Stop The Signal: Army Strips Down Network To Survive Major War”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 26-Mar-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/cant-stop-the-signal-army-strips-down-network-to-survive-major-war/?_ga=2.141421307.876968781.1522068204-689266911.1437082743

Army Gets It

ComNavOps has stated repeatedly that we’ve forgotten what war is.  It’s not even debatable.  Unfortunately, the only service that has even begun to acknowledge the problem and begin preparing for real war is the Army and, interestingly, they seem to be almost frantic about doing so.  They’re desperately up-gunning vehicles and working on the entire electronic/cyber warfare problem.  In the latest example, the Army is trying to “re-field” the SMART-T satellite terminal that was designed to be resistant to jamming and electromagnetic pulses (EMP) but that was fielded and, literally, parked away and forgotten (1).

The Army is also belatedly recognizing that what they’ve developed in the past was unusable by average soldiers.

“What we’re learning after 17 years of war and multiple years out at NIE (Network Integration Evaluations), is what we have out there is far too complicated for our soldiers.” (1)

The Army is also recognizing that their dependence on highly skilled manufacturer’s representatives won’t work in combat.  The reps simply won’t be there.

“Complexity isn’t just a training problem. It’s an operational problem. Systems that only function in the hands of highly trained contractors — the term of art is Field Service Representatives, or FSRs — were awkward but workable in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US troops rotated in and out of well-established Forward Operating Bases. In a Korean crisis, Eastern European war, or Third World flare-up, US forces would have to rapidly deploy all their equipment and people, set up their networks quickly and keep them running with little or no support.”

I’ve done posts on this.  The Navy is sending ships to sea which are totally dependent on manufacturer’s reps to make systems work.  That’s horribly wrong.  If the average sailor can’t operate and maintain the system then the Navy either needs to drastically enhance its training and create super techs or they need to simplify the systems. 

The former is unlikely given that many manufacturer’s reps have spent years acquiring their knowledge and expertise and have advanced degrees.  The Navy just can’t produce that level of capability starting from an 18 year old with no particularly relevant background.

The later is unpalatable to Navy leadership which uses the promise of technology to coax Congressional funding but the alternative is systems that won’t work in combat.  Would you rather have an Aegis/AMDR that can’t be maintained or an old-fashioned revolving SPS-49 that, while limited, works flawlessly and can be maintained and repaired?

The Army is frantically trying to improve their combat capability.  I think what we’re seeing is the recognition that the Army is a lot closer to facing actual combat than the other services and suddenly they’ve woken up to the fact that they’ve been sleeping on the job for decades.  There’s nothing like the threat of actual combat and death to motivate a person or organization to weed out the unnecessary and ineffective systems!  I only wish the Navy would follow the Army’s lead and wake up.  War with China is inevitable and the Navy is still sleeping.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Army Struggles To Streamline Its Networks For War”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 24-Jul-2017,

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/army-struggles-to-streamline-its-networks-for-war/

ATACMS and Geo-Strategic Reality

Once upon a time, the US military engaged in geo-strategic military planning.  This meant that we identified our potential enemies, studied the geography of the expected battlefield, identified weaknesses of our own associated with the geography, sought advantages we could gain from the geography, and planned and equipped for that geo-specific battle.  Thus, our forces and capabilities were closely aligned with the anticipated battle and battlefield location.  Simple and wise.

The classic example of this type of strategy was the Air-Land Battle strategy designed to counter a Russian invasion of Europe.  We understood the geography.  We understood how the geography would dictate the operational planning of both sides, how it would impact operational execution, and we developed plans and equipment designed specifically to take advantage of, and work within, that geography.

Now, however, the US military has abandoned geo-strategic planning in favor of techno-strategic planning.  Rather than develop strategies to counter specific enemies (heck, we won’t even name our enemies!), we now develop strategies to counter generic technologies – technologies that any given enemy might or might not have.  We have abandoned planning for the geographic realities associated with any specific enemy and, instead, are planning generically for opposing technologies.  Thus, our planning overlooks or ignores geographic considerations and cedes geographic advantages to the enemy.

For example, a fight with Russia will occur in a completely different geographical setting than a fight with China and yet we’re treating both the same from a strategic perspective.  We’re attempting to counter their technologies rather than the geo-military realities. 

Let’s look at a specific example.

The Army has announced that it is adding a seeker to its land based ATACMS (MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System) missile in order to be able to hit moving ships at sea at a range of 100 miles or so (1).  The Army is reviving its coastal artillery concept in order to remain a relevant player in the Pacific Pivot.

Two obvious, related points jump out.

• This is clearly an attempt to remain budget-relevant in a Pacific theater that allows for little use of Army ground forces.  Is a ship-attack ATACMS really useful or even viable?  It doesn’t matter.  What matters is that it can be used to strengthen the Army’s budget position.

• This is clearly a niche capability that has little usefulness in any geo-specific battlefield that we are likely to find ourselves fighting on.

An anti-ship ATACMS suffers from the same challenge that every long range missile system does which is the difficulty in targeting at long range.  The 100+ mile ATACMS needs a target and the land based Army has no ready means of providing that targeting.  UAVs could be used although they suffer from the same susceptibility to destruction and susceptibility to communications disruption that all UAVs do.  Land based radar, unless sited on a significant elevation, can’t detect surface targets at that range due to the limited radar horizon.  Targeting data can be provided by Navy or Air Force patrol assets but that not only requires dependence on networking, which we’ve already noted is likely to be degraded and only sporadically available, but it requires dependence on cross-service networking.  Intra-service networking (within a single service) is unreliable.  Inter-service networking (across services) is a fantasy.  We’re still working to get all the services to use the same communications protocols – we’re not going to get cross-service networking to function!

Army ATACMS - Impressive But Useless

So, we’re left with a theoretical capability that sounds good on paper but has little likelihood of usage or success.

Now, let’s look at the geo-specific considerations which the military has chosen to ignore, as we’ve noted.

The Pacific-Chinese theater has very little land accessible by the US military within a 100-200 mile range of any likely battlespace.  China already controls the first island chain and is beginning to eye the second.  Japan is a possibility for siting ATACMS units but 100-200 miles from mainland Japan is not where the main battles are going to occur. 

Well, can’t we seize the first chain islands and then place ATACMS on them?  Sure, but if we have the power to seize the islands then the likelihood that we can’t totally control a 100 mile range around the islands is miniscule.  Look at a map.  The first chain islands are generally not within a hundred miles of likely battles.  If we’ve seized the islands, there won’t be any Chinese ships remaining within range.  They’ll have been destroyed or pulled back to defend the mainland.  Thus, there won’t be any use for anti-ship ATACMS.

Now consider a war with Russia.  It will be a European land war.  Russia simply doesn’t have a significant Navy that is going to operate near land.  Their few ships will be destroyed at the outset by airpower.  There will be no use for an anti-ship ATACMS in a war with Russia.

Similarly, Iran and NKorea possess no relevant navies for an anti-ship ATACMS to defend against.

This is nothing more than recognizing the geo-strategic realities and the enemy order of battle.  When we consider the potential for use of an anti-ship ATACMS, it quickly becomes obvious that there is no practical use.  If there is no practical use then that only leaves its use as a budget leverage gimmick.

Well, why would supposedly intelligent Army leaders want to pursue this if it’s nothing more than a budget leverage gimmick?  They pursue it because it does provide budget leverage.  Remember, the goal of current military leaders is not the defense of our country; their goal is enhancement of their service’s budget slice.  Additionally, this is another symptom of a military that is techno-strategic rather than geo-strategic.  The few military leaders that are not blatantly political and bureaucratic have forgotten what geo-military analysis is and know only how to match technologies.  An anti-ship ATACMS is cool technology, when considered in isolation from any geo-military reality.  The fact that it has no practical use is lost on leaders who have never known any other way to analyze a military problem than by focusing on technology match ups.

Our military leaders have been educated in business management, systems analysis, politics, budgets, accounting, and civilian business practices.  They no longer know how to formulate a coherent military strategy.  Consider the hundreds of poor military management decisions we’ve highlighted on this blog.  They were poor decisions because they were based on factors other than a guiding military strategy.  This anti-ship ATACMS is a symptom of a military that has forgotten how to formulate a strategy.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Carter, Roper Unveil Army’s New Ship-Killer Missile: ATACMS Upgrade”, Sydney J. Freedburg Jr., 28-Oct-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/army-atacms-missile-will-kill-ships-secdef-carter/

The Army Gets It Even More!

Hard on the heels of the previous post comes more good news about Army training (1).  They’re now beginning to exercise in electromagnetically challenged and degraded environments.  This has long been one of ComNavOps’ beliefs, that we need to exercise in seriously electromagnetically challenged environments because that’s what we’ll fight in.  Failure to do so has led to our sailors and soldiers losing basic skills like navigation and map reading and an overdependence on networking and data linking to provide our intelligence and surveillance.  Our individual units have forgotten how to generate their own information.

Here’s the problem in a nutshell,

“After two decades of largely ignoring the danger, the Army is seriously training for a scary scenario: What if GPS, our satellite communications and our wireless networks go down?

It’s hardly a hypothetical threat. Russian electronic warfare units locate Ukrainian troops by their transmissions and jam their radios so they can’t call for help, setting them up for slaughter. American soldiers are much better trained and equipped than Ukrainian ones, but they’re also much more dependent on wireless devices.”

“We depend on networks for everything from communications to guiding precision weapons, to not shooting friendly units by accident, “to not getting lost in the woods …”

Now, the Army is beginning to train for lost electronic aids.  Training for an electromagnetically challenged environment starts with the basics.

“So the Army is now deliberately disrupting its own units during training. For example, when brigades go to the National Training Center, they naturally bring all their usual GPS navigation systems — but now “we routinely take that capability away from them,” said Perkins [ Gen. David Perkins, head of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)]. “We’re having to teach people at the Basic Course on up on how you operate if that is taken away, in other words introducing people to maps.”

Training then goes on to top end electromagnetic warfare (EW) threats.

“In the past, “we’ve done some training exercises where there’s been GPS jamming; we’ve done exercises where there’s radio-frequency jamming… but it’s very narrow, very limited.” By contrast, he said, under Gen. Milley’s direction, the Army will “bring the full [EW] package to the National Training Center.”

As the article discusses, the Army is having to relearn lessons of old:  maps, compasses, hand drawn battle plans, tactical siting of HQs and communications units, radio discipline to avoid triangulation, etc.

Outstanding Army!  Once again, the Navy needs to learn from the Army.  The Navy is even more dependent on electromagnetic aids then the Army is.  Every weapon the Navy has uses GPS guidance or guidance data links, the heart of the Navy’s defensive plans relies on networks and data sharing for cooperative engagement, UAVs are dependent on highly vulnerable comm. links, etc.  The Navy needs to relearn how to fight in an EW environment.  The Navy needs to find out which weapons simply won’t work in an EW environment.  The Navy needs to break its addiction to and dependence on electronic aids.

In a real war, there’s a lot to said for a high explosive, dumb shell that requires no guidance and can’t be jammed!

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(1)Breaking Defense, “Maps & Jammers: Army Intensifies Training Vs. Russian-Style Jamming”, Sydeny J. Freedberg Jr, 18-Mar-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/fighting-blind-army-intensifies-training-vs-russian-style-jamming/

The Army is Getting It

Here’s an Army item that directly pertains to the Navy.  The heads-up on this came from SNAFU blog (1).  A big thanks to SNAFU for this one! 

ComNavOps has long harped on the need for realistic training and it now appears that the Army is beginning to understand that and is conducting much more realistic exercises.  Realistic training is not just about live fire or smoke or simulated explosions.  It’s about making the entire exercise as realistic as possible.  For example, if you’re going to train for an amphibious assault, you don’t send a single ship to a point just offshore and then leisurely unload AAVs to an empty beach.  Instead, you gather an entire MEU/ARG, place them 50 nm offshore (that’s what our doctrine calls for) and send them ashore by all the means you would use in combat.  You throw in air support, naval gun support, combat engineering with real obstacles to clear, add in dummy mines, simulated casualties and medical evac, and an enemy opposing force which has helos and air cover.  Do that all in an electromagnetically contested environment with degraded GPS and networking and then you’ll have a realistic exercise that provides worthwhile training.

When have we ever exercised a multi-carrier offensive group?

When have we worked on fleet level operations?

So, what is the Army doing?  From SNAFU and Defense News websites, the Army is conducting no-notice, come as you are exercises.

“For example, the 82nd Airborne Division’s Global Response Force element conducted a no-notice exercise in February, jumping into Fort Hood, Texas, to conduct a weapons of mass destruction-elimination mission.” (2)

The Army is also taking the exercise all the way to the expected deployment location rather than just simulate movements.

“Three weeks ago, the Army alerted and then deployed an air defense artillery brigade to the Pacific Command theater of operations for a training exercise.” (2)

Here’s another example of conducting a realistic movement of equipment.

“In April, when one of the brigades from the 101st Airborne Division travels to Fort Polk, Louisiana, for its Joint Readiness Training Center rotation, instead of moving its vehicles over land as it normally would, it will have to ship its vehicles by sea, Donahue [Lt. Gen. Patrick Donahue, the deputy commander of US Army Forces Command] said.”

“This means moving 800 vehicles and 200 containers by rail to the port, then loading them onto a ship and sending them off to Port Arthur, Texas, Donahue said. The unit will then meet its equipment at Port Arthur and transport it to Fort Polk.”

“We’re executing the whole process from fort to port and see if we can make it work,” Donahue said.” (2)

“… to see if we can make it work.”  Isn’t that a horrifying statement?  The Army is supposed to be ready to do this kind of thing and we have a General wondering if we can make it work?  What has this guy, and all the rest of the Generals, been doing for the last few decades?  Talk about failing to do your duty!

All right, enough criticizing.  At least, the Army is waking up from its long slumber and starting to do something about its shortcomings.  That’s more than the Navy is doing.

Training also needs to be large scale, when appropriate.  We have high level Army commanders who have never exercised their complete units because our focus for the last couple of decades has been on small unit actions.  Unfortunately, there’s a world of difference between commanding a tank platoon and an entire division.  It’s not enough to run a single tank around a course and then assume that you can command the maneuvering and operations of an armored brigade.

To that end,

“The Army also is directing units to conduct brigade-level Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises, or EDREs, he [Lt. Gen. Gustave Perna, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for logistics] said.

“We were skirting around the capability by conducting some company and battalion EDREs, but we’re going to up to ante with brigade EDREs,” Perna said.” (2)

Good for you, Army!  If you plan to fight with brigades then you need to exercise as brigades.

Yes, this kind of training costs more money but it’s a lot cheaper than arriving to a peer-level war unprepared and having your ass handed to you. 

The Navy needs to follow the Army’s example and begin realistic training starting with some of these:

• When was the last time the Navy/Marines actually landed an entire MEU/MEB?
• When was the last time the Navy exercised a multi-carrier force?
• The Navy needs to exercise an entire landing through the MLP sea base (I bet it can’t be done!).
• The Navy needs to conduct a live fire swarm test against the LCS.
• The Navy needs to conduct a live fire saturation cruise missile attack against an Aegis cruiser.
• When was the last time the Navy conducted fleet level anti-surface exercises?
• When was the last time the Marines/Navy conducted a full scale port seizure exercise?
• When was the last time the Navy conducted a surge exercise?

It’s pathetic what our training has devolved to but I salute the Army for starting to wake up to the possibility of full scale war and training for it. 

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(1)http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-us-army-is-upping-its-game.html

(2)http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/ausa-global-force/2016/03/16/us-army-generals-criticize-outdated-deployment-model-weve-gotten-rusty/81858318/

The Army Is Out Of The Conventional Warfare Business

ComNavOps rarely comments on Army issues but this item ties directly back to what we’ve repeatedly discussed about the focus of the Navy and the military in general.  I’ve stated that under CNO Greenert the Navy has become focused on the low end of the threat spectrum and peace time operations such as humanitarian assistance instead of the Navy’s primary responsibility which is to wage and win high end combat.  Well, here’s an example of that loss of focus in the Army.  From the DoD website (1),

“The NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA] has changed its focus from conventional warfare, Work [Deputy Defense Secretary] said, to hybrid and counterinsurgency warfare.”

That’s just stunning.  The Army is no longer focused on conventional warfare.  This at the same time that Russia is actively gobbling up countries using conventional arms and developing whole new families of heavy armor vehicles and China is building a massively capable conventional army and navy.  The rest of the world is gearing up for large scale, high end conventional combat and we’re focusing on counterinsurgency.  At some point, the world is going to hand us our heads if we don’t remember what a military is for.

Back to the Navy …  Converting a third of the combat fleet to the LCS is just insane.  We need hard hitting, hard fighting warships not glorified Coast Guard cutters.

Well, apparently the Navy is not alone in choosing the wrong path.  This is an indictment of our senior military leadership.

(1)US Department of Defense, “Work Observes Large-Scale Military Exercise at Fort Irwin”, Terri Moon Cronk, 7-Aug-2015

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=129430