An absolutely astute statement appears in Marine Commandant Berger’s Force Design 2030 (FD2030) update document from 2021. Here it is,
Adversaries will not grant us the time and freedom of maneuver to create conditions necessary to ‘set the theater,’ in the traditional sense.[1]
Given the general idiocy of the FD2030 concept, it is remarkable that the update document would include such a profound statement. I’m not being sarcastic; I mean that sincerely.
If you recall, Saddam Hussein’s failing in Desert Storm (well … one of them, at any rate) was allowing the allied coalition to leisurely build up its forces and pre-position them prior to combat as well as allowing time for extensive recon and planning. The coalition was able to shape the battlefield (set the theater, as the FD2030 document describes it) to their specifications and timing.
The value of shaping the battlefield is self-evident and doesn’t require any additional discussion.
So, given the evident importance of shaping and the brilliant recognition that future enemies (that would be China) will not allow us the time and freedom to leisurely shape the battlefield, why are we wasting time with unproductive naval deployments that accomplish nothing? If we won’t have the time to shape the battlefield (‘set the theater’) once our enemies commit to war then we should be shaping the battlefield today, during peacetime, while we do have some time. We are, in effect, losing the battle before it’s begun!
Instead of wasting our time on nearly year long ‘cruise ship’ deployments, we should be,
- Hardening bases
- Establishing additional forward bases
- Establishing alternate forward bases
- Mapping the E/S China Sea sea beds and measuring the underwater characteristics (salinity, thermoclines, temperature, currents, acoustic conditions, etc.)
- Establishing surge forces
- Pre-positioning initial combat forces
- Rehearsing logistics (Pacific Reforger) and practicing convoy movements
- Establishing regional communication systems
- Establishing networks
- Training to the point of exhaustion on a daily basis
China understands the importance of pre-war battlefield shaping and is actively pursuing it.
- They’ve established a network of [illegal] islands throughout the E/S China Seas.
- They’re establishing bases in the Solomons and other areas.
- They’re setting up ASW defenses around the E/S China Seas.
- They’ve been industriously hardening their bases.
- They’re working hard to bring other countries into their sphere of influence (the Philippines, for example).
- They’re mapping out Taiwan’s defenses and air defense capabilities with constant aircraft penetrations to observe responses.
- They’ve forced the US to virtually abandon the E/S China Seas.
As FD2030 notes, China won’t grant us the time to shape the battlefield. The FD2030 statement is brilliant and yet the entire US military is ignoring it and its implication. China is shaping the battlefield while we stand idly by.
_________________________________
[1]Force Design 2030, Annual Update, April 2021
In my opinion we should be doing a host of things to confront China.
ReplyDeleteAn Asian NATO much like what CDR Chip has discussed.
G2mil's concept of building defense in depth with places like Iwo Jima,etc.
CON's practice of hardening of bases.
We should be doing all of these things.
I also would like to see us establish naval bases at Subic Bay and Cam Rhan Bay and reopen Clark Air Force Base.
These bases should have covered revetments for aircraft, protected fuel and ammunition storage, and missile defenses.
Make them difficult to knock out of action.
Existing bases like
Okinawa and Guam should be given the same treatment.
We should be aggressively patrolling the South China Sea like we own it.
And we shouldn"t be afraid of angering China, in fact that would be expected.
With enough conflict maybe we can decide to get out of this abusive relationship we have with them.
We need to home port substantial naval power in the region.
That might mean 3 carriers in Japan. It's a little close but there doesn't seem to be an ideal location.
But most of all we need, both as a nation and a military, to get serious about this challenge before us.
We may not be interested in this conflict, but it is interested in us.
And getting serious about this challenge may keep us out of war in the future.
Lutefisk
" Asian NATO"
DeleteI would urge you to think this through before calling for it. The European NATO worked because the member nations had varying degrees of modern, high end, competent armed forces. Aside from Japan, what country(s) in the Pacific region have militaries that could offer any significant forces and firepower to counter China? Australia - if you include them in an Asian NATO - have competent but extremely limited forces. South Korea - if you include them in an Asian NATO - are entirely focused on home defense against NKorea and would be unlikely to join. What does that leave?
An Asian NATO could, theoretically, contribute basing rights for the US but that, too, seems unlikely. Most Pacific countries have very small militaries and would most likely to opt for neutrality in a Chinese-US war.
Recall that there was an Asian NATO called SEATO. While claiming some success culturally and economically, it was a military failure. The same problems still apply today.
" might mean 3 carriers in Japan"
DeleteMy goodness, no! You need to recall the lessons of Force Z and the Asiatic Fleet / ABDA. Carriers based in Japan are far too close to overwhelming Chinese forces and firepower to survive beyond the second day of a war. They would accomplish nothing.
Carriers need to be held well out of reach of danger until need for decisive actions, not placed in the front lines where they would be subject to constant attack until sunk.
I can't disagree with your tactical assessment or historical examples, but if not Japan then where to put them?
DeleteIsn't Pearl Harbor too far for limited duration deployments?
Or do we want to patrol the area with other surface ships and have carriers in the region a somewhat uncommon occurrence?
There doesn't seem to be a good answer.
A strike against carriers in Japan would mean a strike on the nation of Japan, which would raise the stakes of a strike.
I'm certainly open to other ideas.
Lutefisk
I think the value of an Asian NATO is that we need these countries with us rather than against us.
DeleteThis conflict with China, in my opinion, is primarily economic.
I believe that asserting ourselves and demonstrating our resolve is vital to potential allies that have the massive dragon next door.
I also think that it is important to raise the stakes of a strike above the level of a minor incursion, as I believe the President framed it in regards to Ukraine.
Lutefisk
"Isn't Pearl Harbor too far for limited duration deployments?
DeleteOr do we want to patrol the area with other surface ships and have carriers in the region a somewhat uncommon occurrence?
You seem to be conflating peace and war scenarios. In peace, you can do whatever you want although you should be wary of 'Pearl Harbor' situations.
Carriers accomplish nothing in peacetime. Our forward deployed carrier in Japan has not deterred China in the least so what's the point of having a carrier there? What would multiple carriers accomplish that one carrier can't? If we won't use our air wings than a carrier is no more useful than a combat canoe and placing a carrier in 'enemy waters' just invites a Force Z / Pear Harbor incident. Indeed, were we to send a group of four carriers to the South China Sea, China might well consider that too good an opportunity to pass up as a way to cripple us while initiating the seizure of Taiwan !
Carriers should be held well back until war begins and then used to conduct fast in and out attack missions or decisive defensive missions.
"A strike against carriers in Japan would mean a strike on the nation of Japan, which would raise the stakes of a strike."
DeleteConversely, if Japan were to declare neutrality, we would be unable to operate our carriers or other forces from Japan and our forces would either be interred or expelled. If interred, we would 'lose' the forces for the duration of the war. If expelled, the forces would be exposed to the full might of China the moment they left Japanese territorial waters and they would be fighting totally unsupported (Force Z, Asiatic Fleet).
Carriers have no business loitering around the forward edge of battle. They need to hang back until it's time to execute a mission and then they strike and retreat to safety.
"I think the value of an Asian NATO is that we need these countries with us rather than against us."
DeleteWell, of course, that's always preferrable but what substantial benefit - other than basing rights - would we get from allying with a bunch of countries that have no significant militaries?
"This conflict with China, in my opinion, is primarily economic."
That's certainly an important part of our conflict with China. An economic SEATO aimed against China would be beneficial but to accomplish that we would need to supply those countries with the markets and trade that they would lose by breaking from China. That's certainly doable but we have shown zero interest in doing that, so far.
"I also think that it is important to raise the stakes of a strike above the level of a minor incursion"
DeleteSetting aside the wisdom of an automatic military involvement in the event of a Chinese incursion, we don't need a treaty or SEATO to do that. We can simply state that if China trespasses into xxxxx's territory, we'll declare war. Simple and direct. No difficult to establish treaty organization is needed.
"...be wary of 'Pearl Harbor' situations"
DeleteAbsolutely. While it would be nearly impossible to conceal a buildup that would be the precursor to a Taiwan invasion, or any other moves that would kick off the war... If I was a Chinese planner, theres no way that I wouldnt make sure to coincide a kickoff with the elimination of the Japan-based CVN. Its just too much of an easy target, the removal of a large chunk of US combat power, and a huge political blow. While Pearl Harbor didnt have the intended effect or success for the Japanese, a Chinese PH part two is likely a big opening move...
"a Chinese PH part two"
DeleteIf the Chinese are smart then, as noted in a previous post, the next Pearl Harbor ought to be more along the lines of striking at our infrastructure, without which our Navy will quickly wither and die. See, "The Next Pearl Harbor - Shipyards"
They don't really need to hit our ships. Hit the drydocks and super cranes and we're finished as a Navy.
Oh youre right of course. Hurting us in CONUS would be awful easy. On another blog there was talk about those kinds of vulnerabilities. They're everywhere!! after that discussion, I was curious, went on a short drive, and figured out how to take down the whole PNW power grid... With a pickup!! And short of having saboteurs in the States, which Im sure there are, simple non-combat operations like scuttling somthing in the Apra inlet, maybe even in the Pearl Harbor channel would have serious effects as well. We are quite vulnerable from all directions.
DeleteBut... Id still remove that annoying forward carrier in my opening salvo...
We just voluntarily shut down our main fuel storage facility at Pearl Harbor with no plan to replace it. China doesn't need to 'Pearl Harbor' us. We're doing it to ourselves!
DeleteThe reason why the US is not doing most of these (Hardening bases,
ReplyDeleteEstablishing additional forward bases,
Establishing alternate forward bases, Pre-positioning initial combat forces) is that these activities would have to occur in South Korea, Japan, or existing US bases/territories as we have no other allies in a war against China. Since the US will not admit this, they just waive their hands saying that these activities will be delayed until Blinken and Austin "obtain" some allies. (As far as "track record", Blinken, Austin, and the other clowns have a knack for alienating everyone that they try to practice "diplomacy" on but we have no real diplomats to send anymore -- only ideologues). The Australian Labor Party is discovering that they can't afford Morrison's AUKUS "agreement" -- so their level of support is TBD. Relative to "networks" and commo, the Navy/USAF/Army are still studying "what"/"how many" of these that they want to build in the (far) future. Relative to "convoys" and "reinforcing via sea" vs by air, I don't think that the US has done anything in this regard since the 1980s. Hence the reasons that not much that you are recommending are happening.
This is not a political blog and we are not going to discuss politics. That said, politics and military matters are intimately linked and a discussion of political matters that directly affect military issues is permissible but tread very cautiously. You can mention current administration officials and their militarily relevant actions but do so factually and unemotionally. Again, this is a very fine line.
DeleteYour overall comment is good but limit the politics.
Apparently others in government have recognized the incompetence of the Blinken/ Austin "diplomacy" in Europe..
Deletehttps://thehill.com/policy/defense/3525893-biden-told-austin-blinken-to-tone-down-remarks-supporting-ukraine-report/
We just need to get "real diplomats" to the Pacific to try to fix the damage that they have done so far in an effort to see if we can win back some former allies and provide the Navy with more flexibility in war planning.
Considering the recent launch of the Chinese CVN, the concept CNO proposes of setting the stage for ourselves is all that much more relevant. Gaining knowledge of SCS operating areas, base hardening, etc are important. The upcoming formation of capable enemy CVBGs that will hold us at arms length will strain our capabilities even more, and the ability to support our battle groups with local, joint, survivable support will be a key to success.
ReplyDeleteChief designer (program leader) of China's recently launched type 003 was born in 1980, only 52 years old today!
DeleteLots of young engineers and scientists in Chinese industry is very danger, much younger than US' military industry.
Civilian industry base is important to a nation's military strength. It has been more than two decades that less and less smart high school gradates in US study STEM in US.
Bunch of patriotic high self esteem people cannot save the nation. Pentagon needs more high quality scientists and engineers.
"much younger than US' military industry."
DeleteDo you have any data to support this claim? If not, do not make unsupported claims. If you have data, please present it.
"young engineers and scientists"
Of course, young engineers are also inexperienced engineers and not all that effective. You become effective over time as you gain practical experience. This is the problem that China faces by stealing information. They may get to the desired end state but they have not acquired the experience along the way and will have difficulty dealing with problems and making changes.
If the Chinese engineer was born in 1980 surely that makes him 42?
DeleteI’d say that that Chinese engineers and shipbuilders in genral are possibly outperforming there western counterparts because of the size, numbers & diversity of there shipbuilding program.
MA
I think size and numbers are relevant, but diversity??? It doesnt help here, regardless of all the rhetoric and politics so recently prevalent. Id think they are less "diverse" anyway, if it mattered...
DeleteSorry I was not clear , I meant the diversity of there shipbuilding programs. From corvettes to giant aircraft carriers and from small AIP submarines to ballistic missile submarines.
DeleteThis must be a great advantage for all of there shipbuilders experience wise.
MA
No, youre right, and I realized that later, but after trying repeatedly, couldn't delete the misguided comment...
DeleteYou make good points our military leaders are ignoring, as noted in https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/military-china-taiwan-world-war-ii-pacific/ where the USMC intends to use "island hopping" tactics similar to those used against Japan during World War II, against China.
ReplyDeleteCommandant Berger and his ilk seem to have forgotten China is a CONTINENTAL nation with overland supply lines, far more difficult to isolate than an island nation like Japan, as we should've learned with the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War. They also forgot China now has the numerical and industrial advantages the US had over World War II Japan. Yet the article makes no mention of regional allies who might help cutoff China from Russian and Iranian oil, and other supplies necessary to wage war!
"Adversaries will not grant us the time and freedom of maneuver to create conditions necessary to ‘set the theater,’ in the traditional sense."
ReplyDeleteFor me, this whole "shaping" the battlefield really is symptomatic of the real problem (I don't pretend to have the solution!) that USA has ceded REALLY all the initiative and "first punch" to China. This isn't like GW1 where after initial invasion by Saddam of Kuwait, we were worried that he would go forward more. He didn't and decided to wait us out. USA after that, was preparing all along to go on the offensive. Today, USA is more like Saddam after Kuwait invasion, we waiting for China to hit us first now. We are solely looking at being defensive.
Not saying we should hit first, not sure that would be the way for USA to start the conflict BUT as far as I can tell, pretty much our entire posture is to let China take the first crack at us. I think this defense mental mindset has proliferated thru US DoD and really has blocked us too often about doing anything, leaning back too much AND REALLY has stopped us from looking at offensive or semi offensive options. We only "shaping" ourselves into a losing position IMO.
"We are solely looking at being defensive."
DeleteUnfortunately, we aren't even doing that. We're not hardening bases. We're not massing supplies. We're actually shrinking the fleet ! We're not emplacing anti-air weaponry around bases. We're not disbursing fuel storage locations. And so on.
We're just not doing anything.
Not sure why, last couple of times, Ive been posting as anonymous instead of my usual Nico.
ReplyDeleteHad same issue. When posting tap dropdown arrow andnitll show your accounts tonlig in with.👍
DeletePutting aside the obvious fact that we are no match for China in the Western Pacific (their fleet is bigger and better armed, morale and intelligence are higher, logistics simpler, etc.) the article contains some unsupported allegations that harm, rather than help our case. To wit:
ReplyDelete1. "China .. established a network of [illegal] islands throughout the E/S China Seas." China's claims to the E/S China seas have not changed since 1987 and remain modest when compared to other littorals'
2. "They’re establishing bases in the Solomons and other areas”. No, they haven't. Plain old.
3. "They’re setting up ASW defenses around the E/S China Seas”. Their ASW is so comprehensive and sophisticated that no vessel can move in or above the E/S China Seas without the PLAN's knowledge and forbearance.
3. "They’re working hard to bring other countries into their sphere of influence (the Philippines, for example)”. Quite so. And we have been doing the opposite.
4. "They’ve forced the US to virtually abandon the E/S China Seas”. Did they use the Chi Force to persuade us to abandon the E/SCS? The Five-Finger Heart Blow, perhaps.
The US is approaching inability to maintain even the presence of controlling the E/SCS.
""They’re establishing bases in the Solomons and other areas”. No, they haven't."
DeleteYes, they most certainly are. Note that the post didn't state that the bases were currently fully functional, only that they're in the process of establishing them. If you haven't, you need to read the agreement with the Solomons. It is clear that the Chinese are setting up a base. They're negotiating for basing rights with other Pacific countries, as well.
"China's claims to the E/S China seas have not changed since 1987 and remain modest"
The claims have expanded to include militarizing EEZs and ADIZs. They now claim sovereignty over the illegal islands and all the rights that go with sovereign territory. Of course, UNCLOS ruled against them and they ignored that despite being a signatory to the treaty. China has made new claims of sovereignty over Japanese held islands. Though outside the E/S China Seas, China has begun making claims of sovereignty over the second island chain.
It would be incredible to view these progressions of claims as 'modest'. They are breathtaking in scope and execution.
" the obvious fact that we are no match for China in the Western Pacific"
DeleteThis is neither obvious nor a fact. While the two country's militaries are trending in opposite directions (the wrong direction for the US), the US still maintains a tenuous military superiority as regards geographical location (China is 'trapped' inside the E/S China Seas), stealth aircraft, submarine forces, large surface combatant tonnage and VLS throw weight, naval aviation, space based surveillance, likelihood of allies (Japan, India, SKorea, Australia), global trade sources in the event of war, etc.
If you claim an 'obvious fact' please be sure that it is actually obvious and factual.
Don't read too much on US media on what China wants to do but carefully watch what they are doing.
ReplyDeleteUp to now, they have learned from mistakes made by US. Therefore, unlikely, they will station large number of troops overseas. This matches their weapon developments. No nuclear powered carrier but conventional powered which have much more up time to operate as they only use them to enlarge defense circle.
For long range strikes, China throws lots of resources on mid to long range supersonic and hypersonic weapons (DF-100, DF-17, DF-21D, DF-26B, YJ-21, ... the list go on and on). With its industry base, they can mass produce in a short time. With many missiles capable precisely strike targets far away, once needed, it is far cheaper than send a large fleet to do the work.
How to intercept these missiles? Pentagon needs to think about, Recently, there is a report from China on use AI to intercept hypersonic weapons as China is becoming the first nation having come basic capability to intercept hypersonic weapons.
Two issues in a war with China. 1. The tactical missile inventory will be quickly depleted in Asia and throughout Navy itself. The solution is to build a few small naval magazines in Asia and spend a few billion dollars on more munitions for them.
ReplyDelete2. Reloading VLS tubes in submarines and surface combatants will prove impossible in WestPac. This cannot be done at sea. Sasebo will be destroyed on day one. Yokosuka is also within range of China's air power and short range missiles, albeit further away and better protected. But it will still get hit and Chinese intelligence with people on the ground will report any ship docking so missiles can target them sitting pierside. Chinese submarines will patrol the port entrance.
Same with Guam, although farther away so requires more expensive intermediate range missiles. I suspect the Chinese Navy may invade before the USA can deploy significant naval forces.
The result, ships and subs will have to transit to Hawaii each time they need to reload! Unless the Navy has secret bases where this can be done, which I highly doubt because no one gives a damn about logistics during peacetime.
My proposal to build establish six small naval airbases in the central Pacific is open for debate, but no one should challenge my other proposal to build three excellent NAF locations much further from China and beyond the range of its intermediate range ballistic missiles and bombers. These may be used as transit points, staging areas, or for combat operations should a Chinese advance prove successful. These bases should have a large naval magazine to resupply aircraft carriers groups and submarines.
NAF Darwin – Australian military airfield (already used by US Marines)
NAF Bucholz – US Army airfield, Kwajalein (Marshall Islands)
NAF Wake Island – US Air Force airfield (rarely used.)
These would have small munitions bunkers around the airfield and also at least a thousand VLS munitions. Build six small covered piers at each location were just two small ships or subs can dock and reload. Wake Island and Kwajalein are very remote so Chinese intel will know nothing while the simple pier cover hides activity from satellites and aerial reconnaissance. Attacking these would require China's few and ultra-expensive ICBMs which I doubt they would attempt given the small dispersed targets available.
The need for this is self-evident and should be our Navy's top priority, but our Navy is too corrupt and dysfunctional to change.
For informational purposes, the ranges from China (say, Wuhan, to pick a point) to Darwin, Kwajalein, and Wake are:
DeleteDarwin = 3175 miles
Kwajalein = 3753 miles
Wake = 3345 miles
Some approximate ranges for Chinese ballistic missiles are (data from missilethreat.csis.org):
DF-4 (IRBM) = 3400 miles
DF-5 (ICBM) = 8100 miles
DF-26 (IRBM) = 3100 miles
DF-31 (ICBM) = 7300 miles
DF-41 (ICBM) = 9300 miles
JL-2 (SLBM) = 5600 miles
This illustrates the reality that no base is out of range and the need to provide missile defenses for all bases. This also illustrates the impact of ballistic missiles. The mere fact of their existence requires us to provide defenses, thereby tying up funds and resources regardless of whether the Chinese would choose to expend missiles on the bases or not. This suggests the obvious question: where are our IRBM/ICBM missiles so that we can attack Chinese bases and impose defensive costs on them? When it comes to tactical ballistic missiles, we've kind of ceded exclusive rights to the Chinese!
While Kwajelin and Wake are simple and easy to use as waypoints or staging areas, beyond that I dont see the point of staging naval aircraft ashore. Their range makes them insignificant. Sure, there are tankers, but will there be?? For how long? And what will they strike?? Being within Chinese land based missile range, puts them at risk on the ground, and only defensive in the air. At least on a carrier, theyre mobile and can push forward, or retreat, or leave to rearm. If we're going to use those bases, USAF aircraft are much better suited to it.
DeleteIf we're going to scrap some carriers, then relocate the airwings to bolster the others. Putting them ashore independently seems wasteful. If the carriers are discarded, Id rather spend the rather minor savings on SSGN SLEPs, or at the very least a few more Virginias, since at least they will have offensive capability...
Missile defense systems like Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3s are suspect with the need to hit them incoming at Mach 4 head on. Moreover, they will be fired in salvos, so dozens incoming at the same time. The solution is somehow jamming their guidance. I'm not an expert on that, but just misleading missiles a mile off course is the same as killing one.
ReplyDeleteThere is also the threat of ship or sub fired cruise missiles that will arrive low with maybe 10 seconds warning. Why don't we have Phalanx systems on hilltops facing west on Guam?
"The solution is somehow jamming their guidance."
DeleteCorrect me if I'm wrong but my understanding is that the ballistic missiles use inertial guidance supplemented by satellite position fixes. They don't really have a guidance signal to jam although 'spoofing' the satellite fix might be worth attempting. Given that the 'guidance' is internal and there is nothing to jam, the solution might be the extensive use of decoy targets of various types. Flood a missile's sensor with possible targets and see if it can pick out the one right target.
Way out of my lane so just speculating, here.
"cruise missiles ... Phalanx systems on hilltops"
DeleteBase defense needs to mimic naval layered defenses with ESSM, RAM, and CIWS. To the extent possible, all anti-air systems should be mobile so increase survivability and deny the enemy pre-targeting of fixed emplacements.
This is yet another example of the list of things we should be doing to harden our bases and prepare to fight for our bases - something we haven't had to do since WWII. We're just not serious about base defense for inexplicable reasons.
Agree with base defenses. Im really not understanding why we arent seeing Aegis Ashore installations at every base... Its relatively simple, straightforward, existing tech. Heck its got to be easier to build ashore than on a ship!! So why don't we have them??
Delete"Aegis Ashore installations at every base"
DeleteIdeally, I'd like to see mobile radar vehicles instead of large, fixed facilities which are easily targeted. There are many radars out there that are smaller and claim to be as good or better than the Aegis system. Of course, those are manufacturer's claims so who knows what the truth is? I also don't know whether they'd be capable of ballistic missile detection which appeared to have been something of a challenge for Aegis.
My problem with Aegis Ashore is that it is a fixed target and if it's not 100% effective (and nothing is !) then it will be destroyed in the first salvo of cruise/ballistic missiles and then you've lost your entire radar based defense. Hence, my desire for mobile and multiple radars. That's the ideal concept. Does the equipment exist to make that ideal concept a reality? I don't know but we should be frantically investigating it.
I would also offer the thought that whatever we come up with, it must be stand alone. The US military is obsessed with multi-component, networked systems whereby one asset does the initial launch detection, another does the initial track, another does the mid-track and guidance, another does the anti-missile launch and initial guidance, and so on and then they have an orgasm telling us about the seamless, integrated, coss-connected, engagement and kill chain. Well, none of that is going to be available in combat and none of it is going to work. We need a totally stand alone system. If, perchance, some outside asset can share some data in combat, that's a bonus but it's something we can, or should, count on. In combat, simplicity wins and complexity loses (ask the Tiger tanks).
I've discussed my fleet design ideas here before, so won't go into detail on that. But one concept has been to get rid of the hugely expensive (and ill-suited for assaults) "big deck amphibs" and replace them with a group of smaller, cheaper, and more versatile conventional amphibs.
DeleteThis would require removing the LPD-17s from the amphibious fleet (where they are too big and too expensive to be risked close enough into shore to conduct seaborne landings, and have experienced significant problems including stern gate issues). Rather than parking or SINKEXing tem, I would convert them to the ABM/BMD ships that HII has proposed for the same hull. I admittedly have no way to estimate conversion costs, but since the hull is a major cost driver and that would be there to start, and since the large open space that is the well deck would eliminate the need to rip out a lot of internal bulkheads, one would expect the conversions to be relatively inexpensive (at least until the USN got involved).
Such a ship could mount AEGIS or perhaps a more powerful and ABM/BMD-focused radar. It could carry a large inventory of optimized ABM/BMD missiles (far larger than a Burke or Tico). These would clearly be stand-alone ships.
There are 11 LPD-17s, and new amphibs are being built on a similar hull. The existing LPD-17s with enough remaining life to be cost-effective, plus some of the newer hulls, should be sufficient to produce a dozen or so ABM/BMD ships. These could be deployed around Pearl or Guam or more forward bases as defense against Chinese long-range missile attacks. Same in the Atlantic/Europe region and also to protect domestic ports.
"replace them with a group of smaller, cheaper, and more versatile conventional amphibs."
DeleteAs a point of comparison, the WWII Haskell class attack transport was 455 ft long, 15,000 t full load displacement, and carried 17 landing craft of various types, 1500 troops, and all their cargo/gear.
The LPD-17 class is 684 ft long, 25,000 t full load displacement, and carries 2 LCAC and 14 AAV (one use, one trip only), 633 troops.
So, if you reduce the size of the LPD-17, which only carries 633 troops and two limited-useful landing craft, won't you also reduce the number of troops and landing craft? A troop capacity of 633 is already very small and you'll reduce it further? You're getting down to Company size landing forces!
Of course, you could go the WWII route and pack in the troops and cargo but then you'd have to forego the crew comforts which I know you're violently opposed to doing. Have you thought this all the way through?
So, what size amphibious ship do you envision replacing
"eliminate the need to rip out a lot of internal bulkheads"
DeleteThat's true to an extent but the flip side is that you'd have to add a lot of internal bulkheads to support the "large inventory of optimized ABM/BMD missiles (far larger than a Burke or Tico". You can't install VLS systems into air. They need solid structural support. They're heavy!
The radar systems would likely need massive additional power generation, cooling, electrical runs, computer support facilities, operator spaces, etc.
The BMD version of the LPD-17 is certainly possible but it wouldn't be the casual, cheap conversion you think.
Per China's growing number of ICBMs, one reason they wouldn't target Wake or Kwajalein is that Pearl Harbor has dozens of juicy targets, all easily seen by anyone from off base for targeting. Does the Navy have a wartime plan to dock ships far apart? At least don't tie ships next to each other.
DeleteI just googled and found this photo on the first page.
https://gcaptain.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/160701-N-SI773-163-800x533.jpg
Just a few hours ago, China conducted a mid-course antiballistic missile defensive test.
Deletehttps://www.news18.com/news/world/china-conducts-mid-course-antiballistic-missile-test-says-not-aimed-at-any-country-report-5403235.html
"...one reason they wouldn't target Wake or Kwajalein..."
DeleteWith their mass production and quantity build mindset, along with their big buy-in on long range missiles isnt that a dangerous, wishful assumption???
@CNO- Good point about mobility vs Aegis Ashore... But do systems that are small enough to be mobile have the ability to function at the same level as Aegis?? If so, then yes, put em on wheels, please!!
DeleteI think someone here once suggested that the Navy just take an Aegis ship they plan to early retire and place it at Guam with minimal crew. They don't even need the engines as tugs can move it around as needed so long as shore power can be hooked up.
Delete"do systems that are small enough to be mobile have the ability"
DeleteThat's the key question. The manufacturers say yes but reality hasn't yet been heard from. I find it somewhat suggestive that despite a plethora of small radars in the world, all of which claim better than Aegis performance, the Navy continues to go with very large, 'fixed' installations. Then again, given the Navy's history of poor decisions ...
"...once suggested that the Navy just take an Aegis ship....
DeleteNow i can get behind that!! Once theyre decommissioned, theyll never return. I imagine the Navy will push to scrap them almost immediately, rather then mothball them. So as "mobile Aegis Ashore", theyre basically expendable since they were being decomm'd anyway, yet fully functional. All the issues about the tanks and maintenance would be largely irrelevant. They be operating with a vastly reduced crew. Whats not to like about this idea??
"...all of which claim better than Aegis performance..."
DeleteIts frustrating having to try and discern the truth!!! Does the Navy know Aegis is superior and sticking with it, or are the other systems specs accurate, or just manufacturer propaganda?? Or does anybody actually know anything?? Without in depth testing, who really knows???😡
"Without in depth testing, who really knows???"
DeleteThat's the key: realistic, extensive testing. I've never heard of a manufacturer conducting a live radar detection test of realistic targets like stealth ships and aircraft under realistic weather conditions, sea state, and electronic warfare hinderances. Of course, I've also never heard of the Navy doing it, either, although they ought to at least know the SPY/Aegis performance pretty well just from daily use. However, I've never heard of the Navy inviting sensor manufacturers to come and use the Navy's ranges and ships/aircraft for test and evaluation purposes. Seems like they'd want to do that.
Absent any of that, we're left to try to parse out the truth with very little to go on.
As a current events addition to the original post, I just read that Tinian is getting expansion work for military use. I hope that hardening is part of the plan...!!!
ReplyDeleteThey are establishing a NAF as I recommended! Just kidding. But it's good some good steps are underway. Now do five more sites.
ReplyDelete