Friday, June 10, 2022

Helicopters in Combat

We’ve done posts on the survivability of helos in combat and it isn’t good (see, “Assault MV-22” and “Helo Assault”).  Going back to the horrendous helo loss rates suffered by the US in Vietnam, the same for the Soviets in Afghanistan, the loss of an entire group of 31 Apache helos in Karbala in 2003, as well as the many isolated shoot downs over the years, it is obvious that helicopters are quite vulnerable over the modern battlefield.  Today, the trend in high loss rates seems to be continuing with the Russians in Ukraine.

 

This leads to two obvious questions:

 

  1. Is there any future in helo combat operations?
  2. If not, why is the US so heavily invested in helicopters?

 

Let’s tackle the first one. 

 

 

Is there a future for helo combat ops?

 

The short answer is, yes, there is a combat role for helos but it is a carefully constrained role.  The original vision of helos roaming the battlefield, ready to swoop down on the enemy like a diving hawk is no longer valid – if it ever was.

 

The overwhelming conclusion from every battlefield helo operation in history is that helos that operate on their own, unsupported, are very vulnerable and will suffer very high loss rates if the enemy has any degree of anti-air capability, whatsoever.  Any enemy soldier with a man-portable, surface to air missile is a lethal threat to helos and is virtually undetectable and unstoppable.  In fact, old fashioned barrage gunfire is still highly lethal and almost impossible to avoid or counter.

 

Hey, let’s detour, slightly, and talk about tanks for a moment.  Modern tanks from foreign countries have had a tough time on the various Middle East battlefields.  We see video after video of tanks being destroyed by an enemy soldier with a man-portable, anti-tank missile/rocket launcher.  These soldiers are virtually undetectable and unstoppable.  Are tanks useless on the modern battlefield?  The answer is the same as that for helicopters.

 

In both cases, what we see in video after video is tanks/helos operating individually or in small units, unsupported.  In that situation, tanks/helos have very poor detection capabilities – not because their sensors are particularly bad but because an individual soldier is easily concealed and very difficult to detect.  It is clear that unsupported tank/helo operations are going to suffer very high loss rates.  There’s nothing wrong with helos or tanks, per se;  it’s the battlefield tactics and doctrine that is wrong.

 

I keep saying ‘unsupported’.  What does that mean?  What kind of support can increase the survival and effectiveness of tanks/helos?

 

Let’s continue with the example of tanks.  ‘Support’ has historically and doctrinally been a case of infantry and tanks operating together, each supporting the other.  It has been the job of the tank to supply suppressing fire, destroy fortifications, and deal with enemy vehicles while the infantry suppresses the enemy’s anti-tank troops.  Infantry and tanks have to work together, providing mutual support.  This is not something that can just happen spontaneously.  It has to be trained and exercised, like any other tactical action.  Unfortunately, the Marines have historically completely ignored this (while they still had tanks) and I see little evidence of the Army training for this.

 

The exact same concept applies to helicopter combat operations.  Why wouldn’t it?  Helos require co-ordinated ground support from the infantry (preferably mech infantry and/or armor to allow greater mobility and ground coverage).  Helos can supply the stand-off fire support for the infantry while the infantry suppresses enemy anti-air capability. 

 

We’ve seen that when helo units are sent on isolated, unsupported missions, even seemingly benign ones, it often turns out poorly (the aborted non-combat evacuation mission by a group of CV-22s in South Sudan in 2014, for example).

 

I’m not going to attempt to go into any greater detail about the specific tactics of helo-infantry mutual support because, frankly, I don’t know them.  Land combat is outside my area of expertise.  I can recognize the problem and the general solution but not the specifics.

 

On a related note, the same need for mutually supporting elements applies to naval operations.  For example, we’ve all mocked Commandant Berger’s Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ship – and rightly so, for a variety of reasons – but none of us, myself included, have analyzed the LAW within the framework of a multi-component, mutually supporting force.  To be fair, Berger has declined to share his operational concept whereby the supporting elements for the LAW are laid out … I suspect because there is no concept of operations (CONOPS) and there are no supporting elements.  That aside, even I can’t imagine any supporting concept that would allow the LAW to be effective unless we dedicate large surface escort groups of Burkes and carriers to accompany each LAW which then totally invalidates the LAW mission.  So, this failure lies at the feet of Commandant Berger but it still illustrates the idea of mutually supporting elements and the specter of failure that accompanies the lack thereof.

 

The overarching lesson is the need to fight as a combined arms force with each element supporting the other.  This will allow each element to do what it does best and do it effectively.  Militaries around the world, ours included, have failed to recognize and implement this lesson and the results have been repeated failures.

 

We, as observers and analysts, have also failed to recognize this lesson and we persist in assessing weapon systems in a one-on-one evaluation with no allowance for supporting elements and tactics.  It’s one of my pet peeves in discussions.  We need to look at the overall situation and assess how the item under discussion fits within a larger framework.  Only then can we render an informed and useful judgment. 

 

So, with all that said, is there a future for helo combat ops?  Yes!  … but only with proper, mutually supporting elements and well developed, highly trained tactics and doctrine … which given our lack of interest in doctrine and tactics is almost a no.





Now, the second question …

 

 

Why is the US so heavily invested in helicopters?

 

This one is a little harder to answer, partly because I’m not a land combat expert and partly because there is no good answer.

 

For the US military, with its obsession with technology, the helo is highly attractive.  On paper, the helo has all the characteristics that the military loves:  it’s cheap (on a relative basis!), it’s a very high density weapons platform that is packed with firepower, it’s a high tech wonder that can be constantly upgraded with ever more advanced technology, it’s extremely mobile and provides excellent area coverage, it requires less crew than a tank, and it just looks menacing and lethal (you’ve gotta love the look of an AH-65 Apache!).  The problem is that paper doesn’t fight and in the real world helos are not being effectively used and, for that reason, border on combat failures.  Still, it’s easy to understand the allure of the helo for US military leadership.

 

Another way to approach this question is to look at the reverse aspect.  What if there was no such thing as helos?  What would we be spending our budget on?  … bullets, rifles, bombs, mines, mortars?  Those things aren’t shiny and sexy!  They don’t knock the socks off Congressmen who are being asked to provide funding.  Sadly, our military leaders don’t want to make the effort to ‘sell’ Congress on dirty, mundane items that are – or should be - the backbone of combat.  Instead, they want to hold up pictures of sexy, menacing helos.  That’s how they think you get budget funds!

 

This kind of thinking is a symptom of the modern military affliction of laziness.  Yes, laziness!  We want to win wars (well, actually we don’t and haven’t really tried to win a war since WWII but that’s another topic) but we don’t want to do the hard, dirty work that’s required.  We want a clean, dainty, stand off weapon with precision guidance that we can easily control from well up the chain of command.  Well, that’s a helo.  Too lazy to crawl in the muck and do the hard work of winning a war, we’d rather zoom around and look good so … more helos!

 

A final ‘answer’ is yet another of the afflictions we suffer from and that is the refusal to acknowledge reality and the enemy’s competence.  We assume that everything we do will work perfectly and nothing the enemy does will have any effect.  With that assumption, the helo looks great!  The fact that almost every battlefield example of helo combat operations has turned out poorly doesn’t even register on our leader’s minds.  Enemy MANPADs may be ubiquitous but our own delusions are even more prevalent!

 

 

Conclusion

 

Helo combat operations are viable but only with proper doctrine, tactics, and training.  We need to stop training in isolated units (helos practice a raid, for example) and start training in combined elements (helos and infantry practice a raid, for example, with air cover thrown in along with artillery support).  We’re going to fight combined (I hope!) so why aren’t we routinely training that way?  In fact, we shouldn’t train any other way.

 

We need to rigorously re-evaluate our helo combat doctrine and tactics.  What we have is not likely to work.  We need to figure out why and modify our doctrine and tactics accordingly.  Where is the combined helo-infantry Top Gun school?

 

To be fair and repetitive, I’m not a land combat expert and perhaps some of this already exists.  If so, I’d be glad to hear about it.


52 comments:

  1. The Red Legs would like to take issue with your tanks and infantry combo, your missing the part of the trinity.

    Tanks unsupported vs infantry w/atgw and artillery works
    about as well The Light Brigade at Balaclava.
    Attack helos are light cavalry useful at times, pursuing
    routed or retreating forces, poor against formed infantry
    with their aaw intact.

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    1. You appear to have utterly missed the point of the post. It was all about mutually supporting, combined arms. Read the post again.

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  2. I did a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, Ca in June-July of 2008 before deploying to Iraq with 1SBCT/25th ID. Everybody got to play their roles in a simulation of Combined Arms operations, to include an ANGLICO detachment that was co-located with my Fires cell. Fast forward a couple of months to deployment and we did nothing that even remotely looked like combined arms operations, whether it was due to weather, mechanical issues, etc.

    In my opinion as a former 13Fox (Fire Support Specialist/Forward Observer), combined arms operations in a COIN environment were rare. Raids were about being not seen or heard, having a PID (Positive Identification) of targets, how reliable were the units from the Iraqi Army going to be (drop weapons and run at first contact).

    Indirect Fire (IDF) whether it be Artillery or Mortars, or Rockets, was extremely difficult to get a fire mission approved because of collateral damage concerns. Even when we got the M982 Excalbur GPS-guided 155mm round which had an accuracy of less than 15m from target and was meant for use in populated areas, we had to wait for approval from high above to shoot.

    Afghanistan was a complete 180 from Iraq. As I have mentioned in previous posts, I went to Afghanistan in 2009-2010 with the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team/2 ID. We initially went to NTC to train up for Iraq and halfway through our rotation, the Good Idea Fairy at the Pentagon tossed out the idea of sending a Stryker Brigade to Afghanistan for the first time. There again, combined arms operations were virtually non-existent because of the lack of hardballs (paved roads, three to be exact, I think), mountains, lack of available assets, having the ANA (Afghani National Army) take the lead on operations (if they too, did not run away). I was fortunate to be able to get assets that most could not for my guys that were out, be it a JSTARS, Predator or Reaper UAVS, I usually was able to get AWT (Air Weapon Teams) Apaches or Kiowas to come into our Area of Operations (AO).

    ComNav, honestly I could write a dissertation on this subject but I would be here all day. I tried to be as brief as possible but I think I missed the mark. I can email you what I have in my files about this stuff, if you would like.

    Respectfully,

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  3. Are western forces in love with attack helicopters because of there utility in COIN/bush wars that they have been fighting in the last few years?
    Between the two world wars the UK ( British Empire) focused its military on COIN operations, often with the use of attack aircraft with very similar performance to modern attack helicopters.
    When ww2 broke out those empire forces and aircraft were little use against Germany in a peer war.

    MA

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    1. "When ww2 broke out those empire forces and aircraft were little use against Germany in a peer war."

      You've nailed it! Generalizing beyond just helos, this is the problem the US military is now facing. We've optimized ourselves to low level wars over the last few decades and are now woefully unprepared for peer war.

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    2. In the Uk the Afghan war has left the British Army with no modern armoured vehicles of any use in a peer war.
      But we are buying right now 50 brand new Apache e helicopters!
      In the Uk we should be using this money for equipment & training for peer warfare.
      MA

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    3. "Between the two world wars the UK ( British Empire) focused its military on COIN operations, often with the use of attack aircraft with very similar performance to modern attack helicopters."

      Nonsense. In the 20's, British military theorists, like B. H. Liddle Hart and Percy Hobart, were laying down the groundwork for armor and maneuver warfare that we saw in WW2. In 1927, the British established the Experimental Mechanized Force (EMF) to work on the techniques, tactics, and equipment required for armored warfare. The RAF trained with the EMF to demonstrate the value to coordinating air-ground operations. This led to establishing the Tank Brigade in 1931. The Britain recognized the growing threat of Germany and fielded a fairly modern army at the start of WW2.

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    4. I agree that some parts of the British army were very progressive between the wars, my comment was based on the policing role that the pre war British army was preoccupied with controlling the empire. The fall of France in 1940 and the defeat of the BEF would suggest that Britain was not prepared for peer war against Germany.
      It wasn’t until 1942 that the British Army managed a significant victory against the Germans at El Alamein.
      We learnt more in 3yrs of defeat than in all those pre war years , but that is probably true of any nation at war.

      MA

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  4. Might it have to do with the division of Aviation roles between services from a legal perspective? Aka, have nothing to do with fighting whatsoever.

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  5. The Swedish Army found a good way to motivate infantry to co-operate with tanks. The tanks have coffee machines.

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  6. "well, actually we don’t and haven’t really tried to win a war since WWII but that’s another topic"

    I would vehemently disagree. Or rather you dangle that and say its only a passing comment. What war have we fought since WW2 that is comparable? None really none for such absolute aims. But in strictly military sense what wars would you say we lost since WW2?

    Also you are overstating Karbala.One believe lost yes rather most others damaged and written off but returned with their crews from a really poorly planed mission. Would you say CVs in WW2 were a bad ideal because the Japanese launched a poorly planed mission at Midway in WW2? Or because the British lacked a good selection of modern aircraft to back the invasion of Norway on theirs? Consider how that fight might have gone if they had at least one larger carrier and say F4Fs and SBD Dauntless to fly of them. Not saying they would win but that kind of air power and range might well kept a lot Norway not occupied (well by Germany)

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    1. "what wars would you say we lost since WW2?"

      What I said was that we 'haven’t really tried to win a war since WWII'. That we haven't tried to win a war since WWII is indisputable. The closest we came was Desert Storm and we stopped short of total victory and later had to refight the war. Since WWII, we have lost - or not won - Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Kosovo, Afghanistan ... every significant conflict we've entered.

      Note the 'not won' passage.

      "overstating Karbala"

      Hardly! Every helo shot up and an unknown number written off. The enemy had nothing but small arms, anti-aircraft guns, and (some reports) RPGs. I've seen no reports of MANPADS. This was as low tech an enemy as possible against our top of the line attack helos and they utterly destroyed the helo unit. Imagine if the enemy had any type of missiles, sensors, etc.

      Also, I don't draw conclusions from single examples of anything. My helo conclusions are based on the cumulative experience of Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, and every other combat action I can study.

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    2. Id have to agree with "havent tried...". The most common example cited is Vietnam. Ive always believed that if the military had been given a hands off, gloves off opportunity, with only the basic goal of complete victory, it would have gotten done. Desert Storm is a bit different in that we were part of a coalition with no mandate beyond freeing Kuwait, so while the actual goals were achieved, it didnt solve the problem. Thats a bit tougher to find fault with. But in a peer war, we absolutely have to eliminate the politics, worries about collateral casualties, and anything else that will detract from the swiftest, most complete victory possible.

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    3. "Ive always believed that if the military had been given a hands off, gloves off opportunity, with only the basic goal of complete victory, it would have gotten done...

      "But in a peer war, we absolutely have to eliminate the politics, worries about collateral casualties, and anything else that will detract from the swiftest, most complete victory possible."

      The problem is our political leaders keep trying to win war "on the cheap," without demanding the American public make the necessary sacrifices so the military has the resources necessary to win a war- implementing a draft, rationing, raised taxes- which then forces the military to do a half-assed job. We won't even beat North Korea, unless the American public "takes off the kid gloves" and accept those sacrifices as necessary to win a war.

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    4. "without demanding the American public make the necessary sacrifices"

      War should be a 'whole nation' effort. If the politicians can't lay out a case that convinces the majority (and a large majority, at that !) to support a war then maybe we shouldn't get into the proposed war. Maybe the populace, at large, is wiser than our politicians when it comes to entering a war or not?

      For example, a good case was made for Desert Storm and the populace bought in and supported the war and it produced largely positive results (though ending in a timid, incomplete victory). In contrast, Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan lacked solid cases, the populace did not buy in, and the results were poor.

      The lack of support and 'buy in' by the populace then ties the hands of the politicians and military in that they have to be cautious because their actions might cause the war to be even more unpopular. This limits our range of political goals and military options which explains why we haven't tried to win a war since WWII.

      Perhaps we should be listening to the people instead of the politicians?

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    5. "... implementing a draft, rationing, raised taxes..."

      Are you talking about during wartime or during peacetime?

      Lutefisk

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  7. In 1940 German panzer units, unsupported by infantry, punched through French lines, causing panic and subsequent collapse.
    Similar success in the early stages of Barbarossa too.
    I expect there are some in both our military, and the military forces of our adversaries, who still hope for outcomes like this

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  8. I cover this topic in my on-line book. Here is a small part from:
    http://www.g2mil.com/helo-ops.htm

    Operation Lam Son 719 began in early 1971 and was the last major employment of helicopters by the US military. It was launched into Laos to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line. The United States provided logistical, aerial, and artillery support to the operation. American ground forces were prohibited by Congress from entering Laotian territory, but supported the offensive by rebuilding the airfield at Khe Sanh. South Vietnam provided its best units for this month long offensive and the Pentagon was confident that American firepower and aerial mobility would guarantee victory. After a series of bloody battles, the South Vietnamese retreated back home after losing nearly 1600 men. The U.S. Army lost 215 men killed, 1149 wounded, 38 missing, and lost 108 helicopters while 7 American fighter-bombers were shot down.

    All of these aircraft were downed with basic AAA weapons as the North Vietnamese had no SAMs in Laos, nor any radar-guided AAA guns, suicide micro drones, or video guided missiles.

    Helicopters are like amphetamines, they make you feel great but are harmful to your health. The late Col. Fletcher Prouty USAF wrote that the heavy use of helicopters was a problem in Vietnam. He noted they required one-third the manpower and logistics and resulted in roughly one third of American casualties. This estimate seems high, but helicopters required huge base camps to protect them from the range of enemy heavy machine guns and mortars. Nevertheless, hundreds of helicopters were destroyed on the ground in Vietnam.

    Huge numbers of troops were required to run these camps and protect them. Big daily convoys were needed to provide the fuel and support the big camps, and those needed infantry protection. Helicopters were shot down daily while crashes due to mechanical problems were common. These required helicopters and crews on standby for rescue and recover efforts. Pilot and repair personnel were always short due to their extensive and lengthy training periods. Finally, helicopters were required for convoy and base camp protection needed to support helicopter operations! Col. David Hackworth wrote that his most successful operations occurred when he surprised the enemy by marching his troops long distances to areas where the enemy expected the noise of helicopters to alert them.

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    1. An outstanding point about the massive logistics and support effort required to operate helos. To be fair, this is equally true for any major weapon system. Tanks require a massive logistics and support effort as do artillery or ships or whatever. It becomes, then, cost:benefit ratio. Are we getting enough combat effectiveness out of helos to justify the logistics/support effort? My answer would be no but, at the very least, it ought to prompt a re-evaluation by military planners because it's certainly questionable.

      We debate the value of carriers all the time. Why shouldn't we debate the value of helos in combat?

      Good comment and link!

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    2. "We debate the value of carriers all the time. Why shouldn't we debate the value of helos in combat?"

      Well said. Sadly, debating in good faith- as opposed to using straw men, e.g., saying, "China has antiship ballistic missiles! Therefore, aircraft carriers are useless!" and denouncing anyone with an opposing view as a "regressive dinosaur"- is a lost art these days.

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  9. "Helo combat operations are viable but only with proper doctrine, tactics, and training. We need to stop training in isolated units (helos practice a raid, for example) and start training in combined elements (helos and infantry practice a raid, for example, with air cover thrown in along with artillery support). We’re going to fight combined (I hope!) so why aren’t we routinely training that way? In fact, we shouldn’t train any other way.
    We need to rigorously re-evaluate our helo combat doctrine and tactics. What we have is not likely to work. We need to figure out why and modify our doctrine and tactics accordingly. Where is the combined helo-infantry Top Gun school?"

    Coming right after your RIMEX post, this really hits on an important point. We need to revive the Fleet Problem/SpringTrain practice of having large-scale live exercises with significant opposition forces in conditions which simulate what we are apt to see in war.

    There may be a place for photo-op games in building relationships with foreign allies, but that's not what's going to win wars for us. And the ability to win wars decisively--with strategy and tactics that work, with equipment that supports them, and with fully trained personnel to execute them--is what will keep other folks from picking a fight with us. Now, if we just don't go around picking on them, we might actually achieve peace.

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    1. "We need to revive the Fleet Problem/SpringTrain"

      Unfortunately, the Navy believes they have brought back the Fleet Problem. In fact, they even call it that! However, it's barely even a shade of the original and, from what little I can glean, is completely worthless.

      "Now, if we just don't go around picking on them"

      I don't know if you meant it this way but this is a key point. Our deployments (your preferred operating mode) just irritate enemies without actually accomplishing anything. Now, one can legitimately argue that irritating enemies is a good thing but if we aren't going to accomplish anything positive and are just left with irritating/worsening relationships, one has to ask why we're doing deployments. Every ship we send into the E/S China Seas worsens relations with China without accomplishing anything positive for us. Why are we doing it? The same applies to Russia, Iran, and NKorea.

      If you want us to not 'go around picking on them' then we should seriously reconsider our deployments.

      I suspect that's not what you meant with your comment but the words hit on a key point, regardless. You, and we (the US), should give it some serious thought.

      My model of home basing and constant maintenance/training would avoid the 'picking on them' aspect of deployments although that is merely an unintended byproduct, not an objective.

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    2. "Our deployments (your preferred operating mode)"

      Umm, nope. I think this is a situation where you read the word deployment in something I wrote and jumped to the conclusion that I meant deployments the way the USN is doing them. My approach incorporates a whole lot more of your home basing and training approach than I think you have considered.

      But I don't think you can go completely without deployments, for a couple of reasons:
      1) I would take a combined diplomatic/economic/military approach and deployments done the right way are an essential part of the alliance-building process that has both diplomatic and economic benefits.
      2) If a navy never deploys anywhere, then over time certain skills atrophy. Knowing how to fight away from home, even far away, is a necessary skill that atrophies if neglected.

      That being said, I definitely favor reducing the time spent deployed for reasons of retention, training, and maintenance. But we need to be realistic about ways to accomplish it. We have certain commitments that we must either cover, or find an ally to cover, or punt them to see the void filled by Russia and/or China. One, by building a large number of cheaper single-purpose ships, I would cut the cost/ship in half. enabling an increase in fleet size from 300 to 600, and I would crew those ships by reducing the admin/overhead headcount and moving those people to sea. 100 ships deployed out of 300 means being gone 1/3 of the time, whereas 100 ships deployed out of 600 means being gone 1/6 of the time. Two, I would seek allies to take over some of our existing commitments. Our Quad partners Australia, India, and Japan can take over a lot of the load in the Pacific, and particularly Indian, Ocean areas. UK and perhaps NATO can take over a lot in the European area. We would still need to deploy in sufficient numbers to show those allies that we are with them, but it could be cut way back from today, maybe 50 ships at a time instead of 100. And more of a specific mission concept than a deployment concept. No more 13-month deployments or back-to-back deployments. Sometimes you just have to say no.

      So I don't think that ending all deployments is reasonable or practical, but I would cut back over time. And we can't just quit cold turkey.

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    3. " read the word deployment in something I wrote and jumped to the conclusion"

      You have explicitly stated, multiple times, that a deployment under your model would be 3-6 months. That is a standard deployment: a meandering cruise with no specific task or mission.

      "If a navy never deploys anywhere, then over time certain skills atrophy."

      What skills?

      "Knowing how to fight away from home"

      How does a deployment teach fighting away from home? With very few exceptions, we don't actually engage in combat on deployments and we don't even conduct combat drills that are of any value for anything other than photo ops.

      "We have certain commitments that we must either cover"

      This is a false statement. There are no treaties or obligations that require us to conduct deployments. Stop making this false claim.

      " still need to deploy in sufficient numbers to show those allies that we are with them"

      This is another false claim. We have the entire 7th fleet based in the Pacific and yet very few countries in the region believe we're 'with them'. Actions demonstrate 'with-ness', not numbers of ships and our actions are emphatically not demonstrating 'with-ness'. You have a fixation on numbers as having some sort of magical deterrent - and now 'with-ness' - quality. Again, it is actions, not presence that offers the possibility of demonstrating deterrence and 'with-ness'.

      "And we can't just quit cold turkey."

      Why not? The up side would be enhanced readiness, reduced wear and tear, less stress on sailors, hugely reduced operating costs, etc. The downside would be ... um ... I can't think of any.

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    4. This model would remove the "learning about the deployment area" aspect of deployments. However, I doubt the crews of deployed ships learn a lot about that, because they're sailing around on a mobile piece of the USA.

      Actually that suggests a new sub-profession of naval officer, one who spends a lot of time on loan to other navies, becoming thoroughly familiar with that navy, its language and culture, its ships and bases, and so on. These would be invaluable when an operation was required in that area. If the USN was to recruit them from the children of immigrants, they'd have the language already. But I bet this would not fit into Navy career structures.

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    5. "This model would remove the "learning about the deployment area" aspect of deployments."

      While this seems like a "nice to have", with the exception of having someone that can speak another language to help enable joint operations, wont charts tell us all we need to know? Short of some very inshore ops where the nuances of currents, tides, and shipwrecks might be relevant, is local knowledge really that important?? Admittedly it seems the USN has a lack of officers that can plot a course without hitting somthing (think Avenger on a reef, DDG collisions, CG run aground, etc) even WITH charts and nav aids, so maybe they DO need local practice. But, better training in basic seamanship could fix that...

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    6. "Revive Fleet Problems "

      On Youtube, I recently caught a Drachinifel video detailing the first few Fleet Problems, what they were about, how they went, and how they affected shipbuilding priorities, different uses of ships and aircraft, etc. Quite fascinating and worth a listen. (It was a video but I just listened while at work) Its interesting how the fleet and leadership actually learned from these. Sadly I think those days are never to return...

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    7. "So, yes, there is value in experiencing the anticipated operating environment but by way of deployments. Brief missions, specifically for the purpose of gaining local exposure, are all that's needed."

      Agree. I think part of the problem is that my use of the word deployment was taken to mean the current USN approach to deployments. What I have in mind is much more like your mission approach.

      We do have to do something about the level of commitments that we have undertaken since the Cold War era. I see two possible solutions:
      1) Shift some of our commitments to allies. UK (and possibly NATO) in Europe, the Quad in Asia-Pacific, possibly the entire British Commonwealth if we were able to work out some kind of associate relationship.
      2) Increase the size of the fleet by building a number of smaller, cheaper, single-purpose ships. Cutting average cost/ship in half would permit building 600 ships for the cost of the Navy's proposed 350-ish fleet. And personnel to operate those ships can be provided by cutting way back on admin/overhead headcount and cost.

      If we just quit cold turkey, my worry is that we will essentially create a void that China (and Russia) will only be too happy to fill.

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    8. "wont charts tell us all we need to know?"

      There is value in having operational experience in the particular environment. For example, one can be expert in helo operations at sea level but moving to a mountainous region with high (and possible hot or extreme cold) altitude plays havoc on lift capacities, fuel efficiency, range, and maneuverability which, in turn, affects tactics and operational planning. Without actually experiencing the environment, it is nearly impossible to appreciate and factor in the environmental effects. Now, this DOESN'T REQUIRE A 6-12 MONTH DEPLOYMENT TO EXPERIENCE. A couple of weeks of intense training will suffice.

      Similarly, for example, a submarine can gain valuable experience in a given region by experiencing the local thermoclines, acoustic ducting, salinity effects, underwater currents, etc. Again, this DOESN'T REQUIRE A 6-12 MONTH DEPLOYMENT TO EXPERIENCE.

      So, yes, there is value in experiencing the anticipated operating environment but not by way of deployments. Brief missions, specifically for the purpose of gaining local exposure, are all that's needed.

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    9. "What I have in mind is much more like your mission approach."

      Not at 3-6 months as you have explicitly stated in past comments and with no crystal clear mission. My mission concept is just that - go do a [short[ mission and RTB. A mission would be 2-4 weeks, generally.

      "We do have to do something about the level of commitments"

      WE HAVE NO COMMITMENTS !!!!!!!!!!! If you say this again, I'm going to delete the comment as false.

      What we have are self-inflicted deployments in response to Combatant Commander requests which are based on no geopolitical or military strategy or need.

      "my worry is that we will essentially create a void that China (and Russia) will only be too happy to fill."

      They're already 'filling the void' because we aren't involved. We're uselessly cruising around, accomplishing nothing. We've already quit ! There's already a void. You need to stop focusing on trying to establish some number of ships that will magically cause the Chinese (and others) to shrivel in fear. They're ignoring us with the entire 7th fleet in the Pacific. A few more ships won't do anything.

      Delete
  10. Back in 2015 I wrote this short article "Update Helicopter Tactics"
    http://www.g2mil.com/Helo-assualt.htm

    Common sense, but ignored. They still practice sending massive V-22s and CH-53 blindly over enemy territory and hope the LZ will not be hot.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. How will you deploy the four-man recon teams with which you intend to ensure the LZ won't be hot? By parachute? Deploying them by foot may be too time-consuming, giving the enemy time to fortify their positions, summon reinforcements, or simply move out of reach.

      Delete
    2. They'll be sent by helo or airdropped a couple miles away from the LZ after intel promised everyone there are no substantial enemy force in the area. Then they have an hour to walk to the LZ and check it out just before the helos arrive. If they can't do that, intel was wrong and the landing is aborted.

      Delete
    3. "Then they have an hour to walk to the LZ and check it out just before the helos arrive."

      That's what scout helicopters are for.
      In the 101st, that was one of our primary jobs.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    4. But helos can't check for mines and booby traps, spiderholes, and a soggy LZ. I'd rather have four guys stomp around for a few minutes, guide the incoming helos, and even provide cover fire should they miss someone.

      The Army and Marines no longer have real scouts anymore. Massive Apaches are "scouts". MD-500s are great, and Robinsons too. They just came out with an all electric one.
      https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/electric-powered-robinson-r44-takes-flight/

      Imagine patrolling with very little noise and little heat signature.

      Delete
    5. "The Army and Marines no longer have real scouts anymore. Massive Apaches are "scouts"."

      Scout helicopters were not needed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
      There you want to have the thermal optics and firepower of the Apache.

      But in a real fight with a real enemy, you can't waste the Apaches snooping around.

      In a real fight you send out the scout aircraft, the expendable ones.
      When they find something (or blunder into something), then the commander can decide what he wants to do about it, and that may be the Apaches or something else.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    6. "But helos can't check for mines and booby traps, spiderholes, and a soggy LZ. I'd rather have four guys stomp around for a few minutes, guide the incoming helos, and even provide cover fire should they miss someone."

      I guess I'm thinking of something different.

      Potential LZ's are scouted ahead of time, and the scout helicopters must be clever about what they're doing so as not to bring attention to a potential site.

      Having recon teams stomping around the future LZ doesn't seem to be disguising intentions, depending on how far in advance they are performing their recon.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    7. "or blunder into something"

      A time-honored scouting technique !

      Delete
    8. "A time-honored scouting technique !"

      And probably the most commonly used.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
  11. So much to say about this topic as I served as a scout helicopter pilot in the divisional cavalry of the 101st during the 1990's.

    A couple of comments to start off:

    What is the best weapon to kill tanks? Other tanks.

    You should never choose a helicopter over a fixed wing aircraft unless you need to hover or a vertical take off and landing.

    I would tend to agree with CNO's main idea here in that helicopters are a great asset when used properly, but I would use about 1/2 of the helicopters that the army is currently using.

    The army has a fascination with the Apache as a tank killer, and it did kill tanks in Desert Storm. And think about that thing hovering out there with 16 Hellfire missiles.
    Each Apache killing an entire company of enemy tanks! WOW!

    Of course, it doesn't really work that way.
    Attack helicopters can't hold ground and they can't stand and fight.
    (They are kind of like the horse archers of the pre-gunpowder era. Deadly harassers, but not able to seize and hold ground.)

    American attack helicopters with the ability to hover, pop up, fire a Hellfire (targeted by someone else), and then quickly move to another firing location is an extremely valuable tool to have, but I think it's clear why it's a niche role.

    If I was in charge of the army, I'd eliminate the separate attack helicopter battalions and attach a smaller number of those Apaches to the cavalry squadron to attack targets of opportunity located by the scout helicopters.

    I would also supplement the helicopter scouting with a substantial number of UAV's and drones, although I might not reduce the number of scout helicopters because the air cav squadrons already are limited in size and sometimes you want human eyeballs out there where they can be there to make sound decisions.

    The Apaches, with their extreme mobility and lethality, would be a good choice as an air cavalry fire brigade for things like flank security.

    The money and resources saved from using a substantially smaller number of helicopters would go towards armored vehicles, the real killers of tanks on the battlefield.

    Lutefisk

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  12. In regards to lift helicopters, the army seems to have an ongoing fascination of using helicopters in the way that they did during the Vietnam war.

    And there is a time and place for that. That kind of air mobile warfare in which you air assault entire battalions of light infantry at a time is very useful when fighting a Vietnam style war.
    And we probably will end up in that kind of conflict at some point in Africa or Malaysia or the Philippines or some environment like that.

    But again, that's a niche role and it's filled by the 101st.

    Other divisions really don't have a need for large numbers of lift helicopters.

    It is handy for a light infantry division to perform some limited air assaults with lift helicopters to envelop an enemy force, but where does this fit for a mechanized infantry or armored division, which is what we should be focused on?

    It's nice to be able to quickly deliver supplies in an emergency and there's no doubt that medevac is a great capacity to have.

    But one battalion with a mix of UH-60 and CH-47 helicopters might still be too much.

    The money and resources are better spent towards armor.

    Lutefisk

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  13. "Is there any future in helo combat operations?"

    Look two points - First, any lethal weapons prevent helicopters from function? Yes, surface to air missiles. Helicopters fly low and slow. Second, any replacement? Yes, drones - from combat and gradually move to include even transportation.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " lethal weapons prevent helicopters"

      Lethal weapons don't rule out helicopters. If that were true, no country in the world would have an air force since the surface to air missiles are just as lethal to fixed wing aircraft.

      "drones"

      Drones are not, currently, a capable replacement for combat aircraft. Further, drones save nothing other than pilot lives. For an equal job, they cost an equal amount and they require MORE personnel than manned aircraft, according to Air Force statements, as documented in a previous post.

      Delete
  14. There were dozens of "air assault" disasters in Vietnam, but the Army and Marine Corps mostly covered them up so today's officers don't know about the dangers. And this was against an enemy that had no guided AA weaponry, just machine guns.

    Here is one that was classified until recently.

    https://www.businessinsider.com/oscar-8-mission-near-disaster-for-macv-sog-in-vietnam-2021-5

    "The first two CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters full of men were shot down, as were two UH-1 Huey gunships that were providing close air support. An H-34 chopper attempting a rescue was also shot down."

    ReplyDelete
  15. Wonder how the U.S. Army plans to justify its investment in Future Vertical Lift, after having seen Russian performance in Ukraine?

    ReplyDelete
  16. The US lost 5,600 helicopters in Vietnam. Double that figure when you include our allies and ARVN.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Helicopters, rotary ops in general, need logical constraints placed on them. The US learned harder than anyone that low and slow exposed the old Hueys and even older choppers over 'Nam. Since that point with the occasional hiccup in "we are invincible" disease that led to issues such as in Somalia, the services tend to remember flying into bad places really needs good recon. In this case, rather than infantry as our Boss of the Blog points out, the accompanying and leading element should be recon drones of various types and sizes to scout ahead, followed by something with human eyeballs. Going faster, all for it, speed does help get through the small arms fire as it's not that easy to track a truly fast air vehicle. Why they won't look at removing the artificial constraint (service guidelines) on using a Jet for a tilt rather than rotor (yeah yeah, Gas use) when the tech has to be close is beyond me, but if I'm expected to storm an airfield, I'd rather know my "chopper" was pushing 500 knots, not 200, in order to blow past anyone looking. MANPADS need to track, so the faster you get past their 5 mile range, the better. What is not a great bright idea is FARA- not that the gunship doesn't have a purpose, but this is like using a cruiser to perform scout duties, it's going to be detected far out. Why not invest in a truly tiny, hardened frame (think the titanium tub around an A-10 pilot) with a specifically quiet made (we've had that ability for decades) rotor system to get a 2 man crew to eyeball the lay of the land as silently as possible at a good clip of speed, but slow may help even more in advance of an assault. I'd rather they go slower and not miss an AA squad sitting on the edge of a field. FARA should be a long term replacement for the Apache, though the F-Version Boeing has shown where they put in a pusher prop to boost its speed to the near limits of what FARA does would seem to be cost sensical, so it won't see the light of day when new FARA's can be bought for 3x the cost.

    ReplyDelete
  18. That's an interesting idea of speed in and out...and makes a lot of sense in many ways.

    It's very different than the way we scouted in the air cavalry (but that doesn't mean it's wrong).

    We wouldn't fly low and fast, we flew very low and slow.

    In a lot of ways we moved much like ground vehicles.
    Typical speed was between 24 and 40 knots, which keeps you above the translational lift threshold, allowing the rotor to work in undisturbed air (not injesting its own vortices).

    At those speeds we would regularly fly around trees, not over them.
    For example, a typical ground obstacle that needed to be made aware of was fences.

    But flying over forested areas was more common, but still at around 40 knots, which is fast enough to be a difficult target as you fly over a clearing.

    That 40 knots is kind of the sweet spot between aerodynamic efficiency, survivability, and still being able to see what's down there.

    Of course, the OH-58D (the scout with the mast mounted sight--the ball on top) gave the ability to see much farther and with thermal. That allows pop-up scanning prior to moving, which is nice.

    Lots of ways to skin that cat I suppose.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
  19. There's very few new lessons coming out of ukraine, just confirmation of already learned ones.

    Unsupported, and quite often solitary tanks are easily destroyed. Russia went into this conflict equipment heavy & infantry light. Rifleman contingents were downsized and then gutted by not bringing the conscripted soldiers.

    Additionally, the notion that modern warfare requires less manpower I feel has rightly been debunked. Modern war requires even more soldiers, equipment, and logistics to absorb the losses modern systems & surveillance are capable of delivering.

    As the French & USA learned in 2014
    & 1996 in Libya & Serbia and a lesson the Russians are learning now, precision guided munitions are not a finite resource. In a throwback to WW1 when shortages of artillery shells delayed or disrupted offensive operations, the infantry died in waves. We need to vastly step up our manufacturing capacity of munitions, platforms, and training in order to be combat effective for longer then 6 months of combat at a peer-peer combat tempo.

    And we need to start doing it now.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Excellent posts. I too have come to the conclusion there are no real new lessons from Ukraine.

      Indeed people ignored Russians were making same mistakes they did in 1939 against Finns or 1941-42 and instead attributed success to drone and ATGM wonder weapons.

      IMO the war reaffirms those lessons you mention plus a couple more:

      1. SEAD/DEAD is critical.
      2. Air superiority and thus airpower is critical to breaking stalemates (just as it had been in Normandy) and busting through enemy lines (eg Germany blitzkriegs in 1939-41 or US in 1991). Neither Ukraine or Russia uses airpower save as flying artillery.
      3. Importance of secure and timely communications. Again nothing new - one of the main western advantages in 1944-45 was superb communications.

      These lessons seem to be being unlearned by west - eg US is retiring JSTARS without effective replacement, reducing USAF AEW&C by half and USN is seeking to retire 25 EA-18Gs previously assigned to supporting USAF operations.

      In Europe only Germany and Italy have a dedicated SEAD squadron (both equipped with ageing Tornado ECRs) whilst Greece has a multirole F-16C/D squadron that can do this.

      That's it!

      Delete
  20. Interestingly a while back a French general commented they might see a return to more "light aircraft" for some missions as they're cheaper to operate than helos and also might actually offer greater utility in some missions.

    I don't know what he meant by light aircraft but I assume he meant observation aircraft ala O-1 Bird dog or utility aircraft ala PC-6 Porter.

    IMO helos still have utility but in far fewer numbers than operated now.

    - Counter terrorism
    - COIN - transport
    - Medevac
    - Maritime - primarily ASW, VERTREP and utility missions.
    - Some utility missions - transport in non combat zones.
    - Non combat humanitarian operations


    Other missions might be able to be handled by other systems:

    - Observation/scouting/recon - by UAVs
    - COIN fire support - UCAVs - far better loiter time, more survivable and infinitely more expendable.

    Other missions require rethinking eg ASUW where helos will be exposed to ever more capable air defences.

    Amphibious assault and air borne assault probably both go the way of the dodo. Russia's attempts at an air borne assault on Hostomel airport proved how risky such operations are especially when the enemy is determined and is equipped with reasonably modern and capable forces. Note this is nothing new - anyone remember Market Garden?

    The manned helicopter gunship is another one whose future is probably less than rosy. Russia's confirmed losses here are 30 (8 x Mi-24/35, 6 x Mi-28, 16 x Ka-52).

    Confirmed US losses of AH-64s in Iraq during the invasion and occupation between 2003 and 2010 was 34 airframes, including 15 to hostile fire. This in a far less intense warzone.

    ReplyDelete
  21. I am extremely critical of 'Western" attack helicopter doctrine and the idea that helicopters can conduct aerial interdiction far in front of friendly forces, or that they offer any significant strategic or economic advantage over fixed-wing TACAIR.
    That said, I believe that attack helicopters can be effective as a mobile reserve to break-up enemy penetrations of friendly "lines", or to screen flanks of Corps size forces. A competent peer enemy *will* create these situations (respect your enemy!), and much less expensive rotary wing aircraft could be invaluable when this happens.

    Other battlefield uses of helicopters are generally justified, but I note that much smaller air frames like the H-6 are much more suitable for inserting 4-6 man teams or conducting MEDIVACs. This helicopter even has a hugely successful commercial variant that can be flown by a single aircrew, and at last check, was about 1/5th the acquisition cost of an H-60. Not nearly as capable, but expendible.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete

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