Thursday, November 29, 2018

Maintaining the Gap

Militarily, America has traditionally been able to count on a technology and general capability advantage over its opponents.  This gap between our capabilities and our enemy’s has allowed us to persevere while steadily shrinking in numbers (Reagan era excepted!).  Of late, however, our enemies have been able to match, and in some cases exceed, our technology.  China, in particular seems bent on matching or exceeding both our technology and our numbers.  If successful, they will reverse the military gap and own the advantage.  Russia is matching some of our technology and in a few cases exceeding it – electronic warfare being the prime example.  Russia, however, lacks numbers and the economic foundation to alter the numbers imbalance.

The military gap, or offset, as it has also been called, has, historically, been a transient and ever-changing situation.  Whenever one country develops a new technology it is only a matter of time until all countries have it.  Thus, the original developer gains a fairly short-lived, transient advantage that vanishes over time.  

For example, the US was the first to develop stealth in a workable, mass produced form (F-117 aircraft) and that gave us a significant advantage for a number of years.  Now, however, all countries have stealth capabilities.  Not only that, many countries are developing counter-stealth technologies.  Our stealth-based gap (offset) has ended.

With the end of the US stealth gap, our overall gap has begun to shrink.  Decades ago, we committed to a philosophy of fewer numbers in the misguided belief that we could compensate with superior technology.  Now, though, we’re finding ourselves being matched in technology and we’re losing the numbers advantage we once held – the worst of both worlds.

The narrowing gap is beginning to make an impact.


… during a congressional hearing earlier this month, Rand Corp. researcher and Pentagon war gamer David Ochmanek told senators that “when we run war games against China and Russia, U.S. forces lack the capabilities they need to win … and the gap is widening.” (1)

“I think there’s widespread agreement in the building that our conventional overmatch is eroding,” [Robert] Work [former DepSecDef] said. “The only debate is how long we have.” (1)


Having learned no lessons from history, the US’ solution to maintaining our gap over potential enemies is to develop new technology.  For the US, technology has always been the answer to everything.  Quantity, tactics, training, maintenance, etc. have been relegated to afterthoughts.  We’re focused on technology for its own sake, assuming that superior technology automatically grants battlefield success.  Unfortunately, history is packed with examples of low tech forces matching or beating high tech ones.  Some examples include,
  • NVietnam
  • ISIS
  • Afghanistan/Taliban
  • Hamas/PalestineHouthi rebels
Despite history’s lesson about technology, we remain determined to ride the promise of technology.  A few years ago, it was the Third Offset Strategy which would use networks and unmanned vehicles to make up for lack of firepower, survivability, and numbers despite the fact that our networks and unmanned communications are highly susceptible to electronic countermeasures, as Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine.

Now, the Third Offset talk has died down but the pursuit of technology continues unabated.  The name may have changed but the Third Offset goals still resonate with the US military.

If, as history teaches us, technology is not the way to maintain our gap, what is?

The answer is firepower.  More specifically, effective firepower.

It does us no good to know what color underwear each individual enemy soldier is wearing if we lack the firepower to kill them.  Conversely, the enemy doesn’t really care about intel if they can bring massive and incredibly lethal area bombardments to bear.  The Russian TOS-1 Buratino self-propelled rocket launcher (an MLRS with 30x 220mm rockets) is a good example of a thermobaric, area barrage weapon.

Firepower makes up for a lot of missing intel.

Now, don’t get me wrong, intel/recon/surveillance is important.  However, when it supersedes firepower it becomes counterproductive and intel for its own sake is just wasteful and misleading.  Ideally, intel and firepower should operate hand in hand.  However, if you can’t have both, consider the two cases where one of the factors is missing. 

-       Intel without firepower is useless.

On the other hand, 

-       Firepower without intel is still useful.  Area bombardment is effective, if inefficient. 

Given the general principal, what specific types of firepower do we lack?  Here’s a few,

Conventional ballistic missiles – China, in particular, is building an inventory of such missiles including the much-hyped DF-21 carrier killer.  We sorely lack a 1000-5000 mile ballistic missile.  Ballistic missiles are causing immense concern in the Navy.  Isn’t it about time that we return the favor to China?

Supersonic cruise missiles – We lack supersonic cruise missiles.  Even our newest anti-ship missile, the LRASM, is subsonic.  Again, we worry greatly about our enemy’s supersonic missiles (every conversation seems to include mention of the ‘unstoppable’ BrahMos) and for good reason.  They are very difficult to engage.  We need our own.

Stealthy cruise missiles – The Tomahawk is our main cruise missile and, among its other shortcomings, is not stealthy.  The success rate of Tomahawk against a peer defense is highly suspect.

Artillery cluster munitions – The US has opted to cease development of cluster munitions despite our enemies enthusiasm for them.  Why wouldn’t they be enthusiastic?  Cluster munitions are highly effective and hugely destructive.  We need cluster munitions.

Heavy naval guns – We have an entire amphibious assault doctrine that completely lacks heavy naval gunfire support.  The vast majority of military targets throughout the world lie within 20 miles of the shore.  Heavy naval guns would prove immensely destructive and useful.  Vietnam and a host of other historical examples prove that conclusively.

Very Long Range Air-to-Air Missile – The US developed the Phoenix missile and owned a significant air-to-air range advantage but has since failed to follow up with even longer ranged missiles.  China and Russia are now developing and fielding air-to-air missiles with ranges of 200-300+ miles.

The examples can go on but these should suffice to illustrate our firepower shortcomings.

If we don’t change our approach and begin focusing more on firepower, we’ll someday have the most exquisite knowledge in the history of warfare of the enemy that is destroying us with good old-fashioned area bombardment.

We need to regain our firepower gap or, at the very least, not allow our enemies to own the firepower advantage.



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(1)Foreign Policy website, “The Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, But No One Knows What Comes Next”, Paul McLeary, 18-Dec-2017,



71 comments:

  1. "The vast majority of military targets throughout the world lie within 20 miles of the shore."

    Do you have supporting evidence for this? It appears to contradict most military experience as well as just eyeballing maps.

    Chinese air bases,
    http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_air_force_2007.jpg

    Chinese ground forces,
    http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_ground_forces_2007.jpg

    Airstrikes in Syria and Iraq,
    https://news.files.bbci.co.uk/include/newsspec/19277/assets/project-assets/irag_syria_air_strikes_map_976_1.png

    Allied Force,
    https://planken.org/images/balkans/allfor_mapday23.gif

    Vietnam,
    https://i.redd.it/un2f8rutted01.png

    WWII bombing in Europe,
    https://dlozeve.github.io/ww2-bombings/

    Looks like the overwhelming majority of targets were and are further than 20 miles from shore.


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    1. I don't have it at hand but, yes, studies have demonstrated this. Logically, cities, ports, terminals, shipping, etc. have tended to develop along coasts with access to the sea. This is not to say that there are no targets futher inland.

      Consider China … The sheer number of military targets along the coast is immense.

      Consider population distribution. From a Naval Postgraduate School thesis,

      "With a predicted 80 percent of the world's population living within fifty miles of the coast by 2020, the littoral warfare environment takes on a new dimension (Global Population Distribution Database 1998)"

      All of our plans for expeditionary warfare contain the inherent assumption of sea-based logistics which, by definition, must cross a coastline. Thus, a great deal of military action will occur within 20 miles of the coast.

      And so on. The post contained the much larger issues of advantage gaps and the role of data versus firepower. I'm not interested in wasting time on this kind of trivial, irrelevant argument. Please address the larger themes.

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    2. The value of building battleships in your plan depends on the 20 mile assertion, so it hardly seems irrelevant.

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    3. For sake of [ending] the discussion, let's say that you're 100% right and that one bullet point is invalid. That doesn't even remotely change the post premise nor does it say that battleships are not valuable since there are still a huge number of targets within range. It would merely say that there are more targets out of range that require even more firepower - which was the point of the post.

      Your comment is trivial, incorrect, and argumentative. Try to further the discussion rather than nitpick peripheral items.

      That concludes this utterly useless discussion.

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    4. Your concern about the 20 mile limit is also assuming that a modern heavy naval gun is mo capable than 1940s guns were...

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    5. I'm not sure what you're saying. As documented in NavWeaps, the Iowa class 16" guns had a max range of just under 24 miles.

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    6. Which means approaching within 4 miles of shore to reach 20 miles inland? Or am I misunderstanding? Honestly, from my point of view, if you need to reach more than 10 miles inland (assuming 30 miles range), you need either airpower or rods from God. Nothing else will do.

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    7. i.e., you're explaining the need for Pournelle and Possony's "Strategy of Technology", which I think some of today's leaders are trying to implement without really understanding.

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    8. "from my point of view, if you need to reach more than 10 miles inland (assuming 30 miles range), you need either airpower or rods from God."

      I'm not understanding where your arbitrary limit of ten miles inland is coming from. The entire concept of a battleship in the ground support role is to stand well in to shore and provide support out to the max range of the guns - so, yes, 20 miles or so. Beyond that, ground forces should be well established enough to provide their own artillery support and the AF can help as able.

      I'm not understanding what it is that you're not understanding or disagreeing (?) with?

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    9. "Pournelle and Possony's "Strategy of Technology"

      There's a lot to that writing. What aspect are you referring to?

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    10. arguing about what a Gun can do is a little like arguing that a carrier designed in the 70's is obsolete because it was designed in the 70's.


      As with a carrier the artillery piece is the base part. What goes IN it is the hard part. In effect you can load anything from a dumb ap shell from the 1940's or a ramjet guided 12in saboted round with a range of 100mi in it and guess what......still the same gun.

      And while your developing those rounds you still have the ungodly effective HE and AP rounds.

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  2. The AF and navy briefly kicked around the idea of a conventional Ballistic missile in the early aughts (The aairforce called it Prompt Global Strike). The politicians feared that a conventional launch (especially from a submarine) would be mistaken for a nuclear launch and we'd wind up starting WW3 by accident.

    The US militarys' failure to produce supersonic cruise-missiles (both air and ship launched, for both AShm and land attack) is an act or criminal negligence. This isn't bleeding edge tech (unlike hypersonic missiles).

    JASM,JASM-ER and LRASM are all stealthy to a degree. They are not as stealthy as a B-2 by any means, but they are all much more stealthy than predecessors such as Tomahawk, Harpoon, and SLAM. It's a step in the right direction.

    The Marines love idea of chaining HIMars and MLRS to ships decks. This is a crude "Modular" bandaid at best. Navy ships need a navalizsd, corrosion resistent and fully integrated shore bombadment rocket. The bigwigs will "Nope!" A missile with hundreds of bomblets, but a half dozen or so large submunitions should reduce the UXO hazard while spreading out the shock and awe a little better than one unitary warhead.

    As far as naval artillery goes, I fear that we can't build a new shore attack ship with Zumwalts in the way. Replacing AGS with Excalibur is not the answer because even if it did work, I don't see the value of all that work to turn each of those ships into the equivelant of two floating M109 Paladins. Fitting 10-14 inch conventional guns puts us back in the 'boutique ammo for boutique guns conundrum'. I think that a cheap artillery rocket (properly designed and integrated) is a more realistic solution. The navy might be willing to rip out AGS if they can replace the guns with a couple hundred shore bombardment rockets.

    COMNAVOPS has accurately describes the need for a BVR AAM, he's also accurately described the Political/doctrinal paradox that prevents us from engaging in BVR fights during wartime. We need to acknowledge that we've painted ourselves into a corner and that we are not training the way we intend to fight.

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    1. Very nice comment.

      "The politicians feared that a conventional launch (especially from a submarine) would be mistaken for a nuclear launch"

      The (irony?) is that our enemy, China, sees no problem with launching massive numbers of ballistic missiles and has no fear of triggering a nuclear war. The fear and responsibility to act rationally seems to be all one-sided. We need to come to grips with that logic discontinuity and find a solution.

      My solution is to build ballistic missiles and tell China if they don't like it then they can get rid of their own.

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    2. "we are not training the way we intend to fight."

      You get it!

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    3. If the fear is a non-atomic ICBM is going to be interpreted as a nuclear missile, then hand the job to USAF or the Army.
      USAF ballistic missile sites are known, under satellite surveillance 24/7 and can be internationally inspected to verify non-nuclear warheads. So a middle from on of those silos will not be misinterpreted.
      The Army officially is in charge of coastal defense for the USA.
      Setting up Army posts in Guam and Hawaii with again,!a location without nukes means no false nuclear alarms. Since these will officially coastal defense units, they make a perfectly justifiable counter to Chinese BM’s which are for attacking installations on US soil/within our EEZ. The Army posts could even have AEGIS ashore thus defending the coast and relieving naval ships of having to provide air defense for Pearl and othe USN bases.

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    4. "USAF ballistic missile sites are known"

      Why would we conceivably want to tell our enemies exactly where our nuclear and non-nuclear ballistic missiles are? Isn't that doing the targeting portion of the kill chain for them? Is China telling us where there various ballistics missiles are, what type they are, and allowing inspections?

      Or, do you believe that all nuclear fear responsibility falls strictly on the US?

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    5. No sir, I don't believe it falls strictly on the USA, nor is that my preferred method of deployment for a conventional ballistic missile (CBM. But if the US government were to announce today that it was deploying a CBM, one can easily see China and Russia then make the same argument I was responding to--the risk of a accidentally mistaking a CBM for nuclear. Then we would demand the same conditions for their CBM's. Should they accept then they would have to deploy theirs the same as I have outlined above. Should they reject restrictions(which China probably would) then there should be little international or congressional opposition to deploying a prompt global strike without such restrictions since our enemies wont Should they actually agree to CBM restrictions, what I described is probably how it would play out. I was merely giving a way to respond to that criticism.
      Changing decommissioned USAF silos to CBM's would also be a way to quick deploy a system.

      Ideally, I would see a CBM capable of Virginia payload module deployment for the navy, that could also be air-launched by say a 747 flying in US air space over nevada. The USAF once successfully launched a Minuteman missile from a C-5 to prove the concept was feasible.

      I also wouldn't mind seeing the useless 150 ton turrets of the Zumwalts replaced with a conventional version of the UGM-133 from silos placed where the 155's once were

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    6. "Should they reject restrictions(which China probably would) then there should be little international or congressional opposition"

      Fair enough. You have a realistic view of the situation. Proposing such an arrangement would be a waste of time (Russia has already voided the INF so they're certainly not going to enter into another, similar arrangement nor would they abide by it if they did) but would clearly lay the blame on China and Russia. So, for the cost of some wasted time, I would have no problem attempting the arrangement as long as we didn't unilaterally penalize ourselves as Obama did with the Iran agreement.

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    7. "Ideally, I would see a CBM capable of Virginia payload module"

      This is probably not a good use for the VPM. Given the range of the ballistic missiles, we have plenty of other ways to launch them. The Virginias, on the other hand, offer the only truly stealthy way to launch cruise missiles. The VPM should be limited to cruise missiles.

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    8. "Zumwalts"

      Zumwalts would, indeed, be a good option for a short or medium ballistic missile launch platform. Good thought.

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  3. Conventional missiles need not be true ICBMs like Minuteman and Polaris, but merely SRBMs with 1000-2000 mile ranges. A smaller missile will fit on a large ship (Zumwalts?) or a road mobile launcher that can be stationed on an island or airlifted to the theatre. Airlifting a regiment of SRBM(C) missiles or moving an equipped ship to a theatre not only gives commanders a powerful weapon, it also acts as a powerful political signal that might deter aggression before shooting starts.

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    1. To be clear; a SRBM(C) would be an entirely beast from the aforementioned Shore bombardment rocket (Sho-Roc?) Which should have a range of 75-200 miles.

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    2. If we're abiding by the INF Treaty, we are probibited from fielding ground-based short and medium range ballistic missiles. The INF Treaty does not prohibit sea-based missiles.

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    3. How can that be discriminated from a nuclear or or other "real" WMD before (or within a few weeks of) impact?

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    4. Larry; if it's not a sub, it's not a Nuke. This is one area where Zumwalts' stealth may actually work against it.

      Anon; I imagine that INF (if it isn't dead already) doesn't cover air-launched Ballistic missiles either. A Ballistic missile called Skybolt was developed and scrappsd in the sixties. A conventional Skybolt would probably be cheaper to develop than whatever kind of Sc/ramjet Mach 6 wonder cruise missile is currently being cooked up.

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    5. "How can that be discriminated from a nuclear or or other "real" WMD before (or within a few weeks of) impact?"

      How is this question relevant? I ask this not in a sarcastic manner but in the literal definition of the word. What do you see as the relevance of your question since you already know the answer? What point are you trying to make?

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    6. " What point are you trying to make?"

      Like a boxing match, there are rules: no low blow, no elbow to the head, etc.(why, to prevent boxing match from descending to death match.) Now, for example, before US gonna launch SRBMs/MRBMs to command/control or other mil.facilities somewhere near Beijing/Shanghai or any one of 50 cities with million+ population, the US-China have to set an agreement beforehand that these will ONLY be non-WMD warheads (to prevent accidental nuke guess.) Now, in return Beijing says: well, if that's your intention to prevent accidental nuke war, China will also ensure you that its retaliatory mirv ICBM (since its MRBM/IRBM can't reach CONTUS) will be non-WMD loads.

      Without such agreement, everytime an US SRBM/MRBM about to land near Beijing/Shanghai, you're asking China to guess whether it's nuke tipped or not while you're shooting at them. Or, let me put it another way, Beijing buzz you on the horn: hey,the ICBM about to land on San Diego's naval base is not nuke tipped, therefore, don't you get itchy about retaliatory nuke launch.


      Crazy, isn't it?

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    7. " the US-China have to set an agreement beforehand that these will ONLY be non-WMD warheads"

      If you can't trust China to abide by an international agreement, who can you trust, right? Sorry, but China's credibility is zero. For example, the UNClOS tribunal ruling, to which China is a signatory, was completely ignored by China because it didn't suit their desires. And, now, you want us to trust our national existence to China's word? Are you that naïve?


      " asking China to guess whether it's nuke tipped"

      Perhaps China should not have started a ballistic missile race. Perhaps you should turn the question around and criticize China for asking the US to guess whether a ballistic missile headed for Guam is nuclear? Be consistent. Apply your reasoning to both sides or neither.

      "Like a boxing match, there are rules"

      That's hilarious! China recognizes no rules (UNCLOS, again, or seizing the US EP-3, or seizing a US UUV, or intruding in Vietnamese and Philippine waters, or building illegal islands, or dispensing with their own government in favor of a dictatorship, or violating international patent protections, or manipulating currency, etc.). There are no rules that China will abide by unless it's to their benefit. All other rules are made to be broken.

      "Without such agreement"

      Such agreement with China would be utterly worthless. The complete loss of credibility is one of the costs of China's reckless and rogue behavior.

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    8. It's not about trust, it's human psychology here. If one perceives one is about to die (e.g. incoming missile about to land on one's head), you don't know what he/she is gonna do, especially if he/she has a kill-all device on hand.

      'A ballistic missile landing near/on Beijing' is equivalent of 'a ballistic missile landing near/on DC' psychological wise, and all the strategic consequence it entails.

      Or let me put it this way, you can't trust Chinese on anything. But, in this scenario, you HAVE TO trust Chinese not to lose their mind (mind you, under extreme stress) not to take you with them.

      Crazy, isn't it?

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    9. "in this scenario, you HAVE TO trust Chinese not to lose their mind (mind you, under extreme stress) not to take you with them.

      Crazy, isn't it?"

      No. The only thing crazy is this type of thinking. You deal with China the way you deal with any untrustworthy person with deadly force capability. You kill them first.

      We target China's nuclear capability, including their leadership, and hit it in the opening seconds of a war. Along with that, we develop ballistic missile defense as best we can.

      Not only do we NOT have to trust China, we'd be idiots if we did. We have to plan for their duplicity.

      China has brought this on themselves.

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    10. What you suggested is Arm Race, Part 2.

      AR, part 1: 1945-1991 (USSR)
      AR, part 1a: 1991- ?? (Russia)
      AR, part 2: 2018- ?? (China)

      Not only China (which got economy and tech to keep it up), now you got Russia riled up again (it is very very combative to your suggestion, especially about BMD.)

      btw, CNO, are you suggesting going for the kill shot right away against a MAD power? That's almost suicide-by-homicide (I mean, we can't even wrap it up against sand bandits, how you going to pull it off against couple real deals?)



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    11. "SRBM" is a defined term and an abbreviation for "short range ballistic missile". It describes ballistic missiles of up to 500 km range (not necessarily excluding the possibility of some terminal guidance).
      "1000-2000 mile ranges" fits to MRBMs; medium range ballistic missiles though 2,000 nm range would just barely reach IRBM (intermediate ...) territory.

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    12. CNO,

      One more thought..when the POTUS (or you) suggest a new weapon disposition (e.g. SRBM/MRBM on 1st/2nd island chains), the strategic ramification has to be considered through and through. For example, just in this exchange, you ended up wanting to go for the kill-shot right away knocking out their command/control and nuke forces and hope our BMD works, and not as a counter force against their ASBM (of a more conventional setting of non-MAD consequence) suggested earlier and otherwise, which make our missile deployment either as a deterrence or a MAD inducer if used.

      In other words, we can't afford to pop off these missiles, because if we do, we run into the same strategic risk as shooting off ICBMs except Chinese only has 5-10 min, instead of 30 min, to decide if we all gonna go see Jesus.

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    13. In regards to conventional missiles looking like nuclear missiles, you have to consider third parties. China and Russia won't have time to figure out where a BM is headed. They would have trust us that it is a SRBM(C) headed for some other Target in Some other country, and not a Nuke headed for Beijing or Moscow. There's also other countries who may get their panties in a bunch if we launch a missile over thier country to strike a Target country. Not saying these factors can't be mitigated or just ZFG accepted should the situation warrant.

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    14. "are you suggesting going for the kill shot right away against a MAD power?"

      China is not yet a credible MAD power. They have a limited number of true ICBMs and, even then, with limited reach. Their number of warheads is also limited - not that it takes many to ruin someone's day.

      So, yes, given an inherently evil, unreliable regime bent on world domination I'd absolutely go for the initial kill if we believe we can pull it off. Again, this is what China gets for behaving as a rogue nation.

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    15. "Chinese only has 5-10 min, instead of 30 min, to decide"

      Great, then the odds of success go way up!

      You seem to find lots of fault with US actions and zero fault with identical Chinese actions. I assume you're vigorously writing anti-nuclear comments on Chinese blogs?

      You do understand that, at the moment, it is China that possesses and intends to use ballistic missiles - not the US, right? Do you get that? Seriously, do you grasp that? All of your fears and cautions should be directed at China.

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    16. " just playing out the strategic scenarios."

      I will not allow one-sided Chinese propaganda on this blog.

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    17. @Kirby: Missiles within the 50-200 mile range bracket you suggest are TBMs: Tactical Ballistic Missiles, though I've also heard the term Theater Ballistic Missile being used. The South Koreans are working on payload modules similar to the Virginia Payload Module for their future KSS-X SSKs. Officially the ROKN's KSS-X will merely carry the same conventional TBMs that the ROKA army already uses from tracked and truck launchers.

      The US already has TBMs in arsenal - note ATACMs - but the weakness of TBMs is the relatively short range and how unsubtle of a target they are. If the ground-hugging Tomahawk is considered vulnerable, then a TBM following a ballistic path is a lot more detectable.

      Also your fears of TBMs triggering nuclear alert warnings are unfounded; the flight profile of a TBM does not resemble the flight profile of an SRBM, IRBM, or ICBM. Otherwise all those Scud launches in Desert Storm and all those ATACMS launches in OIF would have triggered so many people.

      While carrying TBMs on warships is certainly possible, the issue comes with the fact that they take up a lot of space, and the problem is ATACMS' 500 lbs warhead doesn't really look that great next to Tomahawk's 1000 lbs warhead and greater range.

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    18. "ATACMS' 500 lbs warhead doesn't really look that great next to Tomahawk's 1000 lbs warhead and greater range."

      On the other hand, the current Blk IV Tomahawk's near $2M price tag doesn't really look that great next to the ATACMS' $800,000 cost.

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    19. "On the other hand, the current Blk IV Tomahawk's near $2M price tag doesn't really look that great next to the ATACMS' $800,000 cost."

      Sure, but then there's all those tradeoffs, in terms of range, warhead size, and the fact that Tomahawk is an immediate drop in, whereas adapting ATACMS to warships is going to take a lot of refitting and testing. Plus, as you yourself have said before, costs are irrelevant in a total war scenario.

      I do look a little askance at pricing increases. In FY2016, the Navy bought 149 Blk IV TLAMs for 203M, or 1.36M apiece. Then the next year, 100 TLAMs cost 189M, or 1.89M apiece. Procurement, how does it even!

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    20. " there's all those tradeoffs"

      No. Tradeoffs, as you're using the term, implies one or the other which is both unwise and silly. The military doesn't have, or even want, just a single weapon. The military wants a range of weapons with many different, and sometimes overlapping, capabilities and characteristics. That provides flexibility.

      The ATACMS is smaller and cheaper - good for smaller, easier to destroy targets. Why expend a larger, more expensive Tomahawk when a ATACMS will do? Why expend a ATACMS when a mortar will do. And so on.

      ATACMS is neither better nor worse than Tomahawk - just different. Each has its optimum applicability.

      Too many people try to make weapon discussions a binary solution set - one or the other - and this is rarely (never?) wise.

      Consider the battleship discussions. Almost everyone wants to turn it into a battleship OR a carrier argument. That's absurd. They complement and supplement each other. No one is suggesting one or the other and yet almost everyone wants to make that the argument.

      There's nothing wrong with discussing characteristics of various weapons but trying to make a one-or-the-other argument is foolish.

      Costs are irrelevant but producibility, which generally correlates with cost, is not. We can probably build more ATACMS than Tomahawks for the same effort, time, and industrial resources - all of which will be finite and limited in a war and must be used wisely.

      It's difficult to do but we all need to keep the overall picture firmly in mind during these discussions or else we fall into trivial and irrelevant arguments.

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    21. WRT to sizing, Tomahawk's narrower and longer, while ATACMS is wider and longer.

      Anyway I wasn't making a knock on ATACMS, my point was that each missile has different characteristics and brings different things to the table, so it's not really a simple either or proposition based on cost. With Tomahawk it's more expensive depending on when you bought it, but you get a terrain following cruise missile with 5 times the range of ATACMS, on the other hand ATACMS is a cheaper missile. There are potential niches where a surface-launched TBM might be useful, but you need to look at the platforms in terms beyond costs. From the implementation side of things, I'd rather double down on Tomahawk because we know it works with VLS; adapting ATACMS for Mk 41 or Mk 57 cells (if it can be done at all) means more dev time that may not work out - we've seen the results, or lack thereof, of the last decade of Navy development programs.

      The South Koreans definitely intend to fire TBMs from their KSS-X boats, but speculation is thst those boats are meant to be their sea-based component of the future South Korean nuclear triad...

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    22. When it comes to warfighting, my POV is that whatever missiles the DDG has in the magazine are a sunk cost paid years ago. You might as well fire them off. If you sink with unfired missiles in your cells because you were trying to save the taxpayer's money that they'd already spent... well. :/

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  4. This brings up an immensely important catch-22... While it seems that the Navy and military in general are pursuing "future-tech" vigorously (laser, railgun, etc), there needs to be a balance, and new ways to integrate it when its properly matured and tested. While I understand the premise of getting new tech to the fleet, starting construction of a class of ships before figuring out that the ammo for the primary weapon was prohibitively expensive seems overzealous. It seems that the Zumwalts shouldve never left the blueprint stage until those details were sorted out!! Maybe in 5 years a tech breakthrough would make it affordable. THEN pull out the blueprints and start cutting steel!!! Another example being the Fords. Maybe EMALS is worthwhile, but why is it so difficult to build cheap elevators that dont function? Electric motors and chains have worked forever, so why reinvent the wheel? Who sold the Navy jillion dollar elevators, and who signed off on it??
    I feel it would be in our intetests to first off, stop the production of the ridiculous LCS yesterday. Then reevaluate the Burke and Zumwalt hulls. Find ways to build a common hull /powerplant that will work for single purpose ASW and AAW ships that would be significantly cheaper. Use the freed up displacement to carry additional mission specific weapons and local defense. This gives each ship more "firepower". Drop the modularity nonsense. Build simpler cheaper ships and plan a shorter lifecycle as tech evolves. And for gosh sakes, mothball them as theyre phased out!!! But right now, more, cheaper and capable ships in the water is whats needed... Its not exactly the fleet composition COMNAVOPS is looking for but it seems like a common sense approach...(not saying that your composition isnt ideal, but without a wholesale replacment of everyone making these decisions, its not likely)
    I agree about train as we fight, but Ill add that we need to start building as if we were fighting...

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  5. The US announced two weeks ago we would no longer abide by the INF
    treaty. Why did we make the announcement? Why now? Now we can place
    SRBM(c) in the wespac to directly threaten china's forces. I don't know if any program is making these. Does anyone?
    I guess this brings up the Jimmy Carter problem. We build the missile and no one lets us base them in wespac. Or, we build it and then change our mind(Carter), the worst president before Obama.

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    1. It was possible to place MRBMs in cargo ships in port of Guam without trashing INF. There are very little land basing options for any such missiles in the Western Pacific.
      To throw away INF was a pointless, childish act.

      You flunked in history if you think Carter was the worst president before Obama. Woodrow Wilson entered the First World War knowing that this war was terrible, knowing doing so would make the submarine issue only worse and ultimately achieving nothing. 116,516 Americans dies needlessly and pointlessly because of Woodrow Wilson.

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    2. "It was possible to place MRBMs in cargo ships in port of Guam without trashing INF. There are very little land basing options for any such missiles in the Western Pacific."

      Quite true about sea basing as that was exempt from INF. Also, quite true about the limited land based options.

      "To throw away INF was a pointless, childish act."

      Russia had already voided the INF and the US was self-imposing a one-sided limitation on itself. The US did not throw away the INF, Russia did. This is not even a debatable point.

      We're not going to pursue presidential political rankings.

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  6. @ComNavOps: With regard to stealthy land attack cruise missile, I recall LM suggesting reducing the warhead size on LRASM in order to accomodate more fuel for greater range. I'm not entirely convinced that's the way to go, but the idea of being able to consolidate one's AShMs and land attack missiles into one platform does have a certain appeal from the loadout planning angle.

    There is talk that the USN is researching hypersonic cruise missiles, though at present it seems these are submarine-launched weapons intended to be alternatives to SLBMs. There is an argument to be made that the lack of research into hypersonic AShMs can be mitigated somewhat if the USN partners with ally nations on R&D and/or observes their work; Japan is working on its own VLS-launched hypersonic AShM, and the MBDA Perseus is a joint Franco-British stealth supersonic AShM program. There is something to be said for letting other people do the hard work and buying a finished product; some might argue the USN is facing a gap in this regard, but given the R&D problems the USN has had, I think there is something to be said for waiting until your allies have an actual finished product and then buying said product from them.

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  7. The US government's ability to run complex and innovative programs seems to have been steadily declining for decades. Compare the problems and delays of the F-35 program to the ICBM program of the 1950s and early 1960s. That program was definitely not perfect, but it got the job done.

    Trying to identify the full reasons for this loss of capability is a job for a specialised historian, but some aspects of it seem plausibly identifiable:

    There's a lack of perceived urgency. US citizens are certain that their country is supreme in the world, and has no military peers. That used to be true, but as you say, that lead is decaying. It may need something like the Sputnik shock to change American minds.

    Selling stuff to the US government has become a very bureaucratic task, and an unappealing prospect. The civilian technology market is easier and more profitable.

    The services' own engineering resources have been hollowed out, in favour of the contractors doing it all. The contractors find making the same stuff for year after year profitable for manufacturing, and appealing to the most conservative politicians. Politicians who want new stuff and non-technical senior officers can be kept distracted and paying out for development projects by means of fantastic technology prospects that can't be turned into practical systems.

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  8. I wish we had a better hi - lo tech balance. Cold war weapon systems weren't perfect but we still had some lo tech/quantity/mass firepower to back up the hi tech low volume systems. Now we only want hi tech low volume systems.

    Do we always need to use a PGM or even more expensive firepower when a SINGLE old fashion MK82 or a couple! would do just a good of a job?

    I wonder how much of the US problems when it comes to defense, is we really only worry or HEAR about weapon systems in development or production cost. Once in service, you never hear any criticism of why we are there and what we are using and the cost. Why are we using Hellfires after doing COIN now for almost 20 years? Why haven't developed or reintroduced cheap rockets that were common on fighters and fighters in the 60s and 70s? Why are still using expensive helicopters when a cheap turboprop trainer/COIN can do the job for a lot cheaper?

    Another problem of never questioning or not enough of questions! is why always this PUSH towards more tech towards the lower echelons? When US Army says they want fancy AI goggles/helmet with computers,datalink,etc...ok, I can see the company commander having this BUT why does every private need this?!? What are the odds a private will bump into a SA22 and call an airstrike on it?!? Shouldn't that have been an obvious question to ask the US Army? Also, thanks, your fancy AI IDed a SA22 or a T80, does the fancy AI help that private tell which of the 1 of 4 guys standing around is ALQ and which 3 are just regular civilians packing AKs?

    There are so many questions on this just ONE system (let alone all the other ones)that should be asked:

    https://breakingdefense.com/2018/11/ai-in-your-eye-army-goggles-will-id-targets-automatically/

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    1. @NICO: There's an argument to better intergrate Blue Force Tracker into a HUD so that infantry don't accidentally shoot friendlies. None of my friends will play Insurgency with me ever again because my IFF sucks and I shoot everyone dead. :V


      "Do we always need to use a PGM or even more expensive firepower when a SINGLE old fashion MK82 or a couple! would do just a good of a job?"

      After ODS, Gulf War Air Power Survey compared 12 sorties with PGMs to 12 sorties with unguided bombs. The 12 PGM sorties dropped 28 weapons and hit 26 targets. The 12 unguided sorties dropped 168 bombs and hit 2 targets.

      A JDAM costs 25k, a Mk 80 series costs about 2k. 700k was spent to hit 26 targets. 336k - the cheaper price - was spent and got 2 targets. To get the same 26 hits, you'd have to do 13 times the effort, spending 4.368M, dropping 2184 bombs, and needing 156 sorties.

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    2. "Gulf War Air Power Survey compared 12 sorties with PGMs to 12 sorties with unguided bombs. …

      A JDAM costs 25k, a Mk 80 series costs about 2k."

      This is the kind of half-thinking that produces skewed and incorrect conclusions.

      Those Gulf War PGMs didn't drop themselves. They were dropped by F-117 stealth planes that cost untold billions(?) to develop. Factor that into the cost analysis.

      In later years, many planes could drop PGMs and the 'true' cost of precision munitions has dropped.

      Further, additional analysis of the PGM performance in Desert Storm revealed that the precision guidance, while an improvement over unguided was nowhere near the initially claimed 90+% accuracy. In fact, estimates ranged down into the 50% area - still an improvement. So, whatever study you're referring to considered a very carefully selected set of data that was not representative.

      There are times when precision guidance is highly desirable but there are many other times when it is not needed. Area bombardment is still highly effective in many scenarios.

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    3. "I would argue …"

      That's exactly what you're doing. You're attempting to make an argument out of nothing. The original statement was,

      "Do we always need to use a PGM or even more expensive firepower when a SINGLE old fashion MK82 or a couple! would do just a good of a job?"

      And the simple answer is, of course not. There are plenty of times when an unguided munition is perfectly effective adequate. The statement did not suggest abandoning PGMs. You're attempting to turn a rhetorical, reasonable question into an argument. This blog is not about argument for its own sake. Move on and if you want to comment, offer something worthwhile.

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    4. @Wild Goose

      I'm still thinking Russian Artillery is a bit overrated at this point. Or perhaps potential so. Its impressive result was being used w/o fear of counter battery fire or air attack. Having the luxury to mass and fire at a time of its own choosing with the Intel advantage. Also no risk at all to its supply chain.

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    5. "I'm still thinking Russian Artillery is a bit overrated at this point."

      You're quite right that the Russians had the ideal situation - just like the US had the ideal situation in the Gulf War. The salient point is the sheer destructiveness of the artillery fire just as the point in the Gulf War was the impact of air power and precision guided munitions.

      Rather than acknowledge the firepower aspect of Russian artillery, the US (and West) is going down the path of networking in the fantasy hope that it will compensate for our lack of firepower.

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    6. "I think the common idea of aircraft using unguided weapons for area bombardment, put forth by many commenters,"

      Who said that? Give me a quote.

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    7. "Rather than acknowledge ..."

      Well no argument there on the networking and or total awareness. I just don't see it working out in a real contested environment. Its still striking the crew of the INS Hanit was unwilling to have their defensive system on because they were afraid it targeting friendlies. If the the sailors of top rate military don't trust their own systems in a relatively moderate intensive conflict where only Israel was flying planes about - it does not speak well for the whole US/NATO/Western system of prioritizing data and automation.

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    8. In fact the INS Hanit raises more questions on second thought. The Commander and crew simply seem not to have trusted their systems to not shoot down their own aircraft in an otherwise uncontested (electronically) environment [And it not like Israel would likely care about an accident shooting down a Lebanese plane for example]. If that is the case in a very good military it certainly calls into question the basis for not armoring ships or caring about durability since crews don't seem to trust or maybe be are not trained to use their defensive systems that replace that (durability and armor).

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    9. "calls into question the basis for not armoring ships or caring about durability since crews don't seem to trust or maybe be are not trained to use their defensive systems that replace that (durability and armor)."

      What a great comment/question! That is exactly the issue, here. As you know, I fall heavily on the armor, toughness side because electronic systems are unreliable, easily countered, and unlikely to be functional in combat.

      Very good comment.

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    10. The hype bothers me. But I take you point as valid the US has in general been lazy and has started from an assumption of easy air supremacy and that solves all your problems... The atrophy of artillery is hand and hand with the atrophy of effective mobile AA systems and likely the lack of mobile fire power that is not predicated on network awareness. I mean as far as I can tell M50 Ontos still looks like a viable light fire support vehicle as well but the Marines can't have that I'm sure F-35 will be on call.

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    11. @Kath: The hype is overblown, and people look at the sheer firepower in isolation without considering the fuller picture: as an example, TOS-1 is devastating against infantry, but its short range of 3.5km means it sacrifices a lot of the range that artillery takes for granted, and if you attempt to use it, you're driving deep into the opposition's artillery envelope (let along mortars or even ATGM). Nevertheless, it is also true that Russian formations have more artillery options in greater quantity than their US counterparts, which means that the Russian Army operates with greater independence from the Russian Air Force.

      Ontos was pretty rad to have, but having to climb out and reload the guns was a bit of a problem when under fire. :V That's one of the things I liked about the BMP-3 and the BMD-4; the 100mm gun can fire ATGMs or HE, and you reload it in a CBRN-protected hull without exposing yourself to fire, not like Ontos or the Brad's TOWs.

      I feel if the USMC is serious about protected firepower they should get in with the Army's Mobile Protected Firepower program, but otoh the Army has been kicking around the idea of a light tank with a 105mm gun tossing HE for fire support for the last 20 years, without much to show for it.

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    12. "TOS-1 is devastating against infantry, but its short range of 3.5km means it sacrifices a lot of the range that artillery takes for granted"

      This is just a bafflingly nonsensical statement. The tank does not have the range of artillery either. Nor, does infantry. So what? That's not their intended function. Similarly, the TOS-1 is not intended as long range artillery. It is intended as an "immediate front" anti-infantry and anti-fortification weapon. It is not intended as long range artillery.

      "if you attempt to use it, you're driving deep into the opposition's artillery envelope"

      If you attempt to use infantry or tanks you're driving deep into the opposition's artillery envelope. So what? It's what they do. Same with the TOS-1. All are supported by long range artillery, attack helos, CAS, etc.

      You're criticizing the TOS-1 for being exactly what it was intended to be while, illogically, ignoring infantry and tanks which operate in the exact same engagement ranges.

      Baffling.

      Your point about protected firepower may have some validity but is unrelated to the post or, as best I can tell, any comment.

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    13. My point to Kath was that far too many people consider only firepower, or only cost, without considering the fuller picture. TOS-1 was merely an example. It's a devastating weapon, yes, but if one looks only at the firepower, one doesn't realise that it's a weapon built for a specific purpose, and the requirements to fulfill that purpose put certain constraints on how TOS-1 can be employed; therefore in order to effectively employ the weapon, one has to look at the full picture and understand what it can and cannot do, what it is vulnerable against, what the constraints it operates under are, and what do you need to do to be able to use it - which, admittedly, you have done in this instance.

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    14. @Wild Goose

      "Army's Mobile Protected Firepower program"

      The USMC had tested the Dragon Fire but inexplicably drooped it (for a change it fired a lot ammo in testing and seemed to have no particular issues). It did seem like mobile firepower. I find the choice for a towed 120mm mortar odd. A self contained light armored vehicle with a better rate of fire and the ability to have an active defense systems seems like and easy choice.

      I mentioned the Ontos because if you can put a automatic 120 mm mortar on a light vehicle I am curious if you could do the same with a large recoil-less rifles and take out the manual reload part.

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    15. "one doesn't realise that it's a weapon built for a specific purpose, and the requirements to fulfill that purpose put certain constraints on how TOS-1 can be employed"

      That's called tactics. You're stating the incredibly obvious.

      Address the post premise. Here are some possibilities to get you started:

      -What kind of gap (offset) should we be developing?
      -Is it possible to develop an offset against a peer especially one that resorts to cyber-hacking?
      -What kind of long term, developmental offset should we be shooting for far down the road?
      -If we can't develop an offset to maintain our gap, where will our military advantage come from?
      -Can we achieve a gap using current technology and capabilities or do we need something completely new?
      -If the gap reverses, how can we deal with a China that has the military advantage?
      -Does the existence of a gap (offset) provide deterrence?

      These are the kinds of topics I'd prefer to see addressed rather than focusing on trivial side details.

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  9. More generally I would sideline all the post points and even the Pentagons budget balancing for one thing first. Fixing the state and trajectory of the Sub Fleet. Traditionally the US has disarmed after wars and had time to stumble into them because of its security of Oceans.

    In seems to me nothing but the best and largest set of SSN, SSBNs and SSGns can replicate that now. Sure they won't provide air cover or land troops but if the opponent cant leave port those things can be dealt in time.

    I admit I have no ideal if Los Angeles class subs or Ohio class subs can be stored. But I honestly would be willing to pay to do that and be expedite all the new subs so they (older classes) could retired before end of life (and convert more Ohios to SSGNs. And per the recent post pay for effective maintenance capacity.

    Prioritize sea denial over positive sea control. Although this would than require better missiles and likely new torpedoes as well.

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  10. Supersonic cruise missiles ... ‘unstoppable’ BrahMos... We need our own."

    Well lets hope the delay produces something lighter and less expensive than the BrahMos. Given the fragility of modern ships The warhead size looks like overkill if you assume impact at Mach 3.

    Mentioning their theoretical awesomeness... I sure any day the USN will announce they are going to simulate a saturation attack on a burke with some 12+ GQM-163 Coyotes any day now to prove that wrong.

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    1. "The warhead size looks like overkill if you assume impact at Mach 3."

      Two thoughts:

      1. You seem to think that Mach 3 alone confers some near-magical degree of destructiveness. We've done posts on this in relation to the super-cavitating torpedo which everyone assumed would sink a ship merely from its kinetic energy. As it turned out, the kinetic energy calcs proved that the KE contribution was almost negligible. I haven't done a KE calc for a BrahMos but it's easily done. Why don't you run it and let us know what you find? The equation is KE= 1/2(m)(v2) -that last term is v-squared

      2. China is building large carriers and planning to build supercarriers. A BrahMos size warhead will be quite useful to attack those size ships. Even the new Chinese Type 55 destroyer/cruiser is 13,000 tons or so and will require some heavy missiles to sink it.

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    2. "You seem to think that Mach 3 alone confers some near-magical degree of destructiveness"

      Not so. I am rather thinking about rendering a unit non functional. Secondly just wondering out load if a smaller warhead might also allow for a smaller missile thus be more easy to deploy in greater numbers and still achieve an effective end.

      Obviously you don't need to crack a Nasnen in half to sink it. I appreciate CVs are bigger but are they really any more durable?

      On the calculation thanks I had Physics in High School. I think that calculation would likely be pointless you rather need to run through all these at minimum (and not just calculate the KE in a vacuum):

      https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509688.pdf

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    3. " not just calculate the KE in a vacuum"

      Of course there's much more to the overall destructive effect than just simple KE. However, the KE calc is simple and provides a ballpark assessment of the KE's contribution to the overall destructive effect. For example, does the KE indicate that we'll vaporize the target with KE alone, barely make a dent, or somewhere in between.

      The supercavitating torpedo which everyone was so afraid of turned out to have a KE around 1-7% of the warhead contribution and, thus, was insignificant.

      For this case, a BrahMos, would the KE alone vaporize the ship and we don't even need a warhead, will the KE not even be enough to dent the hull, or will it contribute some significant portion of the overall destructive energy?

      So, yes, the simple KE calc is useful for this type of discussion. Run it and see what you get and let us know.

      It has been estimated that a carrier would require 8+ or so Harpoon type missiles to begin to worry it. The Enterprise and Forrestal conflagrations both involved the equivalent of dozens of large bomb hits and torrents of flaming fuel yet neither was ever in any danger of sinking so, yes, carriers are really far more durable.

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