Wednesday, September 1, 2021

C-RAM Performance

It’s exceedingly difficult to get actual combat data on weapon systems.  Here’s some glimmers about the Centurion Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) derivative of the Navy’s Phalanx CIWS.

 

The U.S. military says five rockets targeted the Kabul airport on Monday morning and U.S. forces on the airfield used a defensive system to intercept one, Army Maj. Gen. William D. “Hank” Taylor, Joint Staff deputy director for regional operations, told reporters Monday morning at a Pentagon press briefing.

 

“The force protection C-RAM did work. It did engage and had effect on the one, and then one did land in an area, and it was not effective,” Taylor said. (1)

 

Taken at face value, the C-RAM successfully intercepted 1 of 5 rockets.  I say, face value, because I no longer believe anything the military says that I cannot independently verify.  The Army spokesman acknowledges at least one failed intercept.  What happened to the remaining 3 is unknown.  They may or may not have been deemed a threat and may or may not have been engaged.  I also have no reason to believe that only 5 rockets were used to attack Kabul.  This is what happens when you lie repeatedly – people don’t believe you even when you might be telling the truth.



Centurion C-RAM


So, we have a reported success rate somewhere between 20% (1 of 5) and 50% (1 of 2).  Regardless – and acknowledging that it is a very small data set – this is not exactly great performance.

 

Why is this important?  It’s important because the Marines want to establish forward bases and will be placing small units in harm’s way and some sort of C-RAM protection is needed.  Of course, the Marines don’t address this need and have long since abandoned most of their AAW defenses and have no C-RAM protection, at all.

 

We desperately need to test the C-RAM unit under realistic conditions and find out what it can and cannot do and we need to develop an effective C-RAM capability if the Centurion C-RAM turns out to not be effective.

 

 

 

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(1)Navy Times website, “US defense system downed one rocket in Kabul attack”, Associated Press, 30-Aug-2021,

https://www.navytimes.com/flashpoints/afghanistan/2021/08/30/us-defense-system-downed-rockets-in-kabul-attack/


23 comments:

  1. There was a gun system trailed by the Army but appears cancelled, shot down two class 2 unmanned aerial systems April 2015 at Yuma

    The Army Extended Area Protection and Survivability, Integrated Demonstration, EAPS ID program, two missiles and one gun system

    The gun system for short range C-RAM defense was a 50mm cannon at 200 rpm shooting 10 round bursts, used a Continuous Wave radar (not a standard Pulsed radar) from Technovative Applications using infererometer tech, as understand one continuously transmitting panel and three receiving panels to give the necessary angular accuracy for centimeter tracking. The radar tracking both the RAM target and the 50mm projectile, computing the necessary trajectory interception point with a thruster on the projectile for course correction activated from the ground so keeping cost of 50mm projectile low as no expensive electronics required in the 50mm projectile.

    PS Recently under the Army Indirect Fire Protection System, IFPS, Dynetics won the shoot-off using the AIM-9 against the Rafael/Raytheon Iron Dome/Tamir for a cruise missile killer.

    Army requirements "lethality at required keep-out ranges as most important, followed by its ability to provide 360-degree coverage of a defended area. Then, in order of importance, the number of stowed kills, target service rate, load and reload time, the amount of time it takes to emplace the system, and operational availability — which factors in reliability and maintainability — were to be weighed in the decision-making process" would add needed to be compatible with Army A3/4 Sentinel radars and IBCS. "lethality at required keep-out ranges as most important" in WWII Navy found that the 20 and 40mm cannon were not powerful enough to overcome the Kamikaze's a/c kinetic energy and hitting the ships.

    It has been suggested Dynetics won even though they don't produce missiles etc but their new launcher will be compatible with different missiles and so giving Army options, eg Lockheed's Miniature Hit-To-Kill missile, MHTK, was one of the two missiles developed under the Army EAPS ID program, no knowledge of the second missile system.

    To be noted even though Army extensively funding/testing lasers it would appear Army at present time does not think operationally viable in the near/medium term for a cruise missile killer?

    https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/401539.pdf

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    1. That article was published in 2015. Did the Army cancel the systems because they weren't technically or tactically viable, the way the Air Force's Airborne Laser wasn't viable? (Even if you manage to get the laser to work, the laser has to be VERY CLOSE to a ballistic missile launcher's position to shoot the missile during its boost phase, meaning it'll be a sitting duck for enemy air defenses.) Or were they viable, but the Army stupidly lost patience and cancelled the systems before their viability could be demonstrated?

      If the systems were still under development, I think a more recent article would be available.

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    2. My assumption the EAPS ID gun system had the necessary tech with a high probability to kill short range RAM's but Army appear not to fund it, making do with a small number of Phalanx's as a compromise in Afghanistan, Phalanx not optimized for C-RAM.

      The Army's priority has moved from C-RAM to counter threats from UAS and other rotary and fixed wing aircraft, presume the Army change in requirements driven by their assessment of the Russian attack on the Ukraine armored column which was destroyed in three minutes July 2014 at Zelenopillya, targeted by ISR UAS's and bombarded with rockets and artillery using dual purpose improved conventional munitions, a mix of air dropped mines, top down mines and anti-tank submunitions and thermobaric fuel air explosives.

      The Army's 2018 short-range air defense system, Mobile Short Range Air Defense system, M-SHORAD, based on the Stryker using the Stinger missile. The turret fitted with a four-round Stinger launcher, two launch rails for Longbow Hellfire missiles, 30mm cannon and 7.62mm machine gun, sensors the Israeli RADA AESA radar with its four small 90 degree arrays for 360 degree coverage and an EO/IR system. Four battalions planned with 40 M-SHORAD's along with roughly 270 additional ground vehicles and trailers. Question Hellfire etc, requirement creep, not needed for its short range air defense mission.

      Do wonder about only four Stingers on the M-SHORAD turret enough to take out the ISR UAS's etc but will be no defense against RAM as don't think Stinger capable of destroying the small RAM targets, rockets, artillery and mortars that destroyed the Ukraine armored column, to do that would need the EAPS ID gun (numbers - on a Navy note would mention the new Israeli Sa'ar 6 1,900t corvettes fitted with 80 short range CIWS Iron Dome Tamirs - equivalent to RAM and 32 Barak 8's - equivalent to ESSM).

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  2. CNO another good post!

    C-RAM is only one component of an integrated air-defense system that should include: air search radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and an EW system, at a minimum.

    These systems are not cheap, nor are they easy to setup; in fact even our division and corps units generally lack a proper air defense suites. This should hint at how unprotected these 'forward operating bases' will be, and how financial impossible it will be to protect them.

    A 'die in place strategy' might work for NK, or the PRC, *if* the cost of the missiles is low, and the units get outside targeting support, but I suspect even the Russians would balk at the trade-offs.

    GAB

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    1. No stable nation with an functioning government and productive populace, will support a "die in place strategy," as it will always have a better use for the human and material resources to be invested in this strategy. Only terrorist organizations and the criminally incompetent... (Reads the service records of the US military officers and government leaders who proposed this strategy.)

      Sigh.

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    2. @Aim9snake: The USMC 'forward operating base' concept is literally a die in place strategy.

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    3. GAB, that's why I accused the USMC officers who proposed this strategy, of being criminally incompetent.

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  3. All,

    This is the skinny on the C-RAM from the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) website.

    https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/counter-rocket-artillery-mortar-c-ram/

    Depending on the size of a FOB, COP or Airfield, will determine which of these two you may have in place:

    Q-36 or Q-37

    Here is the basic poop on these fellas from their developers:

    Q-36:
    AN/TPQ-36(V)10 Firefinder Weapon Locating System
    Capabilities Specifications Features
    Locates mortars, artillery, and
    rocket launchers
    Locates 10 weapons simultaneously
    Locates targets on first round
    Performs high-burst, datum-plane,
    and impact registrations
    Adjusts friendly fire
    Interfaces with tactical fire
    Predicts impact of hostile projectiles
    Maximum range: 24 km
    Effective range
    Mortar: 18 km
    Artillery: 14.5 km
    Rockets: 24 km
    Azimuth sector: 90°
    Frequency: X-band, 32 frequencies
    Prime power: 115/200 VAC,
    400 Hz, 3-phase, 8 kW
    Peak transmitted power: 23 kW, min.
    Permanent storage for 99 targets
    Embedded Training
    Digital data interface
    Remote operations
    Enhanced situational awareness
    Improved human-machine interface (from www.thalesraytheon.com)

    Q-37:

    TPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating System
    Capabilities Specifications Features
    Locates mortars, artillery, rocket
    launchers, and missiles
    Locates 10 weapons simultaneously
    Locates targets on first round
    Performs high-burst, datum-plane,
    and impact registrations
    Adjusts friendly fire
    Interfaces with tactical fire
    Predicts impact of hostile projectiles
    Maximum range: 50 km
    Effective range
    Artillery: 30 km
    Rockets: 50 km
    Azimuth sector: 90°
    Frequency: S-band, 15 frequencies
    Prime power: 115/200 VAC,
    400 Hz, 3-phase, 43 kW
    Peak transmitted power: 120 kW, min.
    Permanent storage for 99 targets
    Field exercise mode
    Digital data interface (from www.thalesraytheon.com)

    If I recall correctly, the Q-36/Q-37 will detect incoming indirect fire and will determine a fairly accurate POO (Point of Origin) and POI (Point of Impact) allowing for counter-battery fire while the C-RAM engages any incoming projectiles. Once we have a POO, we then can/will counterfire to the grid location within 1-10 meters of the actual target (that depends on whether you use an 8 or 10 digit grid.

    (This is probably a bit much but too much is never enough)

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    1. Umm … I don't know where you got the information you're citing as the link you provided did not have it. Perhaps it's buried somewhere else on the website?

      Regardless, you seem to be conflating two separate concepts: counterbattery and C-RAM. If you, or someone, wants to consider them as some kind of related, overall defensive system that's fine but they are separate capabilities. For example, the radar detection capabilities you cite are for Firefinder radar systems, not C-RAM which has it's own radar.

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    2. I stand corrected. I obviously misread your post and it spiraled down from there.

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    3. No harm done and it was interesting information, anyway. :)

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  4. "It’s important because the Marines want to establish forward bases and will be placing small units in harm’s way and some sort of C-RAM protection is needed. Of course, the Marines don’t address this need and have long since abandoned most of their AAW defenses and have no C-RAM protection, at all."

    It's heartbreaking to realize an "armchair general" (well, admiral) has and continues to put in more thought into this concept, than real generals in US military service. Do the Marines intend to "borrow" C-RAM units from the Army, and drag the latter into a losing battle on an indefensible island, the way Imperial Japan dragged Nazi Germany into a losing battle against the US?

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  5. The problem with firing C-RAM at cheap projectiles like mortar rounds and small rockets is they are flying ballistic. Even if a round hits one as it falls, it rarely blows up, but is knocked off course a bit and falls to explode in a friendly area anyway. Second, firing 100 20mm rounds high into the air means they will fall nearby. How many Afghans were killed or injured when all these rounds showered on Kabul? But they are all we have and much better than current lasers. Their great value is gunning down drones and top attack missiles like Spike.

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    1. "...it rarely blows up, but is knocked off course a bit..."

      Are we sure this is the case? I wonder what kind of rounds are used vs the seaborne version?? I researched the similar Goalkeeper recently, and it had a few different rounds available. Does, or could the Army version be using an explosive/proximity round?? That might make more sense for counter-battery use...

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    2. A quickie wikipedia glance answered my question:
      "Whereas naval Phalanx systems fire tungsten armor-piercing rounds, the C-RAM uses the 20mm HEIT-SD (high-explosive incendiary tracer, self-destruct) ammunition, originally developed for the M163 Vulcan air defense system. These rounds explode on impact with the target, or on tracer burnout, thereby greatly reducing the risk of collateral damage from rounds that fail to hit their target."

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  6. As far as i learned about israeli systems, which are missile based, are programmed to engage eclusively incoming munitions which have a projected point of impact inside inhabited areas. Munitions otside this envelope are ignored and are allowed to impact. This is to avoid expending munitions against incoming which is not considered a threat and avoiding saturation of defences. Furtherbifbthe incoming are outside thebengagement envelope of the battery the data will be handed off automatically to the nearest battery that could be in the engagement envelope. So placement of the single batteries is extremely important to give the best possible coverage for the defence system. High ground would be best.
    In the case of Kabul this can mean a number of things:
    1. The CRAMis not really that efffective and has engaged and intercepted only 1 in 5
    2. CRAM was effective in engaging the sole incoming out of 5 that was considered a threat based on the projected points of impact or the other incoming were outside the engagement envelope and could not engage them
    3. Having no high ground available around the airport and beeing constrained by the airport grounds regading location and relative coverage the system capabilities were already degraded and have been degraded with clutter added by builings and such (the system laying lower than them), with probably a limited vertical engagement angle due to presence of troops (as you can't have the rounds raining on your troops) on the ground the engagement envelope was very limited. Meaning that only 1 out 5 incoming was inside the envelope and could be engaged.
    Probably the system could be considered effective with optimal positiong. If a correct placement is not possible or due to human error the system could be only marginally effective.

    Regarding this systems usage to protect the future marine distributed missile units i see some real problems. These systems are heavy, could be probably the heaviest in the system aside from the ACV. The marines have or are about to eliminate bridging capabilieties of the engineers. So if the bridges of certain islands in the Pacific are not up to the weight of the system and no bridging support, it means that the system could not be optimally placed or even be placed in support at all, meaning that it could be completely useless and leaving troops defenceless.

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    1. "CRAM was effective in engaging the sole incoming out of 5 that was considered a threat"

      Reread the post and quote from the Army General. He stated that C-RAM was not effective against one of the rounds so, as noted in the post, the best possible interpretation is 50% success.

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    2. "Regarding this systems usage to protect the future marine distributed missile units"

      To be clear, the Marines do not have the Centurion C-RAM and do not, in fact, have any type of C-RAM protection. That said, your points about mobility and weight are completely valid.

      More generally, weight and mobility of missile trucks and supporting equipment is an issue the Marines are hand-waving away along with many other issues.

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    3. C-RAMs aboard LCUs would be of great benefit for the protection of Marine landings.

      https://www.g2mil.com/lcugunboats.htm

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    4. Good article. Lots of good ideas there.

      I'm sure you're aware of the similar LSM(R) concept in WWII (see, "LSM(R)"

      Variations on the theme could include mounting MLRS or modern rocket launchers.

      Areas to address would include some kind of fire control system for options that need it, marinizing equipment for permanently mounted systems, and sufficient crew capacity.

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  7. CNO, How would you test CIWS? Put it on a stationary barge and a moving platform while lobbing missiles at it. Then make it more complicated from there. I'm curious because these matters were above my paygrade.

    I'm also concerned about the ammunition drum/magazine. Its capacity seems small to counter a multiple missile attack.

    What befuddles me is the lack of realistic testing. It doesn't seem to be hard to conduct such test. If it was done, then maybe the results were classified.

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    1. "How would you test CIWS?"

      You pretty much answered your own question!

      " maybe the results were classified."

      Testing results are frequently classified but the tests are public knowledge. Many DOT&E reports make note of classified test results but they contain descriptions of the tests. There have been no realistic CIWS tests that I've ever heard of.

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    2. ComNavOps, I have read your Fleet /StructureComposition page. Must admit this is a fascinating. I think you should add to it the design of a minehunter ship that can combine and integrate in itself new drones and old proven systems that can easily find, identificate and kill mines. Or maybe 2-3 types of minehunting ships. For example one could search for mines, the second one to kill them fast. Forces that can quickly clear the path for the surface forces are vital.

      Also logistics Navy. Types of ships or vessels. Tankers, ammunition ships, surveillance ship, supply ships...modern types of these ships are very vulnerable but them mustn't be so.

      Also sometimes you mentioned about ECM ship. Have also idea. Why not to make a small surveillance ship like corvette-frigate. His task is to mini-uavs with combat surveillance radius of 150-200 km. That's not bad idea for NSM or Harpoon ASMs. To have instead of 1-2 SH-60 Seahawks or MQ-8C Fire Scout some mini UAVs like Scan Eagle with increased endurance and range of flight. They can look for ships, track, identificate them and give an OTH targeting for missiles.

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