F-35 Congressional Testimony

The following is testimony provided June 23, 2026, on the F-35 aircraft program presented to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland.  Testimony provided by U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Masiello, Program Executive Officer F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office.[1]
 
Here are some illuminating quotes from the transcript.[1]
 
As you know, the readiness rates are abysmal.  Here’s a major reason why.
 

Gen. Masiello:  In this session, I think I can say one of our challenges, and you talked about it, is if I have over 1,300 operational aircraft out there.  I believe we have set and enabled a sustainment system for about 700 to 800.  So, there is our challenge in readiness. [p.10]

So, the military has sized the sustainment effort for only half the existing aircraft?????!  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 
As a result of the sustainment issues, readiness is in the toilet and the toilet is at the bottom of a deep pit.  Rather than acknowledge the problem, firing people, and then fixing the problem, the military is still engaged in accounting games trying to make it look less bad than it is.
 

Senator Kelly: Thank you.  So, the GAO [ed. Government Accountability Office]  FMC [ed. Full Mission Capable] rate is they said 25 percent.· Your office claims it's 56 percent. [p.18]

It’s 25% and even that is overestimated!
 
As a reminder, there are two sets of mission capable measurements:
 

• Mission Capable (MC) – The aircraft can perform at least one task.  Basically, this means the aircraft can get off the ground.
• Full Mission Capable (FMC) – The aircraft can perform any of its combat mission tasks.  This is what every aircraft should be.

 
One of the problems is low expectations.
 

Gen. Masiello:  We have a North Star for 80 percent MC across the entirety of the fleet, and we need to figure out how to do that. [p.11]

So, general, you’ve set a pathetically low MC standard (only 80% are even rated to be able to get off the ground) that you can’t meet and have no idea how to even achieve that low standard.  Wow.  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 

That's about as ready as it gets.

Sadly, these kinds of problems are not unique to the F-35 program.  For example, the Navy is building carriers and ballistic submarines without the dry dock capacity to support their maintenance.
 
Where is SecDef Hegseth?  How can he read this kind of testimony and not fire everyone connected to the program?  Hegseth has been a major disappointment and his lack of action is why this kind of problem persists across the military.

To be fair, how can Congress hear this and not fire people?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Testimony on the F-35 Aircraft Program”, staff, 1-Jul-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/07/01/testimony-on-the-f-35-aircraft-program

F-35 Block 4 – Total Crap

As you know, the F-35 does not yet have its full combat capabilities.  Those were part of the incremental Block software upgrades and should have happened years ago.  Now, the Block 4 upgrade effort has been delayed yet again.
 

The Pentagon now anticipates the F-35’s Block 4 modernization won’t be complete until 2031 at the earliest, a five-year delay from its original timeline, even as the department rescopes the effort to include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned … [1]

Note the phrases,
 
“at the earliest”
 
“include fewer capabilities than originally envisioned”
 
You know, beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt, that the even the much delayed 2031 date will slip further still and the already downgraded capabilities of the Block 4 will be further downgraded.  Honestly, at the rate we’re going, Block 4 isn’t going to deliver much in the way of new capabilities, at all.  Many features have already been deferred to a nebulous, non-existent, unfunded, future upgrade instead of the Block 4.
 
In addition, the Block 4 program is being reorganized, yet again.  GAO reports,
 

According to program officials, the new Block 4 major subprogram will have fewer capabilities, will experience schedule delays, and will have unknown costs until the program office finishes developing its cost estimate.[1]

The cost for this pile of digital crap is stunning, even by Department of Defense standards.
 

An updated cost estimate for the Block 4 effort, which was $16.5 billion as of 2021, is expected “later in 2025,” according to the GAO.[1]

Well over $16B and counting (with at least five more years of costs still to come!) and with next to nothing to show for it.  I really don’t know how to apply any value-added analysis to that.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  Okay, I guess that was my value-added analysis.
 
On the off chance that you aren’t angry about this, yet, the following should correct that.
 

The F-35 program’s use of incentive fees has largely been ineffective at holding the contractors accountable to delivering engines and aircraft on time,” the GAO stated. “For lot 15 aircraft, where the program originally tied incentives to on-time delivery, the program gave the contractor a second chance to earn fees by redirecting those incentives to other aspects of the program when it was clear that Lockheed Martin would not deliver any aircraft on time.[1]

So, we set up a contract with incentives and then paid the manufacturer incentives even after they failed to deliver aircraft on time.  People should be rotting in jail for this.  See?  More value-added analysis.
 
This is exactly the kind of thing I had hoped that SecDef Hegseth would address but he is disappointing me.  Heads should be littering the halls of the F-35 program.  What is Hegseth doing with his time?
 
 
 
_____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “F-35 Block 4 upgrade delayed until at least 2031: GAO”, Valerie Insinna, 3-Sep-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/f-35-block-4-upgrade-delayed-until-at-least-2031-gao/

Does the Navy Want the F-35C?

The Navy has never appeared to be very enthused about the F-35.  They’ve gone deep into fantasy land to rave about the wonders of the LCS, the Ford, the Zumwalt, and many other programs but the F-35 praise has been very muted.  The actual procurement numbers of F-35s has been minimal, to put it mildly. 
 
Now, however, with a war with China looming on the horizon (by the Navy’s own public statements), has the Navy’s enthusiasm for the F-35 increased?  Is the Navy requesting more F-35s, possible on a crash basis to prepare for the coming war?  Let’s check the 2025 defense spending bill.
 
Congress is in the process of finalizing the 2025 defense spending bill.  Currently, there are various versions of the bill floating around as the various groups put forth their own versions and attempt to reconcile the various versions.  The various actors and their budget versions are shown below.[1]

• President’s budget: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House NDAA: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House defense appropriations: Includes $833 billion in defense spending
• Senate Armed Services Committee: $878.4 billion for the Defense Department
• Senate Appropriations Committee: $852.2 billion defense spending

That’s interesting but let’s look, specifically, at the F-35 requests in the budget.

F-35
 
The President’s budget calls for 9 F-35C for the Navy, 4 F-35C for the Marine Corps, and 13 F-35B for the Marine Corps.  The other actors have similar numbers.
 
The Navy plans to buy 82 F-35C across the five year FYDP, split between the Navy and Marines.  That’s around 9 F-35Cs per year for the Navy, depending on the exact Navy-Marine split.
 
That doesn’t seem like a great deal of enthusiasm for the F-35 on the Navy’s part.
 
 
Notes
 
Here’s some related notes.
 
As you know, despite having 11 aircraft carriers, the Navy has only 9 air wings.  Two carriers have no air wing.  This is slightly understandable as one carrier is always in a mid-life refueling and overhaul.  In recent years, a second carrier has been hard down due to intensive maintenance due to deferred maintenance racked up during too many deployments for too many months.  This is not normal and is an emergency condition.
 
The real problem with this is that 9 air wings leaves us two short in the event of war when we would surge every carrier. 
 
The Navy is statutorily required to maintain 10 air wings.  Congress, as they so often do, neutered their own requirement by granting the Navy a waiver. 

The 2024 NDAA granted the Navy relief from the Title 10 requirement to stand up a 10th CVW by October 1, 2025 pending SECNAV submission of a report to congress analyzing potential approaches to the manning, operation, and deployment of a 10th CVW.[2]

Thus, Congress is complicit in the Navy’s air wing and aircraft shortfall.
 
The Navy, as they so often do, is dealing with this not by acquiring more aircraft and air wings but by playing an aircraft accounting game. 

By 2025, the Navy will have solved its strike fighter shortfall in part by changing how it will field the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter. Instead of two squadrons per air wing with 10 tails, the Navy will now field a single squadron with 14 tails, Rear Adm. Andrew Loiselle, director of the Air Warfare Division (OPNAV/N98), told the House Armed Services subcommittee on tactical air and land forces on Tuesday. testified it was reducing F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fight from two to one squadron per air wing.[3]

How reducing two 10-aircraft squadrons with 20 total aircraft to one squadron with 14 total aircraft alleviates the shortfall is an arithmetic miracle beyond understanding.  Nevertheless, it’s what the Navy is doing.  This further demonstrates the Navy’s lukewarm view of the value of the F-35.

 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “F-35s, frigates and FRA woes: Here are the issues facing Congress in upcoming FY25 budget process”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Sep-2024,
http://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/f-35s-frigates-and-fra-woes-here-are-the-issues-facing-congress-in-upcoming-fy25-budget-process/
 
[2]https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117134/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS25-Wstate-GeringB-20240416.pdf
 
[3]USNI News website, “Navy Adjusts F-35C Squadron Size to End Fighter Shortfall by 2025”, John Grady, 14-Jul-2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/07/14/navy-adjusts-f-35c-squadron-size-to-end-fighter-shortfall-by-2025

How the F-35 Software Should Have Been Done

As we’ve seen and discussed, software has become the major obstacle to successful programs and the F-35 is probably the poster child for this.  The F-35 logistics and maintenance program, ALIS, was supposed to have been a miraculous piece of software that would do … well … everything plus several things we haven’t even thought of yet.  As it turned out, it couldn’t run a toaster correctly and may be the biggest military software flop in history.  In addition, the vaunted Block 4 software that enables full combat capability from the aircraft is years overdue with no implementation date in sight and many of the features have been permanently deferred to a non-existent ‘future’ date or deferred to the next aircraft program.  Those features will never be part of the F-35.  Even worse, because of the hugely delayed software and the resulting concurrency, we’ve produced hundreds of orphan F-35s that are so out of date that they will never be upgraded.  They’re essentially garbage throwaways at $100M each. 
 
Could all this have been avoided?  I don’t see how.  After all, this is how aircraft development and acquisition programs go, right?  I mean, everyone knows that, right? 
 
Well, let’s now take a look at how the software should have been handled and how all of this could have been avoided.  Wait … is that really possible?  Could all of this have been avoided?  Yes, it could, quite simply, as a matter of fact, and now we’ll see how.
 
 
Requirements – To begin, the software was insanely over spec’ed.  Only a lunatic – or the US military – would have attempted to cram so many features into the software.  We’ve talked about this at length.  The software had far too many requirements that had nothing to do with combat (looking at you ALIS) and nothing to do with realistic combat (looking at remote guidance handoffs and similar technology for the sake of technology features).  The military is obsessed with technology for its own sake.  Our guiding principle should be K.I.S.S. (Keep It Simple, Stupid).  One could also refer to this as K.I.S.A. (Keep It Simple, Admiral) since ‘admiral’ is a synonym for ‘stupid’.  The two words are interchangeable. 
 
By reducing the software requirements to just direct and realistic combat features we could have cut the scope, cost, and time to produce the software in half, or whatever actual large proportion.  So, half our job is done before we even begin!
 
Think of this as the Boyd approach to software:  not a single line of code that doesn’t directly enable realistic combat.  Programmer Boyd would be proud of us!
 
Of course, even with drastically pared down requirements, some significant amount of software is still required and here’s how it should have been handled.
 
We start by recognizing three absolutely critical and obvious conditions:
 
1. Software is platform agnostic. 
 
2. Software must be its own, stand-alone program, separate from the hardware program.
 
3.  Hardware development cannot proceed until the software is finalized.
 
 
Platform Agnostic Software - This is the key to software development. We didn’t need to have an actual F-35 aircraft in order to develop the software.  The software can be developed in laboratory simulations or on surrogate aircraft if an actual aircraft is needed for some reason that I can’t fathom.  We could have loaded the software on a Piper Cub, if necessary.  This would have allowed us to completely develop the software without every spending a penny on the physical aircraft.  The physical aircraft is the last thing we need.  It’s the final piece of the puzzle not the first.  The F-35 attempted to do the reverse.  They built the aircraft first and then remembered they had to add some software.  Utterly predictably, that approach failed miserably.
 
Stand-Alone Program Management – Software comes before hardware and must be its own, stand-alone project from a program management perspective.  Software cannot be an afterthought, add-on to the hardware as it was with the F-35.  The only way to effectively manage the software and avoid having it become an afterthought is to make it its own program with its own, clearly and rigidly defined requirements, schedule, and milestones.  If the software fails to meet its milestones, you don’t screw around or extend the program;  you kill it, learn lessons, fire and court-martial the managers, and move on.  Failure, then, becomes a positive in the sense that it serves as a warning – a severe warning – to the next project and manager to maintain tight control on the project and to be realistic regarding capabilities.  No more promising the moon and delivering nothing.  Fire and court-martial a few people and the next ones fall in line.
 
Start Point - Software is the hardware enabler.  Without the software, the hardware is just a very expensive paperweight.  In other words, there is no point even buying the first hardware rivet until the software is complete.  Thus, the completion of the software is what controls and triggers the start of hardware development.  This doesn’t mean partial completion with some nebulous phased delivery in the ephemeral future;  it means just what it says:  complete.  Finished.  Nothing left to do.  The contract is fully satisfied.  ‘I’s’ are dotted and ‘T’s’ are crossed.  Last line of code is written.  Had we followed this with the F-35, we would not yet have spent a single penny on the F-35 aircraft, itself.  What a savings!  We would not now have hundreds of orphans and wasted billions of dollars and have an entire fleet of only partially combat capable aircraft.  We might have even recognized, decades ago, that the software was not viable and halted the program while we could have still easily gotten out from under it.  We could have learned lessons and moved on to a second, wiser attempt (who am I kidding?  we don’t learn lessons  …  but, I digress).
 
 
Conclusion
 
Nothing that I’ve described is anything other than common sense and none of it requires any act of Congress.  It could be implemented tomorrow by nothing more than a command from the Chief of Naval Operations or Secretary of the Navy.  Some of you will protest some aspect or another but that’s just you being trapped in your paradigm and unable to see outside it.
 
Had we done this with the F-35, do you see the very early off-ramp that would have presented itself when it quickly became obvious that the software would not, and could not, be delivered in any useful time frame?  For just a hundred million dollars or so of initial programming, it would have become clear that we did not have a viable software and the program would have terminated with the hardware portion never having begun.  How many billions of dollars would we have saved? 

F-35 Software Problems Continue

We’ve previously noted that software has become the leading cause of schedule delays and cost overruns and we cited the F-35 program’s attempt to implement the Technology Refresh (TR-3) leading to Block 4 upgrades (see, “F-35 Software Case Study” and “The Heartbreak of Software”) without which the F-35 cannot achieve full combat capability.
 
About a year ago, the Pentagon put a freeze on deliveries of new F-35s pending fixes for the TR-3 implementation.  F-35s have been piling up in warehouses awaiting a resolution of the software issues.
 
Honestly, the freeze on deliveries has been more symbolic than effective since the Pentagon has continued payments for the new aircraft with just a $7M withholding per aircraft.[1]  That means that Lockheed has still been getting around 91% of the contract price for aircraft that don’t meet spec and can’t be delivered.  That’s not a bad deal if you can get it!
 
Financial aspects aside, I’m not sure any of us fully appreciate just how badly broken the software side of things are in the F-35 program.  The Pentagon has just caved to various pressures and announced that the delivery freeze has been lifted despite the software problem remaining unresolved.  Hmm …
 

Bowing to operational demands, the Pentagon has lifted a year-long freeze on accepting new F-35 stealth fighters — even though the problem that prompted the standstill has not been fully resolved.[1]
 
Persistent problems with TR-3 prompted officials to eventually capitulate to an interim software fix …[1]

 
Read this next quote slowly and carefully and fully grasp the meaning and implications.
 

… jets will be delivered with interim software that facilitates training, but a second software drop that enables combat capabilities likely won’t be available for at least another year.[1]

That’s right.  We’re delivering training jets but not fully combat capable jets.  We’re decades into this program, have built a thousand aircraft, and still don’t have a fully combat capable aircraft.  Someone should face a firing squad for this.
 
The purpose of this post is not to simply beat on the F-35 program.  Instead, I’d like to highlight a couple of points that this development hammers home for us.
 
Software – As we’ve noted, software has become the main obstacle to successful programs.  We’ve already stated that we need to change the way we treat software and make it its own program instead of just an afterthought for the hardware.  This latest incident just hammers that point home.  Our frontline combat aircraft, the F-35, is not yet fully combat capable due to continuing software problems because the software was treated as an afterthought. 
 
For acquisition programs, our focus has to be software, software, software.
 
SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE !
 
Phased Delivery – The incompetent, lazy method of running an acquisition program is to use some sort of incomplete, so-called ‘phased’ delivery where the product is delivered incomplete, to be finished over subsequent years of development.  Of course, this never works out.  The F-35, for example, has yet to achieve full combat capability and we’ve built some thousand aircraft, none of them fully combat capable.  That’s criminal and leads to endless upgrades which add to the cost of the aircraft.  That $80M aircraft becomes a $100M+ aircraft after all the upgrades are included. 
 
Further, by all accounts, we’ve produced hundreds of F-35 orphans which, due to concurrency, will never be brought up to standard and are, essentially, throwaways.  Again, that’s criminal.  This half-assed F-35 production program just hammers home the folly of any kind of phased delivery program.
 
We have to adopt a philosophy of the product, the whole product, and nothing but the whole product or don’t bother building it.
 
Contracts – The final point that this incident hammers home is the unmitigated stupidity of a contract that does not specify and demand delivery of a fully capable product in order to get paid a single penny.  You wouldn’t make a partial payment on an incomplete automobile, would you?  So why are we paying for incomplete aircraft (or ships or anything)?  Again, we need to bring back firing squads on a regular basis.
 
 
Inescapable Conclusion
 
Our acquisition program methodologies are badly broken and our military leadership is 100% complicit to the point of dereliction of duty and criminal fraud.  We have got to start learning lessons from our endless string of failures.  Congress needs to start firing admirals.  Accountability is the only way people as stupid as our military leaders will ever learn a lesson.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “F-35 deliveries to resume next week, despite incomplete upgrade”, Michael Marrow and Valerie Insinna, 11-Jul-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/f-35-deliveries-to-resume-next-week-despite-incomplete-upgrade/

F-35 Software Case Study

We’ve come to recognize that software has become the major stumbling block in weapon systems development, even more so than construction and physical performance issues (see, “The Heartbreak of Software”).
 
As you know, the F-35 was delivered in a non-combat capable condition due to software limitations.  The full-combat capable software was planned to be delivered in Block increments as listed below.
 
Blocks 1A and 1B - initial pilot training and multi-level security
Block 2A - improved training capabilities
Block 2B – basic air-to-air combat capability;  basic air-to-ground combat capability
Block 3i – Block 2B plus new hardware to support USAF IOC
Block 3F - full flight envelope and baseline combat capabilities; began 2018 and completed 2023
Block 4 – full weapons (17 new weapons) and ESM capabilities;  pending;  requires Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)
 
Block 4 is the full combat capability version.  See Forbes[2] for a good discussion of the Block 4 upgrade but note the 2022 time of the report.  Today, Block 4 is still pending despite many of its features having been deleted and pushed into some nebulous future date land where they will languish forever and never get implemented.  Thus, even the dumbed down version of Block 4 cannot be delivered in a timely manner, being years overdue, already, and still years in the future.
 
We now have yet another example of major software problems in the software-cursed F-35.  Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) upgrade which is required to implement the dumbed down Block 4 and make the F-35 fully combat capable has encountered major software problems resulting in the military halting acceptance of new aircraft.
 

Since July 2023, the Pentagon has refused to accept newly built F-35s due to software woes with the TR-3 upgrade, which has slipped numerous times past its original fielding date expected for April 2023.[1]
 
Problems with an upgrade installed on some Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters rolling off the production line have now disrupted plans to incorporate those upgrades on existing aircraft, and the F-35 Joint Program Office does not have a date for when those jets will get the much-anticipated retrofits.[1]
 
The F-35 program “was scheduled to begin TR-3 [Technology Refresh 3] retrofits in April 2024 with the intent to modify 149 aircraft over the subsequent 12-month period,” JPO spokesperson Russ Goemaere told Breaking Defense. But now, “[t]he Program is working closely with F-35 customers to establish a new start date for those modifications based on a number of factors including software and supply chains.[1]
 
TR-3 — which features a more powerful processor, greater memory and a panoramic cockpit display that collectively enable a suite of new capabilities known as Block 4 … [1]

TR-3 began being installed in new production aircraft with Lot 15.
 
 
The military’s solution? 

“Very capable TR-2 jets will continue to fly operational missions while awaiting the start of TR-3 retrofits.”[1]

I’m sorry but no.  F-35s with TR-2/Block 3x are not ‘very capable’.  They lack most of the weapons and sensor capability required for full combat capability.
 
To provide some perspective, the F-35 has been in production since 2008-9.  That’s 16 years and we still don’t have full combat-capable aircraft due to software delays.  Just as we’ve begun retiring LCSes without them ever having had fully functional modules installed, we may see F-35s retire without ever having been fully combat capable.
 
We have got to start recognizing that software is now the primary obstacle in weapon system development and we need to modify how we approach program management and software development.
 
 
 
_____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Pentagon delays F-35 retrofits amid upgrade woes”, Michael Marrow, 4-Apr-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/pentagon-delays-f-35-retrofits-amid-upgrade-woes/
 
[2]Forbes, “Inside Block 4—The Mostly Secret Plan For Making The F-35 Fighter Even More Lethal”, Loren Thompson, 14-Nov-2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2022/11/14/inside-block-4-the-mostly-secret-plan-for-making-the-f-35-fighter-even-more-lethal/?sh=3a0dc3184423

The Heartbreak of Software

It has become painfully clear in recent decades that, more and more, the major stumbling block in weapon acquisition programs is software, rather than hardware. 
 
The F-35, for example, has failed on the software side of things rather than the hardware.  The all-encompassing, mission planning, parts inventory controlling, maintenance regulating, aircraft health assessing ALIS software has been a colossal, and to date, unrecoverable, failure.  Further, the F-35 was planned to be fully combat capable only with the advent of the Block 4 software upgrade which is now hopelessly behind schedule and has had many of its planned features deleted or deferred to some undetermined future time.
 

The F-35 program, now 4 years into its Block 4 modernization efforts, continues to experience cost increases and schedule expansion. Costs continued to rise during 2021 due to crucial hardware development and testing upgrades, among other things. In 2021, the program office added 3 years to its Block 4 schedule and now expects to extend Block 4 development and delivery into fiscal year 2029 …[2]

As of 2021, the program office now plans to complete Block 4 capability deliveries 3 years later than the original schedule due to software quality issues, funding challenges, and the addition of new capabilities, among others.[2]

If/when it ever happens, Block 4 will introduce over 75 major upgrades into the fighter.
 

So, the Block 4 upgrades enabled by TR-3 are quite imposing, increasing the range and diversity of weapons that can be carried, plus the sensitivity of sensors used to detect, track and engage targets. Most of the new weapons, 17 in all, are “kinetic” weapons such as missiles, but they also include non-kinetic systems that use clever software and waveforms to jam or confuse enemy warfighting systems.
 
Block 4 also enhances networking capability with other tactical systems to enable what the military calls integrated, long-range “kill webs.”[1]

However, before these changes can be implemented, the fighter’s core processor and memory unit must be improved. This is accomplished via an upgrade called Technology Refresh 3, or TR-3. The fighter’s previous computing system, TR-2, is not adequate to support the capability upgrades included in Block 4.
 

TR-3 is being installed in all new production aircraft including the Lot 15 aircraft being delivered today, and will be retrofitted onto fighters already in the fleet back to Lot 10.[1]

This would seem to imply that all aircraft delivered prior to Lot 10 will become ‘orphans’ and relegated to non-combat duties.  Thus, we see that software issues, not hardware, are going to relegate hundreds of aircraft to non-combat status.
 
Software issues not only impose schedule or ‘orphan’ penalties but actual cost penalties, as well.
 

A recent report by the Government Accountability Office noted that the cost of Block 4 upgrades to the F-35 fleet had risen to an estimated $15 billion across over a dozen years.[1]

That’s staggering and that’s just a minor software upgrade cost;  just one block of a planned four.
 
 
Discussion
 
Much of the software delays and problems associated with weapon system acquisitions are self-inflicted in the sense that we create needlessly complex requirements.  For example, the entire faddish trend of wanting to be able to control any weapon from any platform is idiotic in the extreme.  In what real world scenario would this capability be required?  The answer is … none.  This is just the pursuit of technology for its own sake.  If there was no penalty for this it would be fine;  useless but harmless.  However, the reality is that every line of code that is added to a program takes time, costs money, increases the likelihood of unintentional interferences with other bits of code, and requires time to test and debug.  When we’re already struggling – and failing – to produce useable combat aircraft in less than two decades, needlessly complex software is the last thing we should be pursuing.

 
 
 
_______________________________

[1]Forbes website, “Inside Block 4—The Mostly Secret Plan For Making The F-35 Fighter Even More Lethal”, Loren Thompson, 14-Nov-2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2022/11/14/inside-block-4-the-mostly-secret-plan-for-making-the-f-35-fighter-even-more-lethal/?sh=5172e58f4423
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
Continue”, Apr 2022, GAO-22-105128

F-35C Ramp Strike Lesson

The investigation of the Jan 2022 ramp strike by an F-35C has become public and is presented in a USNI News website article.[1]  I’d like to draw a lesson from it that the Navy won’t and yet it’s the most important one.

To summarize the incident, a pilot was attempting to perform an abbreviated landing procedure, wound up with too low an approach speed, couldn’t recover, and suffered a ramp strike.  The Navy’s investigation determined that the cause was pilot error for failing to switch on two automated landing aids which control approach speed (glide slope) and angle of attack.  From the article/report, 

The junior officer had performed a specialized landing approach to Vinson for the first time, but he did not realize a built-in aid that helped control the plane’s power during landing was switched off.[1] 

… the [pilot] remained in manual mode when he should have been (and thought he was) in an automated command mode designed to reduce pilot workload during landings.[1] 

After the turn, the pilot didn’t engage the two landing assist tools on the fighter, the Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC) and the Delta Flight Path (DFP), which automate some of the pilot’s necessary tasks for landing on an aircraft carrier. When activated, DFP automatically adjusts the throttle to keep the aircraft on correct glide scope to land on a carrier, while the APC maintains the fighter’s angle of attack.
 
The Navy’s simplistic conclusion was pilot error.  While technically true, it completely ignores the larger error and the more important lesson to be learned from it.
 
The larger error was the pilot’s dependence on automation.  The automated landing aids, designed to increase the safety of landings, actually make landings less safe by decreasing the pilot’s skills due to dependence on automated aids.  This is analogous to our lost map reading and ground/ship navigation skills due to dependence on GPS. 
 
Note that when I use the term ‘dependence’, I mean it in the context of drug use dependency where the user becomes unable to function without the dependency.  The user is addicted.  Our pilots/soldiers/sailors have become addicted to automated aids and are unable to perform basic functions without their electronic aids.
 
What is the proper lesson from this incident?  It’s that we should either eliminate automated landing aids (and GPS and other dependencies!) from aircraft or restrict their use to emergency or extreme hazardous weather conditions. 
 
Dependence on automation should not be the normal condition.
 
Instead of this vital lesson, what did the Navy investigators recommend? 

… investigators recommended that aviators stop performing Sierra Hotel Breaks, that policy require F-35C pilots to always use Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP) throttle assists and that heads-up displays include indicator lights showing when flight aids are activated.[1] 

This is just increasing our dependence on automated aids.  What will future pilots do when the automated aid won’t work due to electrical failure or combat damage?  How will they land, having never learned/practiced manual landings or never been forced to maintain a level of expertise?  By increasing dependency on automation, we’re ensuring that pilots will become less capable and less skilled and will have more mishaps, not less.

We are dependent and addicted to technology and are losing our ability to function normally.

________________________
 
Note:  We see this in society, in general, too.  For example, the routine use of calculators in school has produced a generation of students who have no mathematical ability.  They are unable to calculate change at a register without aids.  They are unable to estimate large number manipulations (exponential manipulations and order of magnitude manipulations).  They don’t know multiplication tables.  In short, they’re mathematically ignorant.  I see it every day.
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel Break’ Resulted in South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says”, Sam LaGrone, 21-Feb-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/02/21/pilot-error-after-sierra-hotel-break-resulted-in-south-china-sea-f-35c-crash-investigation-says
 

F-35C Reality Check

Well, here’s a tidbit of information about the initial F-35C carrier deployment that you likely won’t see publicly acknowledged again.  Referring to the F-35C’s deployment aboard the USS Vinson, VAdm. Whitesell had this to say about the aircraft’s availability (readiness) rates.

 

“For that generation five fighter [ed. the F-35] to be fully full-mission capable, what was the percentage rate – which right now looks on paper starkly low, but now, what systems were not up? And how did it really affect – if we had to go into conflict, what would that be? And then what do we have to do to fix it?” Whitesell [Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell, Commander, U.S. Naval Air Forces] said.[1] [emphasis added]

 

As you recall, the F-35C just completed its first deployment aboard the USS Vinson.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise but the Navy’s, the F-35 had ‘starkly low’ availability.  The admiral did not offer a numerical percentage but given that the target full mission capable percentage is horrifyingly low (around 50%), ‘starkly low’ must be in the 20-30% realm.  That’s putrid and means the aircraft were barely operational.

 

What is the admiral going to do about the ‘starkly low’ availability rates?  Well, for one thing, he’s going to check on how spare parts impacted the situation.  Read this carefully,

 

“With our international coalition partners flying the platform too, when we ask for a part, did we lose out to another country when we were on deployment? Where were we on the pecking order? Right now, it looks like we fared well, but I need to talk to Lockheed Martin since they run the ASP [ed. Afloat Spares Package] and the global spares program – [Hybrid Product Support Integration],” he said.[1]

 

Did you catch the part about having to talk to Lockheed Martin ‘since they run the ASP and global spares program’?  So, it’s not the Navy that controls spare parts allocation for its aircraft … it’s Lockheed Martin. 

 

… GAO claims that “the government still has very limited control over the F-35 supply chain, including ordering, part procurement, and inventory,” with defense officials telling the GAO that Lockheed still maintains “substantial control” over areas like parts storage and transport, and maintainers describing constraints that keep them from repairing parts that are proprietary.[3]

 

How did we get ourselves into a situation where a civilian contractor controls whether or not a deployed carrier aircraft gets spare parts?  Having near monopolistic control over parts availability, Lockheed would never manipulate and restrict F-35 parts availability to subtly influence future production prices in their favor, right?  Right?  Still, does this sound like the way to run a war … hoping that Lockheed favors our deployed aircraft with parts?  On a related note, what if China cyber-hacks Lockheed and messes up the parts distribution system?  They could put our carriers out of action just by hacking the parts distribution computer program!  Is having Lockheed run the parts program really a good idea?

 

We’ve given up onboard maintenance ability to contractors and now we’ve given up spare parts management to a contractor?

 

In addition to spare parts shortages, here’s another one of the problems the F-35 encountered:

 

During the recent deployment, the F-35C squadron found that some seals on the aircraft did not function as planned in the at-sea environment.

 

“There’s already [a] new design coming out of Lockheed Martin for the new seals,” he said. “So there’s some learning that’s been done.[1]

 

The Navy declared IOC (Initial Operating Capability) for the F-35C on 28-Feb-2019.  That’s three years ago and we’re just now finding out that basic seals for a carrier deployed aircraft are a problem?  I guess that IOC wasn’t really operational, was it? 

 

On a related note, the seals issue once again highlights the difficulty in adapting a land based aircraft (which is what the F-35 is) to maritime use.  So many people want to point to some land weapon system and say, just bolt it to the deck of a ship.  Well, it’s a lot harder than that and this is yet another example of why most such efforts fail.

 

From the Navy’s announcement about the F-35C IOC,

 

The Navy added in its statement that “in order to declare IOC, the first operational squadron must be properly manned, trained and equipped to conduct assigned missions in support of fleet operations. This includes having 10 Block 3F, F-35C aircraft, requisite spare parts, support equipment, tools, technical publications, training programs and a functional Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS).[2]

 

I guess proper seals weren’t a requirement.  We also know that ALIS has never functioned properly.  Apparently, spare parts availability isn’t an assured thing.  So … how could the Navy have declared IOC?

 

The F-35C first flight was Jun-2010.  In the intervening 12 years, no one thought to test a carrier aircraft at sea or in a simulated saltwater environment to check things like seals?  They could have simply parked an F-35C on the deck of a deployed carrier, exposed to the elements, and then checked the condition at the end of deployment.

 

I know the Navy has never met a test they didn’t want to bypass but sometimes tests are good and necessary.

 

So, ‘starkly low’ F-35C aircraft availability persists and yet the Navy wants to get more F-35s into the air wings?  I think we need to back the availability truck up (and hopefully run over some F-35s!) and work on the readiness rates before we commit to placing the F-35 into the air wings and wind up further reducing our already hollow carrier force even more. 

 

Do we really want carriers going to war with aircraft that have ‘starkly low’ availability rates?

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “A Generational Change in Naval Aviation Has Begun Amidst Tight Budgets, Fighter Gaps”, Mallory Shellbourne, 24-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/24/a-generational-change-in-naval-aviation-has-begun-amidst-tight-budgets-fighter-gaps

 

[2]USNI News website, “Navy Declares Initial Operational Capability for F-35C Joint Strike Fighter”, Megan Eckstein, 28-Feb-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/02/28/navy-declares-initial-operational-capability-for-f-35c-joint-strike-fighter

 

[3]Breaking Defense website, “Pentagon wants $500M to get data to manage F-35 parts”, Valerie Insinna, 29-Apr-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/pentagon-wants-500m-to-get-data-to-manage-f-35-parts/

Hellcat and F-35

We’ve come to believe that long, drawn out development programs spanning decades are the norm for new aircraft.  That’s our paradigm and because we labor under that paradigm, we see decades long development programs as normal and don’t question it.  In fact, we question when someone suggests a shorter development cycle.  For example, read the responses to the post, “How To Build A Better Aircraft” to see the knee jerk, paradigm-inspired, negative reactions.

 

The reality is that our paradigm could not be more wrong.

 

Let’s consider the example of the F6F Hellcat, the aircraft that won the naval aviation war in the Pacific.  The Hellcat went from prototype contract award in Jun-1941 to first production aircraft in Oct-1942, a period of only 16 months and then entered squadron service on the USS Essex just 4 months later in Feb 1943.

 

F6F Hellcat

In contrast, the F-35 has been under development for well over two decades with the first X-35 demonstrator prototype contract having been awarded in 1997.  Development is still ongoing with the Block 4 full combat software suite still not ready and likely never will be !!!!!!

 

What if the F-35 had been needed for WWII?  It would have been the mid-1960’s before the aircraft would have been ready even in the limited form it is today.  We’d have lost the war while waiting for the F-35 (well, no we wouldn’t but I’m making a point).

 

Most of you are already pounding out a reply pointing out (rationalizing failure, actually … think about that … about what you’re defending …) that the F-35 is vastly more complex than the Hellcat so, of course, it would take more time.  Well, why don’t you pause your typing for a few minutes and let’s examine that argument.

 

First, is the F-35 really more complex than the Hellcat was, for its time?  The Hellcat incorporated new technology such as laterally distributed, hydraulically actuated, landing gear that rotated 90 degrees while retracting.  It had a new powerplant, the Pratt & Whitney R-2800-10 with a two stage, two speed, supercharger.  The propeller featured variable pitch which was regulated by oil pressure via the propeller governor.  And so on.[1]

 

Adding to the complexity and degree of difficulty was the fact that all design work was done by hand.  There were no computers, no computer aided design (CAD), no computer drawn blueprints, and no computer performance modeling and simulations.  Calculations were done by hand or, perhaps, with the aid of a slide rule.  Aeronautical theory was barely out of its WWI infancy.  Aircraft design was largely a matter of corporate institutional knowledge, trial and error, and ‘feel’ from the designers. 

 

Production was a challenge.  There was no automated, robotic assembly;  everything was hand built.  New production techniques, such as the use of flat aluminum sheets on the Hellcat, were being conceived and put into use on the fly.

 

The Hellcat was a complex undertaking, for sure!

 

It’s highly debatable that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was.  However, that’s an unproductive debate.  For the purposes of this discussion, let’s stipulate that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was.  [uh … I’ve got a bad feeling about this]  In fact, let’s stipulate (with no supporting evidence) that the F-35 is the most complex undertaking man has ever attempted.  That should satisfy the F-35 apologists and allow us to move on with our discussion.  [oh, oh … why does this feel like a trap coming?]   

 

Having reminded ourselves about the development time of the Hellcat and the F-35 (and blamed the complexity of the F-35 for the extended development time!), let’s ask ourselves, which is better:  a short development time or a long development time?  It’s not a trick question.  The answer is obvious.  A short development time is infinitely preferable to a long development time.

 

The F-35’s protracted, glacially slow development time is all kinds of bad and wrong.  The F-35’s original design requirements, established well over two decades ago, are no longer relevant.  Many aspects of the F-35, such as the IRST, now border on obsolete because they were spec’ed a couple of decades ago.  What might have been revolutionary capabilities two decades ago, such as the sensor fusion, are now commonplace and likely better in other aircraft.  The degree of stealth that might have been useful and very effective two decades ago is now considered merely semi-stealthy and is losing its effectiveness every day. 

 

Far worse, this kind of protracted development is simply not acceptable in a world that might go to war at any time.  The Hellcat is the model for useful development time.

 

Now, let’s re-examine our reason (rationalization) for the F-35’s prolonged development.  What did all you apologists just clamor about?  Oh yes … the complexity of the F-35.  [and the trap closes!]

 

So, if complexity is the reason for protracted development times and if prolonged development times are bad then it stands to reason that complexity is bad.  Simple logic.  Also, blindingly obvious.

 

Thus, the very complexity that the F-35 supporters and apologists proudly proclaimed earlier in the post is, in reality, the reason why the F-35 has been such a failure!  The fanboys have proudly latched onto the root cause of failure and are promoting and defending it.  [… oops!]

 

So, having identified what’s wrong with the F-35, let’s now address the ‘why’.  Why is the F-35 the most complex undertaking ever attempted by man?  Again, it’s not a trick question.  The answer, of course, is because we attempted to leapfrog generations of rational, methodical, educational development in an attempt to jump into the future.  In other words, we unwisely latched onto revolutionary instead of evolutionary.

 

In contrast, the Hellcat, while it had new features which were then state of the art, was still an evolution of the F4F Wildcat and, as such, was a magnificent and timely success.  Revolutionary development usually fails and, if it succeeds, takes decades.  Evolutionary development produces a useful, timely product.  Which approach should we be following?  Again, not a trick question …

 

There’s nothing wrong with pursuing revolutionary developments … as long as they stay in the lab until they’re ready.  It is folly to base production programs on non-existent, revolutionary technology.

 

We have to break this cycle of attempting to develop exquisite, leap ahead technology that winds up consuming billions/trillions of dollars and never actually pans out.  We’ve had enough LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, Ford programs that reach for the stars and land in the mud.  We need Hellcats.  If the Navy is right about their prediction of war with China (assuming we opt to contest China’s assault on Taiwan), we need Hellcat’s, now, more than ever.

 

Consider the F-35.  What if, instead of trying to create a sensor fused, holographic, multi-dimensional, subspace, see-through image displayed on a magic helmet in an aircraft that tried to do all things for all services by implementing horizontal and vertical takeoff and landing and can’t communicate with anyone other than itself, we had designed a state of the art (but no further!), single function aircraft, using only existing technology?  We’d have had an optimized, operating aircraft fifteen years ago and it would have been the best aircraft in the world, at the time!  We’d have had a modern Hellcat!  Instead, we have a flying black hole of a money pit … you know, the 50% of the time it’s actually ready to fly (F-35 readiness rates being what they are;  see, “The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates”).

 

So, what do we conclude from all this?

 

• As regards development time, complexity is the enemy of brevity.
• As regards war, complexity is the enemy of timeliness.
• As regards usefulness, complexity is the enemy of relevance.
• As regards budgets, complexity is the enemy of affordability.
• As regards numbers, complexity is the enemy of quantity.

 

Wow!  Complexity is the enemy of many things, isn’t it?  Maybe that should be telling us something about our obsessive desire for complex technology? 

 

Maybe that should be telling us something about the next generation aircraft the Navy is pursuing? 

 

Maybe that should be telling us something about the cruiser replacement the Navy is pursuing? 

 

What was that old caution?  Oh yeah …

 

Keep It Simple, Stupid

 

K.I.S.S.

 

The Navy needs to K.I.S.S. their next aircraft and next ship.

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]LCDR Richard Dann, USNR, Walk Around F6F Hellcat, Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1996, ISBN 0-89747-079-6

House Armed Services Committee - Strikefighters

The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing that proved illuminating as regards future Navy strikefighter plans.(1)  The testimony video is linked in the reference below and the strikefighter shortfall remediation is discussed around the 58:00 mark of the recording and continues until around the 1:05:00 mark.

 

The Navy is proposing to make changes to last year’s plan that will reduce the strikefighter shortfall to zero by 2025.

 

Here are the salient points to come from Adm. Loiselle:

 

Reducing number of F-35C squadrons per air wing from 2 to 1 but increasing the number of aircraft per squadron from 10 to 14.  That would take the F-35C numbers from 20 per air wing down to 14.  It was not clear whether the eliminated F-35 squadron would be replaced by another F-18 squadron or whether it would be a net reduction in air wing squadrons.  If the F-35 squadron is replaced by an F-18 one, that would result in a net increase of 6 aircraft.

 

Two squadrons of F-18s from Fallon would be freed up by replacing them with F-16 and F-5s.

 

The Navy anticipates returning 28 F-18E/F Hornets from inactive status to active status.

 

The Navy believes that the existing Service Life Modification (SLM) program pipeline can handle additional aircraft in 2025 to compensate for any remaining shortfalls.

 

Aircraft are coming into SLM with far more corrosion than anticipated.

 

SLM will produce full Block 3 F-18 aircraft with the 10,000 hr life modification (the original 6,000 hrs plus an additional 4,000 from the SLM).

 

The Navy anticipates by 2025 the SLM program will be able to process an aircraft in one year versus the current 18 months or so.

 

Navy is looking at using their own technicians to conduct corrosion repairs on aircraft prior to entering the aircraft into the SLM process and include only less corroded aircraft in the SLM program.

 

VFA-204 reserve squadron flew adversary training missions at various locations and was a deployable squadron but their F-18 Hornets will be replaced with F-5s and no longer be Navy deployable.

 

F-16s will operate in Fallon instead of F-18s.

 

VFA-12 (Oceana) will be the only F-18 equipped reserve squadron and only deployable reserve Hornet squadron.  That’s a very thin reserve component!

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

(1)Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Hearing: “Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request of the Department of Defense for Fixed-Wing Tactical and Training Aircraft Programs”, RADM Andrew Loiselle, USN, Director, Air Warfare Division (OPNAV/N98) – testifying on behalf of the Navy, 13-Jul-2021,

https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=D50BE244-286E-41DD-88CF-C1523BEC70E4

F-35 Readiness Failure Lessons

It’s no secret that the readiness of the F-35 (and most other US aircraft) is abysmal.  We’ve documented it multiple times including just recently (see, “The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates”).  Well, here are some additional data points provided by Ellen Lord, undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, that paint an even worse picture, if that’s possible.(1) 

 

 

	Rate	Target
Mission Capablea	69%	80%
Fully Mission Capableb	36%	50%

 

^a able to perform one of the F-35’s assigned missions – lowest level of readiness

 

^b able to perform any of the F-35’s assigned missions – highest level of readiness and the only one that is meaningful and useful and indicative of combat readiness

 

 

Aside from yet again demonstrating the fraudulent nature of Navy readiness reporting, the data demonstrates that the F-35 has consistently had atrocious readiness rates from the very start of the program until now.  Readiness has not generally or significantly improved and this is with an abundance of manufacturer’s assistance, clean bases, and ample parts (in most cases).  This does not bode well for war when all of those things will be in short supply.

 

What is causing the abysmal readiness rates?  According to Lord,

 

Lord attributed the low percentage of fully mission capable jets to ongoing issues with the F-35′s canopy and the F135 engine’s power module.

 

Although she did not elaborate, the program has grappled with a longstanding problem with “transparency delamination,” where outer layers of the canopy begin to peel away from the base. (1)

 

Other sources cite other problems affecting readiness.

 

The GAO noted that spare parts shortages had contributed to the F-35 not being able to meet readiness objectives.

 

“Specifically, the F-35 supply chain does not have enough spare parts available to keep aircraft flying enough of the time necessary to meet warfighter requirements,” the GAO stated. “Several factors contributed to these parts shortages, including F-35 parts breaking more often than expected, and DOD’s limited capability to repair parts when they break.” (1)

 

Okay, so the Navy is falsifying readiness reports and the F-35 is inherently difficult to maintain.  However, rather than beat up on the F-35 yet again, let’s focus on a few things that jump out from the data.

 

 

Targets – It’s bad enough to fail to achieve readiness targets but the larger issue is just how low the bar has been set on those targets.  A fully mission capable rate target of only 50% is absolutely pathetic and demonstrates just how far our definition of a good aircraft program has been dumbed down.  The same is true of the mission capable rate.

 

For any aircraft, the mission capable rate (the ability to perform just one of the assigned missions – which basically means the ability to take off) should be on the order of 95%+ while the fully mission capable rate (which is the only measure of a combat readiness) should be 80%.

 

This dumbing down, this lowering of expectations, is symptomatic of the mindset of the entire military.  Instead of demanding high performance and combat ready standards, we’ve lowered the bar in just about every area.  We’ve lowered the bar for boot camp and physical fitness requirements in order to accommodate women, we’ve instituted routine use of waivers to allow sailors with lapsed certifications to continue operating ships, NAVSEA has hugely reduced (essentially eliminated) the requirements for completion of a ship prior to delivery and acceptance, the Navy has attempted to bypass ship shock testing, and so on.  The list is nearly endless.

 

Quantity vs. Quality – While there is a well known axiom that quantity has a quality all its own, that pearl of wisdom only applies if the quantity is functional.  A thousand aircraft that can’t fly have no quality whatsoever.  We currently have something on the order of 400 F-35 concurrency orphans that are incapable of being cost effectively upgraded to actual current combat standards.  Yes, we’ve got quantities of the F-35 but we haven’t got functional quantities.

 

Our military leadership has emphasized numbers over readiness.  They would seem to prefer 100 aircraft with 40% readiness than 40 aircraft with 100% readiness.  Our military leadership would seem to prefer fifty useless LCS than much fewer ships that are actually functional and useful.  And so on.

 

K.I.S.S. – The failure to achieve even the minimal readiness targets points to an issue of over-complexity.  It stands to reason that the simpler the system, the easier it is to maintain.  The flip side of that coin is that complex systems are more capable …  in theory.  The reality is that overly complex systems fail to perform because they can’t be maintained.  We’ve often cited the fleet wide Aegis degradation as an example of this.  We have to readjust our thinking from trying for the most complex system we can to simpler systems that can actually operate at 100% of designed capability and can be maintained at that level.  We have to adopt the K.I.S.S. principle (see, “K.I.S.S.”)

 

Schedule-Induced Obsolescence – The failure to get the F-35 fielded in a timely manner guaranteed that the program would struggle with spare parts issues.  The parts that were readily available 20 years ago when the F-35 was being spec’ed are, of course, unavailable now, twenty years later.  This, alone, demands that we change our approach to design and acquisition.  We have to stop making weapon systems so complex that they require multiple decades to reach service.  All weapon systems struggle with maintenance after twenty years of service – it’s unavoidable.  Parts suppliers have gone out of business during the intervening decades or have moved on to different or upgraded parts that are not backward compatible.  We have simply got to field new systems in a much faster fashion.  I’ve laid out exactly how to do that (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

 

 

The F-35 fiasco offers many design and procurement lessons for us but we continue to steadfastly ignore them.

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “The Defense Department still isn’t meeting its F-35 readiness goals”, Valerie Insinna, 20-Jan-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/01/20/the-defense-department-still-isnt-meeting-its-f-35-readiness-goals/