Weapon Selection Case Study

The Republic of Stupidia (formerly the Kingdom of Idiotonia) has been considering which of two competing weapons it should acquire.  Here’s a brief description of them:
 
1. Surface to Surface HARE missile
 

• Guidance – combined GPS, terrain following, semi-active radar homing, laser guided, optical with mid-course guidance from any platform anywhere in the world
• Targeting Sensor – combined electro-optical, infrared, infrared imagining, microwave, LIDAR, active radar, library image matching with individual rivet target selection
• Terminal Maneuver – infinite maneuvering through subspace with interdimensional terminal popup
• Networking – ‘on the fly’ spontaneous networking creating a mobile weapons cloud network automatically integrating with all regional networks for up to the nano-second data linking
• Range – intercontinental with planned upgrade to interstellar
• Speed – 70% lightspeed
• Warhead – hyperfusion with dark matter enhanced antimatter core and selectable high explosive, fragmentation, or shaped charge modes
• Cost – four million quadtrillion dollars (2024 $) each
• Production Rate – one per century

 
 
2. Surface to Surface TORTOISE  missile
 

• Guidance – inertial navigation
• Targeting Sensor – active radar
• Terminal Maneuver - none
• Networking – none
• Range – 1000 miles
• Speed – cruise Mach 0.7, terminal sprint Mach 2
• Warhead – TNT
• Cost – $50,000 each
• Production Rate – 1000 per week

 
 
Update Result:  Stupidia chose the HARE missile and subsequently lost the war against the neighboring godless heathens of Commonsenseica due to the one missile per century production rate and the HARE’s cyber vulnerability discovered by a teenager in Commonsenseica who was trying to program a video war game and wound up inadvertently taking control of the HARE missile.
 
 
 
Think this is silly?  Let’s take a look at what the US Navy is actually doing.
 
The US Navy is looking at a new anti-ship missile as described below
 
AGM-158C LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile)
 

• Guidance – jam resistant GPS, Inertial Navigation, data link for mid-course guidance and updates
• Targeting Sensor – Infrared thermal imaging with image reference library, passive RF, EO, automatic scene/target matching recognition with AI software guidance for target selection, passive electronic support measures (ESM), data-link for off-board real-time electronic picture of the enemy battlespace provided by other assets, on-the-fly missile-to-missile networking for data sharing and attack coordination
• Networking – on-the-fly missile-to-missile networking for data sharing and attack coordination
• Range - >200 nm
• Speed – subsonic
• Warhead – 1000 lb WDU-42/B HE blast fragmentation penetrator
• Cost – $3M+ each
• Production Rate – something on the order of 100 per year

 
 
Does the LRASM sound eerily similar to Stupidia’s HARE missile with its attendant high cost, complexity, and very poor production rates? 
 
Now consider what a non-existent, theoretical missile based on ComNavOps’ (K.I.S.S.) principles might look like:
 
Non-existent, Basic Missile
 

• Guidance – inertial navigation
• Targeting Sensor – active radar
• Networking – none
• Range – 1000 miles
• Speed – cruise Mach 0.7, terminal sprint Mach 2
• Warhead – high explosive
• Cost – $50,000 each
• Production Rate – 1000 per week

 
Does that sound eerily similar to the TORTOISE missile with its attendant simplicity, low cost, and ease of production?
 
So, which one is the Navy pursuing?  Yeah, the LRASM HARE. 
 
All four of our LRASM missiles should be finished with production in time for the coming war with China and I expect they’ll work just as well as the other weapons we’ve sent to Ukraine.
 
Are we selecting the right weapons?  TORTOISE or the HARE?

LRASM Testing

How many new weapon systems work perfectly (or even moderately well) in their first combat test?  The answer, of course, is none.  That’s why it’s so important to conduct as realistic testing as possible of new weapon systems and to test according to the way you anticipate using the weapon.
 
For example, the Navy’s ‘new’ AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) will be used in massed attacks of hundreds of missiles when attacking a Chinese surface or carrier group.  Anything less will be an unsuccessful waste of time, resources, and opportunities.  Therefore, we’ve undoubtedly been conducting tests using many dozens of missiles to prove out the concept and uncover the hidden problems – because, of course, there are always hidden problems.

LRASM

The LRASM program began in 2009 so now, 15 years later, the weapon must be pretty thoroughly tested and debugged … right?  Well, let’s check in on the latest test.
 

The U.S. Navy in partnership with Lockheed Martin successfully conducted a historic Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) flight test with four missiles simultaneously in flight.

Four missiles?  Four?  Four??????  4????????  Fifteen years into the program?!  We’re going to use these in volleys of many dozens or hundreds.  Fifteen years later we’re now proudly testing four missiles … apparently for the first time ever?
 
What happens when we launch seventy or a hundred missiles simultaneously?  Will they co-exist in the same airspace or will they collide as they conduct their individual maneuvers and respond to variations in wind speed, direction, turbulence, and engine wash from the surrounding missiles?  Can we apply mid-course guidance updates to that many missiles in the same small airspace or will the signals get lost, interfered, or mixed up?  Can the weapon’s sensors function with that many other missiles around?  How big of a radar return will that many missiles generate?  These are supposed to be somewhat stealthy missiles but will that many missiles just provide an easy detection for enemy sensors or can the aggregate remain stealthy despite being a giant ‘ball’ of missiles?
 
Four????  There are always unanticipated problems.  Four????
 
So, how does the Navy think the test went?  I’ll bet it was flawless.
 

During the 12th Integrated Test Event (ITE-12), the U.S. Navy was able to demonstrate the weapon’s inherent high-end lethality from mission planning through kill chain integration and its effects on the target. All mission objectives were met … [1]

When are all mission objectives ever not met according to Navy and contractor announcements?
 
The LRASM program has been in existence for 15 years and this is the 12^th test???  Assuming each previous test involved just one missile, as suggested by the breathless excitement of this announcement about multiple missiles, that means we’ve tested just 11 missiles in 15 years and, likely, the majority of those tests didn’t involve actual missile performance but were things like captive carry tests, pylon separation tests, telemetry/comms tests, and so forth.  How many actual, end to end tests have been conducted?  I can’t find any data but it’s probably just a few.
 
So, to repeat, how many new systems fail their first combat test?  All of them plus, now, this one, for sure.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Lockheed Martin Conducts Test With 4 LRASM In Flight”, Naval News staff, 3-Apr-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/lockheed-martin-conducts-test-with-4-lrasm-in-flight/

Reality or Fantasy?

Having largely failed to develop and field a new long range anti-ship cruise missile (LRASM), the Navy is now asking industry to develop yet another new missile with the capabilities of the LRASM for a small fraction of the price. 

The US Navy is seeking industry’s assistance to rapidly prototype and field a new air-launched, stand-off weapon inexpensive enough to manufacture en masse and perform on par with the service’s current anti-ship cruise missile.[1]

The Navy solicitation notice to industry states that the new missile “should be “complimentary” to the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile”.
 
In fact, the Navy’s notice suggests that the new missile should be even better than the LRASM. 

… the service posted a public notice earlier this month that it should have “increased range at lower costs” and “integrated a high-maturity propulsion system with proven payloads.”[1]

Note that it is not unambiguously clear from the notice that the ‘increased range’ refers to the LRASM although that is the Navy’s current air-launched anti-ship missile.
 
So, the Navy is asking for a better missile at a substantially lower price. 

Possible proposals from industry should aim for a cost no greater than $300,000 per all-up-round with a production capacity of at least 500 rounds per year, the notice states.[1]

For comparison, the LRASM costs around $3M per missile.  Thus, the Navy is asking for better performance at 1/10th the cost.  Does anything seem out of whack about this?  ComNavOps has long been calling for cheaper weapons that can be mass produced quickly and affordably but this goes well beyond the realm of reasonable and deep, deep into the world of pure fantasy.  Even allowing for some degree of profiteering by industry, if they had the technical capability to produce a missile with better performance than the LRASM for 1/10^th the cost, they’d already be doing it.
 
But wait … the fantasy grows!
 
The Navy is looking to field this new missile in 2027.[1]  For comparison, the LRASM began development in 2009 and production began eight years later in 2017.  Even today, 15 years after beginning development, we’ve only produced a grand total of 258 missiles, as shown in the table below, and the Lot 4,5 missiles are not expected to be delivered until 2026.

Let’s check the reality-fantasy ratio on this.  Ideally, you’d like a 100% reality to 0% fantasy, right?  Common sense and history tell us with absolute certainty that when you start subtracting from reality and adding fantasy, you fail.  So …
 
The Navy wants a better LRASM at 1/10^th the price.  Does that seem like reality or fantasy?
 
The Navy wants the new weapon fielded by 2027.  Even if you consider this year to be the start of development (and no development contract has yet been issued), that means the Navy is looking to field this weapon in just three years versus the eight years it took to field the LRASM.  Does that seem like reality or fantasy?
 
The Navy wants a production capacity of 500 missiles per year compared to the LRASM demonstrated production rate of 258 missile in 7 years which is a production rate of 37 missiles per year!  Does that seem like reality or fantasy?
 
We have to be a little bit fair, here, and note that the Navy is just exploring the concept. 

“The objective of this notice is to help the government determine if there are existing sources with the capability and experience to rapidly prototype, integrate, test and field a long-range, network-enabled weapon system capable of launch from a F/A-18E/F and F-35A/C,” according to the notice.[1]

They may find out that it’s utterly unrealistic and drop it but the point is that the stated desire is so far from reality that someone is wasting a lot of time and effort on something that should be patently obvious is impossible.
 
Now, as stated earlier, ComNavOps has long called for cheaper weapons.  However, hand in hand with that call is the call for simpler weapons … it’s the ‘simpler’ part that makes the ‘cheaper’ part a reality.  Could the Navy develop a cheaper and simpler anti-ship cruise missile?  Yes! 
 
How can we produce a simpler missile?  A good start would be to eliminate the network capability and all the mid-course handoff, pass back and forth, guidance by a Boy Scout in Utah capability that is total garbage and adds nothing to the combat capability.  Make a missile that flies to a spot, opens its sensor ‘eye’, looks for a target, and then attempts to fly into the target.  Eliminate the choosing a specific rivet to hit and just settle for a hit anywhere.  Modern ships aren’t armored.  A hit anywhere will be a mission kill or sinking (ask the Russians!).  Eliminate all the sensor imaging garbage that only increases the software complexity and cost and wrecks schedules.  You don’t need an image library on a missile.  In war, just let it hit anything that meets a few basic sensor criteria.  Anything you hit is going to hurt the enemy.
 
Let’s stick with reality and leave fantasy in the laboratory.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy seeking to rapidly prototype new air-launched, stand-off missile”, Justin Katz, 27-Feb-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/navy-seeking-to-rapidly-prototype-new-air-launched-stand-off-missile/

LRASM Update and Production History

The Navy has been trying, half-heartedly, to replace the obsolete Harpoon anti-ship missile.  The initial attempt was/is the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).  Let’s check the status of the program.

 

The LRASM program began in 2009 and production was authorized in February 2014 as an urgent capability stop-gap solution to address range and survivability problems with the Harpoon missile.[1]  This is a completely valid need/requirement as the Harpoon is obsolete against any moderate defense.  As an urgent need, accelerated program, the LRASM should have been put into production in, what, several months, maybe a year given that it is a modification of an existing missile, the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)?  By now, thirteen urgent years later, we should have thousands of missiles in the fleet and in inventory, right?

 

As a reminder, the LRASM program initially had two paths:  the LRASM-A version was a subsonic cruise missile based on the Lockheed Martin's AGM-158 JASSM-ER while the LRASM-B version was a supersonic missile.  The –B was cancelled in 2012.

 

The initial plan was for LRASM to be launched from aircraft and, eventually, adapted to ship launch from VLS systems.  As we’ve noted, after some initial feasibility tests, the ship launched version seems to have ceased development.

 

A brief timeline is presented below.  Note that this was an urgent need program.  With that in mind, the drawn out time frame is quite disappointing.

 

 

2009 – Program start with LRASM-A subsonic version and LRASM-B supersonic version.

2012 – LRASM-B cancelled.

2013 – Testing begins.

2013 – Company funded VLS test.

2015 – Designated AGM-158C

2017 – Lot 1 Low Rate Initial Production contract for 23 air-launched missiles.

2018 – Approved for use on B-1 bomber.

2019 – Approved for use on F-18 Hornet.

 

Had the urgent need been met in a year or less, this program would have been an excellent example of rapid adaptability and responsiveness.  As it stands, however, it is yet another example of a badly broken R&D and procurement system.

 

Here is a timeline of the LRASM production contracts.

 

Jul 2017 - LM awarded $86M contract for production of 23 missiles for Lot 1 LRIP [3]

Jan 2019 - LM awarded $172M contract for production of 50 missiles for Lot 2 [4]

Apr 2020 - LM awarded $167M contract for production of 48 missiles for Lot 3 [6]

Feb 2021 – LM awarded $414M contract for production of 137 missiles for Lots 4 and 5 [2]

Nov 2021 – LM awarded $125M contract for production of 42 missiles for Lot 6 [5]

 

The contract totals appear to be $964M for 300 missiles which gives an average cost of $3.2M per missile.

 

So, an urgent need program has delivered (meaning contracts awarded rather than missiles actually delivered) 300 missiles in 8 years using an existing missile as its basis.  That’s disappointing performance, to say the least.  I guess ‘urgent’ doesn’t mean in the military what it does in real life.

 

 

________________________________

 

Related Note: The LRASM was to have been quickly followed by the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 2 anti-ship missile slated for entry into service in 2024.  In reality, the 2020 DOT&E report states that the Navy is now hoping for OASuW Increment 2 sometime in the FY28-30 time range and, without a doubt, that will slip by a few to several years.  This really is pathetic.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM

 

[2]https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/lockheed-martin-lrasm-production-usaf-navy/

 

[3]https://www.defensedaily.com/lockheed-martin-wins-87-million-lrasm-production-contract-tests-ship-launch/air-force/

 

[4]https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2019/2019/01/u-s-navy-air-force-award-lockheed-martin-2nd-lrasm-production-lot/

 

[5]https://www.govconwire.com/2021/11/lockheed-awarded-125m-for-6th-long-range-anti-ship-missile-production-lot/

 

[6] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/lockheed-martin-lmt-secures-168m-145202359.html

P-8 Poseidon – Ship Killer

The Navy is awarding Boeing a contract to begin integration of the LRASM with the P-8 Poseidon.  Given that we already have multiple ways to launch anti-ship missiles (LCS, Burke, F-18 Hornet, Constellation, etc.), why is the Navy doing this?  Well, the Navy’s answer is,

 

The whole goal here, at the broadest level, is to create problems for Chinese military planners. [2]

 

Hmm … Let’s circle back to that in a bit but, for the moment, let’s review the P-8 concept.

 

The primary function of the P-8 is anti-submarine warfare (ASW) although, in typical Navy fashion, as documented on the NavAir website, they’ve loaded on broad area maritime surveillance, directing Triton UAVs, maritime and littoral operations, strike warfare, and search and rescue.[6]  As we’ve seen, multiple functions dilutes training time/focus and produces less-than-expert operators … woefully less than expert.

 

P-8 Poseidon

Heading into 2020, the Navy had a validated requirement for 138 P-8 Poseidons[1] but halted purchases with an inventory of 128.[2]  So, optimistically, on any given day we have 80-100 aircraft available to cover the world’s oceans and operate against Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea, among others.  That’s a lot of ocean to cover with not many aircraft!

 

GAO puts the program unit cost at $200M each in 2012 dollars (program unit cost = $270M each).[3]  The combination of limited numbers of aircraft and high cost suggests that the wise commander will very carefully utilize and preserve the aircraft and avoid high risk operations that place the aircraft too near enemy anti-air forces.

 

The P-8 is capable of carrying torpedoes, Harpoon missiles, and SLAM-ER.  The Navy is also looking at adding additional weapons to the aircraft.

 

NAVAIR states that possible weapons systems to be integrated on the P-8A include “the 500 [pounds] to 2,000 [pounds] class of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) variants, Mk 62/63/65 Quickstrike mines, the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB II), Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD), Bomb Rack Unit BRU-55, and Universal Armament Interface (UAI).” [4]

 

So, not only has the Navy loaded the aircraft/crew with multiple functions on top of the primary mission, they now want to turn the aircraft into a multi-mission strike aircraft capable of mining, stand off strike, and close in strike … identical to the F-18 Hornet.  Isn’t that kind of multi-faceted strike capability a full time training effort by itself?  Where’s the time for ASW and all the other multi-missions?

 

Does every platform in the military really need to be capable of conducting every type of mission with every possible weapon?  Isn’t that how you become incompetent at every mission instead of expert at one?

 

Just out of curiosity, where will the P-8 get its targeting data (see, "LRASM - A Good Half Of A Weapon System")?  Yes, the aircraft carries its own radar but a large, slow, non-stealthy aircraft that is radiating is another way of describing a dead aircraft.  If the P-8 is close enough to a target to detect it, it’s close enough to be easily detected and killed by the enemy.  Let’s bear in mind that naval targets (meaning ships) are not going to be spotted at a thousand miles.  Every ship, today, is stealthy to varying degrees.  Chinese ships, in particular, visually appear to be more stealthy than ours and a searching aircraft will have to get quite close to target them.  I’m guessing Chinese ships will be detectable at around 30 miles.  That puts the P-8 well within the ship’s AAW kill zone.  Is this the kind of risk we want to take with our only fixed wing ASW asset and one that is limited in numbers and exorbitant in cost?

 

Returning to the LRASM issue, the P-8 will likely be able to carry 4 LRASM.

 

The P-8 has four wing pylons. Each of these stores stations, which are rated at 2,500 pounds, are able to carry standoff cruise missiles, such as AGM-84 Harpoons and SLAM-ERs, and eventually the stealthy Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). [5]

 

Does the ability to launch a maximum of 4 LRASM justify exposing rare and expensive aircraft to enemy defenses?

 

So, to sum up, with the P-8 program we have,

 

• not enough numbers to be effective given the mission load
• an aircraft too expensive to risk
• an aircraft/crew tasked with too many missions to be expert at any of them and the focus/training for the primary mission will be diluted
• an aircraft that cannot self-target without exposing itself to destruction
• a concept that will result in operating a large, slow, non-stealthy aircraft too near enemy defenses

 

Now, as promised, let’s circle back to the initial bit about how a LRASM missile-armed P-8 will ‘create problems for Chinese military planners’.  How will a large, slow, radiating, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable, defenseless aircraft create problems for the Chinese?  To the enemy, the P-8 is what is known as a target drone and all the Chinese need is for the aircraft to fly within range so that they can leisurely shoot it down.  How is serving up a valuable, rare, expensive target drone on an aerial platter creating a problem for Chinese military planners?  Isn’t it far more likely that the Chinese will be sending us thank you notes rather than scratching their heads over the problems we’ve created?

 

This kind of delusional thinking is how people will get killed when war comes.

 

What is it with the Navy’s refusal to become outstanding at one task?  The belief that a single platform/crew can competently perform dozens of functions is delusional.  The dilution of training time, alone, guarantees that this cannot happen.

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “US Navy Plans To Stop Buying P-8 Poseidon Sub Hunters Despite Growing Undersea Threat”, Loren Thompson, 2-Dec-2019,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/12/02/us-navy-plans-to-stop-buying-p-8-poseidon-sub-hunters-despite-growing-undersea-threat/?sh=2857adb159fe

 

[2]Breaking Defense website, “With missile upgrade, P-8A Poseidon brings capacity, complexity to China fight: Analysts ”, Justin Katz, 2-Dec-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/with-missile-upgrade-p-8a-poseidon-brings-capacity-complexity-to-china-fight-analysts/

 

[3]Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions, Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs”, Mar 2012, p.117

 

[4]The Diplomat website, “US Navy to Arm P-8A Poseidon With Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile”, Franz-Stefan Gady, 6-Feb-2020,

https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/us-navy-to-arm-p-8a-poseidon-with-long-range-anti-ship-missile/

 

[5]The Drive website, “The Case For Stripping The P-8 Poseidon Down Into An RB-8 Multi-Role Arsenal Ship”, Tyler Rogoway, 22-Jul-2021,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40859/the-case-for-stripping-the-p-8-poseidon-down-into-an-rb-8-multi-role-arsenal-ship

[6]https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/P-8A-Poseidon

Navy Strike Doctrine

We’ve had a lot of discussions about the role of the carrier.  ComNavOps has stated that strike (land attack) is no longer a carrier mission.  There remains, however, a substantial number of observers who still cling to the outdated concept of carrier strike operations.

 

Why is carrier strike – meaning, manned aircraft – no longer a mission?  Modern, peer defenses, consisting of both defending aircraft and land based surface to air (SAM) missiles along with extensive and sophisticated sensors have rendered aircraft strikes far too risky.

 

The preferred alternative is, of course, cruise missiles as suggested by the following missile characteristics.

 

Cost – Tomahawk cruise missiles cost around $2M compared to aircraft which cost $80M-$100M each.  In addition, aircraft operate on a daily basis and flight hour costs are on the order of $15K-$30K per flight hour, day after day.  That makes for an incredibly expensive weapon delivery system.  In contrast, a cruise missile has no operating or maintenance costs to speak of.  Finally, the cost of training and ‘maintaining’ a pilot is enormous whereas, again, the cruise missile has no pilot cost.

 

Expendability – Cruise missiles are, by design and by cost, expendable.  Aircraft, by design and cost, are not.  Modern peer defenses guarantee that strike aircraft will suffer significant attrition and the cost to replace the airframe and produce a new pilot is staggering.  Worse, the time required to produce new airframes and pilots is prohibitive during a war.

 

Stealth – The US Navy currently has no stealth strike aircraft.  That aside, cruise missiles have significantly greater stealth than even a stealth aircraft due to their much smaller size, smaller cross sectional area, smaller profile (regardless of angle), smaller engine exhaust (IR signature), and ability to fly a sea skimming terminal approach.  And, of course, new cruise missiles have stealth shaping.

 

Numbers – The current US Navy Tomahawk cruise missile inventory is somewhere in the vicinity of 3000-5000.  The Navy currently has 9 air wings with around 44 F-18 Hornets in each for a total of 396 potential strike aircraft.  Of course, in actual operations only a fraction of those would be available as aircraft are needed for carrier defense, various CAPs, tankers, and escorts.

 

Missiles can be massed in very large numbers against a target.  Strike aircraft are severely limited in number although each aircraft can carry 2-4 missiles or several bombs.  Weight limits, weight distributions, external fuel tanks, range considerations, self-defense requirements, etc. limit the number of missiles that can realistically be carried.

 

Weather – While carrier aircraft can operate in bad weather, to a degree, there are significant limits.  Missiles, in contrast are virtually unaffected by weather.

 

Range – Cruise missiles have a range of around 1000 miles.  Aircraft have an effective combat range of 200-300 miles although various types of standoff missiles would add to that range.  For example, the air launched Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) has a range of somewhere around 300 miles which, when added to the aircraft’s range, puts the total strike range at around 500-600 miles.  The extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) has a range of 500 miles or so which, combined with the aircraft’s range, gives a total strike range of 700-800 miles.  Other weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) have much lesser ranges.  JSOW has a high altitude release range of 70 miles.

 

 

The benefit, such as it is, of air launched, standoff attack missiles is negated by very long range SAM defenses and enemy aircraft which can, and will, contest the launch points.  The effort required to conduct an airborne, standoff strike (aircraft, fighter escorts, tankers, EW escorts, BARCAP, etc. also negates the benefits.  In short, it requires a far more massive effort to conduct an airborne, standoff strike than to conduct a simple ship-launched, cruise missile strike and the benefits are few especially when weighed against the inevitable aircraft losses.

 

So, is ComNavOps alone in his assessment?  After all, a lot of people are still unwilling to give up their comforting paradigm of carrier strike.  Well, it would seem that the Navy has also concluded that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset as evidenced by the strike history of the last few decades.  The table below is adapted from Wikipedia.(1)

 

 

 

Operation	Date	No. of Missiles
Gulf War	1991	288
Iraq disarmament	Jan 1993	46
Iraq disarmament	Jun 1993	23
Operation Deliberate Force	Sep 1995	13
Iraq disarmament	Sep 1996	44
Operation Infinite Reach	Aug 1998	79
Operation Desert Fox	Dec 1998	325
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia	1999	218
Operation Enduring Freedom	2001	50
Invasion of Iraq	2003	802
Dobley airstrike	Mar 2008	2
Al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen	Dec 2009	2
Libya	Mar 2011	124
Military intervention against ISIL	Sep 2014	47
Attack on suspected radar sites in Yemen	Oct 2016	5
Shayrat airbase strike	Apr 2017	59
Damascus/Homs chem weapons strike	Apr 2018	66

 

 

 

 

There have been manned aircraft strikes during that time but those have been relatively few and only in low threat scenarios such as the infamous ‘truck plinking’ during the ISIS campaign.

 

You might also recall that not too long ago, the Navy had stated that the F-35 would be last manned naval aircraft – further recognition that manned aircraft strikes were no longer viable – and, more recently, the Navy attempted, but failed, to develop unmanned strike UAVs (that eventually ‘devolved’ into the unmanned tanker).  Clearly, the Navy has moved on from carrier strikes.

 

The implication of the Navy’s recognition that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset is that the carrier air wing should be shifting its composition from strike to air superiority.  We need to drop any aircraft that is a ‘strikefighter’ and switch to pure air superiority.  The immediate import of this line of reasoning is that the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, which the Navy is working on now, needs to be a pure air superiority fighter and not a strikefighter.  Disturbingly, the Navy is already referring to the NGAD as the F/A-XX strikefighter so that train is already headed off the tracks.

 

Carrier aircraft strike has gone the way of the battleship in terms of being the primary strike method.  We need to complete the transition to carrier air superiority by modifying our doctrine and operational practices and adjust our air wing composition accordingly.  Carriers and their air wings remain just as vitally important as ever but their mission has changed.  Just as the battleship proponents clung to their outmoded paradigm, so too will the carrier strike proponents cling to theirs but the change is inevitable.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomahawk_(missile)#United_States_Navy

LRASM Update

Once the hottest item on the Navy’s weapons wish list, the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM, AGM-158C) was intended to be air launched from F-18s and then quickly adapted to shipboard vertical launch from standard Mk41 VLS systems.  Of late, however, the LRASM seems to have faded away.  Air launch tests have been conducted but the vertical launch effort appears to have ceased.  The most recent vertical launch progress I can find is a 2017 Lockheed funded test that demonstrated that a LRASM could push through a VLS vertical launch cell cover.(4)  The Navy also conducted a test firing of the LRASM from a container mounted at an angle, similar to the Mk141 Harpoon rack launcher.(3)  I’ve found no mention of anything more recent.

LRASM

 

The Air Force appears to have certified the missile for use and awarded Lockheed Martin a $414M contract earlier this year to produce 137 LRASM for its B-1 bombers.(2)

 

DOT&E cites numerous problems with LRASM development and a paucity of testing.  A DOT&E Quick Reaction Assessment (QRA) report covering tests from 2017-2019 stated that the assessment had limited operational realism and that testing had demonstrated multiple hardware and software failures.(1)  Further, the Navy’s Modeling and Simulation (M&S) effort for the missile is incomplete and, therefore, inadequate to determine whether the system meets its key performance parameters (KPP).

 

Unfortunately, that’s all the information there is as the details are classified.

 

The LRASM is now being described as an interim anti-surface solution in response to a Pacific Fleet  2008 Urgent Operational Need request.  2008?  It’s now 2021 and the LRASM is still undergoing testing.  If this rate of progress is what passes for urgent it’s no wonder the Chinese are building their fleet far faster than we are!  Urgent?  What a travesty.

 

The description of the missile as an interim solution is also telling and indicates the Navy’s sudden loss of interest.

 

While I have no problem – and would applaud – a cessation of interest due to technical problems that cannot be solved or would cost too much to do so, I also note that this is symptomatic of the Navy’s tendency to jump from one shiny toy to the next.  Recall how the Navy went from describing the Zumwalt as the single foundation upon which the future fleet would be built to completely unwanted in the span of a few months?

 

Of course, without the classified details I can’t determine whether the program has run into insurmountable technical issues or just the Navy’s wandering attention span.

 

In any event, it now appears that the Tomahawk anti-ship missile (once called TASM but now referred to as the Maritime Strike Tomahawk in the Navy’s never ending quest to appear to be developing something new despite the TASM having been in service for years prior to being removed in 1994) has overtaken the LRASM in the Navy’s eyes and now seems to be the focus of development.

 

  

 

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(1)Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,  2020 Annual Report, Jan 2021, p. 161

 

(2)https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29027/U_S__Air_Force_Orders_400_JASSM_ER__137_LRASM_Missiles#.YFJsyvZFyM8

 

(3)https://strategypage.com/htmw/htairw/articles/20200316.aspx

 

(4)https://news.usni.org/2017/08/18/lrasm-succeeds-sea-b-1b-bomber-tactical-launch-test

LRASM – A Good Half of a Weapon System

The Navy has announced that the air launched AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is operational on the F-18 Super Hornet.  This is very good news as it now provides the non- or semi-stealthy aircraft the ability to launch from long range which enhances the survivability of the aircraft (and decreases the need for stealth?  - what do you say to that, F-35?).  LRASM is a welcome replacement for the obsolete Harpoon. 

However, the LRASM is only half of a weapon system.  The other half is sensors.  As we’ve noted many times, the longest ranged weapon in the world is useless unless you can find a target from the same range as your weapon.

Hornet and LRASM

The LRASM is reported to have a range of 200-500 miles depending on what source you want to believe.  Currently, the Navy has very few sensors (none?) capable of survivably detecting targets at that range.

As a brief reminder, the LRASM is a stealthy anti-ship cruise missile based on the AGM-158B JASSM-ER.  The missile has a 1000 lb penetrating (whatever that means) blast fragmentation warhead.  It uses multiple sensors and modes to find targets which gives it reduced dependence on GPS guidance.

LRASM is designed to detect and destroy specific targets within groups of ships by employing advanced technologies that reduce dependence on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, network links and GPS navigation in electronic warfare environments. (1)

So, this is some good news but now the Navy needs to put some work into developing a long range sensor system that can effectively and survivably operate in enemy controlled or contested air space.  Only with such a sensor system can we get the maximum benefit of the LRASM.

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(1)USNI News website, “Next-Generation Anti-Ship Missile Achieves Operational Capability with Super Hornets”, Xavier Vavasseur, 19-Dec-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/12/19/next-generation-anti-ship-missile-achieves-operational-capability-with-super-hornets