We’ve come to believe that long, drawn out development programs spanning decades are the norm for new aircraft. That’s our paradigm and because we labor under that paradigm, we see decades long development programs as normal and don’t question it. In fact, we question when someone suggests a shorter development cycle. For example, read the responses to the post, “How To Build A Better Aircraft” to see the knee jerk, paradigm-inspired, negative reactions.
The reality is that our paradigm could not be more wrong.
Let’s consider the example of the F6F Hellcat, the aircraft that won the naval aviation war in the Pacific. The Hellcat went from prototype contract award in Jun-1941 to first production aircraft in Oct-1942, a period of only 16 months and then entered squadron service on the USS Essex just 4 months later in Feb 1943.
 |
| F6F Hellcat |
In contrast, the F-35 has been under development for well over two decades with the first X-35 demonstrator prototype contract having been awarded in 1997. Development is still ongoing with the Block 4 full combat software suite still not ready and likely never will be !!!!!!
What if the F-35 had been needed for WWII? It would have been the mid-1960’s before the aircraft would have been ready even in the limited form it is today. We’d have lost the war while waiting for the F-35 (well, no we wouldn’t but I’m making a point).
Most of you are already pounding out a reply pointing out (rationalizing failure, actually … think about that … about what you’re defending …) that the F-35 is vastly more complex than the Hellcat so, of course, it would take more time. Well, why don’t you pause your typing for a few minutes and let’s examine that argument.
First, is the F-35 really more complex than the Hellcat was, for its time? The Hellcat incorporated new technology such as laterally distributed, hydraulically actuated, landing gear that rotated 90 degrees while retracting. It had a new powerplant, the Pratt & Whitney R-2800-10 with a two stage, two speed, supercharger. The propeller featured variable pitch which was regulated by oil pressure via the propeller governor. And so on.[1]
Adding to the complexity and degree of difficulty was the fact that all design work was done by hand. There were no computers, no computer aided design (CAD), no computer drawn blueprints, and no computer performance modeling and simulations. Calculations were done by hand or, perhaps, with the aid of a slide rule. Aeronautical theory was barely out of its WWI infancy. Aircraft design was largely a matter of corporate institutional knowledge, trial and error, and ‘feel’ from the designers.
Production was a challenge. There was no automated, robotic assembly; everything was hand built. New production techniques, such as the use of flat aluminum sheets on the Hellcat, were being conceived and put into use on the fly.
The Hellcat was a complex undertaking, for sure!
It’s highly debatable that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was. However, that’s an unproductive debate. For the purposes of this discussion, let’s stipulate that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was. [uh … I’ve got a bad feeling about this] In fact, let’s stipulate (with no supporting evidence) that the F-35 is the most complex undertaking man has ever attempted. That should satisfy the F-35 apologists and allow us to move on with our discussion. [oh, oh … why does this feel like a trap coming?]
Having reminded ourselves about the development time of the Hellcat and the F-35 (and blamed the complexity of the F-35 for the extended development time!), let’s ask ourselves, which is better: a short development time or a long development time? It’s not a trick question. The answer is obvious. A short development time is infinitely preferable to a long development time.
The F-35’s protracted, glacially slow development time is all kinds of bad and wrong. The F-35’s original design requirements, established well over two decades ago, are no longer relevant. Many aspects of the F-35, such as the IRST, now border on obsolete because they were spec’ed a couple of decades ago. What might have been revolutionary capabilities two decades ago, such as the sensor fusion, are now commonplace and likely better in other aircraft. The degree of stealth that might have been useful and very effective two decades ago is now considered merely semi-stealthy and is losing its effectiveness every day.
Far worse, this kind of protracted development is simply not acceptable in a world that might go to war at any time. The Hellcat is the model for useful development time.
Now, let’s re-examine our reason (rationalization) for the F-35’s prolonged development. What did all you apologists just clamor about? Oh yes … the complexity of the F-35. [and the trap closes!]
So, if complexity is the reason for protracted development times and if prolonged development times are bad then it stands to reason that complexity is bad. Simple logic. Also, blindingly obvious.
Thus, the very complexity that the F-35 supporters and apologists proudly proclaimed earlier in the post is, in reality, the reason why the F-35 has been such a failure! The fanboys have proudly latched onto the root cause of failure and are promoting and defending it. [… oops!]
So, having identified what’s wrong with the F-35, let’s now address the ‘why’. Why is the F-35 the most complex undertaking ever attempted by man? Again, it’s not a trick question. The answer, of course, is because we attempted to leapfrog generations of rational, methodical, educational development in an attempt to jump into the future. In other words, we unwisely latched onto revolutionary instead of evolutionary.
In contrast, the Hellcat, while it had new features which were then state of the art, was still an evolution of the F4F Wildcat and, as such, was a magnificent and timely success. Revolutionary development usually fails and, if it succeeds, takes decades. Evolutionary development produces a useful, timely product. Which approach should we be following? Again, not a trick question …
There’s nothing wrong with pursuing revolutionary developments … as long as they stay in the lab until they’re ready. It is folly to base production programs on non-existent, revolutionary technology.
We have to break this cycle of attempting to develop exquisite, leap ahead technology that winds up consuming billions/trillions of dollars and never actually pans out. We’ve had enough LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, Ford programs that reach for the stars and land in the mud. We need Hellcats. If the Navy is right about their prediction of war with China (assuming we opt to contest China’s assault on Taiwan), we need Hellcat’s, now, more than ever.
Consider the F-35. What if, instead of trying to create a sensor fused, holographic, multi-dimensional, subspace, see-through image displayed on a magic helmet in an aircraft that tried to do all things for all services by implementing horizontal and vertical takeoff and landing and can’t communicate with anyone other than itself, we had designed a state of the art (but no further!), single function aircraft, using only existing technology? We’d have had an optimized, operating aircraft fifteen years ago and it would have been the best aircraft in the world, at the time! We’d have had a modern Hellcat! Instead, we have a flying black hole of a money pit … you know, the 50% of the time it’s actually ready to fly (F-35 readiness rates being what they are; see, “The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates”).
So, what do we conclude from all this?
- As regards development time, complexity is the enemy of brevity.
- As regards war, complexity is the enemy of timeliness.
- As regards usefulness, complexity is the enemy of relevance.
- As regards budgets, complexity is the enemy of affordability.
- As regards numbers, complexity is the enemy of quantity.
Wow! Complexity is the enemy of many things, isn’t it? Maybe that should be telling us something about our obsessive desire for complex technology?
Maybe that should be telling us something about the next generation aircraft the Navy is pursuing?
Maybe that should be telling us something about the cruiser replacement the Navy is pursuing?
What was that old caution? Oh yeah …
Keep It Simple, Stupid
K.I.S.S.
The Navy needs to K.I.S.S. their next aircraft and next ship.
________________________________
[1]LCDR Richard Dann, USNR, Walk Around F6F Hellcat, Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1996, ISBN 0-89747-079-6
