“10 U.S. Code § 8669b -
Senior Technical Authority for each naval vessel class”
New vessels includes both new
classes and new ‘flights’ or blocks of existing classes as defined in definitions
section of the Code 10/d/(1)/B:
(i) a substantially new class of craft (including
craft procured using “new start” procurement); and
(ii) a class of craft undergoing a significant
incremental change in its existing class (such as a next “flight” of destroyers
or next “block” of attack submarines).
The Code also notes that the
definition applies to both manned and unmanned vessels.
Thus, Congress is looking to
exercise oversight on all new or significantly altered ship construction. The latter is important as it closes one of
the Navy’s favorite loopholes for getting around already established oversight
controls by claiming that essentially brand new ships are just modifications
(flights or blocks) of existing ships.
The new Burkes (Flt III) and the new LX(R) amphibious ships (now LPD-17
Flt II) are examples of the Navy’s attempts at evading Congressional oversight.
This legal requirement is the
result of the Navy’s cumulative and systematic naval vessel acquisition
failures (Ford, LCS, LPD-17, Zumwalt, etc.) over the last few decades. Congress’ intent is to force the Navy to
exercise better program management. The
question is, what is a ‘Senior Technical Authority’ (STA) and what will they
do?
The full text of the relevant
U.S. Code can be found in reference 1.
The following are some
passages from the Code to help us try to understand what the STA is, and will
do.
Senior
Technical Authority – As described in the Code text below, the key
characteristic of the STA is that it is a person who is independent of the
acquisition program chain-of-command. The
hope is that this will free the person from Navy pressure and allow the STA to
make decisions free of command influence.
It is also worth noting that the person would be a Senior Executive
Service member which is the civil equivalent to military flag rank. Again, the hope is that this will allow the
person to act independently and free of influence.
(2) Individuals eligible for designation.—Each
individual designated as a Senior Technical Authority under paragraph (1) shall
be an employee of the Navy in the Senior Executive Service in an organization
of the Navy that—
(A) possesses the technical expertise required to
carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection (b); and
(B) operates independently of chains-of-command for
acquisition program management.
Responsibilities - STA shall
establish, monitor, and approve standards for the vessel class. Exactly what types of standards and what
level of detail this refers to is not spelled out.
Each Senior Technical Authority shall be responsible
for, and have the authority to, establish, monitor, and approve technical
standards, tools, and processes for the class of naval vessels for which
designated under this section in conformance with applicable laws and
Department of Defense and Department of the Navy policies, requirements,
architectures, and standards.
Standards aside, the main
responsibility of the STA is to certify new construction as being ready for
production. The certification process
and actions are described below.
- Description of engineering and technology risks
- Designation of critical technologies
- Test plan approval dates
- Technical objectives and demonstrated performance
- Determination that knowledge objectives are achievable prior to detail design and construction
- Certification that test plans are effective
- Other risk reduction efforts
- Certification that each critical system has been prototyped or proven via identical components
- Certification by SecNav that test plans are fully funded in future years
- STA will approve, in writing, ship specifications before Request For Proposals for detail design and construction. This is an attempt to prevent concurrent development and production.
- Certification process must be complete 30 days prior to first funding of the lead vessel.
While some of the details,
such as the exact type of standards that the STA will establish are not
explicitly spelled out, the intent of the law seems quite clear. Congress is attempting to prevent future
concurrent development and production fiascos and intends to withhold funding
until an independent overseer, the STA, certifies that the vessel is ready for
production.
Okay, that’s clear
enough. What remains to be seen is how
the Navy will respond. We’ve seen a
consistent pattern of the Navy ignoring or working around Congressional intent
for the last few decades (recall that Congressionally mandated shipbuilding
plan that is now long overdue and the Navy continues to ignore the law?) so it
is unlikely that the Navy is going to meekly accept Congressional
oversight. Instead, the Navy will find
workarounds, loopholes or, failing that, will simply ignore the law. In fact, we can already see the Navy trying
to find loopholes and ways around the law.
… last year lawmakers mandated more careful ship
design reviews in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act.
Lloyd [Rear Adm. Jason Lloyd, the Navy’s chief engineer and the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) deputy commander for ship design, integration and
engineering] said the Navy is still working its way through that language,
which requires that each class of naval vessel have a senior technical
authority who is outside the chain of command – and therefore independent from
influence for cost or schedule reasons, for example – who would be responsible
for signing off on ship designs before they can move into the construction
phase, among the senior technical authority’s responsibilities.
“We’re trying to work through that now, what that
really means. That was kind of put in because there’s concerns with the fact
that we may have built some ships before they were ready to be built. And we’re
starting to see some of those issues come up as cost,” Lloyd said. (2)
Consider the Admiral’s
statement, “We’re trying to work through that now, what that really
means.” The meaning is plain – it’s only
the Navy’s plan to work around it that’s unclear, as yet. The Admiral’s statement makes it clear that
the Navy has no intention of being bound by any authority that isn’t under its
direct control. I have no doubt that an
entire Navy legal task force is hard at work crafting workarounds and
identifying loopholes with the objective of ignoring the legal mandate.
Do you, perhaps, think that
I’m overstating the degree of the Navy’s willingness and intent to ignore the
law? Well, overwhelming precedent exists
for my belief that the Navy will do everything it can to subvert Congress’
intent and the law. Here's a few examples to jog your memory.
Ticonderoga Retirements – The
Navy tried to early retire the Ticonderoga class and Congress intervened and
instructed the Navy not to. Despite
Congress’ clear intent that the ships not be early retired, the Navy persisted
in their attempts and eventually concocted the fraudulent ‘modernization’
scheme that had the effect of idling and early retiring half the Ticonderoga
fleet (see, “Ticonderoga Class Modernization” and “Still Trying To RetireCruisers”).
Cost Caps – Congress imposed
construction cost caps on the Ford and LCS.
Of course, the Navy simply ignored the caps, blew right through them,
and then went to Congress after the fact and got the caps increased (see, “LCSCost Cap”). When Congress ran out of
patience and refused to further increase the caps after multiple increases, the
Navy came up with the practice of partial deliveries of incomplete ships to
meet the caps, followed by additional ‘second phase’ construction which did not
count against the caps.
Carrier Numbers – The carrier
fleet is legally mandated at 11 carriers.
The Navy simply ignored the law and reduced the carrier fleet below the
legal limit when the Enterprise was retired, knowing full well that the Ford
would not be ready for many years.
Further, the Navy has dropped the number of air wings to 9 which means
we only have, at most, 9 active carriers.
Give the Navy's blatant disregard for the law, we see, then, that we have
two considerations regarding this law:
1. What the legal statements
dictate.
2. What the Navy thinks the
legal statements allow them to get away with and to what degree the Navy will
simply ignore the law.
The Navy has been operating
above and beyond the law for many years and it is long past time for Congress
to exercise their Constitutional oversight responsibility. However, Congress needs to be prepared for a
long battle since the Navy will not willingly accept oversight. This law is an excellent start but I can’t
help but wish that Congress had included criminal penalties in the law for SecNav and CNO failure to comply.
If the Navy would put the
same energy, effort, and creativity into training and maintenance that they put
into evading the law, we wouldn’t have any problems.
(2)USNI News website, “Columbia
SSBN Program Doing Land-Based Testing to Avoid Past Shipbuilding Mistakes”,
Megan Eckstein, 5-Aug-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/08/05/columbia-ssbn-program-doing-land-based-testing-to-avoid-past-shipbuilding-mistakes
The result after badass of LCS and Zumu
ReplyDelete"Senior Technical Authority – As described in the Code text below, the key characteristic of the STA is that it is a person who is independent of the acquisition program chain-of-command"
ReplyDeleteNot sure that will be sufficient. I would almost suggest you would need completely parallel chain of command separate from all others not just the acquisition command. More like an Internal affairs type system possibly. Thus promotion would depend only on effective oversight.
Also of course the STA will need a budget to bring its own outside experts or maintain a staff of those.
"Not sure that will be sufficient."
DeleteI have some doubt, as well.
"Thus promotion would depend only on effective oversight."
As I vaguely understand it, there is no promotion. The Senior Executive Service already is the equivalent of flag rank. There is probably some slight upward supervisory position but these are people who are already at the top. I think that is one of the points - to have people who are immune to promotion desires or pressures.
You do raise a good question about funding. Nothing I saw indicates where the support funding would come from.
I was thinking more of where the staff would come from in terms of promotion. No one senior person can possibly be the master at evaluating all things. Is the staff going to be all civil service or civilian contractors and thus divorced from the USN bureaucracy and also have no concern about pissing off their paymaster if was the navy instead (lower ranked uniform).
DeleteI don't know if you have looked into this and I'm not 100% sure but it seems like the civil branch choices are limited. I think that the large ship designers are MOSTLY affiliated with the military. There are currently 4 colleges that allow you to study naval engineers as a civilian and all of them emphasized on small ship designing and unmanned naval vehicles. Let's hypothesized that we have all those 4 colleges recruiting at full capacity, I still can say for sure that we don't have enough civilian development and input to have the expertise to oversee such an important project without some prior military involvement. The funny thing is that the Air Force equivalent is aerospace engineering degree has more than 150 Universities supporting it while aggressively marketed and developed and our Air Force ends up with the F-35. It is gonna take more than an STA in charge to change the way of thinking, it needs the entire institution to challenge the conventional wisdom and that requires a vibrant and strong civilian institution (my opinion is that the military culture revolves around trust and dependency, therefore really difficult to question the foundation-the aforementioned conventional wisdom). It is my hope that when I get to a college-age entering, I could enter a much more developed naval engineering atmosphere but it is unlikely that something like this could reasonably happened is the near future.
Delete"large ship designers are MOSTLY affiliated with the military."
DeleteThat's kind of unavoidable since the military is the largest source of large ship design in the US. That's also not a bad thing. Having past military experience or affiliation is not the problem. The problem is when the project overseers/managers are in the direct chain of command of the Navy. That means they've lost their ability to make unpopular decisions.
The point of the STA is not to remove any connection with the military but to remove the project overseer from the chain of command.
Also, bear in mind that the Navy does not have ship designers. Design work is contracted out to the commercial shipbuilding companies. Those people are civilians though obviously closely connected to the military.
I do wonder about the prospect of removing the project overseer from the chain of command as well cause i feel like this position destroys any prospect for reemployment. I do wanna say that I am not aware how Senior Executive Service member are recruited but i assumed it's like how Colonel James Burton in the Pentagon Wars. To do what's right, it has deprived him the ability of promotions and job prospects and it's unlikely that someone in such a high position is willing to alienate their service branch. Another question that i was wondering about is the length of the job, will we have a designated position and whoever is chosen will hold the job for the length of his service life, or will we alternate between members?
Delete"prospect of removing the project overseer from the chain of command"
DeleteThey won't be removed from the chain of command because they will never have been in it. The SES is separate from the Navy. Any promotion possibilities in the SES remain the concern of the SES.
"wondering about is the length of the job,"
The term of the STA is specified in the law as the time required to certify the vessel for production. In any reasonable scenario, it should be a year or two, I would guess.
"If the Navy would put the same energy, effort, and creativity into training and maintenance that they put into evading the law, we wouldn’t have any problems."
ReplyDeleteAin't that the truth.
I have many doubts about whether this STA will actually work instead of rubber stamping egregious failures, but if it does perhaps the end of the fiasco tunnel is a bit closer.
Another point is the lack of technical expertise to actually evaluate very complex systems.
That's what I was trying to get would an independent staff that is not tied to the navy or the contractors.
Delete"That's what I was trying to get would an independent staff that is not tied to the navy or the contractors."
DeleteThe problem is that you need considerable technical expertise, and that is gong to be hard to get without some ties to either Navy or contractors.
"The problem is that you need considerable technical expertise,"
DeleteNot necessarily. It depends on what level of detail you want to get into. If the STA is going to architecturally design the ship and specify the tensile strength of each bolt then, yes, you've got to have an STA with PhD level engineering expertise. However, if the STA is just going to set the top level requirments and then see to it that the various steps are carried out in the proper order then, no, you don't need extreme technical expertise. Many of us on this blog, given some access to classified information, could fill the role quite well. It's mostly common sense.
The wise STA will consult with subject matter experts and consider their input while making their decisions. Again, mostly common sense. How many of the points that I've hammered on in this blog boil down to just common sense? That's right, most of them!
The position will be tough to fill with someone who wont bow to pressure and influence. In fact, Id think that theres pressure and influence trying to shape the position before its filled. Clearly the Navy is, as CNO adeptly showed. I think the Internal Affairs type is the right approach. Common sense, a hint of technical knowledge, unshirkable moral courage, along with an immovable attitude of "Im gonna kill your project unless you absolutely prove its ready... Every T dotted and I crossed or else..." is whats needed!!
DeleteSign me up...!!!
Delete@CDR Chip
DeleteYou need expertise. It might come from the Navy or the US contractors but there are other NATO navies and other experts retired or from academia or Merchant Marineor in Industry, who knows not currently building for the Navy. Sure now you got get clearances and stuff, but... how would that stack against the cost of not building a new LCS?
Just saying I think the position(S) (is there on per ship or overall) needs not only a good flag level officer free of worry, but a staff not dependent on going back into the general USN to do the footwork on research and what not.
I dont have much faith in finding a "good flag level officer"...
DeleteAs far as expertise, i disagree. Some basic knowledge of systems and how they relate to a CONOPS is all thats needed. We wouldnt have needed a Electromagnetic PhD to ask:
"So, whats the failure rate of the EMALS prorotype?"
"About 10% sir..."
"Thats unacceptable. Ill give you 6 more months to sort it out or Ill be reverting to steam. We're two years from a keel laying of the new Ford, so youre almost out of time. Sorry Jim..."
An STA need not be an ASW or MCM expert to say "This ship is supposed to be modular. If you cant produce the functional proven modules Frank, Im going to kill the whole class. We are looking at a keel laying in 22 months. You have 18 to have tested, integrated, shock tested modules ready for production or Im shutting you down..."
Delete"I have many doubts about whether this STA will actually work"
DeleteAs do I. However, what we're doing now clearly isn't working at all so why not try something new?
To be clear, I am absolutely in favor of this attempt, Congress actually doing something after God only knows how many billions squandered is very welcome news.
Delete"Another point is the lack of technical expertise to actually evaluate very complex systems."
ReplyDeleteI have one thought that has intrigued me from the first time I heard about it, in Bahrain in 1970. Royal Navy counterparts explained to me that the RN splits what we call line officers into two communities--call them deck/weapons and engineering. Engineering officers run the ship, and deck/weapons officers fight the ship. The Chief Engineer and First Lieutenant (XO) are basically equal, although the First Lieutenant has primacy over disciplinary matters. Engineering officers do not get command at sea, but do command major shore facilities, including shipbuilding and maintenance.
The deck/warfare officers are much more intensely trained in things like rules of the road, strategy, and tactics than are our line officers. The engineering officers are much more intensely trained to develop superior technical expertise.
In the ship procurement and building context, the deck/warfare officers would specify the mission and CONOPS and the engineering officers would design and develop the ship to meet that CONOPS. Each side kind of does the part that fits its expertise. Tradeoffs would be negotiated between the two--to get one more gun you need to give up one more missile launcher, and so forth.
I think the split makes more sense from a ship operations standpoint, but the more I look at procurement, the more I think it may make a lot of sense there, too.
The big problem with these laws is that they don't specify what happens if you break them, i.e. jail time and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. If you want compliance then add teeth. Oh, definitely specify that it gets tried in federal court instead of courts martial. That should add a bit o' chill in the air.
ReplyDeleteAgreed 100%!!
DeleteNo consequences=No effort to comply!!
I am afraid that the real most important under table issue is who get money. Companies have their lobbying force at high gear.
ReplyDeleteIn recent years, US military tech development constantly suffer long delay and huge cost overrun. This is either poor planning or poor executing or both, from my industry experiences. People first boast unrealistically to fool general public and then under delivery.
As many like to criticize China but you can see they frequently complete military tech development ahead of schedule. Not to mention, they build an advanced navy ship ~1/3 cost of equivalent of US one with ~half construction time.
China's recent development of 076 amphibious ship is very interesting as it puts two electrical magnetic ejections on it. An amphibious ship with many drones is a good idea which US navy may also study to build one.
It seems like what is needed is to resurrect BuShips.
ReplyDeleteYes!
DeleteThis looks like another attempt to prematurely lock in specifications before we actually know what the Navy needs, and what actually can be done. Sure it looks good to the beancounters to have a piece of paper to hold up and use as an excuse to beat up the engineering types that where ask to do what turn up
ReplyDeleteundo able given the fund allotted.
Only if we allow the STA to change specifications or Requirements when necessary without congressional interference can this possible be made to worK. In other words the the STA must have the power to correct problems when the are discover. That way he will not be forced to waste billion of dollars trying to meet specification that are not really needed.
You may have missed the intent of the STA as regards specifications. The objective is to establish specifications BEFORE beginning construction so as to avoid the current bad practice of concurrent construction and development. The co-objective is to ensure that the specifications CAN BE MET and that they are not based on non-existent technology.
Delete"This looks like another attempt to prematurely lock in specifications before we actually know what the Navy needs,"
I don't know what you're saying here. Again, the intent is to lock in specifications BEFORE commencing construction. Hard to see how that's anything but good so I'm not sure what you're seeing as a problem.
The STA is not limited as to who he can consult with and he will, undoubtedly, consult with engineers and anyone else he thinks might have legitimate input. What he, hopefully, won't do is listen to admirals who have no clue and are interested only in partnering up with a defense company so as to obtain a cushy retirement job.
If I've misunderstood your comment, feel free to explain further.
Taking this a whole different direction, this statement "Rear Adm. Jason Lloyd, the Navy’s chief engineer and the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) deputy commander for ship design, integration and engineering," got me to thinking, why is that a RADM slot, so I took a look at the NAVSEA org chart. There are 17 slots filled by flag officers. Doesn't that seem a bit top-heavy at one command?
ReplyDeleteWow...!!! I dont think a Fleet needs 17 flags!!!
DeleteInteresting that the NAVSEA CO has only had two at sea tours, both on Knox FFs, but was part of the Zumwalt and LPD-17 development programs. Now a VADM. So much for accountability...
DeletePerhaps part of the answer is to use senior staff from foreign (friendly) navies/organisations?
ReplyDeleteIs that even legally possible?
DeleteOf course it is!
DeleteI don't know if there is any legal prohibition against foreign personnel serving in an SES position but it would appear to be highly unlikely to happen. For starters the STA MUST be an SES employee which means any candidate foreign personnel would have to be hired as US SES. Meeting and documenting the SES Core Competencies using foreign experience would be a challenge and it is doubtful that any foreign personnel would want to do so and would be willing to commit to the multi-year tasking.
DeleteSo, there may not be a legal prohibition (or maybe there is? citizenship may be a requirement - I don't know) but it seems very unlikely that it would happen.
I doubt it would be legal as the actual STA. But I suppose under that you might be able to bring in tiny staff of non US citizens assuming that they already had had background checks and could get a new one. We do officer exchanges with key allies all the time.
Delete"tiny staff of non US citizens assuming that they already had had background checks"
DeleteWe don't allow Virginia class subs to participate in exercises with allies (or our own forces!) due to fear of revealing classified information. I can't imagine we'd agree to allow foreign personnel to see the detailed specs for new classes of ships.
There is a serious issue - US has lost civilian ship building industry. Current US ship building industry is almost equivalent to military ship building industry. Good technologies, practices and efficiencies learned from civilian side are missing.
ReplyDeleteAmong US allies, S. Korea (no. 2) and Japan (no. 3) still have significant civilian ship building industry, especially they focus more on high tech ones than China (no. 1).
It is harsh but might be necessary - force US ship yard to compete with S. Korea and Japan on new contracts. For a short period, some unionized patriotic Americans might lose their jobs but could force them to be more efficient.
I'm sorry, but this sounds too much like creating a new bureaucracy to grade the papers of the existing bureaucracies.
ReplyDeleteNothing wrong with that if the existing one has proven track record of sub optimal outcomes.
DeleteAlthough the Navy should probably face some kind formal Congressional investigation to report/review and with the power to enforce change to the acquisitions process as well.
But isn't the real solution to fix the existing one? I just don't see where adding another level of bureaucracy solves anything. Navy needs to be given some solid direction and held to it. And holding them to it means firing those who don't follow it.
Delete"I just don't see where adding another level of bureaucracy solves anything."
DeleteTheoretically, you're correct. We already have all the existing tools needed to effectively oversee the Navy. Number one among the tools is the purse strings. Congress should simply halt all funding to the Navy until Congress gets whatever they want from the Navy (firing people, revised acquisition processes, whatever). However, since Congress seems largely unwilling to do this (although they've held back some unmanned vessel funding), I'm all for trying this approach if additional bureaucracy is what Congress is comfortable with.
I'm dubious but hopeful.
Actually, I'd turn it around and say theoretically this may be a good idea, but in practice I don't see it accomplishing much.
DeleteWe need to fix the basic process, not add on another layer of bureaucracy. We need to develop strategy, identify missions to support that strategy, develop CONOPS to accomplish that mission, and design ships to CONOPS. And we need some cost discipline, particularly with respect to opportunity cost. I don't see any of that coming from this.
Color me dubious but not particularly hopeful.
"We need to fix the basic process, not add on another layer of bureaucracy."
DeleteWell that's fine certainly the Pentagon is allowed a huge amount of latitude to waste and screw up over and over again quite unlike any of agency.
But in this case it seems to a relatively independent second look look is hardly a new layer of bureaucracy.
I can't find it now and probably only had is a print out but I had an article from the 90s looking at how much internal auditing the Pentagon did compared the largest auto companies (VW, GM Ford, Toyota, etc). and it was not even close. Almost nobody is internally and independently checking on things and also rewarded for bringing bad news to light or challenging rosy assumptions.
I mean if the DLA can loose 7 billion dollars worth of stuff, I hardly think an small team taking a hopefully unbiased eye to acquisitions before the Pentagon starts spending and than pulling sunk cost arguments out its butt is a problem.
Auditing works because you have objective standards to compare to--GAAP or whatever standard you are applying. This strikes me as more like a judgement call about somebody else's judgement call. I would be more positively impressed by establishing some firm standards for doing it in the first place.
DeleteMaybe I will feel differently about how it actually turns out in practice, but for now I am hopeful but not optimistic--and quite frankly, not all that hopeful.
Let them catch the next Zumwalt or Ford or LCS or (insert name here) and stop it. Then maybe we will have something. Right now, I just don't see it making much difference.
ReplyDeleteI mean, where are we going to find the angels to fill these positions?
I've dealt with too many federal "oversight" agencies that didn't do any real oversight. To me, it's just adding another layer of bureaucracy to help somebody CYA. "Maybe it was a dumb idea, but don't blame me. STA signed off on it." The classic bureaucrat pass-the-buck move.
Well, I'm pretty sure you don't think the current system is working. Since you don't like Congress' attempt to improve things, what PRACTICAL solution do you suggest?
DeleteOh, I've got a LOT of ideas, but you knew that.
DeleteOne, come up with some kind of reality-based strategy, define CONOPS based on that strategy, and build the fleet you need to execute that.
Two, pay some attention to cost, including opportunity cost. How much better is a Ford than a Nimitz? How much better is a Ford than a Nimitz and a Kitty Hawk? How much better are two Fords than a Nimitz, a Kitty Hawk, and a 10-ship escort squadron? My guess is not at all, at best, and a whole lot worse until the EMALS and arresting gear and weapons lifts work.
Three, don't build anything until any new technology is thoroughly tested, and don't build more than one AFTER the new technology is tested, until you have time to put it all together out to sea and find out what doesn't work nearly as well on a ship as it did on a test bed. Before you build one Ford, you test everything to the nth degree. But equally important, before you contract for 2 or 3 or 4 Fords, you take the first one to sea and make everything work perfectly in that environment. Shipboard and test bed are not the same.
Four, understand that we are never going to build the Navy we need if it all has to be Fords and Zumwalts and LCSs and LHAs/LHDs. The only ways to get the fleet we need are to split it up, either high/low or your war/peace mix. That's one problem I worry about with STA. If they just look at a project in a vacuum, and not the tradeoffs, then I don't know how much good they will do.
I guess my biggest concern is the opportunity cost thing. If you evaluate any ship in a vacuum, you can get to where STA can sign off on it. But nobody seems to be asking the question, "If we build a Ford, how may cruisers/destroyers/frigates are we sacrificing that we could build if we built a Nimitz? And is the Ford really so much better than the Nimitz that we can blow off those cruisers/destroyers/frigates and be ahead of the game?
"Oh, I've got a LOT of ideas,"
DeleteYes, you've got ideas but they're not really practical in the real world. That's what I was asking. In the real world, what idea do you have that could actually be implemented? You scoff at what Congress has done but at least they did something. They implemented a real world idea.
So, what real world idea do you have that could be implemented and how would it be executed? For example, your opportunity cost concept, setting aside the merits or lack thereof, can't be implemented in the real world because it would require a complete rethink on the part of Navy leadership which, if they haven't done so on their own by now, after all their failures, they're never going to do - so it's not really a practical, implementable scheme.
Yes, I am talking about a complete rethink for Navy leadership. I think the Navy has to build the changes in internally, not just bolt on some external checker.
DeleteIn the words of that great philosopher, Lawrence Peter Berra, “In theory, theory works well in practice. In practice, it doesn’t.” We need more practical thinking and less theoretical.
Opportunity costs—That online video presentation by CAPT Tal Manvel at USNA on developing the Ford concept made it pretty clear that they did not consider, and were basically directed not to consider, opportunity costs. It's nice to know that the Fords can theoretically generate more sorties than another carrier, but does it generate more than two other carriers, or does it generate enough to offset the fact that you can't afford escorts? Opportunity cost has to be driven into the process from above.
High/low mix—I think Zumwalt did some stupid things--the enlisted uniform fiasco for one. But he understood that we were going to lose a lot of funding with Vietnam drawing down, and we better figure out how to build numbers with less money, so he came up with high/low mix. I thought the Perrys were underpowered and undergunned, just like the Knoxes (which weren’t Zumwalt’s) before them. But both Knoxes and Perrys turned out to be pretty good ASW platforms, and that was huge in winning the Cold War. The 600-ship navy would have been totally impossible without the head start on numbers that 46 Knoxes and 51 Perrys gave us.
War—The Navy has to remember that their job is to win wars, not play with snazzy toys. Strategy drives mission, mission drives CONOPS, CONOPS drives ship design. A snazzy toy that doesn’t help you win a war is useless. This is where selection boards come in. We need to promote warriors, not paper shufflers.
Career Path—I would like to look at the way the Royal Navy does their officer corps. They split what we call line officers into deck/weapons and engineering. Engineering runs the ship, deck/weapons fight the ship. Deck/weapons officers get trained in rules of the road, strategy, and tactics and get command at sea. Engineering officers develop technical expertise in engineering areas and get command of shore activities and ship construction, maintenance, and repair facilities. They build up a reservoir of senior officers with significant engineering/scientific/technical knowledge and experience. Those guys could become BuShips. Deck/weapons officers give them the combat specs needed, and they figure out the most cost-effective way to build them. They’re not perfect, they’ve had some issues, but mostly with yo-yo spending cuts. I think they’ve actually been pretty creative with some of their responses.
Honesty and Discipline—I think the Navy needs to be told, “OK, you’ve got $X to spend per year. Build the best fleet you can for that.” If you give them, say, $20B a year to spend, then if they’re honest, they figure out that they can’t build Fords and Zumwalts and LCSs and LHAs, or they run out of money before they get to a fleet. Maybe the STA introduces some honesty.
Change orders—Once you start to build something, that’s what you build. If you come up with a better idea, put it on the next ship of the class, and backfit it onto the earlier ones in a major maintenance period.
Ship lives—If a ship is built to last 40 years, keep it 40 years. If we had kept the Perrys and Spruances their full lives, we’d still have about 6 Sprucans and 30-40 Perrys.
Career—If you retire and go to work for a defense contractor, your retirement pay and benefits go on hold until to leave that gig.
But you are right. I am suggesting a complete rethink by Navy brass, because I don't see any way the problem gets solved otherwise. If a bunch of people have to be fired to get there, then start firing. My ideas are long-term, because I don’t think there is a fix without changing the culture.
Maybe the STA will work. Maybe it will be the tool that gets the Navy to see the error of its ways and turn around. But I don't think so.
DeleteOne interesting thing is that the Navy's projected cost of the 304 ships that it has to build to get to 355 in 30 years is $22 billion a year. CBO's latest estimate is $29 billion. Somebody is way off on cost estimation, and I wouldn't bet on CBO being the one who is. If anything, I think even they may be underestimating. They have the Fords at $13 billion apiece, for example. The $22 billion number is in line with what the Navy has been spending in the last 3-4 years, and I'm guessing that's how they got there. Here, let's put some cost numbers on everything, so they total up to what we've been spending, and let's run that up the flagpole to see if somebody salutes it. Sounds like that gambit has been discovered, at least by SecDef and the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Here's one way costs get out of control. I had a friend who was one of the officers on the construction team for the Nimitz. He told me, "It is no fun building a carrier within 100 miles of DC. Every week, some admiral drives down and decides that the bridge layout is wrong, and the radar repeater needs to be over here, and the helmsman needs to stand over there, instead of the layout we were building. So a change order goes in, and the contractor has to reroute all the electronics (mostly back to where they were 2-3 admirals' visits ago), which mean changes to all the decks below, and we add a million or two to the cost."
Contractors know they will get rich off change orders, and they do. So when you start building a ship, finish the same ship you started, unless you have a serious health or safety issue. If somebody comes up with this new and improved way to do something while you are in construction, put that on the next one in the class, and plan to backlit it to this during a major maintenance period.
Also, put a limit on how much new stuff you put on any ship. Say 75-80% of it has to be existing technology. If you have some wonderful and great new tech, iron the bugs out a bit more and again, put it on the next ship in the class. The original idea with the Fords was a three-ship progression--say, the EMALS would go on the first ship, the arresting gear would go on the second, and the electronics would go on the third, or something like that. Focus on making one thing work at a time, instead of having a ship whee nothing works. Of course, based on CAPT Manvel's speech, if we had gone that route, we would have dropped the electronics part, so it would have been a 2-carrier progression. I still don't see how you put something as important as a catapult on a carrier, without testing it so much, both on land and at sea, that it couldn't possibly fail. But that's just me.
Perhaps it's time to be brutal in dealing with the Navy's defiance. If the Navy is defying Congress--a constitutional authority over them--then we should be charging Admirals under the UCMJ for disobeying a lawful order. They don't have to be sent to prison, but could certainly be demoted and discharged under "less than honorable" conditions if not a outright dishonorable discharge. You take away their authority, retirement, and money. Do that 4 or 5 times and they will begin to obey the law.
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