HMS Dreadnought Lessons

The introduction of the Royal Navy’s HMS Dreadnought in 1906 revolutionized naval warship design and instantaneously obsoleted every existing battleship.  The Dreadnought story is commonly available and I won’t repeat it, here.  You can research it yourself, at your leisure.  It is also not the intent of this post to debate the merits or drawbacks of any particular aspect of Dreadnought’s design.  Instead, let’s examine the lessons that we can learn from Dreadnought’s story.

 

HMS Dreadnought

Instantaneous Obsolescence – The Dreadnought design was so advanced that it instantaneously rendered every existing battleship obsolete.  That achievement, however, required multiple significant technological advances all packaged into one ship and that was the key:  packaging.  The individual technologies were not unique; 12 inch guns and steam turbines already existed.  The achievement was not the individual technologies but, rather, the packaging of that combination that made for a unique and revolutionary achievement.

 

The lesson, here, is that unique and revolutionary advances don’t necessarily have to come from entirely new technologies but can come from inspired packaging of existing technologies.  Developing all new technologies is incredibly expensive, time consuming, and difficult (for example, Ford EMALS, Ford AAG, Zumwalt Advanced Gun System, Ford elevators, LCS NLOS, etc.) but inspired packaging of existing technologies to achieve new capabilities is quick and cheap, needing only inspiration which, admittedly, is too often in short supply.

 

 

Offsets – Dreadnought created a tactical and possibly strategic offset for the UK which conferred a military capability and advantage that no other country could match – an offset.  This is the dream of the US military which has become caught up in the pursuit of an almost magical, mythical offset so profound that it will guarantee our military dominance for decades to come.  Of course, this is delusional.  Offsets never last long enough to offer any long lasting benefit because other countries instantly copy whatever the breakthrough was.  At best, the supposed offset might last a few years and could prove useful if a military need just happened to arise during that short window.  The US development and use of stealth is an example of such a short-lived offset that just happened to coincide with the Desert Storm conflict and thus proved useful (the F-117 aircraft).  In the event, Dreadnought was copied – and improved on – by other countries in a matter of a few years and the UK’s offset vanished before they could take advantage of it.

 

It is instructive to note that Dreadnought’s short lived advantage strongly argues against long ship service lives but that’s another topic.

 

The lesson, here, is that offsets are fleeting and confer no lasting advantage and, therefore, the obsessive pursuit of an offset is delusional and pointless.

 

 

Firepower – This is self-evident.  Dreadnought’s increase in firepower – through number of guns more than the size - was a massive step forward.  Firepower superiority is a timeless warfare requirement and a lesson that should never need repeating and yet the US military is currently abandoning firepower in favor of networks and a mythical, magical, information offset that can never exist.

 

The lesson, here, is that firepower – the ability to destroy the enemy’s people and things – is the only military advantage that has any meaning or validity because it is the ultimate arbiter of military success or failure.  Yes, we all understand the role of logistics and industrial production but even those are pointless unless their end result is the delivery of overwhelming firepower.  And yes, we all understand the usefulness of battlefield intelligence as a supporting enhancement or enabler to firepower, not a replacement for it.

 

Speed - What made Dreadnought such a massive step forward was the combination of firepower and speed.  Speed allowed the ship to use its massive firepower to greater advantage than any other existing ship.  For example, Dreadnought could maintain a range advantage, sail out of danger, choose the time and circumstances of engagement, cross the ‘T’ at will, and simply dictate the course of a battle due to significantly superior speed. 

 

Speed enabled Dreadnought’s firepower to be used to its maximum advantage.  Speed was an enabler and enhancer of the ship’s firepower.

 

The lesson, here, is not speed (though speed is always nice!) but the recognition that secondary characteristics or capabilities that can enhance the primary characteristic can be just as effective as a new, primary capability.  In our pursuit of ever larger, more powerful, longer ranged weapons (I’m looking at you, Standard and cruise missiles) we should not overlook the secondary means to more effectively employ the primary effect.  It is also worth noting that secondary effects are often (always?) cheaper and easier to develop than primary effects.

 

What this is implying is that tactics and enhancements that can better utilize existing weapons may be just as important, or more so, than trying to develop bigger weapons.  The Navy is exclusively focused on bigger weapons (well, actually, bigger networks) rather than better tactics and enhancements.  In fact, disturbingly, I’m unaware of any rigorous tactical development efforts within the US Navy.

 

 

Now, for a bit of fun …

 

Example Implications To Ponder

 

Battleship - What if we re-introduced a modernized Iowa-ish battleship?  It would instantly render all existing warships obsolete with its massive firepower – gun and missile – and incredible armor.  A ship that could effortlessly sink any existing ship and shrug off most damage from any existing weapon system would certainly confer a Dreadnought-type advantage for several years until other countries could build their own, similar ships and, given the prevailing anti-battleship sentiment it might well confer an advantage of a decade or more until other countries became convinced that it was a good idea.

 

UAV Carrier – UAVs and aircraft carriers both exist but what if we packaged the two together?  A dedicated UAV carrier carrying hundreds of small surveillance and ?combat? UAVs would be a highly effective force multiplier.

 

Armored Sensors – Armor and sensors have both been around forever but what if we packaged sensors inside armored pop-up or pop-open enclosures instead of mounting them out in the open, totally exposed?  This would eliminate the possibility of sensors being destroyed by simple shrapnel from fragmentation missiles and would confer an instant and significant combat advantage to the ship that couldn’t be easily blinded and mission killed.

 

Long Range ASW – Aircraft and ASW sensors have been around for many decades but what if we packaged the two together and mounted ASW sensors on a long ranged, fixed wing aircraft.  Such an aircraft, with its speed, range, and endurance could conduct ASW operations far beyond the range and endurance limits of ASW helicopters and far beyond the range of escort ships.  Its speed of relocation would greatly expand the coverage area, as well.  ASW aircraft would push the ASW detection and engagement points much further out and, while not rendering submarines irrelevant, would significantly increase the challenge for enemy submarines.  Okay, I know that we already had such an aircraft – the S-3 Viking - but a good idea is still a good idea and bringing a good idea back can provide a profound advantage even if we once had it and foolishly gave it up.

 

 

I can go on listing potential good ideas along these lines but you get the idea and you can come up with your own.  The point is that there are plenty of advantages to be gained from simple repackaging of existing technologies.  We don’t always have to obsessively pursue leap-ahead technology that never seems to pan out.  Perhaps we should concentrate on existing technologies, tactics, and secondary enhancements and allow someone like, oh, say China to take the lead in developing new technologies and then simply copy them if/when they’ve invested billions and wrung out the problems for a new technology?  Hmm … there’s something to think about … let China be our R&D organization instead of the other way around.  But, I digress …