LCS Mine Countermeasures Assessment

Surprisingly, two of the Navy’s MCM configured LCS have been moved from the Middle East to a port in Malaysia despite the obvious possibility of Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz.  The ships were relocated about a week or so before the US strikes began.  If the Iranians do lay mines (there are no confirmed reports yet), we’ll desperately miss the LCS MCM capabilities … or will we?
 
From a Hunterbrooks website report, we learn that the LCS MCM capability is even more problematic and limited than we already knew.  The report provides information from a US Navy briefing.[1]
 
As you read it, bear in mind that the summarized information presented below is the Navy’s information, not mine.  If you want to dispute anything, you’ll have to take it up with the Navy.
 
By trying to be multi-mission, training time available for mine countermeasures is being significantly reduced to support ASuW, VBSS, and other missions.
 
The entire MCM package consists of
1x MH-60S Seahawk

• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
• mine neutralization system (underwater suicide drone)

2x Common Unmanned Surface Vehicles (CUSV) that can tow:

• AN/AQS-20 side-scan and volume-search sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

Each CUSV/AQS-20 mission is consuming large amounts of prep time, significantly reducing the overall clearance rate of an already glacially slow process.

• 4+ hrs pre-mission maintenance
• 1.5 hrs post-launch sonar calibration

 That’s 5.5+ hrs of time before the mission even begins!
 
AQS-20 sonar has a habit of failing to record data which is not detectable until after the mission, during the post-mission analysis.
 
CUSV still has a tendency to “runaway”, out of control.
 
CUSV comms are unacceptably short range requiring the LCS to operate in or near the minefield.
 
Navy MCM doctrine requires a visual ID of mines and the camera fails even in relatively clear waters.
 
The single CUSV crane is a single point of failure and is prone to failure.
 

 
With the preceding in mind, are we really missing much if the LCS-MCM vessels aren’t in the Middle East?  No matter how you slice it, this is an epic embarrassment for the Navy.
 
 
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[1]Hunterbrook website, “Demining Hormuz How The U.S. Navy Arrived At Worst-Case Scenario Unprepared”, Spendley & Johnston, 13-Mar-2026,
https://hntrbrk.com/demining-hormuz/