Exercise Nonsense

The US participated in an island defense exercise as part of ‘Balikatan 2026’.  The following statement from a USNI News article on the exercise demonstrates why this kind of exercise is worse than useless.
 

At this point in the Littoral Deep Battle plan, an overwhelming torrent of fires ripped apart any notional enemies that made it to the beach.[1]

“Overwhelming torrent of fires” ????
“ripped apart any notional enemies”  ????
 
Who wrote this article … Steven Spielberg?
 
Where was the intelligent, free acting, well equipped enemy force with their own “overwhelming torrent of fires” ripping apart any notional defenders after having pounded the defenses with an overwhelming torrent of missiles, rockets, and drones?  Where was the attacker’s Gen. Van Riper?
 
One might be tempted to say, yeah, this wasn’t a perfect exercise but it was a start and better than nothing, right?  Wrong.  

First, it’s not a “start” on anything.  We should have been practicing assault defense for decades.  We should be well past the “starting” point.  

Second, and worse, we now have a group of officers and men who think this is how reality will be and they’ll have no idea what to do when the perfect, scripted actions they're used to are demolished by the enemy’s vote.  An NBA basketball team wouldn’t practice against a high school team and believe that would somehow prepare them for a championship game.  Why would we practice against a ludicrously simplistic “assault force” and believe for a second that it was in any way realistic or helpful?  All this did was establish and reinforce bad habits in our doctrine and our people.
 
I guess we learned our lesson from Millennium Challenge 2002.  You avoid controversy by making the exercise ridiculously easy.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “‘Littoral Deep Battle’ - The Army’s Plan to Defeat an Amphibious Invasion in the Indo-Pacific”, Aaron-Matthew Lariiosa, 5-May-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/05/05/littoral-deep-battle

Trump’s Battleship – What is it Really?

A reader recently launched a mini-rant about the classification of Trump’s battleship as a battleship, claiming it should be a heavy cruiser, instead.  This led me to reflect on what it really is.  Heavy cruiser?  Light cruiser?  Oversized destroyer?  Arsenal ship?  Something else?
 
As you all know, President Trump has a fondness for hyperbole (turning Canada into the 51^st state, seizing Greenland, this pretend battleship, etc.) which is often just a prelude to subsequent negotiations (he loves making deals!).  Only the left takes the obvious hyperbole as meaning anything.  The wiser and calmer among us recognize it for what it is and get a chuckle out of it.  Thus, the classification of Trump’s battleship as a battleship is strictly for public relations purposes and, perhaps, a bit of a thumbing of the nose at China.
 
So, if it’s not a battleship, what is it?  Acknowledging that we lack enough specifications to draw much in the way of definitive conclusions, let’s go down the list of classifications, just for fun, and see what, if anything fits.
 
Battleship – It’s clearly not a battleship as it lacks armor, survivability, and effective fire support for land forces among other shortcomings.
 
Heavy Cruiser – A heavy cruiser is a mini-battleship with appropriately heavy armor, guns (land attack), and anti-ship weaponry.  Again, this ship is clearly not a heavy cruiser.
 
Light Cruiser – These are compromise ships that try to excel at one aspect of heavier ship’s tasks while retaining some armor and survivability and, most importantly, holding to a cost-conscious construction budget.  They may be specialized as anti-air, anti-surface, escort, or other tasks.  Trump’s battleship could fall somewhere in this category, in some respects, although it is stunningly not budget-friendly and lacks a specialization so it’s not really a light cruiser.
 
Oversize Destroyer – Trump’s ship certainly falls into this category in terms of the lack of armor and survivability but it has way too much in the way of weapons and is insanely expensive for a destroyer, oversize or not.
 
LCS – Trump’s ship checks a lot of the boxes for being an LCS!  It tries to be all things.  It depends on mostly non-existent systems.  It has no clear mission focus.  One could plausibly call it a hugely oversized, astoundingly expensive LCS although, thankfully, no one has yet mentioned interchangeable modules.
 
Arsenal Ship – The arsenal ship is a concept ship that is, essentially, a mobile missile barge with only that one function.  We’re getting close, here.  Trump’s ship is, essentially, a mobile missile barge albeit with large scoops of non-existent, fantasy gold plating (rail gun, laser, etc.) piled on and lots of independent capabilities that an arsenal ship would lack.  It also conflates anti-air and strike missions instead of focusing on just one.  Nevertheless, this is the closest fit as far as classification.
 
That said, as an arsenal ship it is a hideously poor design as evidenced by the cost and multiple fantasy systems.  An arsenal ship should be a minimally functional, cheap barge for carrying missiles for some other platform to control.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The only conclusion is that, like every recent Navy ship program, the “battleship” is just a collection of disjointed technologies, mostly non-existent, cobbled together and slapped with the inspiring label of “battleship”.  It lacks a CONOPS and, certainly, no formal Analysis of Alternatives has been performed. 
 
Given the extremely low probability of it ever actually being built, we should simply view it as an indicator of Trump’s enthusiasm for a strong Navy and hope that enthusiasm eventually gets channeled into more productive and useful assets.
 
As far as this post, take it as a bit of amusement.  Don’t get too worked up over it.

Satellites - Single Point of Failure

One of the worst things you can have in combat is a single point of failure;  a linchpin upon which an entire operation depends.  If it fails, you lose everything.  For example, let’s imagine a ship has several types of sensors and all are operated off electrical power that ultimately passes through a single cable.  That cable would represent a single point of failure.  Sever the cable and all the sensor systems would be rendered inoperative by a single component’s failure.  We have seen examples in industry and the military where supposedly redundant, independent systems have failed because of an unrecognized single point of failure.  In our example, we might be tempted to proudly proclaim that we have set up multiple independent sensor systems.  After all, they’re physically separated.  They use different frequencies.  They each have their own cooling systems.  Those that need motors each have their own.  Completely independent;  nothing in common ...  except for the single power cable that no one thought about and did not recognize as a single point of failure.
 
Our military is currently constructing a single point of failure on a very large scale in the form of satellite communications.  Consider the vast number of systems that all depend on satellite communications:  drones, weapons, command and control, sensors, and on and on.  If we lose satellite communications, we lose … well … a huge chunk of our entire military capability.
 
You might be tempted to argue that satellite communications are not a single point of failure because we have dozens/hundreds/thousands of satellites and no enemy could possibly eliminate all of them.  Setting aside the highly debatable nature of that assertion, think, what do all satellites have in common?  That’s right, a very small number of control/communication stations … approaching a single point of failure.  It doesn’t matter how many satellites you have if they all depend on a very few control stations.
 
Think further, what do all control stations have in common?  An even smaller number of software programs that run them.  If an enemy can hack/virus the software (we’ve seen that it’s almost impossible to prevent hacking of military or commercial networks and programs), it instantly renders all the control stations and their associated satellites useless.
 
Well, none of that could ever happen, you say.  Except that already has and we have at least one public example.
 

A global outage across Elon Musk’s satellite network ​affecting millions of Starlink users had left two dozen unmanned surface vessels bobbing off the California coast, disrupting communications and halting operations for almost an hour.
 
The incident, which involved drones ‌intended to bolster U.S. military options in a conflict with China, was one of several Navy test disruptions linked to SpaceX's Starlink that left operators unable to connect with autonomous boats, according to internal Navy documents reviewed by Reuters and a person familiar with the matter.[1]

Think even further.  What if a key individual (a single point of failure, by definition!) were to shut down or sabotage the entire satellite system, perhaps motivated by bribes/payoffs or coerced by Chinese threats against him or his family?  Couldn’t happen, you laugh?  How about this:
 

Reuters reported last year that [Elon] Musk unexpectedly switched off Starlink access to Ukrainian troops as they sought to retake territory from Russia, denting allies' trust in the billionaire.[1]

There you have a single (non-military!) individual shutting down a satellite system because he disagreed with the military and geopolitical actions.
 
Think further still.  The single point of failure doesn’t have to involve destruction of assets, cyber attacks, or rogue villains.  It could be as simple as routine mechanical/software failure.  Here’s an example.
 

In April 2025, during a series ​of Navy tests in California involving unmanned boats and flying drones, officials reported that Starlink struggled to provide a solid network connection due to the high data usage needed to control multiple systems, according to a Navy safety report of the tests reviewed by Reuters.[1]

Given the complexity of modern systems, sometimes you don’t even know why a system failed.
 

In the weeks leading up to the global Starlink outage in August, another ​series of Navy tests was disrupted by intermittent connection issues with the Starlink network, Navy documents reviewed by Reuters show. ​The causes of the network losses were not immediately clear.[1]

Now let’s close with one of the dumbest statements I’ve heard in a while, courtesy of Mr. Bryan Clark at the Hudson Institute.
 

Despite the setbacks, the upside of Starlink – a cheap and commercially available service – outweighs the risk of a potential outage disrupting future military operations, said Bryan Clark, an autonomous warfare expert at the Hudson Institute. “You ​accept those vulnerabilities because of the benefits you get from the ubiquity it provides,” he said.[1]

In peacetime you might accept the occasional failure because the downside isn’t all that serious.  It’s not life or death … just inconvenience.  In war, it most certainly is life and death and you can’t afford systems with known single points of failure and a known, not insignificant, failure rate to begin with.
 
 
Discussion
 
Given our overwhelming dependence on satellites, do you think the Chinese are going to allow us to continue to use them, unhindered?  Of course not!  They’ll attack them physically, electronically, digitally (software), and via human operator vulnerabilities.  Anyone want to bet that there aren’t Chinese agents embedded in the military or Starlink?  One way or another, I’d be very surprised if we have many operating satellites two weeks after the war starts.
 
We see that satellite communications could be disrupted in a variety of ways:  physical destruction, cyber attacks, software viruses, sabotage, and routine failure, among other methods.  Does it make sense that so much of our military, current and future, has, as its very foundation, satellite communications?  Would any sane individual purposely build a system with that many known, anticipatable vulnerabilities?  And yet we’re doing exactly that.  Worse, we’re increasing our use of, and dependence on, satellites instead of decreasing it.
 
Consider that the military, some years ago, recognized GPS as a significant vulnerability.  All of our navigation and most of our weapons depend on GPS.  GPS was recognized as a single point of failure and the military, to their slow and belated credit, has set about mitigating that dependence.  We’re now designing systems that use alternates to GPS.  We knew we couldn’t accept a single point of failure, like GPS, and yet we’re intentionally and enthusiastically embracing satellites as a single point of failure.  That’s baffling.
 
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Reuters website, “Exclusive: Starlink outage hit drone tests, exposing Pentagon’s growing reliance on SpaceX”, David Jeans, 16-Apr-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/starlink-outage-hit-drone-tests-exposing-pentagons-growing-reliance-spacex-2026-04-16/

Our Future Warfighting Concept in Action

Apparently, two ships attempting transit of the Strait of Hormuz were attacked by Iranian small boats.
 

The captain of ‌a tanker said it had been approached by two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gunboats that fired ‌on the vessel.[1]
 
A container ship was also hit by gunfire … [1]

The vessels turned back and no injuries or significant damage was reported (so why did they turn back?).
 
What is the significance of this?  The significance is that it’s the future of our military/Navy and it’s not looking good.  This should be eye-opening and shocking for those idiots who are developing our future warfare concepts.
 
What is the foundation of our future warfare concepts?  It’s regional (if not world wide!) sensor networking resulting in total situational awareness with the sensor network intimately linked to weapons.  Nothing exists without us being aware of it and destroying it.  To be fair, the military doesn’t actually talk about destroying things when it describes our future warfare concepts.  I added that part.  The military talks about total awareness somehow, in some undefined way, giving us an advantage by rendering the enemy “confused” and that will gain us victory without any explicit mention of firepower.
 
The regional sensor network will be comprised of all manner of sensors from ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.  We will blanket the region and we’ll see everything.
 
The Middle East, and the Strait of Hormuz, in this case, is a clear example of the regional sensor network concept being applied against a third rate enemy over a very small region.  This should be as dominating an effect as is possible to get.  Iran has no sensor countermeasures.  No jamming.  No signal disruption capability.  No reported cyber attack capability.  Nothing to hinder our sensors or the regional network.  Our networked sensing should be flawless.  Perfect.  Omniscient. 
 
So … how did Iranian boats manage to attack two merchant ships and return safely to wherever they came from?  How did we not see them?  How did we not kill them seconds after they emerged from wherever they were hiding?  For that matter, how could they hide from our all-seeing, all-knowing, regional sensor network?  These are not some kind of uber-stealth vessels aided by sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.  These were some Iranians in a speedboat sailing around, pretending to be a navy – the equivalent of Boy Scouts pretending to be an Army.  The Navy claims to be able to spot periscopes at vast distances ... but not speedboats racing around confined waters?
 
The Strait of Hormuz is not the vast Pacific Ocean.  It’s a very small area and we should be able to blanket it with sensors.  That’s the whole idea of our regional sensor network.  How much more challenging will this be when we attempt it across, say, the entire first island chain when we fight China?  That’s thousands of miles and millions of square miles.  How’s that going to work if we can’t even successfully execute the concept over a tiny strait against an unresisting enemy?  And we’re basing our entire future warfare concept on this?  Yikes!
 
Hand in hand with the sensor issues, where was the firepower component?  Where were the patrolling P-8s, Triton, helicopters, ships, F-35s, drones, etc?  Where were the escorts providing protection for the merchant ships?  It’s not as if there are currently hundreds of merchant ships lined up bow to stern, transiting the strait.  It’s just a few odd ships sporadically making the attempt.  Shouldn’t we be keeping an especially close eye on them to ensure their successful passage for public relations purposes, if nothing else?  Shouldn’t we have vaporized those Iranian boats the moment they appeared?  Shouldn’t we have had firepower ready and waiting when the merchant ships radioed a warming call for help?  Could it be that we did see the boats and just had no firepower available to destroy them?  That’s pure speculation on my part and there is absolutely no indication that we ever saw the boats.
 
No matter how you attempt to spin this, it’s a very bad look for the US and a gut-level warning for our supposed military leaders who are crafting a military concept predicated on networked sensors.  We’re in trouble.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Iran Navy Warns Hormuz Shut Again; Ships Report Gunfire”, 18-Apr-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/strait-of-hormuz-iran-navy-oil-tankers/2026/04/18/id/1253365/

Iranian Drone Carrier

The Iranian drone carrier, Shahid Bagheri, has been attacked and set afire by US forces and is, apparently, now burned out and grounded.
 
Setting aside the fate of the vessel, the ship offers some interesting thoughts for the US Navy.
 

The Shahid Bagheri represents Iran’s most significant naval aviation platform. The 40,000-ton vessel was commissioned in February 2025 after being converted from the Perarin, a South Korean-built container ship. Iranian engineers modified the hull to accommodate a 180-meter flight deck equipped with a ski-jump ramp for drone launches.
 
According to CENTCOM, the vessel had been operating as a “mothership” in the Gulf, serving as a floating launch platform for both unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles.[1]

Regardless of the actual capabilities of the vessel, it stands as an object lesson about the ease with which a run of the mill merchant ship can be converted into a drone carrier; something the US Navy could surely use, at least as a prototype for operational experience and doctrine and tactics development.
 
Such a carrier does not need to be the typical gold-plated monstrosity that the USN always tries to produce.  It can be a simple converted merchant ship which is exactly what Iran did with the Shahid Bagheri.  If Iran can do that, surely we can?  Against the scale of USN budgets, such a conversion would be nearly free.
 
The Navy seems committed to unmanned everything so why not acquire and convert a merchant ship as a drone carrier to gain operational experience and develop doctrine and tactics?
 
Heck, had they been thinking ahead, the Navy could have seized the Shahid Bagheri for our own use!  Iran was kind enough to do the conversion so why not take advantage of it?  What a great mission for a bunch of SEALs!  Well, too late now, I guess.
 

Iranian Drone Carrier

This is just idle thinking on my part.  The Navy is probably better off just building more Burkes.  We’re up to … what? … Flt 27 now?  Anything different, or experimental, or innovative would be too much of a risk for the Navy.

 
 
 
_____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “CENTCOM Releases Footage Showing Strike on Iran’s Drone Carrier”, Tayfun Ozberk, 6-Mar-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/centcom-releases-footage-showing-strike-on-irans-drone-carrier/

Criminal Negligence – USS Boise

The Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise (SSN-764), has been waiting pier side since 2015 for routine maintenance.  The Navy has now announced that a 2024, $1.2B maintenance contract has been terminated and the vessel will be retired.
 
Boise was commissioned 1992 and served around 22 yrs until being abandoned pier side by the Navy in 2015 where it has been rotting since.
 
A perfectly good, world class submarine abandoned by the Navy because they prioritized new hulls over maintenance of existing ones.
 
We’re in a pre-war arms race with China and the Navy does this?
 
I’m not a lawyer but this is unforgivable criminal negligence, dereliction of duty, and fraudulent management of the nation’s resources by a decade of Navy leadership.  Every CNO since 2015 should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed.  It’s depressing how many of my posts end with that sentence, isn’t it?

Bye Bye Boise

Combat? What’s That?

I saw the following headline and read the article with great anticipation.  I’ve been calling for a drone carrier for some time now and only Turkey has made a move in that direction so I was very interested to see what kind of vessel this would be, what kind of drones it would operate, and how it would fit into combat operations.
 
“Damen launches ‘Drone Carrier’ for the Portuguese Navy”
 
To say I was disappointed is a huge understatement.  The following describes the ship’s mission focus.
 

The vessel has a high degree of system autonomy. It is designed for unrestricted service in tropical and moderate environments and is especially suited for multi-purpose activities such as oceanographic research, environmental control, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime surveillance and support tasks.[1]

Does anyone else notice the one glaring omission?  There’s no combat mission! 
 
In addition, the vessel is butt-ugly and woefully non-stealthy.
 

I get that Portugal is not going to conduct worldwide combat operations against the Chinese but what about combat ops against terrorists, Middle East combat support missions, or supporting the US Navy in a war?  What about combatting rogue fisheries violators or dealing with Russian or Chinese shadow fleet merchant ships?  What about dealing with Chinese or Russian subs violating Portuguese territorial waters?  What about combatting piracy?
 
Sadly, this non-combat mindset has become the norm in Western militaries. 
 
What’s the old saying?  During peace, prepare for war.  How is this preparing for war?  The West, and that emphatically includes the US, needs to wake up, face the reality that the world is not a peaceful place and start preparing for war.  The US Navy is only now, this next budget year, asking for increased weapons production because of the Iran strikes.  If a couple weeks of moderate intensity (yes, moderate, if even that – this would have been nothing but one battle among many simultaneous battles in WWII) munitions expenditure is enough to seriously deplete our stocks then how ready are we for war with China?
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Damen launches ‘Drone Carrier’ for the Portuguese Navy”, Staff, 7-Apr-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/damen-launches-drone-carrier-for-the-portuguese-navy/

Why Do We Have Lightweight Torpedoes?

During the Cold War, the US Navy concluded that lightweight torpedoes were largely ineffective against Soviet submarines, in terms of achieving a kill.  Even heavyweight torpedoes were questionable and thought to require multiple hits to kill.  Lightweight torpedoes were considered more of an annoyance to Soviet subs than a lethal threat.
 
Lightweight torpedoes are a lethal threat only to small, lighter built diesel subs.
 
Lightweight torpedoes are not a ship-sinking threat to anything much bigger than a patrol boat and are not capable of sinking surface ships, either merchant or naval.
 
That being the case, why is the Mk54 lightweight torpedo so ubiquitous throughout the surface Navy?  Wouldn’t it make more sense for ships to mount heavyweight torpedoes?
 
Here’s a brief comparison of the Mk48 heavyweight and Mk54 lightweight torpedo characteristics.  Characteristics vary, of course, depending on the exact model but these are representative.  Note the lightweight torpedo’s warhead weight and range deficiencies compared to the heavyweight torpedo.

The Mk48 heavyweight torpedo can do anything the lightweight can (which isn’t much) plus it is capable of : 

• Sinking merchant ships
• Sinking submarines
• Sinking surface ships
• Destroying maritime structures (oil platforms and such)

 
There have been reports over the years that the Mk48 has problems in shallow water.  The lightweight torpedo was intended, in part, to be the answer to shallow water issues but has had its own reported problems.  The last DOT&E annual report that I can find for the Mk54 assessed it as operationally ineffective (2014 report) and not operationally suitable (2023 report).
 
All of this leads me to ask, why isn’t the Mk48 standard on surface ships?

What Could the LCS Do in the Middle East?

Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1]  The whereabouts of the third is unknown.  Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz?  Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they were designed for?  As you recall, the original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
 
So, why aren’t they there?  Well, we all know the answer.  The originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never materialized.  But, what if the original modules had become available as fully functioning equipment?  Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East today?
 
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original modules.
 
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
 
ASuW - This was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept.  The NLOS (not to be confused with the current Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles.  By removing all visible threats, it would allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
 
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
 
 
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats.  Such a group in the strait, today, would eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland.  UAVs would provide continuous surveillance with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.  Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged from hiding.  The MCM-LCS would search for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
 
Highly effective, indeed!
 
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for.  The concept was okay but it was dependent on non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
 
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need still exists, what do we have that could do the job?  Well, there’s always air power that could, for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats.  We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide targeting.  We could land Army/Marines in various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using G/ATOR or similar systems.
 
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the software to do so.  Why hasn’t the Navy ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability?  Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
 
 
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and wishful thinking.  We didn’t need the LCS.  The need could have been met with existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land forces.  The cost would have been minimal – free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
 
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment.  The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
 
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
 
Where are the LCSes?  The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]The War Zone website, “U.S. Navy Minesweepers Stationed In Middle East Are Now In Singapore”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-minesweepers-stationed-in-middle-east-are-now-in-singapore

Dropping Like Flies

The Air Force has publicly stated that large UAVs are not survivable on the modern battlefield.  ComNavOps has emphatically stated that, also.  Despite that, many commentators remained convinced that our UAVs will somehow, magically, provide us with total situational awareness.  Well, here’s some evidence that supports ComNavOps’, and the Air Force’s, belief.  From the Atlantic Council  (a supposed non-partisan think tank) website,
 

Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones …[1]

I’ve read unverified, updated reports that the Houthis have shot down as many as 20 MQ-9 Reapers.
 
I have no verification of the reports and no sense of the credibility of the Atlantic Council but it does fit exactly with what I believe and what seems patently obvious:  that slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are simply target drones on the modern battlefield.  Similar reports from other sources vary in number of Reapers shot down but all are in the 14-20+ range.
 
 
Further evidence comes from the current strikes against Iran, as reported by Air & Space Forces website,
 

MQ-9 Reapers are flying numerous orbits over Iran, gathering intelligence and taking out missile launchers in Operation Epic Fury. Yet Iran has managed to down about 10 of the armed drones …[2]

If a thoroughly decimated military like Iran can manage to down that many drones, imagine what a coherent, peer enemy like China could do.  Large UAVs have a lifetime measured in minutes against a competent peer enemy and have no place on the modern battlefield.
 
One of the fears that I have is that the US will take “lessons” from this Iran conflict and apply them inappropriately to a future war with China just as we seem to be doing with the Ukraine “lessons”.  Both conflicts involve utterly inept militaries which renders any “lessons” invalid.
 
The only valid lesson is that large, slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are not survivable in a contested air space and we are foolish to count on them.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Atlantic Council website, “How the Houthis’ strikes on US MQ-9 Reaper drones serve a wider regional agenda”, Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, 26-Feb-2025,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/houthi-strikes-on-us-mq9-reaper-drones/
 
[2]Air & Space Forces Magazine website, “MQ-9s Over Iran: Striking and Finding Targets—But Taking Some Losses”, Chris Gordon and Stephen Losey, 11-Mar-2026,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/mq-9s-over-iran-striking-and-finding-targets-but-taking-some-losses/

LCS Mine Countermeasures Assessment

Surprisingly, two of the Navy’s MCM configured LCS have been moved from the Middle East to a port in Malaysia despite the obvious possibility of Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz.  The ships were relocated about a week or so before the US strikes began.  If the Iranians do lay mines (there are no confirmed reports yet), we’ll desperately miss the LCS MCM capabilities … or will we?
 
From a Hunterbrooks website report, we learn that the LCS MCM capability is even more problematic and limited than we already knew.  The report provides information from a US Navy briefing.[1]
 
As you read it, bear in mind that the summarized information presented below is the Navy’s information, not mine.  If you want to dispute anything, you’ll have to take it up with the Navy.
 
By trying to be multi-mission, training time available for mine countermeasures is being significantly reduced to support ASuW, VBSS, and other missions.
 
The entire MCM package is pretty minimal and consists of just:

- 1x MH-60S Seahawk

• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
• mine neutralization system (underwater suicide drone)

- 2x Common Unmanned Surface Vehicles (CUSV) that can tow:

• AN/AQS-20 side-scan and volume-search sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

Each CUSV/AQS-20 mission is consuming large amounts of prep time, significantly reducing the overall clearance rate of an already glacially slow process.

• 4+ hrs pre-mission maintenance
• 1.5 hrs post-launch sonar calibration

 That’s 5.5+ hrs of time before the mission even begins!
 

AQS-20 sonar has a habit of failing to record data which is not detectable until after the mission, during the post-mission analysis.
 

CUSV still has a tendency to “runaway”, out of control.
 

CUSV comms are unacceptably short range requiring the LCS to operate in or near the minefield.
 

Navy MCM doctrine requires a visual ID of mines and the camera fails even in relatively clear waters.
 

The single CUSV crane is a single point of failure and is prone to failure.

 

 
With the preceding in mind, are we really missing much if the LCS-MCM vessels aren’t in the Middle East?  No matter how you slice it, this is an epic embarrassment for the Navy.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Hunterbrook website, “Demining Hormuz How The U.S. Navy Arrived At Worst-Case Scenario Unprepared”, Spendley & Johnston, 13-Mar-2026,
https://hntrbrk.com/demining-hormuz/

Moderation of Comments

Due to a spate of idiotic comments, largely by one or perhaps two people, I suspect, I’m going to institute moderation of comments until we move on to less “charged” topics.  Thank you.

This is Why You Don’t Depend on Allies

In my ongoing theme about the extremely questionable usefulness of training with, and depending on, allies, we get this:
 

President Donald Trump said Sunday that he has demanded about seven countries send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but his appeals have brought no commitments as oil prices soar during the Iran war.[1]

Any country that complains about increased oil prices has to explain why it won’t send military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Any commentator who criticizes the US military for not keeping the strait open and shipping moving has to explain why they aren’t also asking why the affected countries aren’t providing military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Each country has their own agenda but when those agendas frequently conflict with US interests, one has to wonder why we waste time, money, and resources training with countries that we can’t rely on.  Devoting resources to unreliable allies is illogical in the extreme..
 
The US is once again shouldering the burden of protecting the Middle East from terrorism, nuclear threats, and evil regimes with only Israel to aid us.  The rest of the world is content to stand off and reap the benefits without offering any support. 
 
Japan is bracing for potential gas shortages and increased prices.  Yeah?  Where are their military forces ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the strait?  Don’t complain if you’re not willing to do something about it.
 
This is entering into political commentary so I’ll leave it at that.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Navy Times website, “Trump asks ‘about 7′ countries for help to open the Strait of Hormuz”, Sam Metz, Will Weissert, Julia Frankel and Cara Anna, 16-Mar-2026,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/03/16/trump-asks-about-7-countries-for-help-to-open-the-strait-of-hormuz/

On Balance

There’s never been a 100% one-sided war and the strikes on Iran are no exception.  According to Newsmax website, as reported on 12-Mar,
 

… at least 11 American military bases or installations have been damaged …[1]

Now, compare that to the reported hundreds or thousands of targets hit per day in Iran.  That’s about as lopsided as you can get.
 
Too many people are trying to portray this as some kind nearly even war with Iran effectively fighting back.  Well, that’s about as far from reality as you can get.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Report: 17 US Sites Hit Across Mideast Since Iran War Began”, Charlie McCarthy, 12-Mar-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/u-s-military-iran-war/2026/03/12/id/1249244/

Secondary Effects From Iran Strikes

‘Multi-domain’, that beloved catchphrase of the US military, applies not only to combat but also to results as noted below.
 
 
Oil
 
Here’s an aspect of the strikes against Iran that you may not be aware of.  One of the secondary effects from the strikes on Iran and the toppling of the Venezuela Maduro regime has been the impact on China’s oil imports.
 

Almost all of Iran’s exported oil, and more than half of Venezuela’s, went last year to China, which remained one of the only purchasers of goods from the two heavily sanctioned nations. The two countries combined represented some 17 percent of China’s overall oil purchases …[1]

17% is not an insignificant amount of oil to lose!
 
In addition, the steady crackdown on the so-called shadow fleet of tankers is further reducing oil supplies to China and Russia.
 
 
Hezbollah
 
Apparently Lebanon is growing tired of Iran’s influence on Hezbollah, brought to a head by the strikes on Iran and Hezbollah.  From Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, as reported by Redstate website,[2]
 

… Lebanon called for direct talks with Israel on “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders,” while accusing the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah of betraying the country.
 
But it is his criticism of Hezbollah that is significant. Calling the Shiite Muslim group “an armed faction … that places no value on Lebanon’s interest nor on the life of its people,” Aoun said Hezbollah “wanted to achieve the fall of the State of Lebanon, under aggression and chaos.” He accused the group of working “for the sake of the calculations of the Iranian regime.” [...]
 
Aoun called for a new initiative, backed by the international community, which would establish a truce between Israel and Lebanon while helping the Lebanese armed forces disarm Hezbollah and confiscate its weaponry. The initiative would put in a place a “complete truce” with a halt to Israeli attacks as the two countries begin “direct negotiations under international sponsorship” to achieve a “final cessation of hostile acts” and “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders.[2]

Well directed force does produce positive results.

 
 
_______________________________

 

[1]Politico website, “5 charts show China’s oil dilemma after US strikes”, Paroma Soni and Catherine Allen, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/02/iran-us-strikes-china-oil-supply-charts-00806415
 
[2]Redstate, “Lebanon Drops Some Bad News on Those Anti-American Hezbollah Terrorists”, Nick Arama, 10-Mar-2026,
https://redstate.com/nick-arama/2026/03/10/lebanon-wants-talks-with-israel-n2200042

Joint Bases

If you can’t use it when you need it, it’s not really a joint base, is it?  So why are we paying towards foreign “joint” bases?

NSC Frigate Commonality

Do you remember the main selling point of the Constellation, as originally stated?  It was to use an existing (parent) ship design with absolutely minimal modifications so that commonality would be high, thereby keeping costs low and schedules short.  Instead, the Navy heaped on so many changes that commonality dropped from 85% to 15% at the time of cancellation.  We saw what happened to cost and schedule, as a result.
 
For the National Security Cutter (NSC) frigate, the Navy’s main goal is to get AMERICAN hulls in the water as quickly as possible without worrying about lethality or combat effectiveness.  Setting aside the absurdity of the lack of lethality and combat effectiveness, the only way hulls can hit the water quickly and cheaply is to maintain maximum commonality with the parent NSC design.  Of course, the greater the commonality, the less the firepower and lethality … but, I digress.
 
Unfortunately, we’ve already seen many changes to the parent design.  The forward superstructure is being modified, stern platforms added, weapons changed, electronic warfare added, sensors added, presumably a new combat software system, etc. and those are only the changes we know about and only the external, visible changes.  Each of the listed changes requires modifications to the internal structure, ducting, cabling, bulkheads, layout, runs, utilities, etc.  Changes have a cascading effect far beyond the main change.  Further, the NSC is not built to Navy standards so, presumably, like the Constellation, the Navy will make significant internal structural changes for increased survivability just as was done to Constellation.  My slightly educated guess is that the commonality is already down to around 50% and it’s only going to get worse as the design progresses.  The Navy will continue to make changes.  They can’t help themselves.  It’s who they are and what they do.
 
Affordable and fast production?  I think cheap has already left town and quick is buying a bus ticket out as we speak. 

Follow the Data

I’m seeing far too much unsupported or contraindicated opinions in comments lately.  People are expressing their biases and wishful thinking as “opinions” while ignoring facts, data, history, and logic.  Yes, it’s a human tendency to form a viewpoint while ignoring actual data but, on this blog, we make every attempt to follow the data wherever it leads.  Do not form a viewpoint and then look for data.  Instead, look for data and then follow it to whatever logical conclusion results.
 
I have no problem with allowing comments expressing alternative viewpoints, if they’re supported by data and logic.  Of course, if they are, then they’re unlikely to be alternative viewpoints and, instead, will agree with ComNavOps.  Honestly, the number of subjects that have legitimate alternative viewpoints from the same set of data are few and far between and, generally, legitimate differing opinions arise from a lack of data.
 
Pick up the quality of comments or remain silent.

Mistakes and Experience

ComNavOps doesn’t report or repeat news, he analyzes it.  However, every once in a while something comes along that is just so good that all I can do is repeat it.  Following is a comment from a USNI News website post about the Navy relieving the CO of the USS Truxton for the recent collision with the oiler.  The author of the comment is listed as “Guest” so I am unable to give any further credit.
 

You learn from your mistakes. Mistakes come from bad judgement [sic]. Experience, comes from mistakes. Good judgement [sic] comes from experience.
 
If a mistake is more or less a automatic career ender, what do our officers learn? Answer; don't make mistakes. So are they learning anything other than to avoid risk?
 
Early WW2, we were relieving officers left and right, for not being aggressive enough. Why would we expect them to be aggressive, when we spent all the interwar years training them to avoid risk? That's where we're at now.
 
Who are our senior naval officers today? Survivors of command. The guys who took no risks. Who didn't make a career ending mistake.
 
Then we wonder why they're political animals to a man, going with the flow. Not taking risks. Avoiding responsibility aka "blame". Because that's exactly the type of naval officers our system spits out.
 
"Responsibility" shouldn't be an automatic death sentence.[1]

I have nothing to add to this.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “CO of USS Truxtun Removed from Command after Oiler Collision”, Sam LaGrone, 22-Feb-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/02/22/co-of-uss-truxtun-removed-from-command-after-oiler-collision

This Is Why You Don’t Depend On Allies

ComNavOps has repeatedly criticized our cross training efforts with allies as being pointless and because allies cannot be counted on when need arises.  Why train with someone you can’t count on?  Here’s the latest examples from the US strikes against Iran.
 
First up is Spain.  You’ll recall that it was Spain that abandoned the US by pulling an escort ship from the USS Lincoln carrier task force in 2019 during a threat from Iran (see, “This Is Why You Don’t Train WithAllies”).  This followed several months of training so that the Spanish ship would be qualified to join the task force for a deployment.
 

Spanish authorities have confirmed that they are not allowing U.S. forces to use bases in the country to support continuing strikes on Iran.[1]
 
Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares said Spain would not allow its military bases, which are jointly operated by the U.S. and Spain but under Spanish sovereignty, to be used for attacks on Iran, which Spain has condemned.[1]
 
What started as possible move of around half a dozen [Air Force] tankers from Spain to Ramstein Airbase in Germany, now appears to be a full-on withdrawal of the entire tanker fleet from Moron Airbase (LEMO) and Naval Air Station Rota (LERT) … [1]

Hey, Spain, I assume the refund for the US’ portion of the joint operating costs is in the mail?
 
 
Even America’s stalwart ally, the UK, got in on the ‘abandon your allies’ act by denying the US operating rights from bases.
 

The United Kingdom has reportedly refused U.S. requests to utilize key military facilities—RAF Fairford in England and the joint U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—for any potential strikes against Iran.[2]
 
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has withheld permission for American forces to operate from these bases in support of preemptive or offensive actions against Iran.[2]

I wonder what other countries denied us assistance?
 
Don’t get me wrong.  I fully acknowledge that every country has their own agendas and the right to independently pursue those agendas but this emphatically emphasizes why you don’t waste time cross training with supposed allies and you damn sure don’t contribute money to their bases or assets.  If some country wants to cross train with us or wants us to base forces in their country then they can pay the entire cost.
 
To paraphrase … With Allies like these, who needs enemies?
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]The War Zone website, “War With Iran Now In Its Third Day”, Joseph Trevithick, Thomas Newdick, Howard Altman, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/war-with-iran-now-in-its-third-day
 
[2]Armed Forces Press website, “UK Denies American Use Of Diego Garcia And RAF Fairford For Iran Attacks”, L Todd Wood, 20-Feb-2026,
https://armedforces.press/foreign-policy/2026/02/20/uk-denies-american-use-of-diego-garcia-and-raf-fairford-for-iran-attacks/ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US Uses One-Way Attack Drones Against Iran

Among military websites, the headlines are all atwitter about the US’ use of the one-way, LUCAS, attack drone in the strikes against Iran. 
 
Here’s a Military Times website headline[1]:
 
US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes
 
This is a simply stunning development and marks a new chapter in strike warfare.  From the LUCAS performance specs, never before has any country had the ability to deliver a maximum 40 lb payload to a distance of 500 miles at a cruise speed of 85 mph (74 kts).  The closest the US has come to this in the past is the one-way Tomahawk attack drone (sometimes referred to as a cruise missile) with a 1000 lb warhead and a range of 1000 miles at a speed of Mach 0.74. (570 mph).
 
It’s embarrassing the way we’ve made a habit of proudly trumpeting “new” technologies that have actually existed for many decades.  That’s not to say that there isn’t a use for a small, very slow missile (which is what a one-way drone is) with very low end lethality but to brag that we’ve accomplished something remarkable is humiliating and deceptive (or ignorant).
 
Here’s an example of an embarrassing attempt at praise from Army Recognition website.
 

U.S. Central Command has moved Task Force Scorpion Strike into an operational posture, giving deployed forces a low-cost one-way attack drone capability designed to multiply strike capacity, absorb attrition, and overwhelm defenses through massed, distributed effects. Beyond adding another munition to the inventory, it effectively creates a new layer of “magazine depth” that can be launched quickly from dispersed sites, complicating enemy targeting and imposing unfavorable cost trades on air defenses. The shift matters less for a single drone’s performance than for what it signals: the U.S. military is now treating expendable systems as a scalable combat arm, not a niche experiment … [2]

“overwhelm defenses” ?  Isn’t that what we’ve done repeatedly when we’ve launched dozens of cruise missiles at targets over the years?
 
“massed, distributed effects” ?  Isn’t that a contradiction?
 
“expendable systems” ?  Haven’t missiles always been expendable?
 
“scalable” ?  Haven’t we always scaled operations as needed?
 
Well, sure, we’ve done all that for many decades but never before have assembled all the accolades into a single press release.  Now that’s an accomplishment!
 
Again, at $35,000 per unit, there may be a use for such a weapon but to believe it is something new is just ignorant and embarrassing.
 
 
Warning:  As usual, we are not going to discuss the politics of the US decision to strike Iran, only the military aspects. 

 

_____________________________

 
[1]Military Times website, “US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes”, JD Simkins, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/28/us-confirms-first-combat-use-of-lucas-one-way-attack-drone-in-iran-strikes/
 
[2]Army Recognition website, “U.S. Central Command Deploys First Operational LUCAS Drone Unit for Potential Iran Strikes”, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/u-s-central-command-deploys-first-operational-lucas-drone-unit-for-potential-iran-strikes#google_vignette

Air Superiority Fighter Range

ComNavOps has long proposed a very long range fighter aircraft for the Navy.  One of the persistent objections has been that it is physically impossible to achieve the desired 1000+ nm combat radius (see, "Long Range Carrier Fighter") despite the overwhelming evidence that it is eminently possible.  Well, now it appears that the military agrees with me as evidenced by the requirements for the new F-47 under development.  Amazingly, for modern times, at least, the prototype is due for first flight in 2028.
 

The Air Force has said the F-47 will have a combat radius of more than 1,000 nautical miles and be capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 2. That would make the aircraft’s combat radius nearly double that of the F-22.[1]

AF wouldn’t be making the claim if they (and industry) didn’t think they could do it.  Of course, claims are just that and nothing is proven until demonstrated.  However, we have sufficient examples of very long range aircraft from decades ago to expect that today’s more efficient engines and better aerodynamics should deliver the range we want.
 
We also need to ensure that firepower, speed, stealth, and maneuverability also join with range to make a truly formidable fighter.  Range, alone, will not make an air superiority fighter … but it’s a good start!
 
Let’s hope the military doesn’t try to turn the F-47 into a do-everything, nothing well abomination.  Make it a fighter and leave it alone.
 
This is encouraging if yet premature.
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Air Force's New F-47 Fighter Hits Stride for 2028 Takeoff”, Ward Clark, 26-Feb-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/02/26/air-forces-new-f-47-fighter-hits-stride-for-2028-takeoff-n2199600

Where Did It All Go Wrong?

Clearly, today’s Navy is badly broken in almost every respect but that wasn’t always the case.  In WWII, the Navy was an efficient, deadly, fighting force that knew how to produce warriors and ships on a routine basis.  What changed between then and now?  Where did it all go wrong?
 
Let’s start with the “what changed”.
 
What changed is the focus. From the early 1900's (pre-WWI) on, the Navy had an intense focus on combat effectiveness (with a few notable exceptions such as the WWII faulty torpedo fiasco).  After the late 1950's and early 1960's, the war veterans (those who understood combat and designed ships to meet that requirement) retired leaving people whose focus shifted from combat to career. The focus became empire building, budget pursuit, and career enhancement rather than combat-effective ship and fleet design and procurement.  Without the crucible and filter of combat to weed out the incompetent, idiots who were politically adroit took over and foolish policies became the norm.
 
Okay, that’s clear enough.  Now, when did it happen?  What event triggered the shift?  Let’s check some noteworthy events in history that lead to our current state of affairs.  Some of the events were even hailed at the time as great achievements.  Here’s a chronology (nowhere near all-inclusive!) of events that clearly traces the rise of incompetence:
 
 
General Board (1951) – The Board was dissolved by CNO Forrest Sherman in a move to consolidate his power.  This began the shift in focus from combat to bureaucracy and career.
 
Spruance (1970) – This was the point at which the Navy abdicated its design responsibility and relinquished it to industry as a result of the Total Package Procurement concept originated by the Whiz Kids of SecDef Robert McNamara.  There has been a steady downhill erosion of technical capability and competence by the Navy ever since.
 
Adm. Zumwalt’s Hi/Lo Policy (1970’s) – instead of building the fleet we needed, he settled for the fleet he could get; he compromised the nation’s security and naval strength and institutionalized mediocrity and acceptance of inferiority.
 
Note that my rejection of hi/lo does not mean that we want a fleet of all battleships and carriers.  We need smaller combatants because there are some functions they can fill better than larger ships.  A mix of large and small combatants is not an example of a hi/lo mix, it is an example of a balanced fleet whose needs are all met.  Hi/lo, on the other hand, is an example of an unbalanced fleet that lacks vital levels of warships and attempts to compensate by substituting larger numbers of smaller ships.
 
Offsets (1980’s) – This introduced the pursuit of technological leaps instead of consistent, steady, evolutionary development.  Unfortunately, it has failed every time.
 
Fall of the Soviet Union (1991) – This eliminated all the remaining intense focus on combat that the Navy had.
 
2-1/2 War Abandonment (1993) – Being able to fight and win 2-1/2 wars was the long time standard requirement by which we sized and composed our military.  When that proved expensive (duh!), instead of making the case for it to Congress, the military began adopting a series of ever-shrinking requirements leading to the current “1 regional conflict (not even a war) plus holding against another.  The threat level did not change and yet the requirement shrank, justified by budget rather than threat.
 
Minimal Manning (1990’s) – This began the physical decline of the fleet as maintenance was deferred and ships were allowed to, literally, rot.  This also instituted and formalized the Navy’s acceptance of cripplingly lowered standards of readiness.
 
Concurrency (2000’s) – This god forsaken practice has cost the Navy dearly and has failed miserably every time it’s been attempted and yet the Navy continues to practice it.
 
Unmanned (2000’s) – This marks the Navy’s public and formal acceptance of insufficient combat power in the pursuit of technological fads.  Instead of doing the hard work of evolutionary development, the Navy institutionalized the pursuit of magic beans and the delusional, lazy, easy way forward.
 
Diversity (2010’s) – This marked the Navy’s formal recognition of priorities other than combat effectiveness.
 
 
 
And here we are, today.  It’s clear that there was no single event that crippled the Navy but, rather, a creeping rot evidenced by a series of misguided (to be polite) actions over the years.
 
Ironically, many of the flawed actions were praised at the time they were implemented but only by people who did not have a combat focus.  Looking back, it is easy to see the actions for the mistakes they were.  Our current failure is our inability to see the failings and course correct.

New Swedish Frigate

ComNavOps has long considered the Swedish Visby class corvette as the gold standard of modern, total stealth warship design (not perfect ... just the best out there).  That makes the conceptual design for the next Swedish frigate, a larger vessel than the Visby, seemingly obvious:  simply upsize the Visby and add a few more weapons.  However, that seems not to be the case.  The candidates for the next Swedish frigate appear to be the existing (parent??) designs listed below:
 

• Saab/Babcock - Arrowhead 120 (variant of the Arrowhead 140)
• Naval Group (France) - FDI frigate
• Navantia (Spain) - Alfa 4000 light frigate

 
As a quick reminder, Visby is 238 ft and 840 tons.  For comparison, the Arrowhead 120 is 406 ft and 4,650 tons.
 
None of the candidates exhibit anything approaching the maximum stealth and total signature reduction the modern naval battlefield requires and all would seem to be a significant step back from the Visby in that regard.  Honestly, the parallels between this and the US Navy’s failed Constellation program which attempted to build a “new”, 20+ year old, already obsolete frigate from a parent design, are eerie.
 
Sweden is looking to acquire four frigates from one of the companies listed above.  The contract for four ships is estimated to be between $4.5B -$6.7B(USD) which would be $1.1B - $1.7B(USD) per ship and, of course, no estimate ever comes in on budget so the real cost would likely be pushing $2B or more which seems excessive for relatively simple, dated frigates.
 
I assumed Sweden would simply scale up the Visby design for frigtes/destroyers.  That would be eminently logical and, indeed, that was the original idea for the Visby Generation 2 design.
 

Initially in 2021, FMV [Swedish Defence Materiel Administration] awarded Saab Kockums a contract for the product definition phase of the Visby Generation 2 corvettes, a new class based on the existing Visby-class stealth vessels … [1]
 
However, the program was canceled in 2023 amid Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Sweden’s push toward NATO membership (finalized in 2024), leading to Saab teaming up with Babcock for a new, larger design.[1]

Somehow, in moving from the world’s stealthiest corvette to a “new” dated frigate, Sweden lost sight of what’s important for survival and combat-effectiveness on the modern naval battlefield.  Did some US admirals join the Swedish navy?
 

Arrowhead 120

I fully support the idea of a larger ship than the Visby but why go for a less capable and less survivable one?  Surely, the Visby could be scaled up from a corvette to a frigate without violating any “laws” of shipbuilding.
 
I guess it’s not just the US Navy that engages in perplexing behavior.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Saab, Babcock bank on Arrowhead 120 design for Sweden’s next frigate”, Jonas Olsson, 13-Feb-2026,
https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/saab-babcock-bank-on-arrowhead-120-design-for-swedens-next-frigate/