Satellites - Single Point of Failure

One of the worst things you can have in combat is a single point of failure;  a linchpin upon which an entire operation depends.  If it fails, you lose everything.  For example, let’s imagine a ship has several types of sensors and all are operated off electrical power that ultimately passes through a single cable.  That cable would represent a single point of failure.  Sever the cable and all the sensor systems would be rendered inoperative by a single component’s failure.  We have seen examples in industry and the military where supposedly redundant, independent systems have failed because of an unrecognized single point of failure.  In our example, we might be tempted to proudly proclaim that we have set up multiple independent sensor systems.  After all, they’re physically separated.  They use different frequencies.  They each have their own cooling systems.  Those that need motors each have their own.  Completely independent;  nothing in common ...  except for the single power cable that no one thought about and did not recognize as a single point of failure.
 
Our military is currently constructing a single point of failure on a very large scale in the form of satellite communications.  Consider the vast number of systems that all depend on satellite communications:  drones, weapons, command and control, sensors, and on and on.  If we lose satellite communications, we lose … well … a huge chunk of our entire military capability.
 
You might be tempted to argue that satellite communications are not a single point of failure because we have dozens/hundreds/thousands of satellites and no enemy could possibly eliminate all of them.  Setting aside the highly debatable nature of that assertion, think, what do all satellites have in common?  That’s right, a very small number of control/communication stations … approaching a single point of failure.  It doesn’t matter how many satellites you have if they all depend on a very few control stations.
 
Think further, what do all control stations have in common?  An even smaller number of software programs that run them.  If an enemy can hack/virus the software (we’ve seen that it’s almost impossible to prevent hacking of military or commercial networks and programs), it instantly renders all the control stations and their associated satellites useless.
 
Well, none of that could ever happen, you say.  Except that already has and we have at least one public example.
 

A global outage across Elon Musk’s satellite network ​affecting millions of Starlink users had left two dozen unmanned surface vessels bobbing off the California coast, disrupting communications and halting operations for almost an hour.
 
The incident, which involved drones ‌intended to bolster U.S. military options in a conflict with China, was one of several Navy test disruptions linked to SpaceX's Starlink that left operators unable to connect with autonomous boats, according to internal Navy documents reviewed by Reuters and a person familiar with the matter.[1]

Think even further.  What if a key individual (a single point of failure, by definition!) were to shut down or sabotage the entire satellite system, perhaps motivated by bribes/payoffs or coerced by Chinese threats against him or his family?  Couldn’t happen, you laugh?  How about this:
 

Reuters reported last year that [Elon] Musk unexpectedly switched off Starlink access to Ukrainian troops as they sought to retake territory from Russia, denting allies' trust in the billionaire.[1]

There you have a single (non-military!) individual shutting down a satellite system because he disagreed with the military and geopolitical actions.
 
Think further still.  The single point of failure doesn’t have to involve destruction of assets, cyber attacks, or rogue villains.  It could be as simple as routine mechanical/software failure.  Here’s an example.
 

In April 2025, during a series ​of Navy tests in California involving unmanned boats and flying drones, officials reported that Starlink struggled to provide a solid network connection due to the high data usage needed to control multiple systems, according to a Navy safety report of the tests reviewed by Reuters.[1]

Given the complexity of modern systems, sometimes you don’t even know why a system failed.
 

In the weeks leading up to the global Starlink outage in August, another ​series of Navy tests was disrupted by intermittent connection issues with the Starlink network, Navy documents reviewed by Reuters show. ​The causes of the network losses were not immediately clear.[1]

Now let’s close with one of the dumbest statements I’ve heard in a while, courtesy of Mr. Bryan Clark at the Hudson Institute.
 

Despite the setbacks, the upside of Starlink – a cheap and commercially available service – outweighs the risk of a potential outage disrupting future military operations, said Bryan Clark, an autonomous warfare expert at the Hudson Institute. “You ​accept those vulnerabilities because of the benefits you get from the ubiquity it provides,” he said.[1]

In peacetime you might accept the occasional failure because the downside isn’t all that serious.  It’s not life or death … just inconvenience.  In war, it most certainly is life and death and you can’t afford systems with known single points of failure and a known, not insignificant, failure rate to begin with.
 
 
Discussion
 
Given our overwhelming dependence on satellites, do you think the Chinese are going to allow us to continue to use them, unhindered?  Of course not!  They’ll attack them physically, electronically, digitally (software), and via human operator vulnerabilities.  Anyone want to bet that there aren’t Chinese agents embedded in the military or Starlink?  One way or another, I’d be very surprised if we have many operating satellites two weeks after the war starts.
 
We see that satellite communications could be disrupted in a variety of ways:  physical destruction, cyber attacks, software viruses, sabotage, and routine failure, among other methods.  Does it make sense that so much of our military, current and future, has, as its very foundation, satellite communications?  Would any sane individual purposely build a system with that many known, anticipatable vulnerabilities?  And yet we’re doing exactly that.  Worse, we’re increasing our use of, and dependence on, satellites instead of decreasing it.
 
Consider that the military, some years ago, recognized GPS as a significant vulnerability.  All of our navigation and most of our weapons depend on GPS.  GPS was recognized as a single point of failure and the military, to their slow and belated credit, has set about mitigating that dependence.  We’re now designing systems that use alternates to GPS.  We knew we couldn’t accept a single point of failure, like GPS, and yet we’re intentionally and enthusiastically embracing satellites as a single point of failure.  That’s baffling.
 
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Reuters website, “Exclusive: Starlink outage hit drone tests, exposing Pentagon’s growing reliance on SpaceX”, David Jeans, 16-Apr-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/starlink-outage-hit-drone-tests-exposing-pentagons-growing-reliance-spacex-2026-04-16/

Balloon Story Grows

Well, this story just gets better and better.  If – and I stress the ‘if’ part – we can believe

General Glen D. VanHerck (Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Chinese have floated balloons over the US multiple times … that we know of.

 

A senior U.S. general responsible for bringing down a Chinese spy balloon said on Monday the military had not detected previous spy balloons before the one that appeared on Jan. 28 over the United States and called it an "awareness gap."

 

The Pentagon said over the weekend that Chinese spy balloons had briefly flown over the United States at least three times during President Donald Trump's administration and one previously under President Joe Biden.

 

Air Force General Glen VanHerck, head of U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command and Northern Command, said the balloon was 200 feet tall and the payload under it weighed a couple thousand pounds.

 

"I will tell you that we did not detect those threats, and that's a domain awareness gap," VanHerck said.[1]

 

We are basing our entire military future and national security/existence on total battlefield awareness, data, surveillance, and networking and yet a simple balloon has eluded our detection at least four times … that we know of.  How many other times did it occur that we never became aware of?

 

Our very best surveillance equipment, networks, and software couldn’t see a balloon.

 

These were not tiny little children’s birthday party balloons.  As Gen. VanHerck stated, the balloons were 200 ft tall with slung payloads of a couple thousand pounds.  How do you not detect that?  How many people on this site have claimed that our various radar systems can spot aircraft and ships hundreds of miles away … and yet we can’t see a giant balloon?  Heck, we claim to be able to spot tiny submarine periscopes in the middle of the ocean with our all-knowing, all-seeing radar … but we can’t see a giant balloon.

 

How many people on this site have claimed that carriers are a thing of the past, just waiting to be sunk, because satellites will be able to track carrier groups anywhere in the ocean … and yet none of our satellites could see a giant balloon slowly drifting towards and across America for days on end?

 

Do you people who believe in the omniscience of our radars and detection systems see the ignorance of your claims?

 

 

Consider these previous examples of our vaunted systems being unable to see what’s in front of them:

 

Yemen Missile Attacks – Recall that the Navy claimed that the Burke class destroyer, USS Mason, was attacked multiple times by anti-ship missiles from Yemen.  In reality, despite all the sensors in the region, satellite surveillance, Aegis radar, etc., the Navy was unable to even decide whether an attack had occurred despite the ship launching several defensive missiles (see, “Yemen Missile Attacks").

 

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 – This commercial aircraft disappeared without a trace in the middles of one of the most heavily monitored regions of the world.  Searchers had no clue where to even begin looking.

 

Balloons – Apparently, there were four previous balloons that entered US airspace undetected.

 

Destroyer Collisions – As you know, two Burke class destroyers collided with giant merchant ships during simple sailing.

 

 

If these examples of large objects, none of which were making any attempt to evade, couldn’t be detected, why are assuming we can detect enemy forces that are stealthy and making every effort to hide?  Our entire foundation of future warfare is invalid.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Newsmax website, “General: US Failed to Detect Past Chinese Spy Balloons”, 6-Feb-2023,

https://www.newsmax.com/us/china-spy-balloon/2023/02/06/id/1107478/

Yet Another Information Dominance Failure

The US military is betting its future on intelligence:  networks, data, artificial intelligence, and so on.  Our omniscient intel and situational awareness will overcome the enemy’s superior firepower and numbers.  Data will rule the battlefield.  We’ll be adroitly maneuvering through the multi-domains while the enemy cowers, stunned and confused, in the corner wondering what’s happening.

 

On a seemingly unrelated note, here’s Gen. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on the near instantaneous collapse of the Afghan government and military,

 

There was nothing that I or anyone else saw that indicated a collapse of this army and this government in eleven days. (1)

 

Wait a minute!  Gen. Milley, you had total total information dominance in Afghanistan and you had no inkling that this was coming?  You had networks, people on the ground, data being crunched by computers, UAV overflights, total sensor awareness, and joint all-domain dominance.  In short, you had the perfect information dominance situation that you say we need to ensure future military dominance and yet you got fooled by armed rabble? 

 

And you want to base our entire military future on more of the same?

 

Are you an idiot or are you being paid by some foreign government to sabotage our military?

 

 

We just discussed this and proved that information dominance does NOT ensure victory (see, “Information Dominance – Proof of Failure”) and this is yet another proof of failure of the concept  …  but we’re going to continue down this path as our foundation for future war?  There is not a single example of information dominance winning a war and many examples of losing wars despite having information dominance and yet we’re going to continue down this path?

  

 

Note:  Feel free to comment but we are not going to discuss the politics of Afghanistan.

 

 

______________________________________

 

(1)Red State website, “Mark Milley Afghanistan Press Conference Had the Qualities of a James Bond Martini”, steiff, 18-Aug-2021,

https://redstate.com/streiff/2021/08/18/the-secdef-lloyd-austin-and-cjcs-mark-milley-afghanistan-press-conference-had-the-qualities-of-a-james-bond-martini-n429112

Fight In Plain View

In future wars, the US military believes it will see everything, friendly and enemy, on the future battlefield thanks to vast regional/global command and control networks, UAVs, regional sensor networks, underwater unmanned vessels, unmanned surface vessels, satellites, etc.  ComNavOps has pointed out the fallacy in that belief but, for sake of discussion, let’s follow the logic of that belief and see where it takes us.  I must warn you, the destination may be surprising and upsetting.

 

If we believe our omnipotence to be true then we have to believe the flip side which is that the enemy will also see everything since they will have all the same assets, capabilities, and resources and, in the case of China, they’ll have the added advantage of ‘home field’ (we’re talking about a main war, now, not a proxy conflict in Africa or some such) which provides land based radar, air bases, harbors, etc. which will greatly increase the density of sensors that can be applied to the battlefield.

 

If we believe it to be true then we must believe that all forces, friendly and enemy, will be under constant threat of attack or, indeed, constant actual attack since their location will be continually known.

 

That being the case, the inevitable and inescapable conclusion, then, is that it is mandatory that our forces be able to fight exposed and fully out in the open, as far as detection is concerned, because the enemy will know exactly where we are at all times.

 

That’s right, there will be no hiding, no hidden bases, no skulking LCS distributed lethality ships waiting to pounce on unsuspecting prey, no undetected Marine anti-ship missile units hidden on islands, no undetected transports relocating small Marine units and providing them with resupply, no UAVs blithely flying undetected deep into enemy territory, no submarines cruising undetected through enemy waters, etc.

 

I repeat, the logic has to work both ways.  If we can see everything, so can the enemy.

 

So, if our forces will be constantly exposed and under constant attack, how can they survive?  There is one way and one way only and that is through the application of massive, overwhelming defensive firepower combined with extensive ‘armor’ (‘armor’ includes actual armor and also electronic warfare ‘armor’).  Instead of Burkes with a single CIWS, we’ll need ships with dozens of CIWS/SeaRAM and hundreds of ESSM.  Instead of remaining passive and hidden, our ships will need to radiate constantly (no point using passive sensors since the enemy will know exactly where we are!) and, given the inevitable combat damage, we’ll need ships with multiple redundant sensor systems and backup sensors on top of that.

 

Can this actually work?  Can a force survive under constant surveillance and attack?  Of course they can … if they have sufficient firepower.  This is analogous to telling the other team your play and daring them to stop you.  If you have big enough, fast enough, strong enough players you can successfully execute your play even if the other team knows it’s coming.  This is actually what we did in WWII.  Okinawa was not a surprise to Japan.  They knew it was coming.  They knew exactly where our forces were and they attacked almost constantly but it didn’t matter because we had sufficient firepower to survive and succeed – albeit it at great cost.

 

Of course, the astute among you have noticed that the solution to the problem – overwhelming firepower and armor – is the exact opposite of where the US military is going.  The military is almost ignoring firepower while they pursue networks, data, and command and control schemes. 

 

If our ground forces will be under constant attack, why haven’t we developed a robust, mobile, anti-air capability?

 

If our naval forces will be under constant attack, why are our ships so lightly armed (Burkes have only a single CIWS), unarmored, and without redundant or backup sensors and weapons?

 

If our carriers will be under constant attack, why aren’t we training for multi-carrier group operations?

 

Why does our front line F-35 aircraft carry so few weapons?

 

Why does the Marine Corps believe that platoon size units will be able to survive?

 

And so on …

 

 

Now, the extremely astute among you will have already concluded that the best defense is a good offense.  Rather than simply stand and see how long we can survive while the enemy pounds on us, relentlessly, we need to be conducting our own massive and constant attacks on their assets.  Again, this means firepower, not networks, and massive amounts of it.  Where are our massive offensive forces?  Where are our massively powerful and numerous weapons?  China will be flinging super/hyper-sonic ballistic missiles at us and we’ll be answering with subsonic, non-stealthy, obsolete Tomahawks.  I know which side of that exchange I’d rather be on!  China will be flinging supersonic (Mach 2-4) YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles at us and we’ll be answering with slow, obsolete, non-stealthy Harpoons or, possibly, subsonic Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM).  Again, I know which side of that exchange I’d rather be on.  Chinese submarines will be flinging YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles at us and we’ll be answering with Harpoons or, possibly, an anti-ship Tomahawk missile.  And so on.

 

We lack the firepower, lethality, and numbers of weapons to win a war of attrition.  That’s right, a war of attrition.  If both sides have complete knowledge about each other’s forces, the war defaults to a war of attrition.  All of our vaunted maneuver warfare theories are rendered invalid when the enemy sees everything, just as we can.

 

Now, some of you, quite rightly, may be saying, hey, it’s not possible for the enemy to see all of our forces.  In fact, most of our forces will, at any given moment, be undetected.  Well, if that’s true then it must also be true for the enemy.  Most of their forces will, at any given moment, be undetected and, if that’s the case, why are we basing our entire future military hope on the concept of perfect knowledge and awareness of the enemy’s forces?  Why are we focusing so much effort on networks, data, and sensors if we won’t be able to see the bulk of the enemy’s forces?  Do you see the logical disconnect inherent in what our military is doing?  Either way, perfect knowledge or not, we’re being inconsistent in our logic which means our information-centric approach to future warfare is fundamentally wrong.  The correct approach is firepower-centric with information being used to support firepower, not replace it.  The Russians demonstrated this to perfection in Ukraine and we’ve opted to ignore the evidence.

 

Useful or Pointless?

So, are our systems going to see everything and we’re going to fight in plain view as our military development  path logically dictates or will our systems be unable to see everything which makes our development path fundamentally flawed?  If we are going to fight in plain view, our forces are poorly designed and equipped to do so.

The Illusion of Breakthroughs in Warfare

The US military is obsessively pursuing a Breakthrough in warfare that will provide a massive advantage.  The modern term for such a paradigm shifting Breakthrough is ‘Offset’ although that term, while all the rage for a while, has somewhat faded from use of late.  We’ll use the two terms interchangeably for the rest of this discussion.

 

The US military believes there have been two previous Offsets: 

 

First Offset = nuclear weapons (1950s)

Second Offset = precision guidance (1970s)

 

Some discussions include stealth in the Second Offset.

 

The US military is now pursuing the Third Offset (see, "Third Offset Strategy" and "Offset Strategy Follow Up").

 

The fact, though, is that neither the First nor Second Offset produced any lasting advantage and, in fact, neither produced a decisive advantage in any combat. 

 

Nuclear weapons never produced any decisive advantage, partly because the US wound up opting never to employ them in first use and partly because the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in 1949 thus ending any advantage the US might have had after only four years. 

 

Precision guidance has been useful but has never been decisive;  not in Vietnam (which we lost), Desert Storm (useful but not the decisive factor, by any means), Afghanistan (if we haven’t lost, we certainly haven’t won), or against ISIS (ISIS functioned quite well in the face of precision guided weapons and lost only to ground troops).

 

Stealth, if you wish to include that as an Offset factor, was useful in Desert Storm but was not the decisive factor and has played no significant role in any conflict since. 

 

The major problem with Offsets/Breakthroughs is that they never last long enough to prove decisive in war.  The other side invariably is able to produce the same Breakthrough in amazingly short order.  Consider the following examples of paradigm shifting breakthroughs in warfare.

 

 

 

Stealth – The stealth advantage has been negated both by other countries producing their own versions of stealth aircraft and ships and by the development of stealth detecting technologies such as specialized radar, IRST, etc.

 

Precision Guidance – Guided weapons were copied around the world almost as soon as they came out.

 

Nuclear Weapons – The Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in Sep 1949 thus ending the US advantage after barely four years.  Nuclear weapons never provided a decisive advantage in war for the US and, ultimately, proved useless even as a deterrent since no one believes the US would execute first use of nuclear weapons.

 

Monitor and Merrimack – The ironclad was a huge leap forward in naval warfare and produced a vessel that was, for all practical purposes, invincible compared to the previous wooden, sailing ships.  Incredibly, both the North and South developed ironclads almost simultaneously which completely negated any systematic advantage either side might have gained.

 

Dreadnought – The UK’s HMS Dreadnought revolutionized naval ship design but succeeded only in triggering a naval arms race and the ship was copied and surpassed within five years without providing any advantage for the British.

 

Blitzkreig – While it produced an initial advantage for the Germans, it was negated and defeated in fairly short order and produced no lasting benefit for the Germans. 

 

The Tank in WWI – The first tank to see combat took place in Sep 1916 and by Mar 1918, Germany had introduced its own tank and the first tank-to-tank battle occurred in Apr 1918.  The tank produced no lasting advantage for the Allies.

 

And so on …

 

An interesting Breakthrough that did produce a fairly long lasting advantage was the submarine as implemented by Germany in WWI and WWII.  This is, perhaps, the closest to anyone having achieved a long lasting Breakthrough in warfare and it wasn’t the submarine that was the breakthrough but how it was used.  Other countries developed submarines right along with Germany.  What they didn’t do was develop the operational and tactical implementation to effectively use them.  Germany developed the operational application – convoy interdiction – and the tactics (wolf packs, night attacks, etc.) to maximize the benefits of submarines to unprecedented levels.  They achieved a Breakthrough.

 

The noteworthy aspect of this is that it was not the technology – the submarine – that produced the Breakthrough but the method of employing it – the concept of operations (CONOPS, in modern terminology).  This offers a lesson for us that technology is not the solution but that CONOPS or doctrine can be.

 

Clearly, chasing Offsets is like chasing after Fool’s Gold.  It’s illusory and not real.

 

So where should we look for advantages in warfare?  Unsurprisingly, the advantages come from the old, tried and true factors:

 

• Maintenance
• Tactics
• Training
• Production capacity
• Firepower
• Logistics

 

The US military is focused on the illusory Breakthrough instead of doing the mundane, dirty, lowly, hard work that is necessary to win wars.  The Breakthrough is ‘hard work’, not technology.

Maintaining the Gap

Militarily, America has traditionally been able to count on a technology and general capability advantage over its opponents.  This gap between our capabilities and our enemy’s has allowed us to persevere while steadily shrinking in numbers (Reagan era excepted!).  Of late, however, our enemies have been able to match, and in some cases exceed, our technology.  China, in particular seems bent on matching or exceeding both our technology and our numbers.  If successful, they will reverse the military gap and own the advantage.  Russia is matching some of our technology and in a few cases exceeding it – electronic warfare being the prime example.  Russia, however, lacks numbers and the economic foundation to alter the numbers imbalance.

The military gap, or offset, as it has also been called, has, historically, been a transient and ever-changing situation.  Whenever one country develops a new technology it is only a matter of time until all countries have it.  Thus, the original developer gains a fairly short-lived, transient advantage that vanishes over time.  

For example, the US was the first to develop stealth in a workable, mass produced form (F-117 aircraft) and that gave us a significant advantage for a number of years.  Now, however, all countries have stealth capabilities.  Not only that, many countries are developing counter-stealth technologies.  Our stealth-based gap (offset) has ended.

With the end of the US stealth gap, our overall gap has begun to shrink.  Decades ago, we committed to a philosophy of fewer numbers in the misguided belief that we could compensate with superior technology.  Now, though, we’re finding ourselves being matched in technology and we’re losing the numbers advantage we once held – the worst of both worlds.

The narrowing gap is beginning to make an impact.

… during a congressional hearing earlier this month, Rand Corp. researcher and Pentagon war gamer David Ochmanek told senators that “when we run war games against China and Russia, U.S. forces lack the capabilities they need to win … and the gap is widening.” (1)

“I think there’s widespread agreement in the building that our conventional overmatch is eroding,” [Robert] Work [former DepSecDef] said. “The only debate is how long we have.” (1)

Having learned no lessons from history, the US’ solution to maintaining our gap over potential enemies is to develop new technology.  For the US, technology has always been the answer to everything.  Quantity, tactics, training, maintenance, etc. have been relegated to afterthoughts.  We’re focused on technology for its own sake, assuming that superior technology automatically grants battlefield success.  Unfortunately, history is packed with examples of low tech forces matching or beating high tech ones.  Some examples include,

• NVietnam
• ISIS
• Afghanistan/Taliban
• Hamas/PalestineHouthi rebels

Despite history’s lesson about technology, we remain determined to ride the promise of technology.  A few years ago, it was the Third Offset Strategy which would use networks and unmanned vehicles to make up for lack of firepower, survivability, and numbers despite the fact that our networks and unmanned communications are highly susceptible to electronic countermeasures, as Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine.

Now, the Third Offset talk has died down but the pursuit of technology continues unabated.  The name may have changed but the Third Offset goals still resonate with the US military.

If, as history teaches us, technology is not the way to maintain our gap, what is?

The answer is firepower.  More specifically, effective firepower.

It does us no good to know what color underwear each individual enemy soldier is wearing if we lack the firepower to kill them.  Conversely, the enemy doesn’t really care about intel if they can bring massive and incredibly lethal area bombardments to bear.  The Russian TOS-1 Buratino self-propelled rocket launcher (an MLRS with 30x 220mm rockets) is a good example of a thermobaric, area barrage weapon.

Firepower makes up for a lot of missing intel.

Now, don’t get me wrong, intel/recon/surveillance is important.  However, when it supersedes firepower it becomes counterproductive and intel for its own sake is just wasteful and misleading.  Ideally, intel and firepower should operate hand in hand.  However, if you can’t have both, consider the two cases where one of the factors is missing. 

-       Intel without firepower is useless.

On the other hand, 

-       Firepower without intel is still useful.  Area bombardment is effective, if inefficient. 

Given the general principal, what specific types of firepower do we lack?  Here’s a few,

Conventional ballistic missiles – China, in particular, is building an inventory of such missiles including the much-hyped DF-21 carrier killer.  We sorely lack a 1000-5000 mile ballistic missile.  Ballistic missiles are causing immense concern in the Navy.  Isn’t it about time that we return the favor to China?

Supersonic cruise missiles – We lack supersonic cruise missiles.  Even our newest anti-ship missile, the LRASM, is subsonic.  Again, we worry greatly about our enemy’s supersonic missiles (every conversation seems to include mention of the ‘unstoppable’ BrahMos) and for good reason.  They are very difficult to engage.  We need our own.

Stealthy cruise missiles – The Tomahawk is our main cruise missile and, among its other shortcomings, is not stealthy.  The success rate of Tomahawk against a peer defense is highly suspect.

Artillery cluster munitions – The US has opted to cease development of cluster munitions despite our enemies enthusiasm for them.  Why wouldn’t they be enthusiastic?  Cluster munitions are highly effective and hugely destructive.  We need cluster munitions.

Heavy naval guns – We have an entire amphibious assault doctrine that completely lacks heavy naval gunfire support.  The vast majority of military targets throughout the world lie within 20 miles of the shore.  Heavy naval guns would prove immensely destructive and useful.  Vietnam and a host of other historical examples prove that conclusively.

Very Long Range Air-to-Air Missile – The US developed the Phoenix missile and owned a significant air-to-air range advantage but has since failed to follow up with even longer ranged missiles.  China and Russia are now developing and fielding air-to-air missiles with ranges of 200-300+ miles.

The examples can go on but these should suffice to illustrate our firepower shortcomings.

If we don’t change our approach and begin focusing more on firepower, we’ll someday have the most exquisite knowledge in the history of warfare of the enemy that is destroying us with good old-fashioned area bombardment.

We need to regain our firepower gap or, at the very least, not allow our enemies to own the firepower advantage.

_____________________________________

(1)Foreign Policy website, “The Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, But No One Knows What Comes Next”, Paul McLeary, 18-Dec-2017,

https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/the-pentagons-third-offset-may-be-dead-but-no-one-knows-what-comes-next/

Sensors - What Good Are They?

We’ve previously noted that the US military has gone all in on sensor networks and unmanned vehicles as the basis for its Third Offset Strategy which is intended to provide the US with a military advantage over its enemies.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s commitment to distributed lethality which also depends on regional sensor networks to provide targeting to roving ships with a few anti-ship missiles.  Further, the entire basis of the F-35’s hoped for ‘superiority’ is sensor fusion and situational awareness (it’s sure not air combat maneuvering!).

Unfortunately, we’ve also noted that the entire concept of sensor and data networks is inherently flawed.  Non-enemy induced network crashes, sensor failures, UAV communications link failures, and GPS failures are commonplace.  Add to that wartime cyber attacks, jamming, GPS disruption, electronic countermeasures, electronic spoofing, false signal injection, etc. and the prospects for successful sensor and data networks is dismal – and yet we’re betting everything on exactly this.
Are we being overly pessimistic?  Well, consider,

• The Russians have been giving an object lesson in electronic warfare in the Ukraine and Syria.  US commanders have acknowledged that the Russians have disrupted and ‘disabled’ our dedicated electronic warfare EC-130 aircraft over Syria.

• Iran is believed to have disabled and captured US UAVs.

• US Navy unmanned underwater vehicles routinely wander off due to communication’s loss, never to be seen again.

• Despite having inertial navigation systems and GPS, the Aegis cruiser Port Royal managed to run aground in well known, well charted, home waters.

• Despite GPS and extensive regional sensors, two US Navy riverine boats became lost and wandered into Iranian waters and were captured.

• The Vincennes shot down an airliner despite having continuous, unhindered radar contact.

• Despite the most advanced naval sensors in the world, the Navy has been unable to determine whether any of three separate attacks on a Burke class destroyer off Yemen actually occurred.

• Despite the world’s most advanced radar, sonar, and electro-optical sensors two Burke class destroyers managed to collide with large, slow, non-stealthy commercial ships.

The examples are nearly endless.

Now, as has been recently and widely reported, the Norwegian Nansen class frigate Helge Ingstad (F313) has collided with an oil tanker and been beached to avoid sinking.  The ship has essentially capsized and is laying on its side on the beach.

The Nansen class frigate possesses a multitude of advanced sensors of various types including,

• SPY-1F 3D multi-mode radar
• Reutech RSR 210N air/sea surveillance radar
• Sagem Vigy 20 Electro-optical
• MRS 2000 hull mounted sonar
• Condor CS-3701 ESM/ECM

Despite this impressive array of sensors which should have provided unparalleled situational awareness, the ship managed to collide with a tanker. 

On a related note, yet another modern ‘warship’ has been nearly sunk by a single ‘hit’ – not exactly a tribute to modern warship design, is it?  But, I digress …

The empirical evidence is overwhelming.  Our vaunted sensors and networks do not work at anywhere near the claimed levels.

Our sensor and network systems are simply not reliable.

They don’t work.

And yet, we’re betting our military future on them working flawlessly and doing so in the face of a vast array of countermeasures.

The reasons for failure are many and varied and not all of the failures are due purely to the sensors and networks.

• Comm. links fail (UAVs being lost)

• Networks spontaneously fail (we’ve all experienced this at work or in the military)

• Maintenance shortages cause degraded sensors (the Aegis system being a prime example)

• Human action based on sensor data is inherently flawed (Vincennes)

The overall conclusion is that we can’t count on sensor and data networks and we can’t count on having situation awareness – and yet that’s exactly what we’re betting our military future on.  It’s also worth noting that all of the examples of sensor and data network failings are peacetime examples when everything should work perfectly.  How much worse will our situational awareness be during war?

Now, having said all that, I’m certainly not suggesting that we should abandon sensors and networks.  What I’m saying is that we should acknowledge the inherent limitations and tendencies to fail and not bet our military future on them.  Instead, we should use them as adjuncts to basic technologies (binoculars or sextant, for example) and common sense (post lookouts!).  We should train to function without sensors, to any great extent, and then we’ll be pleasantly surprised when they do, occasionally, work.  We have to break our mindset of dependence on sensors and networks and learn to stick out heads out the porthole and look and reason for ourselves.

We also need to recognize that data, alone, is useless in war.  We need firepower to destroy whatever we see.  Failing that, we’ll have the most perfect awareness in history of the enemy that kills us using low tech, indiscriminate, area bombardments.  For all its impressive development of electronic warfare capabilities, the Russians have not neglected to also develop impressive families of armored vehicles, advanced cluster munitions, treaty busting cruise missiles, very long range air-to-air missiles, advanced torpedoes, etc.  They understand that, ultimately, firepower wins wars. 

The Bare Minimum - Follow Up

One of the never ending surprises about this blog is the response levels to the various posts.  From the start, I’ve been consistently surprised about which topics/posts generate active responses and which don’t.  Some that I think will generate big responses do nothing and others that I view almost as throwaways generate a large response.  Yes, there are a few topics that are almost guaranteed to generate a large response, such as the LCS which everyone hates and seems to want to say it in print or the F-35 which again, is controversial.  Beyond that, though, I’ve given up trying to predict responses.

That said, I’m really surprised by the lack of response to the recent post, “The Bare Minimum” (see, “The Bare Minimum”).  Rereading it, it may be that I failed to adequately convey the concept and its ramifications.  The concept impacts the very foundation of our entire naval combat operational plan!

To refresh, the Navy has a vision of an immense regional, if not world wide, network of interconnected sensors, platforms, and weapons.  In this concept, every asset will have an exquisitely complete picture of both friendly and enemy positions, unit types, and strengths.  This exquisite knowledge will allow us to apply overwhelming firepower against each enemy asset in turn with the enemy not only helpless to prevent it but totally unaware of how it was happening and where it was coming from.  To further compound the enemy’s confusion, weapons will be directed and guided by platforms other than the firing platform, with the weapons sometimes being handed off from one guiding platform to another in a complex chain of control that leaves the enemy completely baffled about where the weapons are coming from.

Distributed lethality is a subset of this concept with individually weak, largely helpless, and sensor-limited units suddenly becoming deadly purveyors of firepower roaming enemy waters and airspace with impunity and lethality.

The Navy’s various networked anti-air systems such as Cooperative Engagement Capability and its more recent descendant, Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA), are also subsystems of this overarching, omniscient network.

To return to the premise of the “bare minimum” post, the concept is that rather than design for ultimate, best, most perfect user experience which is predicated on perfect communications, flawless networks, unlimited bandwidth, and seamless integration of disparate systems and software, we should, instead, be designing for the absolute minimum required capability.

In war, nothing works the way you think it will.  Confusion reigns.  Networks fail spontaneously.  Signals are garbled.  Communications are erratic and sporadic.  And this is before factoring in enemy activities like broad spectrum jamming, false signal injection, satellite destruction, cyber attacks, and the like. 

In other words, if our systems are set up to work only with the most perfect network and data flow the world has ever seen or envisioned and our personnel are trained only to work with this level of system performance, what will happen when the system fails hideously and our personnel are completely lost and have never experienced a significantly degraded system?  The answer is obvious and short – they’ll be lost and they won’t know what to do. 

We’ve seen this play out repeatedly in recent history.  The Ticonderoga class Port Royal’s GPS system failed and no one knew what to do – so, the ship ran aground.

The McCain and Fitzgerald had various system failures and no one knew what to do – so, the ships collided with large commercial vessels.

The MidEast based Riverine boats had various system failures and no one knew what to do – so, the Iranians seized the boats and crews.

And so on.

And these are all during peacetime.

We need to design to a level that provides the bare minimum acceptable performance regardless of the situation or efforts by Murphy, nature, or the enemy to disrupt our systems. 

We need to train our personnel to be effective with the bare minimum sensor data and networking (often none).

In other words, we need to stop designing for the ultimate, mythical, fantasy level of combat and start designing for the realistic, bare minimum and then make sure that the system is capable of delivering that bare minimum level no matter what the enemy does.  Instead of designing a system that depends on the instantaneous, unhindered flow of a gazillion goopabytes of data per nanosecond but that will fail if a single bit is disrupted, we need to design a system that only needs one byte of data to get through, has a quadzillion error checks, has built in system redundancies, and is robust enough to laugh at any natural or enemy disruptions – a system that can be 100% counted on no matter what.

Sure, we can design in extra capabilities and, if nature, Murphy, and the enemy is cooperating and the system is performing better than anticipated then, hey, all the better.  But, and this is the big but, we need a bare minimum standard that we are trained to fight well with and can always count on.  Instead of designing ever more complex, convoluted systems let’s start working on systems that are so rugged and robust that no natural or enemy action can disrupt them.

Let’s ditch the entire Third Offset Strategy and start working on a communication system that allows the F-35 to actually talk to someone other than another F-35 (you didn’t know about that problem, did you?).

Let’s ditch NIFC-CA and start working on basic AAW doctrine that every ship/Captain knows and can and will execute without needing to communicate (that’s kind of what doctrine is!) and let’s drill and train to that standard until it becomes automatic.

Let’s forget about complex chains of hand-offs of weapon guidance and just get weapons that reliably launch and guide without any dependence on GPS.

Let’s drop GPS navigation systems on ships and regain our proficiency with inertial navigation, dead reckoning, celestial fixes, charts, bearings, and compasses.

Let’s drop the LCS multi-power source, cross-connecting, complex gear system that has failed on almost every ship and go back to one power source and direct coupling of power and propulsor.

We need to stop designing exquisite ships and start designing rock solid ships.

And so on.

The very core of our envisioned warfighting capability is based on an unachievable degree of performance.  It’s based on wishful thinking and that’s a recipe for disaster as has been repeatedly demonstrated.

How many more groundings, collisions, and disasters do we need to admit that our dreams of perfect, integrated, omniscient systems are just that – dreams?

We need to return to systems that cannot break because in war, everything breaks.

You can have a Soviet AK-47 assault rifle that works under any conditions or level of mistreatment but, possibly, suffers a bit in accuracy or you can have an exquisitely accurate, technologically advanced, high performance US M16 assault rifle that failed on every other shot in Vietnam.

The concept of “Bare Minimum” is, or should be, central to our approach to warfighting. 

Communications Vulnerability

Long time readers know that ComNavOps has frequently pointed out that the major underpinning of the entire Third Offset Strategy, which is networking and unmanned vehicles, is based on the foundation of unhindered communications.  You can’t operate a network, data links, or control unmanned vehicles if you can’t assure your communications.  I’ve also pointed out that the assumption of unhindered communications is very suspect.  Against a peer, communications will be jammed, spoofed, disrupted, hacked, etc.  This calls into question the very foundation of the Third Offset Strategy and the military’s entire warfighting concept.

With that backdrop, USNI News website reports that the Russians have established a Murmansk BN mobile, truck-based communications eavesdropping and jamming system in Crimea aimed at our destroyers in the Black Sea (1).

Personally, I welcome Russian jamming attempts.  Maybe we’ll learn what vulnerabilities we have and, more importantly, maybe we’ll learn how to conduct operations without transmitting (EMCON), as we routinely did during the Cold War.

Far more interesting and disturbing is this quote from the article.

“What’s it going to do to Aegis? Probably nothing. But maintaining data links could be an issue,” Carlson [Retired Navy captain and naval analyst Chris Carlson] said.” [emphasis added]

This is exactly what I’ve been talking about.  All of our fancy cooperative engagement capabilities, our fantasized regional networking, the entire F-35 combat concept of sharing data, our universal shared tactical picture, our weapon guidance, and the entire distributed lethality concept are all based on unhindered data links.  What happens when a peer figures out how to disrupt or degrade our communications?

Murmansk BN System

We’ve created an immense potential vulnerability and Russian and China can see it and have the capability to take advantage of it.  We desperately need to start conducting realistic tests and find out whether our entire combat concept is based on a fatal weakness or whether we can operate in the face of peer level electronic warfare and communications disruption.  We need to find out before we go to war, not after.

Note: The point of this post is not to debate the effectiveness of the Murmansk BN system. The point is to note the need for robust and realistic testing of our datalink communications which forms the foundation of our entire future military capability.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News, “U.S. Official: Russia Installed System in Crimea to Snoop on U.S. Destroyers, Jam Communications”, Sam LaGrone, 1-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/01/official-russia-installs-system-crimea-snoop-u-s-destroyers-jam-communications