Beam 6.7 m
Draught 1.2 m
Displacement 14 tons
Speed, transit 10 knots
Sweep Speed 8 knots
Power Diesel 2x140 KW
Sweep Depth 3-60 m
ASuW (anti-surface warfare) – The module has been watered down to near nothingness. I think, now, it consists of a guy on the bow with a 9 mm handgun.
ASW (anti-submarine warfare) – The module was cancelled and ASW has been terminated as an LCS mission.
MCM (mine countermeasures) – The module has been in development since just after the Revolutionary War.
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)AN/AQS-20C mine-hunting sonar
Moton [Rear Adm. Casey Moton, program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants] said the Navy planned to deploy the first LCS with the mine countermeasure package in fiscal 2025.Deployment in 2025, assuming that isn’t further delayed, would put the development at 19+ years.
“Overall we’ve proceeded well throughout it.”Well done, indeed, Adm. Moton! A mere 17+ years to develop the MCM module is a praise-worthy accomplishment, without a doubt!
For the IOT&E testing, Moton said Cincinnati’s crew operated the mission package “against a simulated minefield to achieve required mission objectives, including maintenance, pre and post-mission system prep, post-mission data analysis, in-mission command and control and launch and recovery.”Does ‘simulated’ mean an inert mine body or does it mean a virtual, non-existent mine as so many of our exercises use today?
“We completed approximately 230 hours of MCM USV mine hunt operations, over 33 missions from the host LCS as well as from a shore-based command center to fully asses [sic] the sonar’s performance. We executed a total of 12 airborne sorties, with fielded ALMDS and AMNS systems demonstrating the full integration with the MCM mission package,” Moton said.
We demonstrated 16 full launch and recovery iterations in the MCM mission package IOT&E.”Twelve airborne sorties?! Wow! That’s testing the crap out of the system, all right! That many sorties must have thoroughly tested the system in day, night, shallow water, deep water, good weather, bad weather, warm water, cold water, fast currents, high sea states, and against all types of [simulated] mines, and each test must have been conducted many times over to establish statistical validity. The Navy managed to test all those conditions and establish statistical relevancy in only 12 sorties! And against ‘simulated’ mines at that! I’m impressed! There is no chance this system won’t work flawlessly in the real world.
- the protracted 17+ year developmental effort
- the pathetically inadequate testing
- the utterly lacking statistically valid test protocols and repetitions
- the ignoring of the many real world, operational conditions that ought to have been tested (you had 17+ years, for crying out loud!)
- the use of ‘simulated’ mines as proof of performance
- the Navy’s delusional, self-congratulatory attitude to what can only be classified as a fiasco of historic proportions
The investigation into the cause of the starboard [propeller] shaft fault found that there was an installation error. More specifically, Wallace added that based on “initial reports” the shaft was misaligned by as much as 0.8mm to 1mm.The reason this caught my eye was the apparent sensitivity of the shaft to very, very small misalignment. One can’t help but wonder what would happen if the ship were subjected to vibrations, shock, and whipsawing from an explosion in combat. Would the shaft hold up or would it inevitably wind up misaligned by 0.8 mm or more and be rendered unfit?
|USS Boston CAG-1|
Guns or Missiles? Both!
Note two forward triple 8" mounts and aft missile launcher.
Advertised by the Air Force and Boeing as the service’s first "digitally designed and engineered" aircraft, T-7A was lauded as a poster child for developmental speed.
The Red Hawk was expected to begin a new era in rapid design and engineering with iterative development carried out in the virtual world via modeling and simulation without having to bend metal or conduct extensive real-world testing. Systems integration would be accelerated and the time from the first flight to production significantly compressed.
It hasn’t worked out that way.
“A funny thing happens when you move out of digits to reality,” Teal Group analyst J.J. Gertler said. “Digital engineering has the capability to rapidly iterate but it’s only as good as the information you put into it. It may also help you get to a wrong answer faster which you then have to back out of.”[emphasis added]
“Digital engineering isn’t going to make issues go away,” he [Dr. Will Roper, former assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] noted. “It’s going to create a new issue which is – do you trust the underlying models and simulation upon which your performance predictions are based?”[emphasis added]
Air Force officials argue that the roughly $500 million required annually to maintain 32 Block 20 F-22s — which they emphasize are not equipped with the most modern weapons — would be better spent on developing the Raptor’s successor, the secretive Next Generation Air Dominance fighter. Lt. Gen. Richard Moore, Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, further estimated in April that making the Block 20 fighters combat worthy would take about a decade of effort and cost approximately $3.5 billion — a timeline that, ideally, would already see the NGAD system flying.
|U.S. Army HIMARS “Tommy”|
from the 5-3 Long Range Fires Battalion
of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force fires at BRP Pangasinan.
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Samuel Fletcher)
|Aaron Ward after the battle.|
Note the armored aft 5" unmarked despite the mangled devastation
all around it. That's what armor is for.
3-May-1945 - Note the times in this brief sequence of
events during the battle:
As we contemplate our desired fighter, we can see that the
starting point is up in the F-22/14 area rather than the F-16. Again, no big surprise.