Our Future Warfighting Concept in Action

Apparently, two ships attempting transit of the Strait of Hormuz were attacked by Iranian small boats.
 

The captain of ‌a tanker said it had been approached by two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gunboats that fired ‌on the vessel.[1]
 
A container ship was also hit by gunfire … [1]

The vessels turned back and no injuries or significant damage was reported (so why did they turn back?).
 
What is the significance of this?  The significance is that it’s the future of our military/Navy and it’s not looking good.  This should be eye-opening and shocking for those idiots who are developing our future warfare concepts.
 
What is the foundation of our future warfare concepts?  It’s regional (if not world wide!) sensor networking resulting in total situational awareness with the sensor network intimately linked to weapons.  Nothing exists without us being aware of it and destroying it.  To be fair, the military doesn’t actually talk about destroying things when it describes our future warfare concepts.  I added that part.  The military talks about total awareness somehow, in some undefined way, giving us an advantage by rendering the enemy “confused” and that will gain us victory without any explicit mention of firepower.
 
The regional sensor network will be comprised of all manner of sensors from ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.  We will blanket the region and we’ll see everything.
 
The Middle East, and the Strait of Hormuz, in this case, is a clear example of the regional sensor network concept being applied against a third rate enemy over a very small region.  This should be as dominating an effect as is possible to get.  Iran has no sensor countermeasures.  No jamming.  No signal disruption capability.  No reported cyber attack capability.  Nothing to hinder our sensors or the regional network.  Our networked sensing should be flawless.  Perfect.  Omniscient. 
 
So … how did Iranian boats manage to attack two merchant ships and return safely to wherever they came from?  How did we not see them?  How did we not kill them seconds after they emerged from wherever they were hiding?  For that matter, how could they hide from our all-seeing, all-knowing, regional sensor network?  These are not some kind of uber-stealth vessels aided by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.  These were some Iranians in a speedboat sailing around, pretending to be a navy – the equivalent of Boy Scouts pretending to be an Army.  The Navy claims to be able to spot periscopes at vast distances ... but not speedboats racing around confined waters?
 
The Strait of Hormuz is not the vast Pacific Ocean.  It’s a very small area and we should be able to blanket it with sensors.  That’s the whole idea of our regional sensor network.  How much more challenging will this be when we attempt it across, say, the entire first island chain when we fight China?  That’s thousands of miles and millions of square miles.  How’s that going to work if we can’t even successfully execute the concept over a tiny strait against an unresisting enemy?  And we’re basing our entire future warfare concept on this?  Yikes!
 
Hand in hand with the sensor issues, where was the firepower component?  Where were the patrolling P-8s, Triton, helicopters, ships, F-35s, drones, etc?  Where were the escorts providing protection for the merchant ships?  It’s not as if there are currently hundreds of merchant ships lined up bow to stern, transiting the strait.  It’s just a few odd ships sporadically making the attempt.  Shouldn’t we be keeping an especially close eye on them to ensure their successful passage for public relations purposes, if nothing else?  Shouldn’t we have vaporized those Iranian boats the moment they appeared?  Shouldn’t we have had firepower ready and waiting when the merchant ships radioed a warming call for help?  Could it be that we did see the boats and just had no firepower available to destroy them?  That’s pure speculation on my part and there is absolutely no indication that we ever saw the boats.
 
No matter how you attempt to spin this, it’s a very bad look for the US and a gut-level warning for our supposed military leaders who are crafting a military concept predicated on networked sensors.  We’re in trouble.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Iran Navy Warns Hormuz Shut Again; Ships Report Gunfire”, 18-Apr-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/strait-of-hormuz-iran-navy-oil-tankers/2026/04/18/id/1253365/

HMS Dreadnought Lessons

The introduction of the Royal Navy’s HMS Dreadnought in 1906 revolutionized naval warship design and instantaneously obsoleted every existing battleship.  The Dreadnought story is commonly available and I won’t repeat it, here.  You can research it yourself, at your leisure.  It is also not the intent of this post to debate the merits or drawbacks of any particular aspect of Dreadnought’s design.  Instead, let’s examine the lessons that we can learn from Dreadnought’s story.

 

HMS Dreadnought

Instantaneous Obsolescence – The Dreadnought design was so advanced that it instantaneously rendered every existing battleship obsolete.  That achievement, however, required multiple significant technological advances all packaged into one ship and that was the key:  packaging.  The individual technologies were not unique; 12 inch guns and steam turbines already existed.  The achievement was not the individual technologies but, rather, the packaging of that combination that made for a unique and revolutionary achievement.

 

The lesson, here, is that unique and revolutionary advances don’t necessarily have to come from entirely new technologies but can come from inspired packaging of existing technologies.  Developing all new technologies is incredibly expensive, time consuming, and difficult (for example, Ford EMALS, Ford AAG, Zumwalt Advanced Gun System, Ford elevators, LCS NLOS, etc.) but inspired packaging of existing technologies to achieve new capabilities is quick and cheap, needing only inspiration which, admittedly, is too often in short supply.

 

 

Offsets – Dreadnought created a tactical and possibly strategic offset for the UK which conferred a military capability and advantage that no other country could match – an offset.  This is the dream of the US military which has become caught up in the pursuit of an almost magical, mythical offset so profound that it will guarantee our military dominance for decades to come.  Of course, this is delusional.  Offsets never last long enough to offer any long lasting benefit because other countries instantly copy whatever the breakthrough was.  At best, the supposed offset might last a few years and could prove useful if a military need just happened to arise during that short window.  The US development and use of stealth is an example of such a short-lived offset that just happened to coincide with the Desert Storm conflict and thus proved useful (the F-117 aircraft).  In the event, Dreadnought was copied – and improved on – by other countries in a matter of a few years and the UK’s offset vanished before they could take advantage of it.

 

It is instructive to note that Dreadnought’s short lived advantage strongly argues against long ship service lives but that’s another topic.

 

The lesson, here, is that offsets are fleeting and confer no lasting advantage and, therefore, the obsessive pursuit of an offset is delusional and pointless.

 

 

Firepower – This is self-evident.  Dreadnought’s increase in firepower – through number of guns more than the size - was a massive step forward.  Firepower superiority is a timeless warfare requirement and a lesson that should never need repeating and yet the US military is currently abandoning firepower in favor of networks and a mythical, magical, information offset that can never exist.

 

The lesson, here, is that firepower – the ability to destroy the enemy’s people and things – is the only military advantage that has any meaning or validity because it is the ultimate arbiter of military success or failure.  Yes, we all understand the role of logistics and industrial production but even those are pointless unless their end result is the delivery of overwhelming firepower.  And yes, we all understand the usefulness of battlefield intelligence as a supporting enhancement or enabler to firepower, not a replacement for it.

 

Speed - What made Dreadnought such a massive step forward was the combination of firepower and speed.  Speed allowed the ship to use its massive firepower to greater advantage than any other existing ship.  For example, Dreadnought could maintain a range advantage, sail out of danger, choose the time and circumstances of engagement, cross the ‘T’ at will, and simply dictate the course of a battle due to significantly superior speed. 

 

Speed enabled Dreadnought’s firepower to be used to its maximum advantage.  Speed was an enabler and enhancer of the ship’s firepower.

 

The lesson, here, is not speed (though speed is always nice!) but the recognition that secondary characteristics or capabilities that can enhance the primary characteristic can be just as effective as a new, primary capability.  In our pursuit of ever larger, more powerful, longer ranged weapons (I’m looking at you, Standard and cruise missiles) we should not overlook the secondary means to more effectively employ the primary effect.  It is also worth noting that secondary effects are often (always?) cheaper and easier to develop than primary effects.

 

What this is implying is that tactics and enhancements that can better utilize existing weapons may be just as important, or more so, than trying to develop bigger weapons.  The Navy is exclusively focused on bigger weapons (well, actually, bigger networks) rather than better tactics and enhancements.  In fact, disturbingly, I’m unaware of any rigorous tactical development efforts within the US Navy.

 

 

Now, for a bit of fun …

 

Example Implications To Ponder

 

Battleship - What if we re-introduced a modernized Iowa-ish battleship?  It would instantly render all existing warships obsolete with its massive firepower – gun and missile – and incredible armor.  A ship that could effortlessly sink any existing ship and shrug off most damage from any existing weapon system would certainly confer a Dreadnought-type advantage for several years until other countries could build their own, similar ships and, given the prevailing anti-battleship sentiment it might well confer an advantage of a decade or more until other countries became convinced that it was a good idea.

 

UAV Carrier – UAVs and aircraft carriers both exist but what if we packaged the two together?  A dedicated UAV carrier carrying hundreds of small surveillance and ?combat? UAVs would be a highly effective force multiplier.

 

Armored Sensors – Armor and sensors have both been around forever but what if we packaged sensors inside armored pop-up or pop-open enclosures instead of mounting them out in the open, totally exposed?  This would eliminate the possibility of sensors being destroyed by simple shrapnel from fragmentation missiles and would confer an instant and significant combat advantage to the ship that couldn’t be easily blinded and mission killed.

 

Long Range ASW – Aircraft and ASW sensors have been around for many decades but what if we packaged the two together and mounted ASW sensors on a long ranged, fixed wing aircraft.  Such an aircraft, with its speed, range, and endurance could conduct ASW operations far beyond the range and endurance limits of ASW helicopters and far beyond the range of escort ships.  Its speed of relocation would greatly expand the coverage area, as well.  ASW aircraft would push the ASW detection and engagement points much further out and, while not rendering submarines irrelevant, would significantly increase the challenge for enemy submarines.  Okay, I know that we already had such an aircraft – the S-3 Viking - but a good idea is still a good idea and bringing a good idea back can provide a profound advantage even if we once had it and foolishly gave it up.

 

 

I can go on listing potential good ideas along these lines but you get the idea and you can come up with your own.  The point is that there are plenty of advantages to be gained from simple repackaging of existing technologies.  We don’t always have to obsessively pursue leap-ahead technology that never seems to pan out.  Perhaps we should concentrate on existing technologies, tactics, and secondary enhancements and allow someone like, oh, say China to take the lead in developing new technologies and then simply copy them if/when they’ve invested billions and wrung out the problems for a new technology?  Hmm … there’s something to think about … let China be our R&D organization instead of the other way around.  But, I digress …

Information Dominance - Proof of Failure

Cdr Salamander, on his blog, offered a post that contains a pearl of wisdom too good to let pass.  He was discussing a recent wargame (2) whose results have been making the rounds of the Internet and one of the specific points he was addressing was that of networks and information advantage and how the military claims this will give us a decisive advantage over our enemies.  Here is his thought on the notion:

 

We had a huge information advantage over the Taliban and how did that work out for us. (1)

 

I’m not going to discuss that wargame because there is no definitive information on the conditions or results so there is nothing to intelligently discuss.  Besides, what little has come out of it publicly is almost too stupid to believe although the military never ceases to amaze me with its ability to self-deceive so …

 

Instead, I want to expand on Cdr Salamander’s thought a bit.

 

As we’ve discussed ad nauseam, the Navy (and the military as a whole) has bet all-in on networks and information dominance as the foundation and key to future combat dominance.  We’ve also demonstrated the folly of this approach, repeatedly.  I’ll try not to repeat that discussion but I would like to expand on Cdr Salamander’s thought with some more examples.

 

Afghanistan – We had total information – and technology – overmatch over the Taliban to a degree that beggars the imagination and yet, here we are, today, pulling out of Afghanistan having lost after 20 years of total information dominance.  As the Cdr notes, how did that work out for us?

 

Vietnam – We had total information dominance and network superiority (albeit of a cruder level than today) and we lost to people living and fighting day to day in huts, caves, and tunnels.  How did that work out for us?

 

 

Now, let’s consider another example that turned out differently.

 

 

Desert Storm – We had total information dominance and this one was a spectacular tactical victory (and a strategic failure).  What was different about this?  The difference was that we won through overwhelming firepower, training, logistics, and motivation – all the traditional elements of a powerful military.  Of course, having a totally incompetent, unmotivated enemy helped! 

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

Desert Storm was won because we had and applied overwhelming firepower superiority.  Contrast that with Afghanistan.  We had overwhelming firepower superiority, as a military, but we didn’t apply it.  Desert Storm saw armored divisions roaming the battlefield while Afghanistan saw infantry patrols sporadically appearing on the battlefield and then returning to base.  Our information dominance had no decisive impact.

 

The conclusion is obvious:  information dominance does not win wars but firepower does – when it’s applied.

 

We won’t achieve information dominance over China.  At best, we’ll achieve parity.  If we couldn’t win any wars with total information dominance, why do we think we’ll beat China with, at best, information parity?

 

 

 

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(1)cdr salamander blog, “We’re Designing Ourselves To Lose”, 26-Jul-2021,

https://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2021/07/were-designing-ourselves-to-lose.html

 

(2)https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/07/it-failed-miserably-after-wargaming-loss-joint-chiefs-are-overhauling-how-us-military-will-fight/184050/

Fight In Plain View

In future wars, the US military believes it will see everything, friendly and enemy, on the future battlefield thanks to vast regional/global command and control networks, UAVs, regional sensor networks, underwater unmanned vessels, unmanned surface vessels, satellites, etc.  ComNavOps has pointed out the fallacy in that belief but, for sake of discussion, let’s follow the logic of that belief and see where it takes us.  I must warn you, the destination may be surprising and upsetting.

 

If we believe our omnipotence to be true then we have to believe the flip side which is that the enemy will also see everything since they will have all the same assets, capabilities, and resources and, in the case of China, they’ll have the added advantage of ‘home field’ (we’re talking about a main war, now, not a proxy conflict in Africa or some such) which provides land based radar, air bases, harbors, etc. which will greatly increase the density of sensors that can be applied to the battlefield.

 

If we believe it to be true then we must believe that all forces, friendly and enemy, will be under constant threat of attack or, indeed, constant actual attack since their location will be continually known.

 

That being the case, the inevitable and inescapable conclusion, then, is that it is mandatory that our forces be able to fight exposed and fully out in the open, as far as detection is concerned, because the enemy will know exactly where we are at all times.

 

That’s right, there will be no hiding, no hidden bases, no skulking LCS distributed lethality ships waiting to pounce on unsuspecting prey, no undetected Marine anti-ship missile units hidden on islands, no undetected transports relocating small Marine units and providing them with resupply, no UAVs blithely flying undetected deep into enemy territory, no submarines cruising undetected through enemy waters, etc.

 

I repeat, the logic has to work both ways.  If we can see everything, so can the enemy.

 

So, if our forces will be constantly exposed and under constant attack, how can they survive?  There is one way and one way only and that is through the application of massive, overwhelming defensive firepower combined with extensive ‘armor’ (‘armor’ includes actual armor and also electronic warfare ‘armor’).  Instead of Burkes with a single CIWS, we’ll need ships with dozens of CIWS/SeaRAM and hundreds of ESSM.  Instead of remaining passive and hidden, our ships will need to radiate constantly (no point using passive sensors since the enemy will know exactly where we are!) and, given the inevitable combat damage, we’ll need ships with multiple redundant sensor systems and backup sensors on top of that.

 

Can this actually work?  Can a force survive under constant surveillance and attack?  Of course they can … if they have sufficient firepower.  This is analogous to telling the other team your play and daring them to stop you.  If you have big enough, fast enough, strong enough players you can successfully execute your play even if the other team knows it’s coming.  This is actually what we did in WWII.  Okinawa was not a surprise to Japan.  They knew it was coming.  They knew exactly where our forces were and they attacked almost constantly but it didn’t matter because we had sufficient firepower to survive and succeed – albeit it at great cost.

 

Of course, the astute among you have noticed that the solution to the problem – overwhelming firepower and armor – is the exact opposite of where the US military is going.  The military is almost ignoring firepower while they pursue networks, data, and command and control schemes. 

 

If our ground forces will be under constant attack, why haven’t we developed a robust, mobile, anti-air capability?

 

If our naval forces will be under constant attack, why are our ships so lightly armed (Burkes have only a single CIWS), unarmored, and without redundant or backup sensors and weapons?

 

If our carriers will be under constant attack, why aren’t we training for multi-carrier group operations?

 

Why does our front line F-35 aircraft carry so few weapons?

 

Why does the Marine Corps believe that platoon size units will be able to survive?

 

And so on …

 

 

Now, the extremely astute among you will have already concluded that the best defense is a good offense.  Rather than simply stand and see how long we can survive while the enemy pounds on us, relentlessly, we need to be conducting our own massive and constant attacks on their assets.  Again, this means firepower, not networks, and massive amounts of it.  Where are our massive offensive forces?  Where are our massively powerful and numerous weapons?  China will be flinging super/hyper-sonic ballistic missiles at us and we’ll be answering with subsonic, non-stealthy, obsolete Tomahawks.  I know which side of that exchange I’d rather be on!  China will be flinging supersonic (Mach 2-4) YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles at us and we’ll be answering with slow, obsolete, non-stealthy Harpoons or, possibly, subsonic Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM).  Again, I know which side of that exchange I’d rather be on.  Chinese submarines will be flinging YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles at us and we’ll be answering with Harpoons or, possibly, an anti-ship Tomahawk missile.  And so on.

 

We lack the firepower, lethality, and numbers of weapons to win a war of attrition.  That’s right, a war of attrition.  If both sides have complete knowledge about each other’s forces, the war defaults to a war of attrition.  All of our vaunted maneuver warfare theories are rendered invalid when the enemy sees everything, just as we can.

 

Now, some of you, quite rightly, may be saying, hey, it’s not possible for the enemy to see all of our forces.  In fact, most of our forces will, at any given moment, be undetected.  Well, if that’s true then it must also be true for the enemy.  Most of their forces will, at any given moment, be undetected and, if that’s the case, why are we basing our entire future military hope on the concept of perfect knowledge and awareness of the enemy’s forces?  Why are we focusing so much effort on networks, data, and sensors if we won’t be able to see the bulk of the enemy’s forces?  Do you see the logical disconnect inherent in what our military is doing?  Either way, perfect knowledge or not, we’re being inconsistent in our logic which means our information-centric approach to future warfare is fundamentally wrong.  The correct approach is firepower-centric with information being used to support firepower, not replace it.  The Russians demonstrated this to perfection in Ukraine and we’ve opted to ignore the evidence.

 

Useful or Pointless?

So, are our systems going to see everything and we’re going to fight in plain view as our military development  path logically dictates or will our systems be unable to see everything which makes our development path fundamentally flawed?  If we are going to fight in plain view, our forces are poorly designed and equipped to do so.

The Illusion of Breakthroughs in Warfare

The US military is obsessively pursuing a Breakthrough in warfare that will provide a massive advantage.  The modern term for such a paradigm shifting Breakthrough is ‘Offset’ although that term, while all the rage for a while, has somewhat faded from use of late.  We’ll use the two terms interchangeably for the rest of this discussion.

 

The US military believes there have been two previous Offsets: 

 

First Offset = nuclear weapons (1950s)

Second Offset = precision guidance (1970s)

 

Some discussions include stealth in the Second Offset.

 

The US military is now pursuing the Third Offset (see, "Third Offset Strategy" and "Offset Strategy Follow Up").

 

The fact, though, is that neither the First nor Second Offset produced any lasting advantage and, in fact, neither produced a decisive advantage in any combat. 

 

Nuclear weapons never produced any decisive advantage, partly because the US wound up opting never to employ them in first use and partly because the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in 1949 thus ending any advantage the US might have had after only four years. 

 

Precision guidance has been useful but has never been decisive;  not in Vietnam (which we lost), Desert Storm (useful but not the decisive factor, by any means), Afghanistan (if we haven’t lost, we certainly haven’t won), or against ISIS (ISIS functioned quite well in the face of precision guided weapons and lost only to ground troops).

 

Stealth, if you wish to include that as an Offset factor, was useful in Desert Storm but was not the decisive factor and has played no significant role in any conflict since. 

 

The major problem with Offsets/Breakthroughs is that they never last long enough to prove decisive in war.  The other side invariably is able to produce the same Breakthrough in amazingly short order.  Consider the following examples of paradigm shifting breakthroughs in warfare.

 

 

 

Stealth – The stealth advantage has been negated both by other countries producing their own versions of stealth aircraft and ships and by the development of stealth detecting technologies such as specialized radar, IRST, etc.

 

Precision Guidance – Guided weapons were copied around the world almost as soon as they came out.

 

Nuclear Weapons – The Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in Sep 1949 thus ending the US advantage after barely four years.  Nuclear weapons never provided a decisive advantage in war for the US and, ultimately, proved useless even as a deterrent since no one believes the US would execute first use of nuclear weapons.

 

Monitor and Merrimack – The ironclad was a huge leap forward in naval warfare and produced a vessel that was, for all practical purposes, invincible compared to the previous wooden, sailing ships.  Incredibly, both the North and South developed ironclads almost simultaneously which completely negated any systematic advantage either side might have gained.

 

Dreadnought – The UK’s HMS Dreadnought revolutionized naval ship design but succeeded only in triggering a naval arms race and the ship was copied and surpassed within five years without providing any advantage for the British.

 

Blitzkreig – While it produced an initial advantage for the Germans, it was negated and defeated in fairly short order and produced no lasting benefit for the Germans. 

 

The Tank in WWI – The first tank to see combat took place in Sep 1916 and by Mar 1918, Germany had introduced its own tank and the first tank-to-tank battle occurred in Apr 1918.  The tank produced no lasting advantage for the Allies.

 

And so on …

 

An interesting Breakthrough that did produce a fairly long lasting advantage was the submarine as implemented by Germany in WWI and WWII.  This is, perhaps, the closest to anyone having achieved a long lasting Breakthrough in warfare and it wasn’t the submarine that was the breakthrough but how it was used.  Other countries developed submarines right along with Germany.  What they didn’t do was develop the operational and tactical implementation to effectively use them.  Germany developed the operational application – convoy interdiction – and the tactics (wolf packs, night attacks, etc.) to maximize the benefits of submarines to unprecedented levels.  They achieved a Breakthrough.

 

The noteworthy aspect of this is that it was not the technology – the submarine – that produced the Breakthrough but the method of employing it – the concept of operations (CONOPS, in modern terminology).  This offers a lesson for us that technology is not the solution but that CONOPS or doctrine can be.

 

Clearly, chasing Offsets is like chasing after Fool’s Gold.  It’s illusory and not real.

 

So where should we look for advantages in warfare?  Unsurprisingly, the advantages come from the old, tried and true factors:

 

• Maintenance
• Tactics
• Training
• Production capacity
• Firepower
• Logistics

 

The US military is focused on the illusory Breakthrough instead of doing the mundane, dirty, lowly, hard work that is necessary to win wars.  The Breakthrough is ‘hard work’, not technology.

Maintaining the Gap

Militarily, America has traditionally been able to count on a technology and general capability advantage over its opponents.  This gap between our capabilities and our enemy’s has allowed us to persevere while steadily shrinking in numbers (Reagan era excepted!).  Of late, however, our enemies have been able to match, and in some cases exceed, our technology.  China, in particular seems bent on matching or exceeding both our technology and our numbers.  If successful, they will reverse the military gap and own the advantage.  Russia is matching some of our technology and in a few cases exceeding it – electronic warfare being the prime example.  Russia, however, lacks numbers and the economic foundation to alter the numbers imbalance.

The military gap, or offset, as it has also been called, has, historically, been a transient and ever-changing situation.  Whenever one country develops a new technology it is only a matter of time until all countries have it.  Thus, the original developer gains a fairly short-lived, transient advantage that vanishes over time.  

For example, the US was the first to develop stealth in a workable, mass produced form (F-117 aircraft) and that gave us a significant advantage for a number of years.  Now, however, all countries have stealth capabilities.  Not only that, many countries are developing counter-stealth technologies.  Our stealth-based gap (offset) has ended.

With the end of the US stealth gap, our overall gap has begun to shrink.  Decades ago, we committed to a philosophy of fewer numbers in the misguided belief that we could compensate with superior technology.  Now, though, we’re finding ourselves being matched in technology and we’re losing the numbers advantage we once held – the worst of both worlds.

The narrowing gap is beginning to make an impact.

… during a congressional hearing earlier this month, Rand Corp. researcher and Pentagon war gamer David Ochmanek told senators that “when we run war games against China and Russia, U.S. forces lack the capabilities they need to win … and the gap is widening.” (1)

“I think there’s widespread agreement in the building that our conventional overmatch is eroding,” [Robert] Work [former DepSecDef] said. “The only debate is how long we have.” (1)

Having learned no lessons from history, the US’ solution to maintaining our gap over potential enemies is to develop new technology.  For the US, technology has always been the answer to everything.  Quantity, tactics, training, maintenance, etc. have been relegated to afterthoughts.  We’re focused on technology for its own sake, assuming that superior technology automatically grants battlefield success.  Unfortunately, history is packed with examples of low tech forces matching or beating high tech ones.  Some examples include,

• NVietnam
• ISIS
• Afghanistan/Taliban
• Hamas/PalestineHouthi rebels

Despite history’s lesson about technology, we remain determined to ride the promise of technology.  A few years ago, it was the Third Offset Strategy which would use networks and unmanned vehicles to make up for lack of firepower, survivability, and numbers despite the fact that our networks and unmanned communications are highly susceptible to electronic countermeasures, as Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine.

Now, the Third Offset talk has died down but the pursuit of technology continues unabated.  The name may have changed but the Third Offset goals still resonate with the US military.

If, as history teaches us, technology is not the way to maintain our gap, what is?

The answer is firepower.  More specifically, effective firepower.

It does us no good to know what color underwear each individual enemy soldier is wearing if we lack the firepower to kill them.  Conversely, the enemy doesn’t really care about intel if they can bring massive and incredibly lethal area bombardments to bear.  The Russian TOS-1 Buratino self-propelled rocket launcher (an MLRS with 30x 220mm rockets) is a good example of a thermobaric, area barrage weapon.

Firepower makes up for a lot of missing intel.

Now, don’t get me wrong, intel/recon/surveillance is important.  However, when it supersedes firepower it becomes counterproductive and intel for its own sake is just wasteful and misleading.  Ideally, intel and firepower should operate hand in hand.  However, if you can’t have both, consider the two cases where one of the factors is missing. 

-       Intel without firepower is useless.

On the other hand, 

-       Firepower without intel is still useful.  Area bombardment is effective, if inefficient. 

Given the general principal, what specific types of firepower do we lack?  Here’s a few,

Conventional ballistic missiles – China, in particular, is building an inventory of such missiles including the much-hyped DF-21 carrier killer.  We sorely lack a 1000-5000 mile ballistic missile.  Ballistic missiles are causing immense concern in the Navy.  Isn’t it about time that we return the favor to China?

Supersonic cruise missiles – We lack supersonic cruise missiles.  Even our newest anti-ship missile, the LRASM, is subsonic.  Again, we worry greatly about our enemy’s supersonic missiles (every conversation seems to include mention of the ‘unstoppable’ BrahMos) and for good reason.  They are very difficult to engage.  We need our own.

Stealthy cruise missiles – The Tomahawk is our main cruise missile and, among its other shortcomings, is not stealthy.  The success rate of Tomahawk against a peer defense is highly suspect.

Artillery cluster munitions – The US has opted to cease development of cluster munitions despite our enemies enthusiasm for them.  Why wouldn’t they be enthusiastic?  Cluster munitions are highly effective and hugely destructive.  We need cluster munitions.

Heavy naval guns – We have an entire amphibious assault doctrine that completely lacks heavy naval gunfire support.  The vast majority of military targets throughout the world lie within 20 miles of the shore.  Heavy naval guns would prove immensely destructive and useful.  Vietnam and a host of other historical examples prove that conclusively.

Very Long Range Air-to-Air Missile – The US developed the Phoenix missile and owned a significant air-to-air range advantage but has since failed to follow up with even longer ranged missiles.  China and Russia are now developing and fielding air-to-air missiles with ranges of 200-300+ miles.

The examples can go on but these should suffice to illustrate our firepower shortcomings.

If we don’t change our approach and begin focusing more on firepower, we’ll someday have the most exquisite knowledge in the history of warfare of the enemy that is destroying us with good old-fashioned area bombardment.

We need to regain our firepower gap or, at the very least, not allow our enemies to own the firepower advantage.

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(1)Foreign Policy website, “The Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, But No One Knows What Comes Next”, Paul McLeary, 18-Dec-2017,

https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/the-pentagons-third-offset-may-be-dead-but-no-one-knows-what-comes-next/

USS McCain Rammed - Distributed Lethality Sinking

You all know about the recent USS Fitzgerald collision with a merchant ship that heavily damaged and nearly sank the destroyer.  Now, another collision has occurred between the USS McCain and a merchant tanker.  Several sailors are reported missing or injured.  Damage appears to have been severe.  No further details are available at this time.

What I would like to comment on is the Third Offset Strategy and the Navy’s much-hyped distributed lethality plan.  Both depend on absolute and extensive knowledge of enemy activities and locations.  Somehow, almost magically, we’ll know where all of their assets are and what they’re doing while remaining hidden, ourselves.  That sounds great on paper but is going to fail miserably in war.  How do I know?  Because we can’t even keep track of giant merchant ships that sail right up to us and ram us!!!!!!!  So, how are we going to find and track small, stealthy military assets that are using intentional deception, stealth, electronic warfare, jamming, and decoys?  We aren’t!!!!!!!!!  Our offset strategy and distributed lethality plans are idiotic and we’re being rammed with proof of that on a recurring basis.

Ballistic Missile Defense - Operator Error

The Navy has concluded that a recent failed anti-ballistic missile test of the Standard SM-3 Block IIa was due to an operator who inadvertently input an identification of the target as a “friendly”, thus causing the SM-3 to self-destruct before hitting the target.

“A U.S. Missile Defense Agency review of a failed ballistic missile intercept test showed that a mistaken input into the combat system by a sailor on the destroyer John Paul Jones caused the missile to self-destruct before reaching the target.

A tactical datalink controller, in charge of maintaining encrypted data exchanges between ships and aircraft, accidentally identified the incoming ballistic missile target as a friendly in the system, causing the SM-3 missile to self-destruct in flight …” (1)

We’re building a vast network of sensors and weapons as the foundation of the Third Offset Strategy – a strategy that will give us an unrivaled edge over our enemies and assure us of maintaining combat superiority.  At least, that’s what we’re being told.

And now, we see that a simple operator input error can entirely negate a ballistic missile intercept.  What if that had been an actual intercept instead of a test and the missile had been a nuclear missile aimed at a US base or city?  Do we really want to base our entire military “advantage” on a system so prone to inadvertent and haphazard failure?

All of us understand that software systems, and their inputs/outputs are subject to bugs and glitches under the best of conditions, let alone in the middle of war when electronic countermeasures will be blitzing the system, cyber/hack attacks will be constant, and the stress of combat will guarantee that input mistakes and output misinterpretations (remember Vincennes?) will happen with regularity.  Do we really want to bet our military future on such a strategy and such systems?

It’s interesting to note that the Russians and Chinese, while investing heavily in electronic and cyber warfare, are also producing massive increases in traditional, raw, brutal, explosive firepower.  They seem to understand that electronic and cyber warfare will be useful but that firepower still rules the battlefield.

Recall the Vietnam war.  Recall the air strikes by US planes.  For all the sophisticated surface to air missiles, radar warning receivers, countermeasures, and high performance aircraft with computer controlled navigation and weapon delivery systems, etc., our aircraft were still shot down, all too often, by old fashioned ZSU-23 barrage gunfire.

There’s a place for electronic and cyber warfare, without a doubt, but it’s as a complement to explosive firepower not a replacement for it and certainly not as the foundation of an entire military strategy.

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(1)Navy Times website, “Sailor error led to failed US Navy ballistic missile intercept test”, ”, David B. Larter, 24-Jul-2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/naval/2017/07/24/sailor-error-led-to-failed-us-navy-ballistic-missile-intercept-test/

A Word Of Warning

With possibly a single exception, not even the most ardent supporter of the LCS still believes the program accomplished what it set out to do.  In short, it’s a failure.  Beating that dead horse is not the point of this post.  Instead, let’s recall who the LCS’ biggest supporter was and who may be the single exception I referred to.  That person was Bob Work, now Deputy Secretary of Defense.  The man made outrageous claims that the LCS was the greatest warship in the world.  He flatly stated that the Navy got the ship it wanted, with the capabilities it wanted, at the price it wanted.  He demonized critics and cowed supporters.  In short, he was Adm. Rickover if Rickover had been completely wrong.

So, after championing one of the biggest failures of the Navy, Mr. Work has been rewarded with a new position as Deputy Secretary of Defense.  That alone is scary.  Worse, Mr. Work is, apparently, taking charge of the so-called Third Offset strategy which will, he claims, maintain our military edge over a resurgent Russia and China.

Think about this.  The man who championed the biggest failure in recent Navy times is now setting the military’s path for the next few decades?  Is this wise?  Is there any reason to believe that the man’s zealous backing of an epic failure is now going to produce a viable and successful result with an unproven and questionable approach to future warfare?

Still worse is that Mr. Work’s demonstrated demonization of opposition speaks poorly for the possibility of legitimate debate about the course he is attempting to place the military on.  The Third Offset’s dependence on networks, unmanned vehicles, data sharing, etc. are all highly suspect and, at the very least, deserve close scrutiny before we irreversibly commit to them.  Unfortunately, that type of scrutiny and debate is exactly what Mr. Work is famous for discouraging.

It is truly frightening how quickly and completely the military seems to have rolled over and acquiesced to this path.  Meanwhile, Russia, China, and, seemingly, every other country in the world is frantically developing heavy armor, more powerful artillery, stealth aircraft, advanced SAM systems, armored amphibious capabiity, advanced submarines, extensive mine warfare capability, supersonic cruise missiles, intermediate range ballistic missiles, etc.  In short, the rest of the world is rapidly developing the means to blow things up faster and more efficiently while we develop networks, operate green fleets, and factor climate change into our military planning.

Is the man who was so thoroughly wrong about the LCS the man to be setting the military’s future?  I don’t think so.

Third Offset Strategy

The Third Offset Strategy (TOS) is America’s great hope for future warfare, according to our current leaders.  We’ve consciously and deliberately ceded the advantage of numbers (quantity).  We seem to have no interest in bigger and better explosives (witness our stubborn refusal to upgrade or replace Harpoon until just recently), supersonic missiles, or wide area effect weapons like major caliber naval guns.  Our quality edge is eroding at an incredible pace with the Chinese having either caught up or on the verge of doing so in the areas of stealth, armor, ballistic missiles, etc.  The Russians have leapfrogged past us in the area of electronic warfare as evidenced in Ukraine.  That only leaves us a possible advantage in networking, data sharing, and autonomy, according to our leaders.  Hence, the Third Offset was born.

What is the Third Offset Strategy?  According to its principle architect, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work,

“The Third Offset is really kind of simple at its core,” Work said. (The first offset was nuclear weapons, the second smart weapons). “It basically hypothesizes that the advances in artificial intelligence and autonomy [are] going to lead to a new era of human-machine collaboration and combat teaming.”

Shades of Battlestar Galactica!!!

Somehow, in some unexplained way, this human-machine collaboration is going to overcome numerical and explosives deficits. 

What does human-machine collaboration mean, anyway?  Haven’t we had human-machine collaboration for decades?  For example, the Aegis system is a computerized battle system with human interface and oversight in which the human-machine system can operate through the entire spectrum of 100% machine (fully automated) to 100% human controlled.  Another example would be the flight control systems of nearly all modern combat aircraft.  The aircraft are not flight-stable so computer systems take the pilot inputs (control stick) and translate them into control surface movements that a human could not manage.

So, what does human-machine mean?  Honestly, I have no idea.  It seems to be more of a marketing thing than any actual technology.

Taking away all the hype and marketing, human-machine and Third Offset seems to be mainly an emphasis on unmanned vehicles and networks.  Of course, we’ve already discussed the problems with assuming that networks will work flawlessly in the face of peer level ECM and cyber attacks.  We’ve also noted that unmanned vehicles have a disturbing tendency to lose communications and wander off, never to be seen again.

Why we would base our entire future military strategy on such unreliable technology is baffling.

Let’s look a bit closer at the Third Offset Strategy as described by its chief proponent, DepSecDef Bob Work, in a speech he gave in early 2015 (2).

Work notes the temporal aspect of the TOS.  The first two offsets gained us advantages that lasted decades until the rest of the world caught up.  This is unlikely to happen this time around.   Unfriendly countries are hacking our secrets as fast as we generate them.  Essentially, we’re doing the R&D for our enemies.  Thus, any advantage we might gain from the TOS is likely to be very short lived.  As Work states,

“First, it's going to have a much more trying temporal component. In 1975 and in the 1950s, we knew our adversary and we said, "We can pick something where we will have an enduring advantage." We don't think we're in that type of environment right now.” (2)

So, by Work’s own admission, the TOS benefits will be short lived if they ever even exist.  His solution to this challenge is to focus on technologies that can be developed quickly – he suggests a five year period.  Unfortunately, any new technology that can be developed in five years almost by definition can’t have much of an impact.  Look how long it’s taken us to develop a straightforward aircraft, the F-35.  Does anyone really think we can develop a world-changing technological capability in five years?  Heck, it takes us nearly five years just to generate the requirements list that we can give to industry in a request for proposals!

To be fair, he offers a nod to longer range projects but having noted that we can’t seem to maintain secrets, there appears to be no possibility of reaping any long term advantages.

Work offers a fascinating observation about the source of new technology now as compared to during the previous offsets.

“And the third big difference is that in the 1950s and the 1970s, generally these advances were military capabilities that were brought along by military labs. But now with robotics, autonomous operating guidance and control systems, visualization, biotechnology, miniaturization, advanced computing and big data, and additive manufacturing like 3D printing, all those are being driven by the commercial sector.”

We’ve noted this phenomenon before.  Rather than the military driving development, the military is abdicating its responsibilities and depending on the private sector to come up with advances.  There are two problems with this. 

First, industry is driven by profit and will offer those technologies that can generate the most profit rather than those that generate the greatest military benefit. 

Second, industrial technology is highly susceptible to foreign capture.  Even setting aside hacking, industry runs on public disclosure of patents, statements of technologies for the benefit of shareholders, floods of technical papers by company scientists, informal networks of shared data, and so forth.  Anything industry develops will be known to foreign countries as soon as it happens.  It will be impossible to gain any lasting advantage.

Still confused about what the TOS is?  Let’s see what DoD Live website has to say.  They describe five key aspects (3).

• Deep Learning Systems – this involves data pattern discovery;  the ability to discern patterns from less directly relevant data; an example would be radar detection of stealth aircraft using collated data from multiple sources

• Human-Machine Collaboration – this is the use of machines to aid human understanding and decision making;  an example would be fused sensor displays

• Human-Machine Combat Teaming – this is the pairing of UAVs with human platforms;  an example would be the Triton UAV paired with the manned P-8 Poseidon

• Assisted Human Operations – this is wearable technology that enhances human capabilities;  an exoskeleton would be an example

• Network-Enabled, Cyber-Hardened Weapons – this is the production of weapons that are immune to ECM and hacking

That list is fine but it’s already nearly obsolete as far as providing an enduring advantage.  Many countries are already engaged in Deep Learning Systems.  Witness the anti-stealth radar detection technology that is based on collating indirect data from multiple sources.  By all accounts, unfriendly countries are well advanced in this effort.  All countries are deep into Human-Machine Collaboration efforts, developing their own versions of fused sensor displays, for example.  Human-Machine Combat Teaming is more advanced in Russia than it is here.  Russian robotic-human pairings on the Ukrainian battlefield are reportedly well beyond anything we currently have.  Assisted Human Operations are a technology that has not yet been significantly applied by any country, as far as we know.  Network-enabled, cyber-hardened weapons are being pursued by all countries.

Clearly, we have no current significant advantages in any of these areas and, in some, we appear to be behind our enemies.  Whatever we develop will provide no lasting advantage and, quite likely, will not even provide a momentary advantage.  If fact, we may well find ourselves scrambling to catch up to other country’s Third Offset advantages!

As you’ve read this, do you see the military’s focus on technology over training, maintenance, tactics, etc.?  The US military has an almost myopic focus on technology – a belief that technology is the solution to every problem.

Consider this radical alternative …  What if, instead of focusing on non-existent technologies, most of which will never pan out, we were to focus on these aspects of the military:

Maintenance – What if we had an absolute dedication to ensuring that every piece of equipment works and that we have the best trained technicians in sufficient numbers to ensure that the technology and machines that we have work, work flawlessly, work reliably, and can be instantly and locally repaired when they do fail.  Hand in hand with that would go adequate and readily available inventories of spare parts.  For example, what if instead of a 50% readiness among our F-22/35 fleet we had a 98% readiness.  Or, what if instead of depots full of non-functioning F-18 Hornets, we instead had those 200 or so Hornets out in the fleet?  Our air wings would have around 20 extra combat aircraft each!  Or, what if instead of having to retire entire classes of ships early due to neglected maintenance and resulting physical deterioration, we took care of those ships?  We’d have many dozens more combat ships.  Our fleet wouldn’t be shrinking, it would be growing.  Imagine a force with that kind of physical readiness – it would be a force to be reckoned with.

Training and Tactics – What if our soldiers and sailors were absolute masters of their craft.  What if our Captains and Admirals actually knew how to tactically utilize a multi-carrier battle group?  What if we conducted regular and frequent live fire exercises?  Not only would our personnel be better trained but we’d uncover the flaws in our weapons before we have to use them in combat!  What if we conducted actual and realistic amphibious training assaults?  We’d see the flaws in our doctrine and correct them without paying the price in blood to do so.  What if we conducted realistic training rather than the silly set-piece training exercises that we do today?  Maybe our sailors would be prepared to fight instead of surrendering to any Iranian that wanders by.

Readiness – What if our readiness was always at peak levels?  What if our non-deployed pilots weren’t limited to bare flight certification hours like they are now?  What if we had actually usable doctrine for surface action groups, multi-carrier operations, amphibious assaults, and so on?  What if our non-deployed units were actually surge-ready, unlike now?  Readiness ties back to maintenance and training.  What if all that was good to go, all the time?

Force Structure – What if we actually had mine countermeasure assets in sufficient numbers to be effective?  What if we had offensive mine warfare delivery capability?  What if we hadn’t wasted money on the LCS and, instead, had a dedicated ASW vessel?  What if we had some SSKs?

Imagine if, instead of wasting time, money, and resources on some nebulous and idiotic TOS, we focused on maintenance, training and tactics, readiness, and force structure.  What an enormous and enduring advantage that would give us over our enemies.  That alone could be our Third Offset Strategy and it would be infinitely more beneficial than what we’re attempting now.  Compare such an impeccably maintained, trained, and ready fleet to the Russians who have major reliability problems.  Their fleets of submarines, for example, are barely seaworthy.  The level of their ship commander’s training is almost non-existent since they so rarely can afford to put to sea.  Their enlisted ranks border on untrained.  The Chinese suffer from some of the same shortcomings as the Russians, particularly in the quality of their enlisted ranks and the level of training and experience of their commanders.  We could enjoy a perpetual, staggering advantage just from the factors I’ve described. 

Maintenance, training and tactics, readiness, and force structure should be our Third Offset Strategy.  In essence, make what we have work perfectly before we buy more stuff that won’t work and make the quality of our personnel unmatched in the world.  There’s your advantage.  There’s your offset.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Iron Man, Not Terminator: The Pentagon’s Sci-Fi Inspirations”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 3-May-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/05/iron-man-not-terminator-the-pentagons-sci-fi-inspirations/

(2)Defense.gov website, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies”, transcript of speech delivered by Bob Work, 28-Jan-2015,

http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies

(3)DoDLive website, “3rd Offset Strategy 101: What It Is, What the Tech Focuses Are”, Katie Lange, 30-Mar-2016,

http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2016/03/3rd-offset-strategy-101-what-it-is-what-the-tech-focuses-are/