It’s been awhile since we last checked in on the Navy’s LCAC replacement program, the Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) in Nov 2018 (see, “SSC Update”). That program should be about wrapped up by now, right? Let’s check the status.
Status
The Navy/Marines are pursuing an acquisition program of Ship to Shore Connectors (SSC) which are nearly identical replacements for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC). As a reminder, the Navy has 72 existing LCAC with a payload capacity of 60 tons. The Navy plans to acquire 73 SSC with a payload capacity of 72 tons.
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| Ship to Shore Connector, SSC |
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| Nearly Identical LCAC |
As described in the previous update (link above), an interesting new feature is the ability of the SSC to disembark vehicles directly into the water instead of on land. Presumably, this is aimed at offloading AAV/ACV vehicles into the sea as a means of bypassing the standoff range problem for amphibious ships. The SSC would bring the vehicles to within a few miles of shore and drop them into the water to continue to shore on their own while the SSC retires to safety. Unfortunately, this is yet another example of concurrency with this feature having been added part way through production and needing to be back fit to earlier production craft.
The SSC costs $79M each, based on the FY22 Navy SCN budget documents.[1] After an initial flurry, the purchases are being funded at a rate of one or two per year (none in 2020 !) with a total of 25 having been funded, so far. Acquisition began with the first contract awards in 2015 to Textron (New Orleans, LA). Now, seven years later, the acquisition ought to be about done and the SSCs should be in the fleet and smoothly functioning. Unbelievably, however, the second SSC (101) was only delivered to the Navy on 27-Aug-2020, five years after contract award. Seriously? Five years to build a small craft that is a near twin to the existing LCAC?
Despite a hopeful start to what ought to be a simple follow on to the LCAC, the SSC program has been plagued by problems which have caused multiple, long delays. GAO identifies the start of the program as May 2009. Delays have pushed IOC back to the end of 2022 or beyond. That’s 13 years and counting for a simple evolutionary development of the LCAC. That’s pathetic.
Problems
The main problem with the SSC is the gearbox – what is it with gearboxes and the Navy? – which is undergoing its third round of design changes attempting to deal with premature wear. This is yet another example of the folly and cost of concurrent development and production. Once the gearbox problem is solved (it never was on the Freedom class LCS and now they’re all being retired !), the solution will have to be expensively retrofitted to the SSCs already produced. I don’t know why the Navy can’t grasp the idea of testing first, then production. But, I digress …
In 2019, GAO noted,
… testing of Craft 100 (the test and training prototype craft) continues to pose challenges, and electrical system stability and command, control, communications, computers and navigation integration challenges must be resolved … [2]
More recently, cracking propeller blades have become a problem and solutions will, again, have to be back fit to already produced craft.
The program is pursuing two concurrent solutions to address cracking found on 10 of the 12 tested propeller blades when the crafts were loaded with weight as they would be during an amphibious assault.[3]
Seriously … blade strength??? Isn’t this past technology that we mastered long ago? We’ve been making propeller blades of all types since before WWI. Is this an example of trying to cut every possible penny out of a program and then we wind up with understrength items that have to be re-developed and retrofitted and wind up costing ten times the amount of any potential savings? Penny wise and pound foolish? Grumman used to have the right philosophy about physical strength and ruggedness … they overbuilt which earned them the nickname ‘Grumman Iron Works’. There are plenty of places we can cut costs but the actual product should not be one of them. Moving on …
Rationale
Given the Marine’s numerous public statements that they are out of the amphibious assault business, one can’t help but ask the blindingly obvious question, ‘why are we buying amphibious assault landing craft (or, for that matter, new amphibious ships and ACVs)?’
Given that the Navy is building LHAs without well decks and LPDs with less well deck capacity than the ships they’re replacing, again, one can’t help but ask the blindingly obvious question, ‘why are we buying amphibious assault landing craft?’
Possibly as a partial recognition of that logical disconnect,
In a briefing to Navy senior leadership, the program stated that it is considering reducing the total number of craft from 72 to 50. It is also considering updating the cost baseline, which the program indicated will likely result in a breach of statutory unit cost thresholds.[3]
And, if we’re out of the assault business and just need occasional administrative unloadings from amphibious ships then why not procure LCUs for 1/5 the cost? The latest Navy budget documents put the cost of the LCU at $17M each[1] which would be a huge savings over the $79M SSC cost.
Speaking of cost efficiency,
The program stated that Textron has indicated in the past that eight craft per year are necessary to achieve economies of scale … [2]
However, as noted, we’re only procuring one or two per year due to the various ongoing problems and delays. Between the very low production rate and the responsibility to fix interminable problems, Textron has to be losing money badly on this program.
Summary
So, despite an initial promising start to the program, things have bogged down badly, problems have arisen that are proving difficult to solve, concurrency has reared its head, and the manufacturer is likely losing money. This has become another long, drawn out development program like the F-35 and, like the F-35, it is now obsolete before it is even fielded. The Marines have dropped out of the amphibious assault mission, leaving this a craft without a purpose. As we consistently see, protracted development is the mortal enemy of relevance.
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[1]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf
[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, May 2019
[3]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2021
Has the USN ever considered something like the French EDA-R?
ReplyDeleteCarries 80 ton payload (110 in overload mode) and does 20 knots in hydrofoil mode. And they exist and are being used now.
Didn't know about it and looked it up on Wiki:
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engin_de_d%C3%A9barquement_amphibie_rapide
Sorry, should be catamaran, not hydrofoil. Here is a video
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmEv6It-5fE
"80 ton payload (110 in overload mode) and does 20 knots"
DeleteHow is that an improvement over the LCAC or SSC?
"How is that an improvement over the LCAC or SSC?"
DeleteThe improvement is that it exists and is working. And is probably cheaper and more reliable.
LCAC exists and is working. Do you have any documentation about cost or reliability?
DeleteMy understanding is that LCACs are not approved for combat (opposed landings) and your original post documents a lot of issues with SSC. I don't have much on cost of EDA-R except that builder claims cost equivalent to regular landing craft. That may well be self-serving puffery, but looking at the EDA-R it appears to be a much simpler piece of equipment, which would suggest cheaper and more reliable.
DeleteMy only point is that there is something out there, and given the problems that the USN is having reinventing the wheel, maybe it should take a look at existing technology.
EDA-R is large, slow (relative to incoming weapons), slower than the LCAC, and has all the same drawbacks that render the LCAC unsuited for initial assault use.
DeleteIt is quite likely that the only difference between the LCAC and EDA-R is that we know the problems with the LCAC but none of the EDA-R problems have been publicly reported.
US military observers seem to have a fascination with foreign equipment, believing it to be superior and flawless in performance. If there were foreign DOT&E organizations issuing public reports we'd see that they have all the same problems we do.
"It is quite likely that the only difference between the LCAC and EDA-R is that we know the problems with the LCAC but none of the EDA-R problems have been publicly reported."
DeleteThat may be. But my point is that it seems the USN has gone in on the LCAC/SSC track despite the failures encountered. Maybe they should at least look at alternative technologies.
I don't know whether EDA-R is or is not better than LCAC/SSC. Neither does the USN. In the case of me, that's permissible. In the case of the USN, that's not.
"Maybe they should at least look at alternative technologies."
DeleteMaybe they have. How would we know?
It is also telling that despite having begun in 2000, there are only 6 units in service (4 France, 2 Egypt), according to Wiki. Perhaps the world has looked at the design and found it wanting.
I'm no fan of the LCAC/SSC but this obsession we have with foreign designs is illogical and misguided. Evaluate alternatives, certainly, but don't become enamored with them based on absolutely no factual assessment.
"US military observers seem to have a fascination with foreign equipment..."
DeleteFor comparison the very real issues of the NH 90 helicopter experienced by both Norway and Germany. Leading Norway at least to can the thing.
That being said this picture of the Japanese Hatsuyuki-class destroyers does sorta make me want the navy to just buy from Japan direct. Yes they are old now but honestly if I did the math right in adjusted dollars at 60-70 million they are clearly a win of over the what ~350 million for a non working freedom class. And look they have a real crew and the abilty to you know do ASW
Deletehttps://www.thedrive.com/uploads/2022/06/16/Japan-Frigates.jpg?auto=webp&auto=webp&optimize=high&quality=70&width=1920
"clearly a win of over the ... freedom class"
DeleteTo be fair, everything looks good when compared to the LCS.
True, but its the adjusted price what strikes me. Mind I did no deep dive into trying to parse out budget hiding for either ship. But the simple fact is one Navy seems to have built a strait forward Frigate (ASW/GP) at a reasonable price with a decent crew size the other a power point Fantasy.
DeleteAdding. What strikes me so what half are decommissioned (but not as far as I tell broken up) or training vessels now it does seem like they could be upgraded say with the NSM type missile over the Harpoon and nothing indicates the persistent mechanical issues of say the Zumwalt or LCS.
Delete"its the adjusted price what strikes me."
Delete"adjusted dollars at 60-70 million"
Setting aside the true cost versus publicly stated cost which, to be fair, you noted might not be accurate, just bear in mind that that was then and now is now. In other words, those ships were built in the late '70's to early '80's. At that time, there were far less (or none!) rules, environmental regulations, gender/diversity regulations, health insurance requirements, waste management regulations, and so on that all have since been piled onto the manufacturers resulting in increased prices. So, even if the ship was built for $xx in 1980, that doesn't mean it would possible to do so today for a straight, inflation adjusted price.
I'm not disagreeing with you that a solid, basic FFG wouldn't be desirable but I'm cautioning that there are so many more cost-contributing factors today. Maybe there shouldn't be but until we can eliminate them, we're stuck with them.
Without going into politics, (I don't know when and which administration ordered this and I don't care either way, doesn't matter, really!), this does have a "end of the empire" vibe, doesn't it?
ReplyDeleteUSN is ordering a ship which really is just a upgrade, can't EVEN execute such a simple upgrade! and pretty much USMC says it doesn't want it or need it but USN is still going to BUY IT anyways!!!
Congress is nowhere to be found, executive branch doesn't bother and public doesn't care......That's not how to run a country or it's defense.
This is how empire's fall......
LCUs are much better and not just because of lower costs and greater reliability. They can carry twice as much, use far less fuel so can travel intra-theater. They have a range of 1200nm vs 300nm for the LCAC fuel hogs. Given the shrinking amphib fleet, this is very important.
ReplyDeleteLCACs are faster, but this is not very important since anti-tank missiles can still sink them. We are told they are not for opposed landings. Okay, then the amphibs don't need to remain 25 or 100 miles offshore!
I've read (sorry, can't recall the reference) that LCAC can also access a much larger number of beaches than LCU, so there's also that.
DeleteLCACs are much more limited by sea state and get damaged in even smallish waves. The maintenance time for an LCAC is magnitudes more than an LCU. Maybe we should stop buying LCACSand buy LCUs with long range so we can go island to island in our fight against China
Delete"Maybe we should stop buying LCACS and buy LCUs "
DeleteLCUs have inherent problems, also. A muc better comment would be to offer an objective analysis that considers the benefits and drawbacks of both craft, relative to the mission. That would be informative and interesting. I look forward to hearing your analysis.
SSC uses V-22 engines. Given one of the early issues on V-22 was premature gear wear issues, I'd say this ran into the same thing with no one examining V-22 program for issues. I can't say I've ever seen anything about SSCs offloading directly into the water. I have seen them interface to platforms in the water to transfer gear.
ReplyDeleteWhile the Marines are seemingly out of amphib operations, I believe I just saw where the Commandant was just asking for /supporting an increase in amphibious ship numbers... So which is it??
ReplyDelete"So which is it??"
DeleteI've been asking that question for some time now. The Commandant seems to want it both ways: out of the assault business but maintaining an amphibious fleet although for what purpose, I have no idea. The Commandant at best has a severe communication problem and can't convey his plans or, at worst, he's just a blithering idiot. Evidence suggests the latter.
So we need to buy the SSC to replace LCAC,
Deleteto carry the 70 ton version of the M1 tanks the Marines
no longer have, to do amphibious assaults the Marine no longer want to do ?
Is that correct ?
Agreed... Maybe keeping or enlarging the amphib fleet is a hedge against someone with a brain coming along and sh*tcanning the whole EABO nonsense, and the LAW... Although how are the Marines gonna get their tanks back??
DeleteMarines don’t need tanks back. The 30mm ACV variant will provide the necessary direct fire support and swim ashore instead of need a ride on an LCAC. LCACs are maintenance hogs that are too limited be common wave sizes to be useful.
Delete"30mm ACV variant will provide the necessary direct fire support"
DeleteFor a narrow, limited set of functions this may be true. However, the 30 mm ACV lacks the ability to accomplish several important tasks:
-cannot deal with fortifications, bunkers, barriers, and reinforced emplacements
-would have difficulty dealing with enemy tanks and armored vehicles
-lacks the armor to safely and successfully engage enemy troops who have their own heavy firepower and anti-tank weapons
-lacks explosive firepower comparable to tank rounds
30 mm is a nice weapon to have as part of an overall mix of firepower but to depend on it for the entirety of a force's firepower is foolish. If the Marines are going to engage in medium to high end combat (and their recent writings suggest they are getting out of that arena) they need far more firepower than 30 mm. That additional firepower can be supplied by tanks (except that they've eliminated their tanks), artillery (except that they've reduced their artillery and have no way to get it ashore in initial assault waves), or naval fire support (except that the Navy doctrinally wants to stand off 25-50 miles which is beyond fire support gun range).
The Navy/Marines have created an immense problem for themselves by eliminating heavy firepower. It's no wonder the Marines are stating that they're out of the frontal amphibious assault business!
Let me respond one by one:
Delete-capability depends on munitions type
- ability to destroy enemy armor is sufficient and most enemy tanks are either defeatable or have difficulty dealing with 30mm Ammo
-lack of armor is a definite weakness but no worse than BTR80’s
-lack of explosive firepower is made up for in volume which is actually better at suppressing than explosives.
Navy guns have limited effect and no skipper would give up carrier defense or group defense for enabling an amphibious mission.
"capability depends on munitions type"
DeleteOnly to a limited extent. A 30 mm is still just a 30 mm and can only generate a very limited amount of explosive effect. There's a reason why tanks are not equipped with 30 mm guns as their main armament.
"most enemy tanks are either defeatable or have difficulty dealing with 30mm Ammo"
This is true only under limited, ideal circumstances. 30 mm might disable tracks and gear but won't, generally, penetrate and destroy a modern MBT.
"lack of explosive firepower is made up for in volume which is actually better at suppressing than explosives."
Volume of fire, regardless of caliber, is always desirable!
The 30 mm is not a good choice for suppressive fire. Larger calibers equate to smaller magazines/inventory of ammo. For suppressive fire, you want maximum SUSTAINED fire. Smaller calibers, with larger magazines/inventory can sustain fire longer. Since suppressive fire is intended to suppress people, the caliber does not really matter.
"Navy guns have limited effect"
If you believe that 5" guns have limited effect then you must believe that the 4x smaller 30 mm has almost no effect ! The reality is that 5" rounds are far more effective than 30 mm in terms of pure explosive effect.
"give up carrier defense or group defense for enabling an amphibious mission."
If an amphibious assault needs naval gun support then a ship(s) is designated for that task from the beginning of the assault planning.
I wonder if the gearbox for the SSC is made by the same company that manufactured the gearboxes for the Freedom-class LCS variant. I know next to nothing about the SSC which is about the same as my knowledge of the LCACs. Maybe the Commandant can have it both ways. Leave an amphibious force on the East Coast with the current MEU/ARG composition and then tailor the West Coast Marine units for future operations against the PRC. Just an idea.
ReplyDeleteA PMO with a good System Enginering team allocates things like required reliability to each part of the system. Then they have to research to make sure the selected components MEET that reliability figure. The only trade-off occurs if the reliability is close. It is a risk factor if the reliability is not measured but calculated. Come on PMOs I learned this as a USMC 1st LT in my 1st acquisition job back in 1984. Have we forgotten this much simple stuff?
ReplyDelete