Showing posts with label Senior Technical Authority. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Senior Technical Authority. Show all posts

Monday, August 10, 2020

The 2020 National Defense Authorization - Senior Technical Authority

Today, we're going to look at a new, little noticed provision in the law that is a potential game changer impacting how the Navy conducts shipbuilding programs.  We previously noted that Congress has, at long last, begun to exercise its oversight responsibilities over the Navy (see, “Congress Is Doing Its Job – Why Isn’t The Navy?”).  Now, we’ll take a look at what Congress has enacted into law in an attempt to control the Navy’s repetitive shipbuilding fiascos.  Specifically, the 2020 National Defense Authorization (NDA) Act mandates that the Navy provide a ‘Senior Technical Authority’ (STA) for each new naval vessel class undergoing acquisition and prohibits the Navy from funding lead vessels until the class has been certified the by the STA as described in


“10 U.S. Code § 8669b - Senior Technical Authority for each naval vessel class”


New vessels includes both new classes and new ‘flights’ or blocks of existing classes as defined in definitions section of the Code 10/d/(1)/B: 

(i) a substantially new class of craft (including craft procured using “new start” procurement); and

(ii) a class of craft undergoing a significant incremental change in its existing class (such as a next “flight” of destroyers or next “block” of attack submarines).

The Code also notes that the definition applies to both manned and unmanned vessels.

Thus, Congress is looking to exercise oversight on all new or significantly altered ship construction.  The latter is important as it closes one of the Navy’s favorite loopholes for getting around already established oversight controls by claiming that essentially brand new ships are just modifications (flights or blocks) of existing ships.  The new Burkes (Flt III) and the new LX(R) amphibious ships (now LPD-17 Flt II) are examples of the Navy’s attempts at evading Congressional oversight.

This legal requirement is the result of the Navy’s cumulative and systematic naval vessel acquisition failures (Ford, LCS, LPD-17, Zumwalt, etc.) over the last few decades.  Congress’ intent is to force the Navy to exercise better program management.  The question is, what is a ‘Senior Technical Authority’ (STA) and what will they do?

The full text of the relevant U.S. Code can be found in reference 1.

The following are some passages from the Code to help us try to understand what the STA is, and will do.

Senior Technical Authority – As described in the Code text below, the key characteristic of the STA is that it is a person who is independent of the acquisition program chain-of-command.  The hope is that this will free the person from Navy pressure and allow the STA to make decisions free of command influence.  It is also worth noting that the person would be a Senior Executive Service member which is the civil equivalent to military flag rank.  Again, the hope is that this will allow the person to act independently and free of influence.

(2) Individuals eligible for designation.—Each individual designated as a Senior Technical Authority under paragraph (1) shall be an employee of the Navy in the Senior Executive Service in an organization of the Navy that—

(A) possesses the technical expertise required to carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection (b); and

(B) operates independently of chains-of-command for acquisition program management.

Responsibilities - STA shall establish, monitor, and approve standards for the vessel class.  Exactly what types of standards and what level of detail this refers to is not spelled out.

Each Senior Technical Authority shall be responsible for, and have the authority to, establish, monitor, and approve technical standards, tools, and processes for the class of naval vessels for which designated under this section in conformance with applicable laws and Department of Defense and Department of the Navy policies, requirements, architectures, and standards.

Standards aside, the main responsibility of the STA is to certify new construction as being ready for production.  The certification process and actions are described below.

  • Description of engineering and technology risks
  • Designation of critical technologies
  • Test plan approval dates
  • Technical objectives and demonstrated performance
  • Determination that knowledge objectives are achievable prior to detail design and construction
  • Certification that test plans are effective
  • Other risk reduction efforts
  • Certification that each critical system has been prototyped or proven via identical components
  • Certification by SecNav that test plans are fully funded in future years
  • STA will approve, in writing, ship specifications before Request For Proposals for detail design and construction.  This is an attempt to prevent concurrent development and production.
  • Certification process must be complete 30 days prior to first funding of the lead vessel.


While some of the details, such as the exact type of standards that the STA will establish are not explicitly spelled out, the intent of the law seems quite clear.  Congress is attempting to prevent future concurrent development and production fiascos and intends to withhold funding until an independent overseer, the STA, certifies that the vessel is ready for production.

Okay, that’s clear enough.  What remains to be seen is how the Navy will respond.  We’ve seen a consistent pattern of the Navy ignoring or working around Congressional intent for the last few decades (recall that Congressionally mandated shipbuilding plan that is now long overdue and the Navy continues to ignore the law?) so it is unlikely that the Navy is going to meekly accept Congressional oversight.  Instead, the Navy will find workarounds, loopholes or, failing that, will simply ignore the law.  In fact, we can already see the Navy trying to find loopholes and ways around the law.

… last year lawmakers mandated more careful ship design reviews in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. Lloyd [Rear Adm. Jason Lloyd, the Navy’s chief engineer and the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) deputy commander for ship design, integration and engineering] said the Navy is still working its way through that language, which requires that each class of naval vessel have a senior technical authority who is outside the chain of command – and therefore independent from influence for cost or schedule reasons, for example – who would be responsible for signing off on ship designs before they can move into the construction phase, among the senior technical authority’s responsibilities.

“We’re trying to work through that now, what that really means. That was kind of put in because there’s concerns with the fact that we may have built some ships before they were ready to be built. And we’re starting to see some of those issues come up as cost,” Lloyd said. (2)

Consider the Admiral’s statement, “We’re trying to work through that now, what that really means.”  The meaning is plain – it’s only the Navy’s plan to work around it that’s unclear, as yet.  The Admiral’s statement makes it clear that the Navy has no intention of being bound by any authority that isn’t under its direct control.  I have no doubt that an entire Navy legal task force is hard at work crafting workarounds and identifying loopholes with the objective of ignoring the legal mandate.

Do you, perhaps, think that I’m overstating the degree of the Navy’s willingness and intent to ignore the law?  Well, overwhelming precedent exists for my belief that the Navy will do everything it can to subvert Congress’ intent and the law.  Here's a few examples to jog your memory.

Ticonderoga Retirements – The Navy tried to early retire the Ticonderoga class and Congress intervened and instructed the Navy not to.  Despite Congress’ clear intent that the ships not be early retired, the Navy persisted in their attempts and eventually concocted the fraudulent ‘modernization’ scheme that had the effect of idling and early retiring half the Ticonderoga fleet (see, “Ticonderoga Class Modernization” and “Still Trying To RetireCruisers”).

Cost Caps – Congress imposed construction cost caps on the Ford and LCS.  Of course, the Navy simply ignored the caps, blew right through them, and then went to Congress after the fact and got the caps increased (see, “LCSCost Cap”).  When Congress ran out of patience and refused to further increase the caps after multiple increases, the Navy came up with the practice of partial deliveries of incomplete ships to meet the caps, followed by additional ‘second phase’ construction which did not count against the caps.

Carrier Numbers – The carrier fleet is legally mandated at 11 carriers.  The Navy simply ignored the law and reduced the carrier fleet below the legal limit when the Enterprise was retired, knowing full well that the Ford would not be ready for many years.  Further, the Navy has dropped the number of air wings to 9 which means we only have, at most, 9 active carriers.


Give the Navy's blatant disregard for the law, we see, then, that we have two considerations regarding this law:

1. What the legal statements dictate.

2. What the Navy thinks the legal statements allow them to get away with and to what degree the Navy will simply ignore the law.


The Navy has been operating above and beyond the law for many years and it is long past time for Congress to exercise their Constitutional oversight responsibility.  However, Congress needs to be prepared for a long battle since the Navy will not willingly accept oversight.  This law is an excellent start but I can’t help but wish that Congress had included criminal penalties in the law for SecNav and CNO failure to comply.

If the Navy would put the same energy, effort, and creativity into training and maintenance that they put into evading the law, we wouldn’t have any problems.



____________________________________


(2)USNI News website, “Columbia SSBN Program Doing Land-Based Testing to Avoid Past Shipbuilding Mistakes”, Megan Eckstein, 5-Aug-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/08/05/columbia-ssbn-program-doing-land-based-testing-to-avoid-past-shipbuilding-mistakes