Tactical Timidity

One of the worst characteristics a military individual or organization can exhibit is timidity.  Before we go any further, let’s define timidity.  For our discussion, timidity is the failure to act at an opportune moment due to doubt and uncertainty.  Timidity eliminates the possibility of bold success – and devastating failure.  The timid commander will experience neither and, as a result, accomplish nothing.

Let’s consider a few historical examples and then we can discuss the phenomenon.

First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal – 13-Nov-1942

The Japanese, in a major attempt to reinforce Guadalcanal, committed a large task force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, commanded by Adm. Abe, to shell Henderson Field and prepare the way for transports carrying troop reinforcements.  After a confusing, point blank night battle, the defending US force was almost wiped out while Abe retained the bulk of his force intact and relatively undamaged.  The way was clear for Abe to continue on and completely eliminate the US naval presence, destroy Henderson Field, and assure the safe landing of the Japanese reinforcements.  Inexplicably, Abe broke off the engagement and retired.  His timidity likely cost the Japanese possession of Guadalcanal.

Battle off Samar – 25-Oct-1944

Japan’s Center Force, led by Kurita, was still very powerful, consisting of four battleships (including the Yamato), six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eleven destroyers. The group encountered the US escort carriers  and escorting destroyers (Taffy 3).  Despite incessant US air attacks by improperly armed aircraft which were generally ineffective and the destroyer’s heroic actions, Kurita’s force sank three destroyers and the escort carrier Gambier Bay.  At that point, the way to the amphibious shipping at Leyte Gulf was wide open.  Inexplicably, Kurita broke off the attack, turned away, and retired to the north.

German Surface Fleet in WWII

The Germans exhibited repeated, institutional timidity in the use of their surface fleet.  This resulted in the withholding of powerful ships (Tirpitz) from action and the piecemeal expenditure of other ships for little gain.

US Submarine Commanders – 1942

US submarine commanders in the first year of WWII exhibited the inbred, institutional timidity that their peacetime training had instilled in them.  They were cautious and timid in the extreme.  It wasn’t until more aggressive commanders took their places that the US submarine effort became effective.  Of course, the faulty torpedo issue didn’t help!

General George McClellan – US Civil War

Gen. McClellan’s repeated timidity was demonstrated by his refusal to press his advantage during the Peninsula campaign and the Battle of Antietam which could have dealt a decisive blow to the Confederacy.  Thus, the war dragged on and President Lincoln eventually replaced  McClellan.

Military history is replete with examples of timidity that forfeited the opportunity for decisive victory..  History is also full of examples of the opposite, which is calculated boldness and aggressiveness.  For example,

Battle of Mobile Bay – 5-Aug-1864

During the American Civil War, a Union fleet led by Adm. David Farragut attacked a Confederate fleet and three forts guarding Mobile Bay.  During the battle, when confronted with a minefield that could have stymied the Union attack, Adm. Farragut issued his oft paraphrased order, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead”.  The Union fleet passed through the minefield and went on to defeat the Confederate fleet, seize the forts, and capture Mobile Bay.

I won’t belabor the point with endless illustrations of timidity and boldness.

Today, US commanders are the very epitome of timidity.  They spend their command tours in a state of near-paralysis, praying that no one in their command makes a mistake that could result in the dreaded ‘loss of confidence’ and removal from command.  US naval timidity derives directly from the zero-defect mentality that has taken hold of the Navy.  When mistakes are not allowed and no second chances are given, timidity quickly manifests and becomes the ruling culture.

While the formal antidote to timidity is intel, comprehensive intel is often unavailable at the opportune moment.  At that point, there is no substitute for an inherent sense of boldness and aggressiveness backed, of course, by tactical competence and experience.  Boldness requires self-confidence whereas timidity results from the complete absence of self-confidence.

It should be noted that timidity is not simply an artifact of hindsight where poor decisions or poor results are ascribed to timidity.  Someone can make bad decisions without being timid.  An aggressive plan can go badly wrong without having timidity to blame (Operation Market Garden in WWII, for example).

This leads us to note that there is a fine line between timidity and prudence.  Prudence can be thought of as the opposite of a calculated risk – it is a calculated caution.  Adm. Spruance’s decision at Midway to retire after having achieved a significant measure of success was a calculated caution that avoided a possible night battle with Japanese battleships – a battle he could not have won.  His prudence preserved the American success.

So, how do we avoid instilling a habit of timidity in our military leaders?  It starts with abandoning the zero-defect mentality and practice.  In fact, we need to practice the opposite.  We need to encourage officers to make mistakes that they can learn from.  We need to foster an attitude and environment of calculated risk taking coupled with forgiveness.

Encouraging mistakes is good but we have to provide a ‘sandbox’ where officers can exercise their risk taking.  That sandbox is wargames and fleet exercises.  No amount of policy papers encouraging mistakes will accomplish anything.  We need to turn officers loose in realistic exercises to try things and succeed or fail and to do so with no penalties for failing.  We need to be running ten times as many exercises as we do now and they need to be free form and realistic.

We bred timidity into our Navy and we can breed it out.  We just need to make it a priority.