ASROC or Helicopters?

Helicopters are generally recognized as the best ASW platform above the surface; another submarine being the best ASW platform below the surface, of course.  Unfortunately, this leads to the widespread mindset that every ship must have helos embarked for ASW.
 
The problem with the concept of helos on every ship is that the aviation element of a ship is shockingly expensive.  A helo needs a flight deck (something on the order of 80ft x 50ft), hangar (another 80ft x 50 ft), dedicated weapon magazines, fuel storage, maintenance shops and parts storage, pilot and maintainer berthing (and food, water, etc.).  The extra 160ft x 50ft of ship size means more power is needed to move the ship which means bigger engines which requires more ship size which …  You get the idea.

Another problem is that helos are only sporadically available, being notorious for needing maintenance at inconvenient times.
 
Sure, there’s a penalty to be paid for putting helos on every ship but, really, what’s the alternative since we need ASW?  Well, one alternative is ASROC (anti-submarine rocket).  ASROC began back when submarines still had to get fairly close to their target in order to attack.  Today, submarines can attack with torpedoes or missiles from far beyond ASROC range (vertical launch ASROC has a range of around 12 nm). What’s needed is a much longer range ASROC, perhaps on the order of a hundred miles.  Given that we have thousand mile cruise missiles I can’t see any problem with developing a hundred mile ASROC. 
 
In the past, ASROC used arm launchers, box launchers, and common VLS cells.  The flexibility in launch mechanism means that some kind of suitable launcher can be placed on any ship tasked with ASW.
 

A long range ASROC would offer a viable alternative to the incredibly expensive helicopter on every ship.  Note that this does not mean we don’t need ASW helicopters.  We do!  We just don’t need them on every ASW ship.  Helicopters should be reserved for true destroyers (of which there are none in the world), ASW carriers, and, perhaps, a specialized convoy escort frigate.  They should not be on corvettes, general purpose frigates, and cruisers (meaning Burke/Zumwalt “destroyers”).  Want to build a cheaper Burke?  Eliminate the helicopter!

US Helo Crew Rescued By Drone!

An Apache helicopter crashed in the water off the coast of Oman and the military is telling us that the 2-man crew was rescued by an unmanned boat, a 24 ft Corsair.  That’s astounding!  An unmanned boat rescued downed aircrew who had been adrift for two hours.  Here’s the headline.[1]
 

In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat

 
The promise of unmanned is finally being fulfilled!
 
We have no details, only sensationalistic headlines but, presumably, the boat located the aircrew on its own, plotted a course, found the crew, lifted the crew into the boat, applied emergency first aid as needed, and returned the crew to safety.
 
Of course, unless the boat had capabilities I’ve never heard of, it didn’t locate the crew, lift the crew into the boat, or apply emergency first aid because unmanned boats can’t do any of that.  Don’t get me wrong.  Pulling up near the crew so that they could climb aboard, unaided, see to their own first aid (were there any emergency supplies on the boat?  I doubt it), and be transported out of the area is very helpful if no manned asset was available but to call this a rescue by an unmanned boat is akin to saying that a sling on a helicopter rescued a swimmer in the water.  The sling didn’t do anything.  It was just a tool.
 
My larger question is, given that we’re in a high intensity war in the area, shouldn’t we have manned assets blanketing the area, including dedicated search and rescue units?  For example, an SH-60 type helo traveling 170 mph could travel the length of the strait in a half hour or so, depending on the start and end point and could reach any specific point in less time than that, flying a straight line.  Was there no manned ship, boat, or helo anywhere in the strait?  To rescue downed aircrew, we pull out all the stops.  All the stops meant no manned assets?  We’re not talking about covering the entire Pacific Ocean.  The area around the strait is pretty small.  The Navy’s presence in the area seems abnormally sparse which may explain why we seem incapable of escorting ships through the strait.  Is this a war we’re serious about or not?  The Navy doesn’t seem all that serious about it and this is just one more example.
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat”, 9-Jun-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/drone-boat-rescue-us-pilots/2026/06/09/id/1259057/

Surface Ship Aviation

It has been some 80+ years since WWII and in that time we have seen some truly remarkable advances in tank design, aircraft design, missile development, sensors, etc.  One would think that ship design would have advanced at least as much and yet this is clearly not the case.  Not only has ship design not advanced, in many respects it has regressed.  Armor, weapon density, survivability, redundancy, endurance, sailing range, etc. have all regressed.  Well, at least we can say that surface ship aviation has advanced with the development of the helicopter … right?  Or has it?  Let’s look.
 
As a reminder, WWII US cruisers typically carried four seaplanes operated from two catapults and recovered with one or two cranes.  The seaplanes they used included, primarily, the OS2U Kingfisher and, at other times in the war, the Curtis SC-1 Seahawk and Curtis SOC Seagull.  Today, Burke class destroyers Flt IIa and beyond carry one SH-60 type helo (theoretically capable of two but never done, as far as I know) and provision for a small Fire Scout type UAV which have rarely been used and are being phased out (see, “Fire Scout Status”).  Flt I/II Burkes, have no hangar and carry no helos.  The Constellation class carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout type UAV.  The LCS carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout or smaller UAV.
 
 
Aircraft
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the size and abilities of the air wing, so too is the surface ship aviation value dependent on the aircraft they carry.  Following is a comparison of the primary aircraft from WWII surface ships and today’s surface ships.

OS2U Kingfisher

Discussion

 
The main function of ship’s aviation both in WWII and today is scouting/targeting.  In WWII, ship’s planes, with a few hundred miles of search radius and an enemy ship speed of advance of only 30 kts maximum, a ship/scout could ensure the ship’s safety for the better part of a day.  Today, with enemy weapons having a speed of advance of several hundred miles per hour or more, long range searches are more critical than ever and yet today’s shipboard aircraft have around half the range of WWII aircraft.  Does that make sense?  What ship designer thought, “Hey, let’s cut the range of our shipboard aviation in half and go with that.”  and everyone agreed with him instead of laughing him out of a job?
 
The other notable regression is in the number of embarked aircraft.  A WWII cruiser carried four aircraft.  Today’s ships carry one full size helo and a small UAV.  Quite a drop!  Admittedly, a WWII cruiser is a bit bigger than even a Burke but the WWII cruiser also didn’t have the 100 ft flight deck and enormous hangar that a Burke has.  Approximately one third of a Burke’s total length is devoted to aviation.  WWII ships devoted almost no length to aviation.  Catapults were placed wherever there was a small amount of room available, including on top of gun turrets!  

The one area where an argument can be made that aircraft have significantly improved is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Helos have proven quite useful and effective at this thanks to sonobuoys, dipping sonar, and air-dropped torpedoes.  Unfortunately, the reduction in number of embarked aircraft have rendered the ASW helo only marginally useful unless several ships can pool their aircraft.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none.  This is recognition of the very high maintenance demands of helos and their inability to maintain a high readiness rate.
 
So, while ASW helos are theoretically significantly improved, the reality of reduced numbers and readiness rates have rendered any theoretical improvement only marginally useful.
 
As with so many other aspects of ship design, today’s surface ship aviation capabilities have not significantly improved and have, in many ways, regressed.  Today’s ships carry fewer (half or less) aircraft with significantly shorter ranges.  
 
How can we address the shortcomings in surface ship aviation?  We have, potentially two possible alternatives to today’s aviation problems:
 
1. Revert to shipboard seaplanes.  With modern engines, enhanced aerodynamic designs, stealth shaping, etc., we should be able to design a ship’s seaplane with range in excess of a thousand miles and a reasonable degree of stealth for survivability and the ability to scout without being instantly detected.  Four (to use the historical number) such aircraft would go a long ways towards providing ships with effective situational awareness and target detection.
 
2. UAVs.  We’ve discussed the use of small, stealthy UAVs for shipboard surveillance many times.  Operated by the dozens at a time, small UAVs can be quite effective while representing little financial risk if some are lost (see, “UAV’s – Numbers Matter”).

DDH Hayler

Helicopters have long been recognized as one of the most effective anti-submarine (ASW) assets and ASW surface ships have routinely carried one or two helos for that specific purpose.  The problem with ship based helos is that the limited number (1 or, at most, 2) guarantees very limited coverage.  Helos are notorious for maintenance challenges and a ship with, say, two helos can be expected to have perhaps six to eight hours of airborne ASW coverage per day, on average.  One potential solution is to increase the number of helos on a ship thereby creating the aviation (helo) destroyer (DDH).  One such effort was the Spruance DDH 997 derivative, the USS Hayler.
 
Litton, the designer and manufacturer of the Spruance class, proposed a DDH 997 Spruance derivative with a hangar lengthened by 40 ft and widened to the full beam of the ship thereby allowing it to accommodate 4 SH-60B Seahawks.  Curiously, the flight deck remained sized for a single helo and precluded simultaneous flight deck operations by multiple helos.
 
In the event, the DDH version of the Hayler was never built.
 

DDH Hayler Design

Image from www.shipbucket.com,

MhoshiK, Mconrads, Hood, J. Scholtens

 
Destroyer Helo ASW Operations
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the abilities of the air wing, so too is the value of a DDH dependent on the abilities of the helos.  With that in mind, let’s take a closer look at small number helo ASW.
 
Four helos might seem an ideal solution to providing helos for ASW as one might assume that a 4-helo ship could maintain one helo in the air continuously.  However, even if that were possible, that’s not really the way helos would be used in ASW operations.  More typically, helos would surge to a suspected contact which, regardless of the outcome, would then result in multiple helos being ‘down’ for some significant period of time and result in gaps in the desired 24 hour coverage.  Of course, this assumes that multiple helos were available to surge.
 
One also needs to recognize that a single helo, assuming one could keep one helo in the air continuously, is only marginally effective at detection.  The helo’s sonobuoys (whether dropped or dipping) are short range and the area/volume of ocean to be covered around a ship or surface group is immense and ever changing due to the movement of the surface ship/group.  Helos are highly effective at prosecuting contacts but much less effective at detecting submarines in a ‘cold’ search effort.  Ideally, one would like to detect possible contacts with surface ships, at long range, and then use helos to prosecute the contact.
 
As we consider the operation of ASW helos, we need to bear in mind what the definition of an ‘available’ helo is.  First, and foremost, it is a helo that can fly;  no easy task given helo maintenance needs!  Second, the helo needs to have the requisite weapons to be effective.  For example, a helo that drops both its torpedoes is, instantly, toothless.  Yes, it can still search and track a contact but it can’t do anything about it.  Two lightweight torpedoes is not a lot when dealing with a submarine.  In other words, in combat, when torpedoes will be dropped at a profligate rate at any marginal contact, four helos with just 8 torpedoes is not going to provide much effective coverage.  Helos will have to spend much of their time shuttling back and forth to a ship to reload torpedoes.
 
Of course, helicopter ASW is a numbers game.  To be ridiculous, if one had forty helos continuously searching the surrounding area/volume, they would likely be fairly effective.  However, that’s unrealistic.  What would be realistic is a squadron of, say, four DDH vessels with, in that case, 16 helos.  In the case of a convoy or task force, there might well be several to dozens of DDH escorts which would, indeed, provide useful numbers of helos, in the aggregate.
 
Recognizing the importance of numbers in the ASW helo game, this leads us to the true ASW helicopter carrier of which there are, have been, many examples.  The main characteristic of the helicopter carrier is, of course, the capacity to carry and operate large numbers of helos.
 
 
 
Other Examples
 
The Japanese developed two 2-ship DDH classes, the Haruna and Shirane, which could carry three SH-60 type helos while retaining conventional destroyer weapons and sensors.  I’m unaware of any other examples by any other countries.  It is interesting to note that the Japanese produced the two mini-classes and then abandoned the DDH for helicopter carriers in the form of the succeeding Hyuga class.  I do not know what the rationale was but it suggests that the DDH was found to be less effective and efficient than a true helicopter carrier.
 
There have been numerous examples of ASW helicopter carriers but that’s not what we’re looking at in this post. 
 
 
Conclusion
 
It seems clear that the DDH concept has limited value due to the limited number of helos unless the ships are grouped in fairly large numbers.  That being the case, one has to wonder whether the cost of fielding several to dozens of DDH’s could be better spent on a true ASW helicopter carrier.  A helicopter carrier with, say, 18-24 helos would be the equivalent of 4-6 DDH’s.  At a very optimistic $1B per DDH, that would equate to $4B-$6B available for a helicopter carrier.  At a more realistic cost of, say, $2B per DDH, that would equate to $8B-$12B which would allow two to several helicopter carriers for the price of the DDH’s, depending on the degree of commercial adaptation incorporated into the carrier design (a large merchant ship with a flat deck would suffice!).
 
It is also clear that the tactical use of ASW helos is not so much searching as fixing and attacking.  This suggests that if one did want to build a DDH, the ship’s ASW sensors would be just as important as the helos, themselves, as they would be counted on to provide the initial detection.  This means that the DDH design should be a highly specialized, intimately integrated ASW design, as opposed to a mere flight deck on a hull as was the case for the LCS.
 
The lack of actual DDH designs in naval history suggests that the navies who considered the concept found it wanting for whatever reasons.  Our analysis suggests this is the case.  A DDH could, under the right circumstances and with a carefully considered CONOPS, be useful.  Unfortunately, carefully considered CONOPS are not a characteristic of the US Navy.
 
The DDH would seem to have some potential but, overall, the resources would be better spent on ASW helicopter carriers.
 
 
 
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[1]Capt. Michael C. Potter, USNR, Electronic Greyhounds, The Spruance-Class Destroyers, Naval Institute Press, 1995, ISBN 1-55750-682-5

Iwo Jima Class LPH and Vertical Assault

The Iwo Jima class carrier was the first purpose built vertical assault (helicopter) amphibious ship.  In this post, we’re going to take a look at its original design rationale, abilities, and limitations and examine whether those have remained relevant today.
 
Here are some basic specifications for the seven ship class, built in the 1960’s: 

Iwo Jima Class LPH

The amphibious assault helicopter carrier (Landing Platform, Helicopter - LPH) traces its origin back to a 1946 Marine Corps study on the effects of atomic weapons on amphibious assaults.[1]  Marine leadership, 

… concluded that a few atomic bombs could easily destroy the concentrated shipping and also the beachhead of any classical amphibious assault.[1]

As described by Friedman[1], the Marines settled on the helicopter as the means to achieve physical dispersion of both ships at sea and troops on land.  The greater range of the helicopter would allow the host ships to more widely disperse and would allow the troops to land at more widely dispersed locations thus avoiding the concentrations that an atomic bomb would easily destroy.
 
Their decision was strongly influenced by the belief that helicopters would quickly and markedly advance in capabilities (range, speed, lift capacity) – a belief that turned out, disappointingly, to be only partially met.  Friedman goes on to describe some of the helicopter development issues which is, itself, a fascinating topic but outside the scope of this post.  I encourage you to read it yourself, if you’re so inclined.  It’s well worth the time.
 
The Marines, while eagerly adopting the helicopter as the assault transport vehicle also recognized the vulnerability of the helicopter on the battlefield.  Regarding helicopter transport capacity, 

Even larger helicopters were proposed, but the Marines were reluctant to adopt one that could lift many more than twenty men in view of the high vulnerability of individual craft.[1][emphasis added]

The Marines recognized that concentrating greater numbers of troops in a vehicle that was inherently non-survivable would be a mistake.  In comparison, today’s MV-22 transport is rated for 24-32 troops which raises the concentration of risk issue that the Marines were afraid of.  To be fair, most sources state that the MV-22 troop capacity is not actually achievable in real world applications.
 
What did helicopter assault mean for overall requirements?  The Marines were focused on division-strength assaults, 

The Marines concentrated on the requirements of a divisional assault, which were considerable. For example, a January 1951 study envisaged lifting 10,000 men and 3,000 to 4,000 short tons of material.  Total lift, then, would be 520 HRSs [ed. Sikorsky H-19] or 208 HR2Ss, which in turn would require, in the former case, 20 escort carriers with 20 helicopters each, accommodating 150 to 200 tons of cargo, 500 to 600 assault marines, and a 200-man helicopter squadron.[1]

This focus on division level assaults was a far cry from our current MEU/ARG (3-ship Amphibious Ready Group) and disaggregated ARG which employs the three ships of the ARG separately.  Of course, in the event of a genuine assault operation, multiple MEU/ARGs would aggregate to form MEBs (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) and MEFs (Marine Expeditionary Force) although these aggregations are never exercised and constitute a theoretical capability, only.  Further, with the elimination of tanks, reduction in artillery, elimination of heavy mortars, and lack of anti-air vehicles it is highly debatable that MEBs/MEFs are even combat effective anymore.
 
The Marines also considered the tactical usage of the helicopter, 

Tactically, the Marines considered a flight of ten helicopters best for effective control, so that helicopter carriers were generally designed to accommodate multiples of that unit.[1]

We see then, that the Marines of the time were focused on getting large numbers of helos/troops on the ground quickly as opposed to our current concept of slow, drawn out, one-at-a-time MV-22 landings due to the 250 ft aircraft-to-aircraft separations and immense cleared areas required for landing.
 
To their immense credit, the Marines didn’t just come up with wild ideas and implement them without any proof of concept - as we do today - they conducted actual exercises.  For example, 

… May 1948, 8 helicopters from the Palau simulated a full helicopter attack of 184 aircraft flying from six CVEs, to lift a complete regimental combat team which would seize a strategic crossroads inland of the beach.  … each HRP [Piasecki HRP tandem rotor helicopter] carried six passengers about ten miles from the carrier under heavy fighter cover.[1]

Note the use of fighter cover.  The exercises were tactically realistic as opposed to the unrealistic, set piece theater performances we call exercises today.
 
Following tests, the WWII escort carrier USS Thetis Bay was converted for helicopter operations to further test out the concept.
 
At that point, the Marines seemed fully committed to helicopter assault.  A Sep-1954 report stated, 

… over the next ten to fifteen years most existing attack cargo and transport (AKA and APA) ships would be replaced by helicopter carriers.  “This will be occasioned by the VTOL aircraft becoming the principal means of placing personnel ashore under assault conditions.  Supporting personnel and heavy equipment will still be landed by water-borne means but the majority of assault troops will be air-landed.”[1]

Ultimately, a new design LPH, the Iwo Jima class, was built along with several Essex class conversions.  The purpose-designed Iwo Jima class, not surprisingly, offered several significant advantages over the Essex conversions.  Even so, the design was not without its flaws, 

The amphibious force commanders criticized the Iwo Jima design for its “complete lack of landing craft, so that it is of doubtful utility under non-flying conditions and must depend on other types with landing craft to give it an over-the-beach capacity.[1]

This flaw eventually led to the development of the LHA design which incorporated both aviation and  a well deck to support waterborne landing craft.  Interestingly, we have returned to exactly the original flawed design with the new America class variants which have no well decks.
 
 
Discussion
 
Let’s examine several aspects of the original vertical assault concept that birthed the LPH.
 
Rationale
 
As noted, the original rationale was dispersal of ships and troops in response to the threat of atomic bombs.  The original Marine thinking was dominated by the fear of atomic warfare.  With the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), that is no longer a concern.  Any use of atomic weapons would immediately escalate the war to a global nuclear war and eliminate the need for a localized amphibious assault.  In other words, no one is going to bother with an amphibious assault while waging a global nuclear war.  Thus, the original rationale is no longer valid and yet we have not modified our current thinking to account for it.
 
Strengths
 

• Helos allow the rapid transport of troops from a greater distance than waterborne landing craft.
• Troops can be delivered to safer or more strategically beneficial locations rather than to a central troop/beach concentration although safer locations also imply less operationally relevant and useful.
• The greater range of the helos allows greater separation of the helicopter carriers.

 
Limitations

• Bad weather may ground aviation.
• Lack of waterborne landing craft prevents any other means of assault.
• Helo assault is limited to troops and light cargo.  Heavy equipment, tanks, armored vehicles, etc. cannot be transported by air.
• Helos are extremely vulnerable to even modest anti-air defenses.
• Helo carriers have very limited wave transport capacity.  For example, 20 helos per wave x 15-20 troops per helo = 300-400 troops per wave and that’s just troops, no equipment.  It would require 5-7 waves, over many hours or multiple days, to get the full troop complement ashore and that assumes no helo attrition.  The reality is that any reasonable helo attrition would likely result in a portion of the troops never getting ashore and certainly not in a timely manner.
• Limited by the need/availability of suitable cleared landing sites; such sites can be reasonably anticipated by the enemy and become fire traps as demonstrated in Vietnam.

 
Sustainment

The original Marine leadership was focused on division level assaults.  What they failed to address was sustainment.  While simply moving troops ashore is easy (ignoring the extreme vulnerability of the helicopter and the potential lack of suitable landing sites), sustainment via helicopter is not.  In fact, it is impossible.  The logistic supply demands of a division in combat are staggeringly huge and the cargo carrying capacity of a helicopter is vanishingly small.  This remains an unexplained – and hand waved away – weakness in today’s various vertical assault concepts (helos, MV-22, well deck-less LHAs, etc.) as well as the Commandant’s dispersed, hidden, platoon size missile shooters concept.  It is not possible to sustain an assault using helicopters.
 
 
Summary
  
The original rationale for the LPH and vertical assault was dispersal due to the threat of atomic weapons.  As, discussed, this is no longer a valid concern.
 
It is noteworthy that the original Marines identified significant weaknesses in the concept including the extreme vulnerability of helos to anti-air defenses and the absence of waterborne landing craft as an alternative.  Other weaknesses included the inability to transport heavy equipment, the limited number of troops that can be transported per wave, and the impossibility of sustaining an assault using vertical transport.
 
We see, then, that vertical assault is an inherently flawed concept that was justified only by the extreme atomic threat.  With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re still pursuing the flawed vertical assault concept?
 
Where does this leave us today?  For starters, we’ve begun repeating the original mistakes such as the absence of waterborne landing craft in the early variants of the America class LHA.  Additional problems include the extreme vulnerability of vertical landing aircraft to anti-air defenses, first noted by the Marines back in the original concept development.  In fact, the threat to helos has increased markedly over the years with the advent of small, portable, shoulder launched, heat seeking, anti-air missiles of the Stinger type.  Vertical landing aircraft are simply not survivable over a defended battlefield as has been repeatedly demonstrated in the real world (Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, etc.).
 
The inability to transport heavy equipment by air continues, today, and is a serious weakness in the concept.  This limitation relegates any assault to a light infantry effort only and makes the enormous cost and resources dedicated to such a limited capability highly questionable.
 
The need for secure, cleared landing sites has only gotten substantially worse with the advent of the MV-22 which requires enormous cleared areas and huge separations between aircraft to the point that a massed assault is simply not possible.  Landings will have to be a very slow, one-at-a-time affair that is ideal for enemy defensive fire sequentially focused on each landing aircraft in turn.
 
Despite clearly and correctly identifying the inherent flaws in the vertical assault concept, Marine leadership pushed ahead with vertical assault in the belief that the atomic threat was more significant than the known weaknesses.  One can only speculate whether the Marines would have adopted vertical assault if there had been no perceived atomic threat.
 
With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re pursuing an inherently flawed concept?
 
Worse, we have taken the concept and reduced it from a full, divisional level effort and capability to a light infantry effort with no supporting tanks, armor, artillery, heavy mortars, or mobile anti-air vehicles.  Is the staggering cost to build and operate 30+ amphibious ships worthwhile to deliver light infantry ashore?
 
It would seem that vertical amphibious assault is an example of inertia.  The helo assault was established and continues just because it exists.  It exists because it exists.  We need to re-examine this 1940’s era concept in light of the known flaws and, especially, modern defenses which have rendered helos even more vulnerable than they were originally.  The cost/risk to benefit ratio does not support continued vertical assault.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Norman Friedman, “U.S. Aircraft Carriers, An Illustrated Design History”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983, p.359-370.

Helicopters in Combat

We’ve done posts on the survivability of helos in combat and it isn’t good (see, “Assault MV-22” and “Helo Assault”).  Going back to the horrendous helo loss rates suffered by the US in Vietnam, the same for the Soviets in Afghanistan, the loss of an entire group of 31 Apache helos in Karbala in 2003, as well as the many isolated shoot downs over the years, it is obvious that helicopters are quite vulnerable over the modern battlefield.  Today, the trend in high loss rates seems to be continuing with the Russians in Ukraine.

 

This leads to two obvious questions:

 

1. Is there any future in helo combat operations?
2. If not, why is the US so heavily invested in helicopters?

 

Let’s tackle the first one. 

 

 

Is there a future for helo combat ops?

 

The short answer is, yes, there is a combat role for helos but it is a carefully constrained role.  The original vision of helos roaming the battlefield, ready to swoop down on the enemy like a diving hawk is no longer valid – if it ever was.

 

The overwhelming conclusion from every battlefield helo operation in history is that helos that operate on their own, unsupported, are very vulnerable and will suffer very high loss rates if the enemy has any degree of anti-air capability, whatsoever.  Any enemy soldier with a man-portable, surface to air missile is a lethal threat to helos and is virtually undetectable and unstoppable.  In fact, old fashioned barrage gunfire is still highly lethal and almost impossible to avoid or counter.

 

Hey, let’s detour, slightly, and talk about tanks for a moment.  Modern tanks from foreign countries have had a tough time on the various Middle East battlefields.  We see video after video of tanks being destroyed by an enemy soldier with a man-portable, anti-tank missile/rocket launcher.  These soldiers are virtually undetectable and unstoppable.  Are tanks useless on the modern battlefield?  The answer is the same as that for helicopters.

 

In both cases, what we see in video after video is tanks/helos operating individually or in small units, unsupported.  In that situation, tanks/helos have very poor detection capabilities – not because their sensors are particularly bad but because an individual soldier is easily concealed and very difficult to detect.  It is clear that unsupported tank/helo operations are going to suffer very high loss rates.  There’s nothing wrong with helos or tanks, per se;  it’s the battlefield tactics and doctrine that is wrong.

 

I keep saying ‘unsupported’.  What does that mean?  What kind of support can increase the survival and effectiveness of tanks/helos?

 

Let’s continue with the example of tanks.  ‘Support’ has historically and doctrinally been a case of infantry and tanks operating together, each supporting the other.  It has been the job of the tank to supply suppressing fire, destroy fortifications, and deal with enemy vehicles while the infantry suppresses the enemy’s anti-tank troops.  Infantry and tanks have to work together, providing mutual support.  This is not something that can just happen spontaneously.  It has to be trained and exercised, like any other tactical action.  Unfortunately, the Marines have historically completely ignored this (while they still had tanks) and I see little evidence of the Army training for this.

 

The exact same concept applies to helicopter combat operations.  Why wouldn’t it?  Helos require co-ordinated ground support from the infantry (preferably mech infantry and/or armor to allow greater mobility and ground coverage).  Helos can supply the stand-off fire support for the infantry while the infantry suppresses enemy anti-air capability. 

 

We’ve seen that when helo units are sent on isolated, unsupported missions, even seemingly benign ones, it often turns out poorly (the aborted non-combat evacuation mission by a group of CV-22s in South Sudan in 2014, for example).

 

I’m not going to attempt to go into any greater detail about the specific tactics of helo-infantry mutual support because, frankly, I don’t know them.  Land combat is outside my area of expertise.  I can recognize the problem and the general solution but not the specifics.

 

On a related note, the same need for mutually supporting elements applies to naval operations.  For example, we’ve all mocked Commandant Berger’s Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ship – and rightly so, for a variety of reasons – but none of us, myself included, have analyzed the LAW within the framework of a multi-component, mutually supporting force.  To be fair, Berger has declined to share his operational concept whereby the supporting elements for the LAW are laid out … I suspect because there is no concept of operations (CONOPS) and there are no supporting elements.  That aside, even I can’t imagine any supporting concept that would allow the LAW to be effective unless we dedicate large surface escort groups of Burkes and carriers to accompany each LAW which then totally invalidates the LAW mission.  So, this failure lies at the feet of Commandant Berger but it still illustrates the idea of mutually supporting elements and the specter of failure that accompanies the lack thereof.

 

The overarching lesson is the need to fight as a combined arms force with each element supporting the other.  This will allow each element to do what it does best and do it effectively.  Militaries around the world, ours included, have failed to recognize and implement this lesson and the results have been repeated failures.

 

We, as observers and analysts, have also failed to recognize this lesson and we persist in assessing weapon systems in a one-on-one evaluation with no allowance for supporting elements and tactics.  It’s one of my pet peeves in discussions.  We need to look at the overall situation and assess how the item under discussion fits within a larger framework.  Only then can we render an informed and useful judgment. 

 

So, with all that said, is there a future for helo combat ops?  Yes!  … but only with proper, mutually supporting elements and well developed, highly trained tactics and doctrine … which given our lack of interest in doctrine and tactics is almost a no.

Now, the second question …

 

 

Why is the US so heavily invested in helicopters?

 

This one is a little harder to answer, partly because I’m not a land combat expert and partly because there is no good answer.

 

For the US military, with its obsession with technology, the helo is highly attractive.  On paper, the helo has all the characteristics that the military loves:  it’s cheap (on a relative basis!), it’s a very high density weapons platform that is packed with firepower, it’s a high tech wonder that can be constantly upgraded with ever more advanced technology, it’s extremely mobile and provides excellent area coverage, it requires less crew than a tank, and it just looks menacing and lethal (you’ve gotta love the look of an AH-65 Apache!).  The problem is that paper doesn’t fight and in the real world helos are not being effectively used and, for that reason, border on combat failures.  Still, it’s easy to understand the allure of the helo for US military leadership.

 

Another way to approach this question is to look at the reverse aspect.  What if there was no such thing as helos?  What would we be spending our budget on?  … bullets, rifles, bombs, mines, mortars?  Those things aren’t shiny and sexy!  They don’t knock the socks off Congressmen who are being asked to provide funding.  Sadly, our military leaders don’t want to make the effort to ‘sell’ Congress on dirty, mundane items that are – or should be - the backbone of combat.  Instead, they want to hold up pictures of sexy, menacing helos.  That’s how they think you get budget funds!

 

This kind of thinking is a symptom of the modern military affliction of laziness.  Yes, laziness!  We want to win wars (well, actually we don’t and haven’t really tried to win a war since WWII but that’s another topic) but we don’t want to do the hard, dirty work that’s required.  We want a clean, dainty, stand off weapon with precision guidance that we can easily control from well up the chain of command.  Well, that’s a helo.  Too lazy to crawl in the muck and do the hard work of winning a war, we’d rather zoom around and look good so … more helos!

 

A final ‘answer’ is yet another of the afflictions we suffer from and that is the refusal to acknowledge reality and the enemy’s competence.  We assume that everything we do will work perfectly and nothing the enemy does will have any effect.  With that assumption, the helo looks great!  The fact that almost every battlefield example of helo combat operations has turned out poorly doesn’t even register on our leader’s minds.  Enemy MANPADs may be ubiquitous but our own delusions are even more prevalent!

 

 

Conclusion

 

Helo combat operations are viable but only with proper doctrine, tactics, and training.  We need to stop training in isolated units (helos practice a raid, for example) and start training in combined elements (helos and infantry practice a raid, for example, with air cover thrown in along with artillery support).  We’re going to fight combined (I hope!) so why aren’t we routinely training that way?  In fact, we shouldn’t train any other way.

 

We need to rigorously re-evaluate our helo combat doctrine and tactics.  What we have is not likely to work.  We need to figure out why and modify our doctrine and tactics accordingly.  Where is the combined helo-infantry Top Gun school?

 

To be fair and repetitive, I’m not a land combat expert and perhaps some of this already exists.  If so, I’d be glad to hear about it.

Illustrative Examples From Ukraine

While I have emphatically warned about drawing lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war, there are still some illustrative examples to be had.  These are illustrative in the sense that they describe a lesson without requiring complete and accurate data.  In other words, the points and lessons can be discerned whether all the facts are known or not.  Let’s take a look at a couple of illustrative examples.

 

 

Vertical Assault

 

At the onset of combat, Russia launched a massive helicopter assault to seize the Hostomel air base which is just 6 miles outside Kiev.  Reports suggest that 20-30+ helicopters (Mi-8 escorted by Ka-52) were used and that the airfield was quickly secured. 

 

History has demonstrated, repeatedly, that helo operations over contested battlefields are costly and this held true in this case.  The initial attack was costly with videos showing several helos shot down during their approach to the airfield.

 

The Russian’s initial success did not last, however.  Reports indicate that the 4^th Rapid Response Brigade of the Ukraine National Guard counterattacked and partially or completely reclaimed the airfield.  The brigade’s nominal composition was:

 

• Brigade HQ
• 1st Infantry Battalion
• 2nd Infantry Battalion
• Tank Battalion (T-64BV tanks)
• Artillery Battalion
• Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion
• Support units (drones, etc.)

 

The Russian force consisted of purely light infantry and lacked any armor to counter the Ukraine tanks.  They had to rely on a few Su-25 strike aircraft which were, in turn, countered by Ukrainian anti-air and air support.

 

Control of the airfield then appeared to switch back and forth.  Russia appears to have attempted to reinforce its Hostomel forces with only limited success.  At this point, reports become unreliable and events are unclear.

 

The lesson from this illustrative example is one that history has already taught us.  Airborne assault using light infantry cannot succeed without rapid reinforcement from heavier units.  In addition, airborne assault will, by definition, result in an isolated and surrounded force.  Rapid reinforcement from heavier ground forces is mandatory.  Russia failed to quickly link up an armored relief force with the airborne infantry and, thus, failed in their objective to quickly secure the airfield as an operational hub and springboard into Kiev.

 

The US military, and the Marines, in particular, are counting heavily on vertical assault despite extremely heavy historical losses and without any realistic exercises to demonstrate the viability of the concept.  We desperately need to re-examine our vertical assault operational concepts and doctrine and prove/disprove it with realistic field exercises.  History suggests that the concept is not viable against a peer enemy.

 

Self-deception

 

It appears that the Russian military may have suffered from a case of self-deception about the degree of expertise of their soldiers and units.  Without needing any actual data or proof, it is also an absolute certainty that Putin was being told what he wanted to hear regarding capabilities and readiness.  Passing on only positive news to your boss is simply an ingrained bureaucratic and human tendency.  When your boss is a despotic dictator who will kill you if he doesn’t like what you tell him, the already overwhelming tendency becomes an absolute certainty.

 

We can see the exact same thing happening to the US military, today, if perhaps not to the exact same degree (though likely not much different).  As evidenced by their impossibly optimistic statements about our capabilities and readiness, our leaders are either repeating the end result of being fed falsely positive assessments or they’re out and out lying.  I’ll give them the benefit of the doubt and assume that they’re being fed falsely positive assessments.

 

 

Summary

 

As noted and cautioned, the details of the examples may not be completely correct but the generalized lessons stand and the Ukraine examples illustrate the lessons.  Ukraine is a priceless opportunity for the US military to re-examine and refine/eliminate many of its concepts and beliefs.  We absolutely must start injecting reality into our concepts and our training.  We need to stop lying to ourselves about the magnificence of our weapon systems and start testing them realistically and evaluating them through the ruthless and unforgiving lens of life or death combat.

Naval Stealth Helicopter

ComNavOps has long criticized the Navy’s plan to use helicopters as off-board sensor platforms in combat.  Helos also appear to be the Navy’s main distributed lethality sensor asset.  As we’ve discussed, the problem with helos is that they are extremely slow and decidedly non-stealthy.  Add to that the need to operate an active radar and the helo has zero chance of remaining undetected and zero chance of surviving the resultant enemy attack.  Unfortunately, the use of active radar ensures that the enemy will see the helo long before it sees the enemy.

Making the situation worse is the fact that each warship will only carry one or two helos which ensures that coverage will be sporadic and sparse and that combat attrition will quickly reduce the host ship to its own organic sensors.  In other words, in combat, helos will be prove to be only a very tiny step above useless and then, only for a very brief period before they are destroyed.

So, what’s the solution?

The ideal solution is to use lots of small, cheap, limited range UAVs and accept the inevitable attrition while depending on numbers to provide the necessary sensor coverage (see, “TheNext Cruiser and Mini-Hawks” and “UAVs – Numbers Matter” and “SensorAttrition”).

While the concept of small, cheap, numerous UAVs makes eminent sense, the Navy almost always prefers much more expensive and complex solutions.  So, …

Alternatively, a stealth helo might enable the helo to carry out the Navy’s desired off board sensor function.  Is there such a thing as a stealth helo considering those large, radar reflecting rotary blades?  Well, the Army seems to think so and pursued the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche as a stealth reconnaissance helicopter in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s before the project was cancelled due to cost overruns and technical issues.  Other examples include the HAL Light Combat Helicopter and Eurocopter Tiger.  Let’s briefly review these examples.

RAH-66 Comanche – This was intended to be a reconnaissance and light attack helo.  Regarding its stealth, Wiki states,

As intended, it would have functioned as a stealth helicopter, incorporating a number of different techniques and technologies in order to reduce its radar cross-section (RCS) along with other areas of visibility and detectability. The exterior surfaces of the RAH-66 were faceted and covered with both radar-absorbent material (RAM) coatings and infrared-suppressant paint; as a result of these combined measures, the Comanche's RCS was stated to be 360 times smaller than that of the AH-64 Apache. The acoustic signature of the helicopter was also reported to be noticeably lower than comparative helicopters; this reduction had been partially achieved through the adoption of an all-composite five-blade main rotor and pioneering canted tail rotor assembly. (3)

RAH-66 Comanche

HAL Light Combat Helicopter – This is an Indian produced, attack helo featuring very light weight and very high altitude.  According to a Wikipedia article, it is claimed to have stealth profiling, armor protection, a digital camouflage system, infrared (IR) suppression, and an exterior covered by canted flat panels to minimize its radar cross-section.(1) 

HAL Light Combat Helicopter

Eurocopter Tiger – This is a stealthy multi-role attack helo that uses advanced composites which reduce its radar cross section and features reduced visual, IR, and acoustic signatures.

Eurocopter Tiger

Russia - Wikipedia reports the existence of a stealthy Kamov helicopter with a reduced radar cross section (RCS), IR suppression, and an internal weapons bays.(2)

Ka-58 Stealth Helicopter?

A naval stealth helo combining the state of the art stealth features from the preceding examples might allow the Navy to achieve the manned, off-board helo surveillance asset that they’ve been chasing for many years and which is the pre-requisite foundation for a viable distributed lethality concept.  Of course, the question is how stealthy can a helo be?  The only hint we have is the Comanche claim of an RCS 360 times smaller than an Apache but without knowing what kind of radar signature an Apache has, that’s not really helpful.  However, it does suggest that a sufficiently stealthy naval helo might be possible.  At the very least, it would be worth some developmental effort along the lines of calculations and small scale testing.

Hand in hand with any physical stealth design is a stealthy Concept of Operations.  How would a stealth helo operate?  Would it radiate, thereby pinpointing its own location?  Can it radiate, obtain a useful picture of the area, and move sufficiently far away to survive the resultant aircraft or surface-to-air missile attack?  Can passive sensors be used to obtain a useful situational awareness or to supplement active radar to a useful degree?  How many helos are needed to provide sufficient coverage?  And so on …

One of the problems the Navy has is its insistence on using only the SH-60 Seahawk family.  These are large, ungainly, helos – decidedly non-stealthy.  If the Navy were to consider the use of smaller, specialized reconnaissance helos, they might be able to operate more of them and attain better coverage and be better able to deal with mechanical and combat attrition.  The RAH-66 Comanche, for example, was 47 ft long, 11 ft high, and a bit over 6 ft wide as compared to the Seahawk which is 64 ft long and 17 ft high.  An LCS, for example, might be able to operate 3-4 small, stealth helos instead of the single Seahawk family helo they can now.  A smaller, lighter, stealth helo would also be more compatible with the structural strength constraints of the LCS flight decks which are the limiting factor in their helo ops.  A Burke might be able to operate 3-4 stealth helos as opposed to 1-2 Seahawk types.

All of this is conjecture, of course, but it offers a possible path for the Navy’s desired distributed lethality concept.  Of course, there’s still the fact that distributed lethality is just plain stupid but the Navy’s going to do stupid anyway so this, at least, offers a possibility of doing it slightly less stupidly.

_______________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “HAL Light Combat Helicopter”, Retrieved 21-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAL_Light_Combat_Helicopter#Design

(2)Wikipedia, “Stealth Helicopter”, Retrieved 18-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stealth_helicopter

(3)Wikipedia, “Boeing–Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche”, Retrieved 24-Aug-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing–Sikorsky_RAH-66_Comanche#Design