The US has been thoroughly defeated by a bunch of rabble who achieved their overwhelming victory simply by outlasting the US.
Of course, it’s legitimate to ask, what were we defeated from doing? Well, nothing really. We had no victory goals that I could discern so there was nothing for us to actually lose. We simply left. We didn’t accomplish anything but we didn’t seem to have any goals we wanted to accomplish anyway. You can’t be defeated if you aren’t trying to win anything so …
And that’s the major lesson from this entire debacle. Don’t enter a war without a clear cut end result – a victory condition. Failure to do so will result in a never-ending quagmire of aimless milling and churning as twenty years of floundering in Afghanistan graphically demonstrated.
What other lessons can we draw from the Afghanistan experience? Here’s a few:
Information Dominance – Afghanistan proved that this is a complete fantasy. We had total information dominance over the Taliban and yet we left the country in defeat and humiliation. Information dominance can’t be achieved against a peer enemy and even in cases where it can be achieved against minor threats, it absolutely does not guarantee victory and yet it’s the foundation that we’re building our future military capability on. This is an epic failure in the making.
Firepower – Firepower is useless if you don’t use it. We had total firepower dominance in Afghanistan and we did not use it. We applied firepower only sporadically and inefficiently.
Collateral Damage – We were so concerned with collateral damage that we suborned military objectives to collateral damage avoidance. If collateral damage avoidance is more important than military objectives then you shouldn’t be ‘fighting’ a war.
Nation Building – This probably doesn’t need any discussion. The very concept of nation building has been thoroughly disproven and discredited. The only way it can work is to follow the pattern of WWII and our handling of Germany and Japan.
Fixation – Our fixation on Afghanistan, and the Middle East in general, cost us dearly. Our overall military readiness declined, the Marines were turned into a pure land force and completely lost their institutional knowledge about amphibious assault, our military was transformed from an armored, high end force to a low end, lightweight force that was tailored to fight insurgents and is now ill-suited to face China, and we lost sight of why our military exists.
Motivation – The Taliban simply outlasted us. They wanted their victory condition more than we wanted ours which is understandable since we had no victory condition.
Total Destruction - If you do enter a war, end it in as short and violent a way as possible. Total destruction of the enemy’s military capability is the only way to assure an effective victory. It is also the quickest way to end the general destruction of war and it is the best way to minimize total collateral damage.
All of the above can be summed up by stating,
Don’t start a war you don’t intend to win.
We entered a war we had no intention of winning and no clear cut victory condition and, predictably, we failed miserably.
Note: We are NOT going to discuss the politics of this so don’t even bother. Any comments along those lines will simply be deleted.
We failed in Afghanistan due to lack of a viable strategy, and a lack of will to employ military force as required to do the job.
ReplyDeleteWayne Downing engineered the initial Afghan success, but he was dismissed in favor of a 'Big Army solution' that led straight to the fiasco at Tora Bora, and the escape of the Taliban to safe areas in Pakistan. There was no cohesive U.S. strategy after that, and the unwillingness of the Bush administration to either: 1) withdraw completely, or 2) to take the fight into Pakistan was a huge error. Collapse of a corrupt Afghan regime was inevitable at that point.
All that said, the execution of our withdrawal was a colossal failure, and the unforeseen and unintended consequences of that failure are deeply troubling.
GAB
Use 911 as an excuse, elites pulled the nation into Afghan for their "grand strategy" without telling Americans. However, this part is not military thus not to discuss further.
ReplyDeleteStrong fire power did work as US troops defeated and drove out Taliban in all major cities and strategic points in a short time. After that, nightmare started in guerilla warfare.
The whole withdraw ended up in chaos is unavoidable for a simple reason --- CIA gave assessment that previous Afghan government can hold for a while. With this assessment, of course, you cannot evacuate all US collaborators in a hassle or then Afghan government simply could not function. Furthermore, all many Americans believe that CIA analysis, they wanted to stay to suck out last penny or complete other whatever.
"Collateral Damage"
It creates presentiment among people. People see their relatives killed for others' "great mission" could become suicide bombers even though they had no intention to fight US before. Collateral damages create enemies.
The war should not have been fought in first place. There are ways to punish Al Qaeda than a total war, for instance, air raids and short invasions to kill destroy Al Qaeda bases and leave.
"Collateral damages create enemies."
DeleteYou've completely missed the point about collateral damage (along with several other points). No one is arguing for inflicting intentional collateral damage. HOWEVER, the avoidance of collateral damage TO THE POINT THAT IT BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT THAN ACHIEVING MILITARY OBJECTIVES IS EVEN MORE DAMAGING. In that case, avoidance of collateral damage ENSURES that the war will continue longer than need be and ENSURES that even greater collateral damage will occur and more death and destruction will occur.
There is a reason why war is something to be avoided: it causes death and destruction. The best thing that can be done is to end it quickly and totally and that can ONLY occur when military objectives are primary and avoidance of collateral damage is secondary (or tertiary or …). The sooner the war ends, the sooner ALL the death and destruction end. These dragged out actions that the US has taken to entering into are abominations. They have no positive, grand end result and simply prolong the unavoidable collateral damage.
"Strong fire power did work as US troops defeated and drove out Taliban in all major cities and strategic points in a short time."
As stated in the post, firepower was applied sporadically and inefficiently. Once the Taliban had moved out of cities, that was the time to apply maximum firepower and wipe them out, thus ending the conflict. Instead, we withheld firepower and allowed the Taliban to escape to various locations. Once that happened, avoidance of collateral damage became our military objective and we did not decisively seek and destroy - we simply tried to 'maintain', thereby ensuring a long drawn out affair with endless deaths and destruction instead of ending it quickly and totally.
"There are ways to punish Al Qaeda than a total war, for instance, air raids and short invasions to kill destroy Al Qaeda bases and leave."
Again, you failed to grasp the point in the post. Endless raids are NOT a victory condition and produce no positive, grand result. They simply ensure endless collateral damage, death, and destruction no matter how carefully planned and executed to avoid collateral damage. You raid concept ENSURES THE VERY COLLATERAL DAMAGE YOU CONDEMN IN YOUR COMMENT!
"The war should not have been fought in first place."
That's the debatable political aspect that we aren't going to discuss. Having entered into the conflict, we're examining the military lessons from it.
Collateral damage is irrelevant, winning hearts and minds is irrelevant; what is relevant is respect and control.
DeleteNobody liked Stalin, but everyone obeyed him because ultimately, power matters and Stalin wielded absolute power in a way that was perceived to be crudely beneficial to Russia.
Always do what is possible to avoid civilian deaths, but Afghans view collateral damage as what happens when people don’t fight or allow bad guys to manipulate them by being close. For every dead goat scam, there is a story of where the Afghans are happy to see terrorists killed and understand the damage to their crops or homes. The difficulty is understanding how the particular tribe will view the damage to their livelihoods to kill terrorists. It is a truly difficult undertaking, which is why most commands did everything they could to avoid such damage.
Delete"Always do what is possible to avoid civilian deaths"
DeleteNo. Always do what is necessary to accomplish the military objective. Now, in the course of doing that, if you can minimize collateral damage WITHOUT JEOPORDIZING THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE then, of course, do so.
The quickest and most effective way to minimize collateral damage is to accomplish the military objectives as quickly and thoroughly as possible. For example, in a [misguided] desire to avoid collateral damage, we allowed ISIS fuel convoys to travel unmolested and the result was drawn out ISIS existence and thousands upon thousands of extra civilian deaths, atrocities, and destruction. Had we ruthlessly destroyed every ISIS oil truck from the beginning (as well as whatever their source of oil was) ISIS would have been destroyed much quicker and the total death and destruction would have been significantly reduced.
The US military accomplished it victory conditions within 9 months of the start of the war. Al Qaeda had been destroyed or removed from Afghanistan. Why the victory conditions were rewritten to say "Bring Civilization to Heathen" will generate a couple hundred books.
ReplyDeleteInfo Dominance ??, that works when identifying a tank,
it does zip all when trying to determine what will make
the guy holding an AK work with you or at least ignore
the Taliban.
"Al Qaeda had been destroyed or removed from Afghanistan."
DeleteI've seen nothing that indicates our victory conditions were to destroy or remove. I've seen nothing to indicate that we had any actual ultimate victory condition. What we had has an initial series of military objectives which were partially accomplished and partially failed.
The ultimate end result was failure of even those initial objectives since Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS, among other terror groups, are present and thriving in Afg. From a NY Post article:
"Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said: “We know that al Qaeda is a presence, as well as ISIS, in Afghanistan and we’ve talked about that for quite some time.”
"Info Dominance ??, that works when identifying a tank,"
DeleteInformation dominance (ID), as the US military defines it and is pursuing it, means having sufficient information (of all forms) that we are operating inside the enemy's OODA loop and that our knowledge about the enemy is so complete that we can make better, faster decisions which lead, automatically, to victory. In the military's concept of ID, there is no distinction between a country, a tank, or an angry terrorist … we'll completely dominate them all due to information dominance. And this has been proven totally false in multiple wars.
One lesson USA still hasn't learned is how to deal with "sanctuary" zones or countries and restrictions on fighting/dealing with these sanctuaries.
ReplyDeleteWe couldn't fight past Yalu River in Korea, couldn't fight against the Soviets and Chinese supplying North Vietnamese, we never had any idea what to do with Taliban going back to Pakistan,etc,etc...we basically letting the enemy fight another day. Not sure what should have done with Pakistan but it isn't my paid grade either but something we should BY NOW have figured how to deal with or just stay away.
I've addressed this. You do what needs to be done militarily. If the sanctuary country can't or won't help then they're either aiding the enemy or incapable of stopping a threat. Either way, that's the justification for military action on our part.
DeleteI think the biggest lesson to be learned is how to stop the lying to the NCA and the American people. It is extremely ironic that Gen McMaster was involved (granted as the NSA for only a short time) throughout the duration. Careerists will never say a war is lost because they will lose their chance to advance. Professionals will make the decision to strike and get out or never get in because there is no proven way to build a country. Also note that the Powell doctrine was thrown aside during the start of both of these fiascos and Secretary Powell has yet to speak up about his part in them.
ReplyDelete"I think the biggest lesson to be learned is how to stop the lying to the NCA and the American people."
DeleteI'm not sure exactly what aspect you're referring to but I'll offer a general thought. Politicians may well lie for obvious reasons - they're politicians; it's what they do. However, the military shouldn't need anyone to tell them the truth because they should have it already. They should have all manner of sensors and they should have subject matter experts meaning they should have people intimately familiar with the country, the region, the people, the politics, the culture, etc. This should enable the military to formulate well thought out plans to present to the political leadership and well thought out strategies to execute in-theatre. Of course, the political leaders may not heed the advice of the military but that's then the point at which the military leaders need to show some moral courage and resign en masse, if need be, rather than attempt to execute a flawed strategy that is going to get the soldiers killed for no good reason. The military leadership has a responsibility to those they command to not waste their lives.
There should be no lying that involves the military and no need to lie.
As I said, I'm not sure what aspect you were referring to. Feel free to elaborate as long as it doesn't delve into politics.
I am referring to all of the stars that went before the administration, Congress, and the American people to say we are winning, or if we just do this we will win, if we just surge, etc.
DeleteYou raise an excellent point that these same stars should have had a plan that was executable or at least be able to say we got nuttin' that will help build a country. Instead we spent trillions of dollars and thousands of lives blindly following people that were blowing smoke somewhere. Where do we teach the military how to pacify and build a country? We don't. We have no one that can propose anything more than limited violence occupation tactics. Military occupations do NOT provide a feeling of security for the population.
All of the stars that touted that we can win, once nation building became the goal, where lying to themselves (to get ahead), their troops (3x5 cards are not an absolution for this), the politicians, and the American people.
Show me once instance in History where military occupation with an active insurgency, has worked.
We are still suffering under the complete delusion the Marshall Plan helped "rebuild our enemies" after WWII. First of all, Japan got nothing. They built themselves back. Being a supplier for the Korean War obviously helped at a critical time, but we simply paid them for the resources they manufactured. They got no Marshall Plan money.
ReplyDeleteGermany initially got zero as well. Our policy after the war was to strip Germany of all its assets and to starve the German people (The Morganthau Plan) This changed after 1948, however the Germany economy had already begun to take off when it received some Plan money, but it was a pittance compared to the enormous wealth being created by the "German Miracle" after the war.
Belgium took a little money and then refused it almost immediately. They had the fastest growth of any country in post-war Europe.
France got a lot and then resented the puppet strings that came attached.
England got the most money yet remained "the sick man of Europe", with a moribund economy, for decades afterwards.
In other words, the more Marshall Plan money you got, the worse the results seemed to be. Go figure.
This delusion led to the creation of enormous Foreign Aid budgets and the enormous loans & grants given to the 3rd World during the 60's and the 70's. All of it wasted.
The only country to absolutely REFUSE World Bank & IMF "assistance"? China! They've had double-digit growth for decades because of it.
Afghanistan is the latest example of the Marshall Plan delusion: Swollen and bloated with aid money and development projects that all went down a rat hole into oblivion.
What did Germany, Japan, and China do to get the decades-long, enormous growth? Each had many unique policies, but they did do three things in common:
1) A Stable Currency - Avoid inflation.
2) Zero Capital Gains Tax.
3) No Foreign Debt - Rebuild with only reinvested internal profits.
Hey now. With cogent analysis like that....you're taking all the fun out of graft, corruption, and false dunking on the values of limited governments and free markets....
Delete"This delusion led to the creation of enormous Foreign Aid budgets and the enormous loans & grants given to the 3rd World during the 60's and the 70's."
DeleteI'm not a foreign aid expert by any means. That said. It appears that no one got any substantial Marshall Plan aid. From Wiki,
"The Marshall Plan's accounting reflects that aid accounted for about 3% of the combined national income of the recipient countries between 1948 and 1951,[10] which means an increase in GDP growth of less than half a percent."
That suggests that there was little difference between no aid and full aid so I'm not quite sure that your premise is valid, that the less money accepted, the better the result since there was no real difference between none and full aid. Still, it's an interesting thought and, anecdotally, the billions that I've seen poured into foreign aid in my lifetime don't seem to have produced much in the way of long lasting benefits and you seem to indicate as much in your comment.
For the sake of discussion, let's assume that monetary aid is not productive. That being the case, what type of aid, IF ANY, should we offering? In other words, if not money, how can we assist countries or should we not be attempting to provide assistance at all? I'd love to hear your thoughts on this.
@Unknown,
DeleteYou miss the point of huge foreign aid budgets: massive profits for an entire industry based on that funding, with the bonus benefit of talking points and media exposure for politicians. Hey $200-450K jobs are nothing to sneeze at.
GAB
If we want to give aid to a poor country, it should typically just be "Good Advice". Simply implementing the three items in my last paragraph will get them well enough on their way to consistent, double-digit growth for decades to come.
DeleteHowever, for most poor countries I would add a few other tips:
1) Don't waste time on any IMF-inspired "Export-led Growth". It is, almost always, a path to nowhere. It is the path to remaining just a colony of the Davos crowd. Focus instead on your internal economy. Help the cities to make implements the farmers need, and help the farmers to make the food the cities need. Both can then grow together and you won't have as many insurgencies to worry about. Import restrictions can help here.
2) Do not allow Used clothing to be imported from the US or Europe. This practice is destroying economies all over the 3rd World. Create an internal Textile industry. It is the first rung on the ladder to industrial wealth which EVERY country, since the Renaissance, has used to become wealthy. The industry also has a voracious appetite for excess labor coming off the farms and into the cities.
3) Do not allow foreign banks in to your country. If you can manage it: do not allow any usury at all. All investments should be Capital only - not Debt, so everyone shares the risks, and the rewards, of every investment.
4) Avoid even Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) if you can. Better to foster a domestic company, than a branch of a Multi-National (with all the corruption they create). If foreigners want to invest in your country's high growth, they should be forced to SHARE THE RISK WITH YOU by buying securities on your national exchange. Do not allow them to be insulated from risk by accepting their debt finance.
For Afghanistan in particular:
All of our efforts were made extremely difficult when Kabul demanded farmers NOT grow Poppy (which gets a high price) and then taxed their Wheat harvests 70%. By comparison, the Taliban allowed them to grow Poppy and only taxed them 50%. If you were a poor farmer (90% of the population), who would you support?
I would have legalized the Poppy trade, but funneled it into a legal, domestic pharmaceutical industry, which could then be exported around the world.
PS: Any 3rd world president who followed this advice would soon be assassinated, but for those who can pull it off, this is how the UK, the USA, Japan, Germany, and China were all able to grow wealthy.
PPS: If we absolutely HAVE to give money to a country (for geopolitical reasons only). Do not give them loans. It just creates resentment. Just grant the money. This is what China did for years, and everybody loved them. Now they only loan money, and everybody hates them in the 3rd world. Either way, the money will be wasted, but at least they will be your friend.
Let me know what you think. It is basically the same advice you give the Navy: "They don't need more money. They simply have to use what they already have effectively!" ha ha ha
Big Bill
Japan did get US $ outside of the Marshall Plan. Just between the end of the war and June 1948 Japan got $8.3 Billion in todays value. And then another $14 billion from June 48 thru June 51. The earliest funds were used to provide food. And then later to supply food, fuel, fertilizers, and medical supplies to prevent starvation, disease, and social unrest. And then starting in July 48 we provided Japan with industrial raw materials and machinery needed for economic rehabilitation. None of that includes aid provided locally out by small unit commanders of the US Army, Navy, AF, and USMC. And it does not include the tens of thousands or jobs, make that hundreds of thousands, given to Japanese nationals on US bases. Ditto for leases on land for bases and training areas.
DeleteWikipedia does not provide all the answers.
There was a point in late 2002 to maybe 2005 where an option which would have been a positive outcome for the US, the world at large, and in reality most of the people of Afghanistan could have been acheived. The problem is one of the points that ComNavOps highlights in this post. Nation Building.
ReplyDeleteAs a liberal (in the classic sense) democratic republic, we simply could not imagine leaving behind a government in Afghanistan which did not follow the same model. Afghanistan was never going to be a modern democracy, and will not be one in any of our lifetimes. What it could have been is a relatively stable feudal state. I am not simply talking about endless war between neigboring tribes but the acheivement of actual classical feudalism proper. A relatively hands off (possibly at least partially hereditary) central authority presiding over multiple provincial "dukes" (pick appropriate local term), who in turn command alliegance of local "lords" and "knights" (again, pick regionally appropriate terms). This could have been acheived, and done without significant commitment of big Army (saying this as an Army infantryman myself) as mostly a Special Forces operation.
Of course, this would invlolve fighting a "dirty" war, and effectively leaving behind a non-democratic government. The end result would also have been far better for us and for the people of aAfghanistan than the alternative.
That's a fascinating comment and, at the very least, acknowledges reality far more so than our current policies.
Delete"What it could have been is a relatively stable feudal state."
Okay. The reality is that no matter when we left, if the Taliban were still in existence they would have taken over the country exactly as they've done now. Does Taliban rule fit your vision of a feudal state? If not, what would we need to have done to ensure a feudal state system?
My problem with your concept is that the Taliban are not a feudal state but are, instead, a brutal, oppressive, criminal dictatorship. I could be satisfied with a true feudal state but not the Taliban dictatorship state. I could even be satisfied with a benign dictatorship but, again, that is not the Taliban.
It's a fascinating topic and you appear to have given it some thought so what are your further thoughts on this, as related to my reply?
Excellent comment. Thanks for the contribution!
The Afghans WANTED to bring their King back (who had been deposed in 1973 by the communists). The USA nixed that plan because they HAD to "create a Democracy"
DeleteAs we know now, the Pashto Taliban ARE the majority, so building a democracy was just silly & counterproductive.
The King would have created a loyal army by doing what the Afghan Crown had done in the past: Each tribe could send taxes OR their best warriors (led by Royal Officers, of course) These ethnic units would then be deployed in areas of the country they were not from to keep the peace. The Romans did this for 800 years. It works pretty well.
Jocko Willink has said that if you are going to fight a war you must be prepared for not only the people you intend to be killed, but also for those you don't intend (civilians). It is certainly tragic when civilians are caught in the crossfire, but it is impossible to prosecute a war without civilian casualties. I'm not sure if this is something that modern Americans can stomach.
ReplyDeleteIt seemed as if our focus on avoiding civilian casualties was based on an excessive (in my view) fear of angering the Afghans and creating more insurgents. The fact of the matter is that our very presence was going to anger many, if not most, people there no matter what we did. Insurgents don't only join because their 9-year-old cousin was accidentally killed by Americans. They join for religious reasons, ideological reasons, or just because they don't like foreigners in their country. Or, they might even been foreign fighters assisted by Pakistan.
As long as there is an organized insurgency that has some likelihood of success, people will join up. We should have created conditions such that joining the Taliban was a death sentence. Taliban recruits should have been confronted with an extremely short life expectancy due to our use of overwhelming firepower. Instead, our restraint allowed the Taliban to see a victory scenario in the not too distant future. As long as hope exists an insurgency will continue.
Our refusal to confront Pakistan in any substantive way about its support of the Taliban also doomed any mission to failure. The Taliban could expect a steady stream of reinforcements and supplies over the border. These acts of war by the Pakistani military and the ISI should not have been tolerated in any form. Pakistani military officers and intelligence agents active in support of the Taliban should have been targeted and eliminated if necessary. Economic isolation should have been threatened and used if Pakistan refused to reign in Taliban supporters in its military/intelligence complex. If you are not willing to confront those aiding your enemies, you probably shouldn't get into the war in the first place. Pakistan has jumped into China's arms anyway, so we gained nothing in our refusal to confront them.
I have doubts that nation-building in a place like Afghanistan that had no stable gov't for a quarter century before our entry could ever work. But, if you're going to nation-build, you have to win the war there first. Our refusal to do what it took to win the war and destroy all opposition ensured that our nation-building efforts would fail.
Really good comment. I especially like your recognition of, and take on, the Pakistan issue.
DeleteI know some will say we needed use of Pakistan to get access to Afghanistan and we couldn't risk angering the Pakistanis as a result. However, if we couldn't get an "ally" since early in the Cold War to stop supporting our enemy, what is the point of a long term mission? We should know from Vietnam that if insurgents have a safe home from which to get reinforcements and supplies that you cannot win. They will simply wait you out and inflict casualties until you lose the will to fight. Afghanistan should have been turned into the world's largest super-max prison. Nothing should have entered or exited without our permission.
DeleteI really don't understand why more pressure wasn't placed on Pakistan. Particularly when support of their nemesis, India, would be something that makes a lot more sense from a democratic perspective and from a countering China perspective. Simply let the Pakstanis know that next time they get into a spat with India they will be facing F-22s and other American equipment if they don't stop supporting the Taliban.
@Husker95
DeleteThe problem is mental stagnation/ossification in government, academia, and Wall Street.
If the US truly wanted to win in Afghanistan it should had done what the UK and China did to in the past.
ReplyDeleteMassive forced relocation of populations to break grass root connections with the Taliban. Completely depopulate the area on the Afghan-Pakistan border and then declare it a no go zone, create "New Village" settlements complete with basic economic functions and guarded parameters to deter collaborators.
Insist mandatory schooling for all children no exceptions with a curriculum that breaks tribalism. Direct oversight of all settlements with US officials instead of corrupt and paedophilic
leaders.
Maybe then you did have some hope for victory.
That is a thought-provoking comment!
DeleteWould relocation break the grass roots connection with the Taliban or would the Taliban simply be transferred along with the general population and maintain the connection?
Moving these population away from the borders would at least sever the Taliban's ability to connect to resources in Pakistan and beyond. I would located them on the borders of Iran because due to the Sunni-Shia rivalry there is not much of a chance of them cooperating. Even if there is any Taliban embedded within the populace, moving them to a newly create settlement deprives them of knowledge of the geography and keeps them within the community. In the Malayan insurgency, the British knew full well that there are communist sympathizers within the New Villages but since there was a nightly curfew and the settlements were guarded they cannot do much.
DeleteI would go even further to wire tap communications in and out of the settlements, and observe for any signs of collaborators to make a public example of them.
The main issue with Afghanistan IMO is that the US put too much faith into the local community to govern themselves effectively and in line with their policies. In a country which is defined by isolated villages and tribes that will never work.
DeleteIn ancient China Han Wudi deported the entire Yue nation away from their original homeland to break their connection and loyalty.
Also put all children 18 years and below in domitories to really break any connection they have with the Taliban. Be damned if this is inhumane, I would rather be called a tyrant then to see what is happening in Afghanistan right now.
Delete"Our fixation on Afghanistan, and the Middle East in general, cost us dearly. Our overall military readiness declined, the Marines were turned into a pure land force and completely lost their institutional knowledge about amphibious assault, our military was transformed from an armored, high end force to a low end, lightweight force that was tailored to fight insurgents and is now ill-suited to face China, and we lost sight of why our military exists."
ReplyDeleteI would add only that our fixation on a military solution in the area caused us to lose sight of the fact that China was busy outflanking us economically. We haven't lost Cold War II yet, but it has become a much more competitive evolution than it was 20 years ago. We need a major transformation if we are ultimately to succeed against China, and it needs to start now.
"I would add only that our fixation on a military solution in the area caused us to lose sight of the fact that China was busy outflanking us economically."
DeleteGood addition to the list.
Let's not forget that we educate hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals in our universities as well. We didn't educate Soviets because we recognized them as an enemy. It is long past time that we recognized China for what it is.
Delete@CDR Chip: "We need a major transformation if we are ultimately to succeed against China."
ReplyDelete'Need' is correct, but where is the *will* to adjust education and trade schools, to buy American, to build factories in the USA...
I will apologize ahead of time.I deployed to Afghanistan from 2009-2010 and it was brutal to say the least. We took it on the chin, in the gut, etc. I was also deployed to Iraq. There were some in paygrades much higher than mine that tried to employ what we did in Iraq (tactically and strategically) in Afghanistan. The prime example of this is the notorious "Good Idea Fairy" at the Pentagon suggested that we deploy a Stryker Brigade (mine) to Afghanistan. Where we were sent Zabul Province (east of Kandahar) was mountainous, rough tough terrain as well as there only three hardballs in Afghanistan (HWY 1, HWY 601, and I think HWY 631). Having few roads that could handle the Stryker, the insurgents would emplace a pressure plate IED (650lbs+ of HME) and a secondary IED.You avoid one but not the other. We were set up for failure. We weren't just dealing with insurgents, we had high instances of Iranian interference (usually IED components). I could do a dissertation on what went wrong in Afghanistan. Normally fecal matter flows downwards but in this case, it pooled at the top. Considering that a high percentage of Afghani's we were training for the ANA were illiterate and that Afghani's identify themselves by their tribe (Pashtun, Tajik) as opposed to Afghani.
ReplyDeleteROE or Rules of Engagement were extremely inhibiting and the insurgents knew it. Law of War was heavily influential in dictating the RoE. As a former Forward Observer/Fire Support Sergeant, I had an extremely narrow margin for error for employing lethal fires, CCA and CAS.
I tried to inject some personal experience on what happened or didn't happen in Afghanistan. I left a part of me over there in Helmand Province, Zabul Province and for what? The sacrifices that were made by the dead and the living, It is extremely difficult to leave politics out of any discussion involving Afghanistan so I will put the brakes on.
Thanks for sharing your experiences. Without getting into the politics of it, do you have any suggestions on better ways to have conducted the operations? Or, do you view the entire situation as having nothing of value to fight for/over?
Delete"few roads that could handle the Stryker"
I'm not a land combat guy so maybe you can educate me a bit. Why do we have the Stryker if it isn't off-road capable (I thought it was?)? Or, have we become tactically 'lazy' and unwilling to operate off-road, routinely? Wouldn't operating off-road in unpredictable directions greatly reduce any IED threat? What am I missing?
"Why do we have the Stryker if it isn't off-road capable (I thought it was?)?"
DeleteWell, I don't have special expertise but he did say that the terrain in that region was rough and mountainous. Even fully off-road capable vehicles have limits in how rough the terrain is that they can handle. Even tanks.
"Even tanks"
DeleteThis potentially raises the track versus wheel issue, again.
If a region is too rough to operate off road, what moron thought Strykers would be a good idea? If that was the case, then some military genius was almost criminally incompetent. … which I think was one of the commenter's points.
The Stryker was the brain child of General Eric Shinseki. If my memory hasn't failed me, it was originally known as the IAV (Interim Armored Vehicle). In Iraq, Infantry platoons would dismount from their Strykers and conduct operations while the gunner on the Stryker provided armed overwatch. Iraq and Afghanistan are two totally different environments for combat operations (Vietnam we tried to use tanks in the jungle, didn't work out so well). Having driven Bradley's and Stryker's, I would take a Stryker anyday. The Soviets tried to use armor when they screwing around Afghanistan and it work out too well for them either. Afghanistan was more like Vietnam, Chinooks and Blackhawks were the most effective means of getting around.
DeleteThe original version of the Stryker had flat bottoms so when you hit a pressure plate IED, it would detonate underneath the back of the hull under the ramp. Flat hull takes almost all of the blast. They rushed out the V-hull Strykers which provided considerably better blast resistance as the V-shape scatters the blast effects.
Other issues that I saw were scarce Counter-IED assets (depended on where you at), the hesitance to drop the gloves and go the distance. I was there when there elections taking place, the Taliban would go to the villages and start severing hands to get people not to vote.
This was not a clean fight by any stretch.
Getting back to the Strykers for a second. It was fully 8x8 wheel drive, CBRN system, fast (65mphish), easily airlifted. Side note, when I was at Fort Wainwright, we were tasked with world-wide QRF. World-wide QRF was having a Stryker Battalion on 24-hour alert where we could be anywhere in the world in 24 hours with our Strykers.
When you have few paved roads in a country like Afghanistan, you have no choice but to use the hardballs otherwise if you go off a main road, the insurgents would plant secondary IED's in the areas where you might leave the mainroad.
The biggest failure came from either choosing to ignore the past attempts (Soviet Union) and where they failed and not repeat their screw-ups. The Pashtun, the Tajiks know nothing other than conflict and the advantage goes to the defender.
Afghanistan was simply an old fashioned, get in the weeds, in your face fight that was morphed into Star Wars versus Middle Age peasants scrum.
@CNO: "I'm not a land combat guy so maybe you can educate me a bit. Why do we have the Stryker if it isn't off-road capable"
DeleteAfghanistan convinced the Canadian Army to (re)buy Leopard MBTs.
GAB
Where we were sent initially into Zabul Province (Please see link below).
Deletehttps://ontheworldmap.com/afghanistan/administrative-map-of-afghanistan-with-provinces-and-districts.html
There is going off road and then there is going off road. Afghanistan is extremely mountainous and therefore, we went as far we could drive and then humped what you could carry as far as ammunition, water, and field-stripped MRE's and add that to 30-40 lbs of body armor.
Here is a link that goes into pretty good detail about the Stryker family of vehicles.
https://www.inetres.com/gp/military/cv/inf/M1126.html
The Stryker can still drive if no more than 4 tires are destroyed. A Stryker can be looked at as a cruiser/destroyer where as an M1 Abrams can be likened to a battleship. Like any other piece of military hardware, you have to employ it where its capabilities are fully utilized while minimizing the exposure of its weaknesses.
(incidentally, I started out as an Avionics Tech in the AIMD community and then switched over to the Army and I became a Forward Observer (warheads on foreheads ).
"Of course, it’s legitimate to ask, what were we defeated from doing? Well, nothing really. We had no victory goals that I could discern so there was nothing for us to actually lose. We simply left. We didn’t accomplish anything but we didn’t seem to have any goals we wanted to accomplish anyway."
ReplyDeleteWell, stated American goals were a bunch of vague platitudes or utterly impossible nonsense like "bringing democracy to Afghanistan".
On the other hand, non-stated goal such as "stay there as much as possible to justify higher military budgets" were absolutely accomplished.
There are several points that I want to raise with regard to your post, to provoke some thought and discussion:
ReplyDelete1) Fixation on Afghanistan: There wasn't enough focus to Afghanistan. Cheney was looking to the next big thing, the next target to knock over, and he set his sights on Iraq. Iraq then sucked up the troops and focus away from Afghanistan - the Iraq invasion is, IMO, a major contributor to the failure in Afghanistan. The eyes were no longer on the ball.
2) SECDEF Cheney's refusal to accept the Taliban's surrender offer made this an existential fight for the Taliban, prolonging the war. The Taliban were willing to surrender, and Hamid Karzai was prepared to deal with them if they bent the knee. That's Afghan culture: you fight, the surviving loser bends the knee to the winner. Cheney did not understand this, and refused to entertain the idea of accepting a Taliban surrender. If you tell your adversary the only way out is death, then if he's going to die anyway he's going to fight you will all he has, making your life harder.
3) A third issue is a failure of Bush team to understand the true reality they were facing. These were all old cold warriors who believed that examples had to be made of Afghanistan and Iraq in order to show the world that America means business and state-sponsored terrorism will not be tolerated. What they did not understand was that Al-Qaeda was a non-state actor, and therefore the Iraq rationale - invading a nation to warn other nations not to engage in state-sponsored terrorism - just doesn't work. It was a solution for a nonexistent problem that created different problems.
4) US military leadership underestimated the Taliban and did not realise that 20 years of fighting have molded the Taliban into a quite effective fighting force. Study the fighting throughout this year: the Taliban have displayed great command of operational art with their shaping attacks, operational tempo, deployment of forces, the deception attacks mounted to disguise true objectives. They've established their own war college to train commanders, and regular rotations of veteran fighters to serve as training cadres has been ongoing for over a decade.
You have the Taliban fighting in specific AOs for prolonged periods of time, building and maintaining their institutional knowledge and connections, because they've been in this AO for a decade.
Contrast this with the US approach, where a unit will deploy to one part of Afghanistan, go back stateside, be replaced by a different unit, and never return to the same AO. Every unit has a different policy, a different plan. The result is a near-impossibility to maintain institutional knowledge and consistency.