ASROC or Helicopters?

Helicopters are generally recognized as the best ASW platform above the surface; another submarine being the best ASW platform below the surface, of course.  Unfortunately, this leads to the widespread mindset that every ship must have helos embarked for ASW.
 
The problem with the concept of helos on every ship is that the aviation element of a ship is shockingly expensive.  A helo needs a flight deck (something on the order of 80ft x 50ft), hangar (another 80ft x 50 ft), dedicated weapon magazines, fuel storage, maintenance shops and parts storage, pilot and maintainer berthing (and food, water, etc.).  The extra 160ft x 50ft of ship size means more power is needed to move the ship which means bigger engines which requires more ship size which …  You get the idea.

Another problem is that helos are only sporadically available, being notorious for needing maintenance at inconvenient times.
 
Sure, there’s a penalty to be paid for putting helos on every ship but, really, what’s the alternative since we need ASW?  Well, one alternative is ASROC (anti-submarine rocket).  ASROC began back when submarines still had to get fairly close to their target in order to attack.  Today, submarines can attack with torpedoes or missiles from far beyond ASROC range (vertical launch ASROC has a range of around 12 nm). What’s needed is a much longer range ASROC, perhaps on the order of a hundred miles.  Given that we have thousand mile cruise missiles I can’t see any problem with developing a hundred mile ASROC. 
 
In the past, ASROC used arm launchers, box launchers, and common VLS cells.  The flexibility in launch mechanism means that some kind of suitable launcher can be placed on any ship tasked with ASW.
 

A long range ASROC would offer a viable alternative to the incredibly expensive helicopter on every ship.  Note that this does not mean we don’t need ASW helicopters.  We do!  We just don’t need them on every ASW ship.  Helicopters should be reserved for true destroyers (of which there are none in the world), ASW carriers, and, perhaps, a specialized convoy escort frigate.  They should not be on corvettes, general purpose frigates, and cruisers (meaning Burke/Zumwalt “destroyers”).  Want to build a cheaper Burke?  Eliminate the helicopter!

Statistics Will Say Whatever You Want Them To Say

Here is a cost estimate for the war in Iran, as reported by Reuters and provided by the Pentagon.
 

The ​United States' war in Iran has cost $29 ‌billion so far, a senior Pentagon official said on Tuesday, an increase of $4 billion from an estimate provided ​late last month.[1]

I have serious doubts about that figure
 
How can there be any doubt or discrepancy, you ask?  Don’t you just add up the costs?  Well, it depends what you consider to be costs.  For example, it’s incredibly expensive to operate an aircraft carrier so the cost of operating one in this conflict must be significant, right?  Well, no.  That aircraft carrier was going to be operating whether it was involved in the Iran conflict or just on routine deployment.  Those costs would be the same.  Whether in a war or not, you still have to pay for the crew, food, expendables, escort ships, and so on.  That carrier costs nothing extra to operate in war versus peace. 
 
The only true costs of war are the direct, extra costs such as the additional munitions that would not otherwise have been expended.  Thus, the war cost of the carrier is only the extra munitions, fuel, and the like that would not have otherwise been used.  That’s a pretty small figure compared to $29B !
 
I can go through endless other examples but you get the idea.  The cost of the war is only the direct, extra cost.  We have to pay for all the personnel, aircraft, ships, fuel, food, etc. that we would have if there were no war.
 
So, what did the Pentagon include in their cost estimate?  Only the Pentagon knows and they aren’t saying.  As Reuters acknowledges,
 

It is unclear how the Pentagon arrived at the $29 billion figure.[1]

You can say anything you want with statistics by manipulating what you include and exclude.  Here’s a hint that the Pentagon’s estimate may include more than the direct costs.
 

Jules Hurst, ‌who ‌is performing the duties of the comptroller, told ‌lawmakers that the cost included updated repair and replacement ‌of equipment and operational costs.[1]

Repairs and replacement due to battle damage is a legitimate war cost but routine repairs and replacements that would have happened anyway, are not.  Similarly, operational costs are not a direct cost unless they are over and above routine costs.  Even munition expenditures cost zero.  Those munitions have already been paid for.  They cost nothing.  Their replacements will cost something but there has been near zero direct replacement of any of the expended munitions, as yet, since replacement takes months or years.  As Congress begins to allocate munitions replacement funding and the Pentagon begins placing production contracts, then the legitimate war costs will begin to accumulate.  And, yes, I understand including anticipated replacement costs in a war cost estimate.  That’s reasonable, if not accurate.
 
I’m certain – with no concrete evidence – that the Pentagon has loaded every cost they can think of into the cost estimate.  Why?  Because the Pentagon is not in the business of fighting wars;  they’re in the business of securing funding from Congress and a large war cost estimate is a great way to get Congress to provide additional funding.  It’s as simple as that. 
 
The Pentagon wants more money.  You don’t get more money by telling Congress the war is well within your existing budget.  You get money by lying exaggerating falsifying creative accounting to pressure Congress into giving you more money. 
 
Every cost estimate I’ve ever seen from the Pentagon has been highly, and artificially, skewed, up or down, to serve the purposes of an agenda.
 
What has this war cost?  I have no idea but I’m sure it’s not what the Pentagon says.
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Reuters website, “US war in Iran has cost $29 billion so far, Pentagon says”, Staff, 12-May-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-war-iran-has-cost-29-billion-pentagon-says-2026-05-12/

Jump Over Justification

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report on the Navy’s unmanned systems acquisition efforts and they list various challenges the Navy faces in expanding the unmanned fleet.  For example,
 

• Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS [ed. robotic and autonomous systems] investments
• Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS

 
That’s nice, however, the report entirely ignores the fundamental question, why do we even need unmanned assets?  Instead, they jump over the “why” and proceed immediately to address the “how”.  The Navy, and those who report on the Navy, has done this repeatedly and always to their detriment, if not regret.  Can you say “LCS”?  Can you say “Zumwalt”?  Can you … well, you get the idea.  I don’t need to cite the nearly endless list of acquisitions that ignored the why (the CONOPS, in other words) and focused on the how.
 
The report simply accepts the official Navy spiel about unmanned.
 

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems(RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, distributed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships, and submarines. [1]

Consider that statement.  Ukraine proves nothing about naval warfare except that a sufficiently inept navy can be injured by drones.  The Middle East proves nothing about naval warfare because there hasn’t been any naval drone warfare.
 
The statement then unquestioningly accepts the Navy’s idea that unmanned assets will somehow, in some unproven, magical manner be successful.  There has been absolutely no relevant, real world experience to justify drones and no exercises that do so.
 

According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities.[1]

So, a hybrid fleet is “necessary”?  Based on what?  Not based on the real world and not based on exercises so … what?
 
I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times:  I have yet to see a viable CONOPS (the why) for unmanned assets.  The people reporting on the Navy need to question the Navy’s proclamations, not blindly accept them.  GAO needs to examine the why before they examine the how … and so do we.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1] Government Accountability Office, “GAO Report to Congress on the Navy’s Robotic Autonomous Systems”, 16-Jun-2026, GAO-26-109014,
https://news.usni.org/2026/06/16/gao-report-to-congress-on-the-navys-robotic-autonomous-systems

Where Are The Troops?

This is not a land combat blog but, sometimes, I’ve just gotta dip my toe into that world. 
 
We’ve repeatedly seen the US get attacked (with very little success) in the Strait of Hormuz by a drone or a speedboat and then we retaliate by striking combat related facilities.  The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly, we know where they are?  What kind of idiot commander allows known enemy combat facilities to exist during a war?
 
Now, here’s the land combat portion.  Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep, say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait?  As best I can tell, that would eliminate every remaining speedboat and most of the relevant combat facilities (weapons warehoused, radars, command and control facilities, troop housing/hideouts, etc.
 
Oh, but what if Iranian troops confront us?  Oh no!  What will we do?  Well, how about we thank them for revealing themselves and gathering together in one place so that we can more easily and efficiently kill them?
 
A sweep would remove most of the remaining ability of Iran to harass shipping in the strait.
 
Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk soldiers?  If so, then this war isn’t very important.  If it is important, then ground troops are justified.  This would be a training exercise for a WWII battalion.  
 
We started the war with a good approach but it’s devolved into a decidedly half-assed affair the last couple of weeks.

US Helo Crew Rescued By Drone!

An Apache helicopter crashed in the water off the coast of Oman and the military is telling us that the 2-man crew was rescued by an unmanned boat, a 24 ft Corsair.  That’s astounding!  An unmanned boat rescued downed aircrew who had been adrift for two hours.  Here’s the headline.[1]
 

In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat

 
The promise of unmanned is finally being fulfilled!
 
We have no details, only sensationalistic headlines but, presumably, the boat located the aircrew on its own, plotted a course, found the crew, lifted the crew into the boat, applied emergency first aid as needed, and returned the crew to safety.
 
Of course, unless the boat had capabilities I’ve never heard of, it didn’t locate the crew, lift the crew into the boat, or apply emergency first aid because unmanned boats can’t do any of that.  Don’t get me wrong.  Pulling up near the crew so that they could climb aboard, unaided, see to their own first aid (were there any emergency supplies on the boat?  I doubt it), and be transported out of the area is very helpful if no manned asset was available but to call this a rescue by an unmanned boat is akin to saying that a sling on a helicopter rescued a swimmer in the water.  The sling didn’t do anything.  It was just a tool.
 
My larger question is, given that we’re in a high intensity war in the area, shouldn’t we have manned assets blanketing the area, including dedicated search and rescue units?  For example, an SH-60 type helo traveling 170 mph could travel the length of the strait in a half hour or so, depending on the start and end point and could reach any specific point in less time than that, flying a straight line.  Was there no manned ship, boat, or helo anywhere in the strait?  To rescue downed aircrew, we pull out all the stops.  All the stops meant no manned assets?  We’re not talking about covering the entire Pacific Ocean.  The area around the strait is pretty small.  The Navy’s presence in the area seems abnormally sparse which may explain why we seem incapable of escorting ships through the strait.  Is this a war we’re serious about or not?  The Navy doesn’t seem all that serious about it and this is just one more example.
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat”, 9-Jun-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/drone-boat-rescue-us-pilots/2026/06/09/id/1259057/

Lessons From Truk

How often have we seen comments stating that our carriers are hopelessly outmatched against China because a carrier has only around forty combat aircraft (160 in a 4-carrier group) and China has thousands of aircraft?  As good naval analysts always do, let’s turn to history to see what lessons we can learn that might be applicable.  A salient example is the US Navy’s WWII attack on Japan’s Truk island bases on 17–18 Feb-1944.
 
Truk was the major Japanese base in the South Pacific and was referred to as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor" and "the Gibraltar of the Pacific”.  It was believed to be heavily defended, fortified, and nearly impregnable with five airfields and a seaplane base and large numbers of warships.
 
It was feared that an attack on Truk would be quite costly and might well not succeed.  Despite this, an attack was ordered (Operation Hailstone) and conducted by three carrier task forces consisting of 5 fleet carriers  (Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill) and 4 light carriers (Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens) along with seven battleships, including Iowa and New Jersey, and many cruisers and destroyers.
 
The US carriers employed their usual run in under cover of night and pre-dawn launches to begin the attacks and achieved total surprise.  The result was a completely lop-sided victory for the US and Truk was never again a significant threat.
 
As it turned out, the Japanese had already begun withdrawing major naval units from Truk prior to the attack but that does not lesson the courage and skill of the attackers.
 
What can we learn from this?
 
Surprise – Surprise has forever been a major contributor to success on the battlefield and there is no better instrument for achieving surprise on the naval battlefield than a carrier group (submariners might argue that!).  In WWII, carriers conducted high speed run ins to their target under cover of night.  Today, darkness offers less cover but the tactic is still valid.  A carrier at sea is generally “invisible” and can show up anywhere at any time.  An enemy’s superiority can be decisively overcome if surprise can be achieved.  The art and task of the military planner is to arrange matters so as to achieve surprise.
 
Localized Superiority – It doesn’t matter how many assets the enemy has in its total inventory.  What matters is how many are instantaneously available at the point and moment of attack – a concept that seems to elude many of today’s naval observers.  The Japanese had superior numbers of aircraft when the initial US fighter sweep arrived but the Japanese aircraft were largely caught on the ground (see, Surprise, above) thus enabling the US to establish and maintain local, effective superiority.  As long as the attacking force doesn’t hang around too long, local superiority can be achieved and maintained for the duration of an operation.  Thus, the oft claimed superiority of numbers of Chinese aircraft in their total inventory is meaningless.  What matters is how many they can put into the air at the moment of attack.  Even having superior numbers locally is meaningless if surprise is achieved and the aircraft are caught on the ground.
 
Firepower – In addition to the hundreds of attacking aircraft, the US utilized large caliber naval guns on its battleships and cruisers to bombard bases and facilities on the islands and sink several fleeing ships, thus effectively supplementing the carrier aircraft.  As devastating as the air attacks were, nothing compares to large caliber naval gunfire for effective, sustained, unstoppable (with air superiority established!) destruction.  This is a lesson the Navy has completely forgotten.  We have no surface firepower and will one day rue the absence.  Large caliber naval guns are a devastating weapon and it is the responsibility of the naval planner to recognize that and work to bring that firepower into play, as appropriate.
 
Another aspect of firepower is numbers of delivery platforms.  The attack on Truk succeeded due to the immense numbers of carrier aircraft involved (500 aircraft).  An aircraft can only deliver a very limited amount of firepower and has no ability to sustain that delivery without returning to its base/carrier to rearm which means aerial firepower can only be applied sporadically.  This limitation was overcome at Truk (and throughout the war) by applying huge numbers of aircraft.  Each individual aircraft carried an almost insignificant amount of firepower but numbers compensated.  Our carrier air wings, today, consist of only around thirty actual combat aircraft (subtracting out combat aircraft relegated to tanker duty because we idiotically gave up our tankers without replacement).  We’ve forgotten that quantity matters when it comes to delivering firepower.
 
Courage – Last but not least, Truk teaches us the importance of courage.  At the time, there was a great deal of trepidation about an attack on Truk but we went ahead anyway.  Today, we have far too many Chicken Littles who see nothing but doom and gloom and are unwilling to take the slightest risk. 
 
Who Dares, Wins
Fortune Favors the Bold
 
These are the mottos and philosophies we should be living by, not
 
What Will the Chinese Think?
We Can’t Risk Escalation
 
Look at all the people, including within the military, who are terrified by the mere thought of engaging Iran, a third rate military, at best, certain that we cannot win.
 
 
 
As with any battle throughout history, there are important lessons to be learned and, as with every battle throughout history, the Navy is deaf, dumb, and blind to the lessons history is screaming at us.

Decided to Stop or Forced to Stop?

The US pounded Iran and was on the verge of total destruction of Iran’s political and military power and then, inexplicably, stopped attacking in favor of pursuit of a peace agreement.
 
As we’ve often noted, you don’t negotiate with an enemy, you utterly destroy them and then impose whatever surrender terms you want. 
 
Since WWII, the US has failed to pursue ultimate victory in every conflict it’s been involved in and the results have always come back to bite us.
 
Keeping that in mind, let’s change gears.
 
ComNavOps has frequently offered estimates of weapon inventory levels by examining budget documents for the preceding years.  In very brief terms, our weapons have historically had inventories in the low to mid thousands with production rates in the low hundreds.  However, that balance has been upset by the recent heavy expenditures of weapons off Yemen, around Israel, and against Iran.  In other words, our inventories are being depleted far faster than production can replenish.
 
Now, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has done exactly what ComNavOps has done and has issued a report estimating weapon inventories prior to the Iran conflict, specific weapon expenditures during the conflict, and speculation about the amount of time required to rebuild the inventories.
 
As one example, here are the figures for Tomahawk missiles.  As reported by TWZ website, CSIS estimated a pre-war Tomahawk inventory of 3100 missiles and an expenditure of 1000+ missile, thus far.[1]
 
Think about that expenditure rate and note that was against a helpless, fourth rate enemy who was being pounded by other countries and other weapons.  Now, consider how that would change against China.  We’d be expending Tomahawks at a rate of a thousand per week!  But, I digress …
 
What about Tomahawk inventory replenishment ?  It’s not encouraging.
 

Tomahawk procurement “averaged 86 missiles in the past 10 fiscal years (FY 15–FY 26), with most orders coming from the Navy,”  CSIS noted. [1]
 
 … the recent annual production rate is less than 200 … [1]

It’s worse than that, though.  A significant chunk of production is slated for sales to foreign countries, as noted below.
 

Another factor to consider are foreign military sales, with nearly 800 due to Japan, Australia and the Netherlands.[1]

So, we have a very small production capacity which is further “eroded” by deliveries to other countries.  It’s going to take many years to recover our Tomahawk inventory levels.  How much worse will this be during a war with China?  But, again, I digress …
 
The same trends hold true, to varying degrees, for all other weapons in the US military.
 
With low inventories and dismal replenishment rates in mind and returning to the first sentence in this post, we can now legitimately ask whether the seemingly inexplicable pause on the verge of total victory was due to some [misguided] desire for a premature peace or due to having reached a state of weapons depletion that became unacceptable given the constant threat of war with China and the need to maintain a “sufficient “ stockpile of weapons.  In other words, did we choose to stop or were we forced to stop by low weapon inventories?  Did we hit the minimum “safe” inventory levels and had to stop?
 
There’s no way to know the answer but logic suggests that we stopped because we reached a point where we felt we couldn’t expend any more weapons without depleting our inventories to unacceptable levels.  If this is the case, then all the talk of the US being ready and willing to resume attacks is just public relations propaganda for the masses and Iran is in no real danger of further heavy, sustained attacks and that would certainly change the negotiation strategies on both sides.
 
What do you think?  Decided to stop or forced to stop?
 
 
Note:  This is not a post about the “rightness” of the Iran strikes, just the military aspects of those strikes.  Political comments will not be allowed.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]The War Zone website, “Severity Of America’s Depleted Advanced Weapons Stockpiles Detailed In New Report”, Howard Altman, 28-May-2026,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/severity-of-americas-depleted-advanced-weapons-stockpiles-detailed-in-new-report

Discipline

No serious observer of US military forces can have failed to see the decline in training and readiness over the last few decades.  The following news article is testament to that decline by the fact that it is even newsworthy.
 

U.S. Army Gen. Christopher LaNeve, a commander known for enforcing strict discipline and later winning praise from President Donald Trump, is expected to become the Army's next top officer, according to U.S. officials.[1]

Isn’t enforcing strict discipline simply a given in a trained and ready military?  It should be!
 

Two years before joining War Secretary Pete Hegseth's inner circle, LaNeve built a reputation at the 82nd Airborne Division for rigidly enforcing rules, including banning cellphones during physical training and requiring troops to use only military-issued gear.[1]

Banning cell phones and insisting soldiers use military gear?!  What kind of nutcase is this guy?  More to the point, how far has discipline fallen if this is even a story? 
 
As you would expect,
 

The approach did not make him popular with many rank-and-file troops. Current and former members of the division said some soldiers booed LaNeve during All-American Week events in his final year commanding the unit.[1]

Anyone who booed should be instantly dishonorably discharged.  That they weren’t,  proves the depths to which discipline had fallen.
 
Fortunately, not all have bought into the fad of non-existent discipline.
 

However, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, a former 82nd Airborne commander who later recommended LaNeve for a senior Pentagon role, said the general restored discipline and traditional military values to the division.
 
"What he did, which I admired, he brought the 82nd — it had drifted away a bit — back to traditional training and traditional values," Kellogg said. "I think the Army had gotten away from the idea of traditionalism and what it means to fight and how to fight."[1]

Here’s where I fault SecDef Hegseth.  If the unit had “drifted away” from training and discipline, which is to say they drifted away from combat readiness, then the previous commander(s) should be promptly court-martialed for dereliction of duty and dishonorably discharged.  This is the kind of house-cleaning I had hoped Hegseth would implement and has not.  Very disappointing.
 
Please note that this post is not about Gen. LaNeve, specifically, but about discipline and training.  Indeed, LaNeve has some questionable actions he needs to be held accountable for.  For example,
 

In June 2023, LaNeve signed a Pride Month memo recognizing LGBTQ+ troops.[1]

The larger, main point is that military discipline has clearly deteriorated, badly, and needs to be reestablished immediately and forcefully.

 

__________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Gen. LaNeve Poised to Be Army's Next Top Officer”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 28-May-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/christopher-laneve-army-pete-hegseth/2026/05/28/id/1257791/

FY27 Five Year Plan

If you want to read a sales brochure that raves about the magnificence of the Navy, check out the latest 30 year shipbuilding plan.
 
Here are some tidbits from the most recent five year plan for the years 2027-2031 inclusive.[1]
 
Battleship (Qty= 3, $14.5B ea) – Setting aside the reality that these will never be built, the plan is to have three built within the next five years while our high priority, “must get hulls in the water” frigate will only complete four?  There’s some serious delusion at work here.
 
Burke (Qty= 7, $3.61B ea) – Sure, these ships are long since obsolete, non-stealthy, overloaded, have no growth margins, lack close in weapons, and have sub-optimal radars but we’re going to build seven of them anyway because it’s the only ship we know how to build.  Along those same lines, I’ve read that the Navy is going to restart the F6F Hellcat production line because it was successful and we know how to build them.
 
NSC-FF Frigate (Qty= 4, $1.76B ea) – This is our most urgent shipbuilding project, according to the Navy, and we can only get four in five years?  Does this give a feel for our ability to replace sunken ships during a war?  Check out that price!  That’s a long ways from the numbers the Navy was publicly tossing around!  Remember when the Navy was claiming they would build Constellations for around $800M ea?  Now, we’re building slightly upgunned NSC patrol boats for twice that cost!  Yikes!
 
Virginia SSN (Qty= 10, $6.3B ea) – Setting aside the fact that we’ve been unable to maintain a build rate of two subs per year and now we think we’ll build two plus an SSBN each year, do you remember when the Navy proudly (and fraudulently!) claimed it was building Virginia’s for $2B apiece?  Well, now the cost is up to $6.3B and, of course, that’s a lowball Navy estimate.
 
Landing Ship Medium LSM (Qty= 23, $298M ea) – I have yet to hear any viable Concept of Operations for these sitting ducks and yet we’re going to build 23 of them?  I wouldn’t want to be a Marine in the near future!  Shipping on one of those promises to be a one-way trip and a short one at that.
 
Unmanned – Paraphrasing Star Wars, “The delusion is strong in this one.”  From the Navy’s shipbuilding plan,
 

The United States faces a strategic inflection point where peer adversaries have achieved naval mass that the U.S. cannot match with traditional shipbuilding alone.[1]

This statement is utterly false.  We can easily match China’s shipbuilding but we choose not to for reasons that only an insane person could agree with.  This is purely a self-inflicted disadvantage.  We’ve discussed the many ways we could easily and hugely increase our shipbuilding so I won’t belabor it here.
 
The Navy’s solution?  Why, unmanned, of course!
 

To counter this and deliver warfighting capability fast, the USV FoS strategy outlines a rapid, competitive path to deliver affordable, scalable, and adaptable unmanned surface capabilities … [1]

False!  The Navy’s unmanned vessels do NOT delivery warfighting capability.  They are largely unarmed.
 
Retirements - What about retirements?  The five year plan calls for 58 new ships and 46 retirements.  That’s a net gain of 12 ships.  Take that number at face value.  It’s a gain of 12 ships over 5 years which is 2 ships per year.  Compared to Chinese shipbuilding rates, that’s embarrassingly pathetic.  Still, it’s an improvement.  Or is it?  When we start looking at what types of ships will be added and lost, the picture is not good.
 
- 10 CG/DDG will be retired and 10 DDG added.  That’s a net gain of 0 for our top of the line surface combatants.
 
-  Counting all combat ships (carriers, surface ships, attack subs), we’ll gain 22 and lose 25 for a net loss of 3.
 
The numerical gains will be in auxiliary ships, not combat ships.  Auxiliaries are vital but they add no firepower to the fleet.
 
 
Summary
 
Though I’m sure they didn’t intend it as such, the 30 year plan perfectly documents the Navy’s delusions, fantasies, runaway costs, and schedule slippages.  In that sense, it’s quite informative and interesting.  As far as reality … well, that’s not included in the document. 
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Department of the Navy, ”US Navy Shipbuilding Plan”, May 2026, Tables p.15 & 40

USS Ford Deployment

USS Ford just returned from a post-Vietnam record deployment of 320 days.  ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that deployments are of no value and the fleet should be kept home, undergoing continuous, intensive training and maintenance.  The only exception is to perform specific missions and then immediately return.  So, what value (worthiness) did we get from Ford’s record setting deployment?  How much of the deployment was justified? 
 
To review, here’s a timeline of Ford’s deployment activities, as best I can reconstruct it.  As you scan it, ask yourself if the activities are worthwhile.
 
 
24-Jun-2025 began deployment to European Command area of responsibility.
 
19-Jul-2025 arrived Mediterranean
 
17-Aug-2025 North Sea for joint exercises in the Arctic Circle with the Royal Norwegian Navy's HNoMS Thor Heyerdahl (frigate) and HNoMS Maud (tanker), Germany's Hamburg (frigate), and France's Aquitaine (frigate) and Somme (tanker)
 
12-Sep-2025 Oslo, Norway port visit
 
22-26-Sep-2025 NATO Neptune Strike 25-3 exercise
 
24-Oct-2025 Caribbean
 
11-Dec-2025 assisted seizure of a tanker off the coast of Venezuela
 
3-Jan-2026 provided support for Operation Absolute Resolve off Venezuela
 
9-Jan-2026 provided support for Operation Southern Spear in Caribbean
 
27-Feb-2026 off coast of Israel
 
28-Feb-2026 began strikes as part of Operation Epic Fury
 
12-Mar-2026 laundry room fire
 
23-Mar-2026 Souda Bay, Greece, maintenance and repairs
 
28-Mar-2026 Split, Croatia for repairs
 
2-Apr-2026 left Croatia
 
 
 
Let’s analyze the worthiness (value) of Ford’s deployment.  There were two worthwhile activities that could be classified as justifiable missions:
 

• Operation Southern Spear/Absolute Resolve in the Caribbean for the Venezuela confrontation (3 months)
• Operating Epic Fury (Iran strikes) (2 weeks)

 
Even that’s misleading.  The only aspect of the Caribbean operations that was actually necessary as far as requiring a carrier was Operation Absolute Resolve, the capture of Maduro so the 3 month deployment to the area only required a carrier for one day.  Let’s be generous and say 3 weeks were required for the operation to account for transit times and a short period on station prior to the actual execution of the operation.
 
This gives us a maximum of 3.5 months of worthwhile, mission type activity out of an 11 month deployment and, more realistically, 5 weeks of worthwhile, mission type activity out of an 11 month deployment.
 
The rest was useless.
 
The rest was pointless.
 
The rest was a waste.
 
 
The 11 month deployment got us two worthwhile missions (5 weeks) and resulted in a carrier with significant burn damage and burned out sailors, a worn out air wing, and 11 months of deferred maintenance which will cause problems down the road.  Ford will now likely be unavailable for deployment for a year or more.  In contrast, with a home port model, Ford would be continuously mission ready, year round, less the occasional scheduled dry docking every few years.
 
How many of Ford’s sailors will re-up knowing another year long deployment could well be in their future?
 
Home porting (Norfolk) would have allowed the Ford to reach the Caribbean/Venezuela quickly and reached Israel for Epic Fury much quicker.  With constant home port training and maintenance, Ford would have been better prepared for both missions and, debatably, the laundry fire might not have occurred.   Perhaps the persistent toilet problems would also have been resolved although that one sounds like an idiotic design that is never going to work.
 
I don’t think the uselessness of deployments is even debatable, at this point.  Each deployment simply proves my contention.  Each carrier laid up for months or years suffering the effects of deferred maintenance simply proves my contention.  Let’s bring the fleet home and get it back into fighting shape.
 
Thank you, USS Ford, for demonstrating the uselessness of deployments.

Ready! Ready? Not Ready …

It is the job of the military to have contingency plans for every conceivable scenario sitting on the shelf, ready to execute and to ensure that the force is properly trained, maintained, and equipped to execute those plans on a (figurative) moment’s notice.
 
When the Administration decided to strike Iran, it should have required nothing more than to pick a plan off the shelf and assemble the required assets.  We should have been ready and able.
 
Let’s digress for a moment.  How many aircraft carriers did we use during Desert Storm?  The answer is 6.  They were:
 

• USS Midway
• USS Roosevelt
• USS America
• USS Kennedy
• USS Saratoga
• USS Ranger

 
Compare that assemblage of power to the current Iran conflict.  How many carriers are active for this?  The answer is 2.  They are:
 

• USS Ford
• USS Lincoln

 
And Ford was at the end of a long deployment and overdue to return home.  We should also note that air wings during Desert Storm were larger than today’s air wings which makes the two carriers for Iran more like one and a half carriers!
 
An obvious question arises;  did operational requirements only need two carriers or were there only two carriers physically available?  Not knowing the detailed operational plan, we can’t say for sure but a common sense assessment sure seems to indicate that we needed more especially when we compare the needs of Desert Storm to this conflict.
 
Consider:
 
-We seem to lack sufficient air and naval coverage to keep the strait open.
-We clearly lack the air coverage to protect our bases and our Middle East allies from Iranian drones and missiles.
-USS Ford is approaching its one year deployment anniversary which clearly says that the vessel was used because no other carriers were available.
 
 
Were we ready or were we caught unprepared? 
 
A peripheral piece of evidence is the attempted deployment of a MEU during the early Ukraine conflict.  Despite having around 30 amphibious ships, the Navy was unable to form a ARG and provide ships for the MEU.  This suggests that the Navy is nowhere near combat ready and, further, has zero surge capability.
 
One might also ask why the Japan based carrier was not moved to the Middle East?  It’s not as if anyone believes that carrier serves any legitimated purpose in Japan.
 
I can’t offer any definitive answers but the circumstantial evidence suggests that the Navy is woefully unprepared for combat.

This Is Not How You Fight A War

We have, in many posts, discussed how to conduct a war and have noted that the US, and the West, repeatedly fail to finish their wars which results in having to refight them down the road (see, “Ending War – True Victory”).  Consider the following quote from a Redstate article related to an attack by Iran against US ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) eliminated inbound threats and targeted Iranian military facilities responsible for attacking U.S. forces including missile and drone launch sites; command and control locations; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance nodes.[1]

You might be initially tempted to think this is a good, forceful response but give the statement some more thought.  It’s revealing and damning.  After being attacked, we struck various Iranian facilities as listed in the statement.  Since we apparently knew where these facilities and capabilities were, why hadn’t we already attacked them?  In war, you don’t allow the enemy the first shot.  You kill them before they can attack you.  What’s more, if you’re in a war worth fighting, your goal is total victory which means you don’t stop until the enemy forces have been 100% eliminated.  Again, why had we allowed known military facilities to remain in existence?
 
From a military perspective, we now appear to be fighting a half-measures war instead of going for total victory as we had seemed poised to do a few weeks ago.  I’m very disappointed that we’re in a war we don’t seem to want to pursue to the only worthwhile conclusion.  If we weren’t serious about it, we shouldn’t have gotten into it.
 
 
Note:  As always, we’re discussing only the military aspects, not the political.  Political comments will be deleted so don’t bother.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Iran Attacks Our Ships, and U.S. Makes the Regime Regret It”, Nick Arama, 7-May-2026,
https://redstate.com/nick-arama/2026/05/07/us-hits-iranian-targets-n2202116

Exercise Nonsense

The US participated in an island defense exercise as part of ‘Balikatan 2026’.  The following statement from a USNI News article on the exercise demonstrates why this kind of exercise is worse than useless.
 

At this point in the Littoral Deep Battle plan, an overwhelming torrent of fires ripped apart any notional enemies that made it to the beach.[1]

“Overwhelming torrent of fires” ????
“ripped apart any notional enemies”  ????
 
Who wrote this article … Steven Spielberg?
 
Where was the intelligent, free acting, well equipped enemy force with their own “overwhelming torrent of fires” ripping apart any notional defenders after having pounded the defenses with an overwhelming torrent of missiles, rockets, and drones?  Where was the attacker’s Gen. Van Riper?
 
One might be tempted to say, yeah, this wasn’t a perfect exercise but it was a start and better than nothing, right?  Wrong.  

First, it’s not a “start” on anything.  We should have been practicing assault defense for decades.  We should be well past the “starting” point.  

Second, and worse, we now have a group of officers and men who think this is how reality will be and they’ll have no idea what to do when the perfect, scripted actions they're used to are demolished by the enemy’s vote.  An NBA basketball team wouldn’t practice against a high school team and believe that would somehow prepare them for a championship game.  Why would we practice against a ludicrously simplistic “assault force” and believe for a second that it was in any way realistic or helpful?  All this did was establish and reinforce bad habits in our doctrine and our people.
 
I guess we learned our lesson from Millennium Challenge 2002.  You avoid controversy by making the exercise ridiculously easy.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “‘Littoral Deep Battle’ - The Army’s Plan to Defeat an Amphibious Invasion in the Indo-Pacific”, Aaron-Matthew Lariiosa, 5-May-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/05/05/littoral-deep-battle

Trump’s Battleship – What is it Really?

A reader recently launched a mini-rant about the classification of Trump’s battleship as a battleship, claiming it should be a heavy cruiser, instead.  This led me to reflect on what it really is.  Heavy cruiser?  Light cruiser?  Oversized destroyer?  Arsenal ship?  Something else?
 
As you all know, President Trump has a fondness for hyperbole (turning Canada into the 51^st state, seizing Greenland, this pretend battleship, etc.) which is often just a prelude to subsequent negotiations (he loves making deals!).  Only the left takes the obvious hyperbole as meaning anything.  The wiser and calmer among us recognize it for what it is and get a chuckle out of it.  Thus, the classification of Trump’s battleship as a battleship is strictly for public relations purposes and, perhaps, a bit of a thumbing of the nose at China.
 
So, if it’s not a battleship, what is it?  Acknowledging that we lack enough specifications to draw much in the way of definitive conclusions, let’s go down the list of classifications, just for fun, and see what, if anything fits.
 
Battleship – It’s clearly not a battleship as it lacks armor, survivability, and effective fire support for land forces among other shortcomings.
 
Heavy Cruiser – A heavy cruiser is a mini-battleship with appropriately heavy armor, guns (land attack), and anti-ship weaponry.  Again, this ship is clearly not a heavy cruiser.
 
Light Cruiser – These are compromise ships that try to excel at one aspect of heavier ship’s tasks while retaining some armor and survivability and, most importantly, holding to a cost-conscious construction budget.  They may be specialized as anti-air, anti-surface, escort, or other tasks.  Trump’s battleship could fall somewhere in this category, in some respects, although it is stunningly not budget-friendly and lacks a specialization so it’s not really a light cruiser.
 
Oversize Destroyer – Trump’s ship certainly falls into this category in terms of the lack of armor and survivability but it has way too much in the way of weapons and is insanely expensive for a destroyer, oversize or not.
 
LCS – Trump’s ship checks a lot of the boxes for being an LCS!  It tries to be all things.  It depends on mostly non-existent systems.  It has no clear mission focus.  One could plausibly call it a hugely oversized, astoundingly expensive LCS although, thankfully, no one has yet mentioned interchangeable modules.
 
Arsenal Ship – The arsenal ship is a concept ship that is, essentially, a mobile missile barge with only that one function.  We’re getting close, here.  Trump’s ship is, essentially, a mobile missile barge albeit with large scoops of non-existent, fantasy gold plating (rail gun, laser, etc.) piled on and lots of independent capabilities that an arsenal ship would lack.  It also conflates anti-air and strike missions instead of focusing on just one.  Nevertheless, this is the closest fit as far as classification.
 
That said, as an arsenal ship it is a hideously poor design as evidenced by the cost and multiple fantasy systems.  An arsenal ship should be a minimally functional, cheap barge for carrying missiles for some other platform to control.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The only conclusion is that, like every recent Navy ship program, the “battleship” is just a collection of disjointed technologies, mostly non-existent, cobbled together and slapped with the inspiring label of “battleship”.  It lacks a CONOPS and, certainly, no formal Analysis of Alternatives has been performed. 
 
Given the extremely low probability of it ever actually being built, we should simply view it as an indicator of Trump’s enthusiasm for a strong Navy and hope that enthusiasm eventually gets channeled into more productive and useful assets.
 
As far as this post, take it as a bit of amusement.  Don’t get too worked up over it.

Satellites - Single Point of Failure

One of the worst things you can have in combat is a single point of failure;  a linchpin upon which an entire operation depends.  If it fails, you lose everything.  For example, let’s imagine a ship has several types of sensors and all are operated off electrical power that ultimately passes through a single cable.  That cable would represent a single point of failure.  Sever the cable and all the sensor systems would be rendered inoperative by a single component’s failure.  We have seen examples in industry and the military where supposedly redundant, independent systems have failed because of an unrecognized single point of failure.  In our example, we might be tempted to proudly proclaim that we have set up multiple independent sensor systems.  After all, they’re physically separated.  They use different frequencies.  They each have their own cooling systems.  Those that need motors each have their own.  Completely independent;  nothing in common ...  except for the single power cable that no one thought about and did not recognize as a single point of failure.
 
Our military is currently constructing a single point of failure on a very large scale in the form of satellite communications.  Consider the vast number of systems that all depend on satellite communications:  drones, weapons, command and control, sensors, and on and on.  If we lose satellite communications, we lose … well … a huge chunk of our entire military capability.
 
You might be tempted to argue that satellite communications are not a single point of failure because we have dozens/hundreds/thousands of satellites and no enemy could possibly eliminate all of them.  Setting aside the highly debatable nature of that assertion, think, what do all satellites have in common?  That’s right, a very small number of control/communication stations … approaching a single point of failure.  It doesn’t matter how many satellites you have if they all depend on a very few control stations.
 
Think further, what do all control stations have in common?  An even smaller number of software programs that run them.  If an enemy can hack/virus the software (we’ve seen that it’s almost impossible to prevent hacking of military or commercial networks and programs), it instantly renders all the control stations and their associated satellites useless.
 
Well, none of that could ever happen, you say.  Except that already has and we have at least one public example.
 

A global outage across Elon Musk’s satellite network ​affecting millions of Starlink users had left two dozen unmanned surface vessels bobbing off the California coast, disrupting communications and halting operations for almost an hour.
 
The incident, which involved drones ‌intended to bolster U.S. military options in a conflict with China, was one of several Navy test disruptions linked to SpaceX's Starlink that left operators unable to connect with autonomous boats, according to internal Navy documents reviewed by Reuters and a person familiar with the matter.[1]

Think even further.  What if a key individual (a single point of failure, by definition!) were to shut down or sabotage the entire satellite system, perhaps motivated by bribes/payoffs or coerced by Chinese threats against him or his family?  Couldn’t happen, you laugh?  How about this:
 

Reuters reported last year that [Elon] Musk unexpectedly switched off Starlink access to Ukrainian troops as they sought to retake territory from Russia, denting allies' trust in the billionaire.[1]

There you have a single (non-military!) individual shutting down a satellite system because he disagreed with the military and geopolitical actions.
 
Think further still.  The single point of failure doesn’t have to involve destruction of assets, cyber attacks, or rogue villains.  It could be as simple as routine mechanical/software failure.  Here’s an example.
 

In April 2025, during a series ​of Navy tests in California involving unmanned boats and flying drones, officials reported that Starlink struggled to provide a solid network connection due to the high data usage needed to control multiple systems, according to a Navy safety report of the tests reviewed by Reuters.[1]

Given the complexity of modern systems, sometimes you don’t even know why a system failed.
 

In the weeks leading up to the global Starlink outage in August, another ​series of Navy tests was disrupted by intermittent connection issues with the Starlink network, Navy documents reviewed by Reuters show. ​The causes of the network losses were not immediately clear.[1]

Now let’s close with one of the dumbest statements I’ve heard in a while, courtesy of Mr. Bryan Clark at the Hudson Institute.
 

Despite the setbacks, the upside of Starlink – a cheap and commercially available service – outweighs the risk of a potential outage disrupting future military operations, said Bryan Clark, an autonomous warfare expert at the Hudson Institute. “You ​accept those vulnerabilities because of the benefits you get from the ubiquity it provides,” he said.[1]

In peacetime you might accept the occasional failure because the downside isn’t all that serious.  It’s not life or death … just inconvenience.  In war, it most certainly is life and death and you can’t afford systems with known single points of failure and a known, not insignificant, failure rate to begin with.
 
 
Discussion
 
Given our overwhelming dependence on satellites, do you think the Chinese are going to allow us to continue to use them, unhindered?  Of course not!  They’ll attack them physically, electronically, digitally (software), and via human operator vulnerabilities.  Anyone want to bet that there aren’t Chinese agents embedded in the military or Starlink?  One way or another, I’d be very surprised if we have many operating satellites two weeks after the war starts.
 
We see that satellite communications could be disrupted in a variety of ways:  physical destruction, cyber attacks, software viruses, sabotage, and routine failure, among other methods.  Does it make sense that so much of our military, current and future, has, as its very foundation, satellite communications?  Would any sane individual purposely build a system with that many known, anticipatable vulnerabilities?  And yet we’re doing exactly that.  Worse, we’re increasing our use of, and dependence on, satellites instead of decreasing it.
 
Consider that the military, some years ago, recognized GPS as a significant vulnerability.  All of our navigation and most of our weapons depend on GPS.  GPS was recognized as a single point of failure and the military, to their slow and belated credit, has set about mitigating that dependence.  We’re now designing systems that use alternates to GPS.  We knew we couldn’t accept a single point of failure, like GPS, and yet we’re intentionally and enthusiastically embracing satellites as a single point of failure.  That’s baffling.
 
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Reuters website, “Exclusive: Starlink outage hit drone tests, exposing Pentagon’s growing reliance on SpaceX”, David Jeans, 16-Apr-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/starlink-outage-hit-drone-tests-exposing-pentagons-growing-reliance-spacex-2026-04-16/

Our Future Warfighting Concept in Action

Apparently, two ships attempting transit of the Strait of Hormuz were attacked by Iranian small boats.
 

The captain of ‌a tanker said it had been approached by two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gunboats that fired ‌on the vessel.[1]
 
A container ship was also hit by gunfire … [1]

The vessels turned back and no injuries or significant damage was reported (so why did they turn back?).
 
What is the significance of this?  The significance is that it’s the future of our military/Navy and it’s not looking good.  This should be eye-opening and shocking for those idiots who are developing our future warfare concepts.
 
What is the foundation of our future warfare concepts?  It’s regional (if not world wide!) sensor networking resulting in total situational awareness with the sensor network intimately linked to weapons.  Nothing exists without us being aware of it and destroying it.  To be fair, the military doesn’t actually talk about destroying things when it describes our future warfare concepts.  I added that part.  The military talks about total awareness somehow, in some undefined way, giving us an advantage by rendering the enemy “confused” and that will gain us victory without any explicit mention of firepower.
 
The regional sensor network will be comprised of all manner of sensors from ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.  We will blanket the region and we’ll see everything.
 
The Middle East, and the Strait of Hormuz, in this case, is a clear example of the regional sensor network concept being applied against a third rate enemy over a very small region.  This should be as dominating an effect as is possible to get.  Iran has no sensor countermeasures.  No jamming.  No signal disruption capability.  No reported cyber attack capability.  Nothing to hinder our sensors or the regional network.  Our networked sensing should be flawless.  Perfect.  Omniscient. 
 
So … how did Iranian boats manage to attack two merchant ships and return safely to wherever they came from?  How did we not see them?  How did we not kill them seconds after they emerged from wherever they were hiding?  For that matter, how could they hide from our all-seeing, all-knowing, regional sensor network?  These are not some kind of uber-stealth vessels aided by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.  These were some Iranians in a speedboat sailing around, pretending to be a navy – the equivalent of Boy Scouts pretending to be an Army.  The Navy claims to be able to spot periscopes at vast distances ... but not speedboats racing around confined waters?
 
The Strait of Hormuz is not the vast Pacific Ocean.  It’s a very small area and we should be able to blanket it with sensors.  That’s the whole idea of our regional sensor network.  How much more challenging will this be when we attempt it across, say, the entire first island chain when we fight China?  That’s thousands of miles and millions of square miles.  How’s that going to work if we can’t even successfully execute the concept over a tiny strait against an unresisting enemy?  And we’re basing our entire future warfare concept on this?  Yikes!
 
Hand in hand with the sensor issues, where was the firepower component?  Where were the patrolling P-8s, Triton, helicopters, ships, F-35s, drones, etc?  Where were the escorts providing protection for the merchant ships?  It’s not as if there are currently hundreds of merchant ships lined up bow to stern, transiting the strait.  It’s just a few odd ships sporadically making the attempt.  Shouldn’t we be keeping an especially close eye on them to ensure their successful passage for public relations purposes, if nothing else?  Shouldn’t we have vaporized those Iranian boats the moment they appeared?  Shouldn’t we have had firepower ready and waiting when the merchant ships radioed a warming call for help?  Could it be that we did see the boats and just had no firepower available to destroy them?  That’s pure speculation on my part and there is absolutely no indication that we ever saw the boats.
 
No matter how you attempt to spin this, it’s a very bad look for the US and a gut-level warning for our supposed military leaders who are crafting a military concept predicated on networked sensors.  We’re in trouble.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Iran Navy Warns Hormuz Shut Again; Ships Report Gunfire”, 18-Apr-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/strait-of-hormuz-iran-navy-oil-tankers/2026/04/18/id/1253365/

Iranian Drone Carrier

The Iranian drone carrier, Shahid Bagheri, has been attacked and set afire by US forces and is, apparently, now burned out and grounded.
 
Setting aside the fate of the vessel, the ship offers some interesting thoughts for the US Navy.
 

The Shahid Bagheri represents Iran’s most significant naval aviation platform. The 40,000-ton vessel was commissioned in February 2025 after being converted from the Perarin, a South Korean-built container ship. Iranian engineers modified the hull to accommodate a 180-meter flight deck equipped with a ski-jump ramp for drone launches.
 
According to CENTCOM, the vessel had been operating as a “mothership” in the Gulf, serving as a floating launch platform for both unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles.[1]

Regardless of the actual capabilities of the vessel, it stands as an object lesson about the ease with which a run of the mill merchant ship can be converted into a drone carrier; something the US Navy could surely use, at least as a prototype for operational experience and doctrine and tactics development.
 
Such a carrier does not need to be the typical gold-plated monstrosity that the USN always tries to produce.  It can be a simple converted merchant ship which is exactly what Iran did with the Shahid Bagheri.  If Iran can do that, surely we can?  Against the scale of USN budgets, such a conversion would be nearly free.
 
The Navy seems committed to unmanned everything so why not acquire and convert a merchant ship as a drone carrier to gain operational experience and develop doctrine and tactics?
 
Heck, had they been thinking ahead, the Navy could have seized the Shahid Bagheri for our own use!  Iran was kind enough to do the conversion so why not take advantage of it?  What a great mission for a bunch of SEALs!  Well, too late now, I guess.
 

Iranian Drone Carrier

This is just idle thinking on my part.  The Navy is probably better off just building more Burkes.  We’re up to … what? … Flt 27 now?  Anything different, or experimental, or innovative would be too much of a risk for the Navy.

 
 
 
_____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “CENTCOM Releases Footage Showing Strike on Iran’s Drone Carrier”, Tayfun Ozberk, 6-Mar-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/centcom-releases-footage-showing-strike-on-irans-drone-carrier/

Criminal Negligence – USS Boise

The Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise (SSN-764), has been waiting pier side since 2015 for routine maintenance.  The Navy has now announced that a 2024, $1.2B maintenance contract has been terminated and the vessel will be retired.
 
Boise was commissioned 1992 and served around 22 yrs until being abandoned pier side by the Navy in 2015 where it has been rotting since.
 
A perfectly good, world class submarine abandoned by the Navy because they prioritized new hulls over maintenance of existing ones.
 
We’re in a pre-war arms race with China and the Navy does this?
 
I’m not a lawyer but this is unforgivable criminal negligence, dereliction of duty, and fraudulent management of the nation’s resources by a decade of Navy leadership.  Every CNO since 2015 should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.  It’s depressing how many of my posts end with that sentence, isn’t it?

Bye Bye Boise

Combat? What’s That?

I saw the following headline and read the article with great anticipation.  I’ve been calling for a drone carrier for some time now and only Turkey has made a move in that direction so I was very interested to see what kind of vessel this would be, what kind of drones it would operate, and how it would fit into combat operations.
 
“Damen launches ‘Drone Carrier’ for the Portuguese Navy”
 
To say I was disappointed is a huge understatement.  The following describes the ship’s mission focus.
 

The vessel has a high degree of system autonomy. It is designed for unrestricted service in tropical and moderate environments and is especially suited for multi-purpose activities such as oceanographic research, environmental control, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime surveillance and support tasks.[1]

Does anyone else notice the one glaring omission?  There’s no combat mission! 
 
In addition, the vessel is butt-ugly and woefully non-stealthy.
 

I get that Portugal is not going to conduct worldwide combat operations against the Chinese but what about combat ops against terrorists, Middle East combat support missions, or supporting the US Navy in a war?  What about combatting rogue fisheries violators or dealing with Russian or Chinese shadow fleet merchant ships?  What about dealing with Chinese or Russian subs violating Portuguese territorial waters?  What about combatting piracy?
 
Sadly, this non-combat mindset has become the norm in Western militaries. 
 
What’s the old saying?  During peace, prepare for war.  How is this preparing for war?  The West, and that emphatically includes the US, needs to wake up, face the reality that the world is not a peaceful place and start preparing for war.  The US Navy is only now, this next budget year, asking for increased weapons production because of the Iran strikes.  If a couple weeks of moderate intensity (yes, moderate, if even that – this would have been nothing but one battle among many simultaneous battles in WWII) munitions expenditure is enough to seriously deplete our stocks then how ready are we for war with China?
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Damen launches ‘Drone Carrier’ for the Portuguese Navy”, Staff, 7-Apr-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/damen-launches-drone-carrier-for-the-portuguese-navy/