The Heartbreak of Software

It has become painfully clear in recent decades that, more and more, the major stumbling block in weapon acquisition programs is software, rather than hardware. 
 
The F-35, for example, has failed on the software side of things rather than the hardware.  The all-encompassing, mission planning, parts inventory controlling, maintenance regulating, aircraft health assessing ALIS software has been a colossal, and to date, unrecoverable, failure.  Further, the F-35 was planned to be fully combat capable only with the advent of the Block 4 software upgrade which is now hopelessly behind schedule and has had many of its planned features deleted or deferred to some undetermined future time.
 

The F-35 program, now 4 years into its Block 4 modernization efforts, continues to experience cost increases and schedule expansion. Costs continued to rise during 2021 due to crucial hardware development and testing upgrades, among other things. In 2021, the program office added 3 years to its Block 4 schedule and now expects to extend Block 4 development and delivery into fiscal year 2029 …[2]

As of 2021, the program office now plans to complete Block 4 capability deliveries 3 years later than the original schedule due to software quality issues, funding challenges, and the addition of new capabilities, among others.[2]

If/when it ever happens, Block 4 will introduce over 75 major upgrades into the fighter.
 

So, the Block 4 upgrades enabled by TR-3 are quite imposing, increasing the range and diversity of weapons that can be carried, plus the sensitivity of sensors used to detect, track and engage targets. Most of the new weapons, 17 in all, are “kinetic” weapons such as missiles, but they also include non-kinetic systems that use clever software and waveforms to jam or confuse enemy warfighting systems.
 
Block 4 also enhances networking capability with other tactical systems to enable what the military calls integrated, long-range “kill webs.”[1]

However, before these changes can be implemented, the fighter’s core processor and memory unit must be improved. This is accomplished via an upgrade called Technology Refresh 3, or TR-3. The fighter’s previous computing system, TR-2, is not adequate to support the capability upgrades included in Block 4.
 

TR-3 is being installed in all new production aircraft including the Lot 15 aircraft being delivered today, and will be retrofitted onto fighters already in the fleet back to Lot 10.[1]

This would seem to imply that all aircraft delivered prior to Lot 10 will become ‘orphans’ and relegated to non-combat duties.  Thus, we see that software issues, not hardware, are going to relegate hundreds of aircraft to non-combat status.
 
Software issues not only impose schedule or ‘orphan’ penalties but actual cost penalties, as well.
 

A recent report by the Government Accountability Office noted that the cost of Block 4 upgrades to the F-35 fleet had risen to an estimated $15 billion across over a dozen years.[1]

That’s staggering and that’s just a minor software upgrade cost;  just one block of a planned four.
 
 
Discussion
 
Much of the software delays and problems associated with weapon system acquisitions are self-inflicted in the sense that we create needlessly complex requirements.  For example, the entire faddish trend of wanting to be able to control any weapon from any platform is idiotic in the extreme.  In what real world scenario would this capability be required?  The answer is … none.  This is just the pursuit of technology for its own sake.  If there was no penalty for this it would be fine;  useless but harmless.  However, the reality is that every line of code that is added to a program takes time, costs money, increases the likelihood of unintentional interferences with other bits of code, and requires time to test and debug.  When we’re already struggling – and failing – to produce useable combat aircraft in less than two decades, needlessly complex software is the last thing we should be pursuing.

 
 
 
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[1]Forbes website, “Inside Block 4—The Mostly Secret Plan For Making The F-35 Fighter Even More Lethal”, Loren Thompson, 14-Nov-2022,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2022/11/14/inside-block-4-the-mostly-secret-plan-for-making-the-f-35-fighter-even-more-lethal/?sh=5172e58f4423
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
Continue”, Apr 2022, GAO-22-105128