Helicopters in Combat

We’ve done posts on the survivability of helos in combat and it isn’t good (see, “Assault MV-22” and “Helo Assault”).  Going back to the horrendous helo loss rates suffered by the US in Vietnam, the same for the Soviets in Afghanistan, the loss of an entire group of 31 Apache helos in Karbala in 2003, as well as the many isolated shoot downs over the years, it is obvious that helicopters are quite vulnerable over the modern battlefield.  Today, the trend in high loss rates seems to be continuing with the Russians in Ukraine.

 

This leads to two obvious questions:

 

1. Is there any future in helo combat operations?
2. If not, why is the US so heavily invested in helicopters?

 

Let’s tackle the first one. 

 

 

Is there a future for helo combat ops?

 

The short answer is, yes, there is a combat role for helos but it is a carefully constrained role.  The original vision of helos roaming the battlefield, ready to swoop down on the enemy like a diving hawk is no longer valid – if it ever was.

 

The overwhelming conclusion from every battlefield helo operation in history is that helos that operate on their own, unsupported, are very vulnerable and will suffer very high loss rates if the enemy has any degree of anti-air capability, whatsoever.  Any enemy soldier with a man-portable, surface to air missile is a lethal threat to helos and is virtually undetectable and unstoppable.  In fact, old fashioned barrage gunfire is still highly lethal and almost impossible to avoid or counter.

 

Hey, let’s detour, slightly, and talk about tanks for a moment.  Modern tanks from foreign countries have had a tough time on the various Middle East battlefields.  We see video after video of tanks being destroyed by an enemy soldier with a man-portable, anti-tank missile/rocket launcher.  These soldiers are virtually undetectable and unstoppable.  Are tanks useless on the modern battlefield?  The answer is the same as that for helicopters.

 

In both cases, what we see in video after video is tanks/helos operating individually or in small units, unsupported.  In that situation, tanks/helos have very poor detection capabilities – not because their sensors are particularly bad but because an individual soldier is easily concealed and very difficult to detect.  It is clear that unsupported tank/helo operations are going to suffer very high loss rates.  There’s nothing wrong with helos or tanks, per se;  it’s the battlefield tactics and doctrine that is wrong.

 

I keep saying ‘unsupported’.  What does that mean?  What kind of support can increase the survival and effectiveness of tanks/helos?

 

Let’s continue with the example of tanks.  ‘Support’ has historically and doctrinally been a case of infantry and tanks operating together, each supporting the other.  It has been the job of the tank to supply suppressing fire, destroy fortifications, and deal with enemy vehicles while the infantry suppresses the enemy’s anti-tank troops.  Infantry and tanks have to work together, providing mutual support.  This is not something that can just happen spontaneously.  It has to be trained and exercised, like any other tactical action.  Unfortunately, the Marines have historically completely ignored this (while they still had tanks) and I see little evidence of the Army training for this.

 

The exact same concept applies to helicopter combat operations.  Why wouldn’t it?  Helos require co-ordinated ground support from the infantry (preferably mech infantry and/or armor to allow greater mobility and ground coverage).  Helos can supply the stand-off fire support for the infantry while the infantry suppresses enemy anti-air capability. 

 

We’ve seen that when helo units are sent on isolated, unsupported missions, even seemingly benign ones, it often turns out poorly (the aborted non-combat evacuation mission by a group of CV-22s in South Sudan in 2014, for example).

 

I’m not going to attempt to go into any greater detail about the specific tactics of helo-infantry mutual support because, frankly, I don’t know them.  Land combat is outside my area of expertise.  I can recognize the problem and the general solution but not the specifics.

 

On a related note, the same need for mutually supporting elements applies to naval operations.  For example, we’ve all mocked Commandant Berger’s Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ship – and rightly so, for a variety of reasons – but none of us, myself included, have analyzed the LAW within the framework of a multi-component, mutually supporting force.  To be fair, Berger has declined to share his operational concept whereby the supporting elements for the LAW are laid out … I suspect because there is no concept of operations (CONOPS) and there are no supporting elements.  That aside, even I can’t imagine any supporting concept that would allow the LAW to be effective unless we dedicate large surface escort groups of Burkes and carriers to accompany each LAW which then totally invalidates the LAW mission.  So, this failure lies at the feet of Commandant Berger but it still illustrates the idea of mutually supporting elements and the specter of failure that accompanies the lack thereof.

 

The overarching lesson is the need to fight as a combined arms force with each element supporting the other.  This will allow each element to do what it does best and do it effectively.  Militaries around the world, ours included, have failed to recognize and implement this lesson and the results have been repeated failures.

 

We, as observers and analysts, have also failed to recognize this lesson and we persist in assessing weapon systems in a one-on-one evaluation with no allowance for supporting elements and tactics.  It’s one of my pet peeves in discussions.  We need to look at the overall situation and assess how the item under discussion fits within a larger framework.  Only then can we render an informed and useful judgment. 

 

So, with all that said, is there a future for helo combat ops?  Yes!  … but only with proper, mutually supporting elements and well developed, highly trained tactics and doctrine … which given our lack of interest in doctrine and tactics is almost a no.

Now, the second question …

 

 

Why is the US so heavily invested in helicopters?

 

This one is a little harder to answer, partly because I’m not a land combat expert and partly because there is no good answer.

 

For the US military, with its obsession with technology, the helo is highly attractive.  On paper, the helo has all the characteristics that the military loves:  it’s cheap (on a relative basis!), it’s a very high density weapons platform that is packed with firepower, it’s a high tech wonder that can be constantly upgraded with ever more advanced technology, it’s extremely mobile and provides excellent area coverage, it requires less crew than a tank, and it just looks menacing and lethal (you’ve gotta love the look of an AH-65 Apache!).  The problem is that paper doesn’t fight and in the real world helos are not being effectively used and, for that reason, border on combat failures.  Still, it’s easy to understand the allure of the helo for US military leadership.

 

Another way to approach this question is to look at the reverse aspect.  What if there was no such thing as helos?  What would we be spending our budget on?  … bullets, rifles, bombs, mines, mortars?  Those things aren’t shiny and sexy!  They don’t knock the socks off Congressmen who are being asked to provide funding.  Sadly, our military leaders don’t want to make the effort to ‘sell’ Congress on dirty, mundane items that are – or should be - the backbone of combat.  Instead, they want to hold up pictures of sexy, menacing helos.  That’s how they think you get budget funds!

 

This kind of thinking is a symptom of the modern military affliction of laziness.  Yes, laziness!  We want to win wars (well, actually we don’t and haven’t really tried to win a war since WWII but that’s another topic) but we don’t want to do the hard, dirty work that’s required.  We want a clean, dainty, stand off weapon with precision guidance that we can easily control from well up the chain of command.  Well, that’s a helo.  Too lazy to crawl in the muck and do the hard work of winning a war, we’d rather zoom around and look good so … more helos!

 

A final ‘answer’ is yet another of the afflictions we suffer from and that is the refusal to acknowledge reality and the enemy’s competence.  We assume that everything we do will work perfectly and nothing the enemy does will have any effect.  With that assumption, the helo looks great!  The fact that almost every battlefield example of helo combat operations has turned out poorly doesn’t even register on our leader’s minds.  Enemy MANPADs may be ubiquitous but our own delusions are even more prevalent!

 

 

Conclusion

 

Helo combat operations are viable but only with proper doctrine, tactics, and training.  We need to stop training in isolated units (helos practice a raid, for example) and start training in combined elements (helos and infantry practice a raid, for example, with air cover thrown in along with artillery support).  We’re going to fight combined (I hope!) so why aren’t we routinely training that way?  In fact, we shouldn’t train any other way.

 

We need to rigorously re-evaluate our helo combat doctrine and tactics.  What we have is not likely to work.  We need to figure out why and modify our doctrine and tactics accordingly.  Where is the combined helo-infantry Top Gun school?

 

To be fair and repetitive, I’m not a land combat expert and perhaps some of this already exists.  If so, I’d be glad to hear about it.