Well, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Gilday seems to have
suddenly remembered the LCS and wants to see them deployed a few more
times. Of course, what they would
usefully do on deployment, he didn’t say and I can’t imagine but at least it
might give the crew some sea time.
We’ve known the LCS has had major reliability and
maintenance problems, all along, despite the Navy’s constant glowing
affirmations about the miracle of the LCS maintenance model – you know, the
model that involves no at sea maintenance and requires excessively costly dock
side maintenance every couple of weeks.
Well, CNO Gilday now acknowledges the problems.
We
know enough about that platform [ed. the LCS] and the problems that we have
that plague us with regard to reliability and sustainability, and I need them
resolved.” (1)
LCS reliability problems have impacted deployments with some
stunning failures and the specter of systemic propulsion problems looms large
for future deployments.
“The
propulsion architecture’s unreliability means you are going to have to come up
with a different way to deploy the ship that doesn’t require every deployment
to be transoceanic,” Clark [Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute.] said. “By the time the ship gets to Singapore,
it needs a lot of work done to it and your deployment time is cut down by the
fact that you have to repair the ship once it arrives. (1)
What does this systemic inability to transit tell us about
the Navy’s fantasy vision of distributed lethality operations deep inside enemy
waters? It tells us that it’s pure
fantasy. If we can’t even transit from
one port to the next, how can the LCS operate for extended periods in
combat? Oh wait, we can’t because even
if we can get to the operating area without breaking down, we have to return to
port every two weeks for dock side maintenance.
Seriously, who came up with this maintenance model and then what genius
ignored the model and decided it made the LCS ideal for distributed lethality?
Reliability and maintenance aside, there’s also the matter
of the non-existent modules. The only
module that exists in any semi-functional form is the anti-surface warfare
(ASuW) module and it’s only semi-functional because the original specifications
and requirements have been downgraded so completely. The anti-submarine (ASW) and mine
countermeasure (MCM) modules have been in development for decades and show no
signs of being ready in our lifetimes.
CNO Gilday acknowledges the modules failures.
“I
have to deliver ... both the mine and ASW modules.” (1)
Good luck, CNO!
You’re running out of time. Four
of the ships are being immediately retired, never having seen a module, and the
rest are rapidly running through their lifespans, again without any functional
modules. We’re going to see more LCS
retiring without ever having carried a useful, functional module. That’s just embarrassing.
 |
Just Park It Off To The Side Somewhere
And We'll Dispose Of It When We Get Some Time
|
Without modules, the LCS is barely a Coast Guard
cutter. Gilday acknowledges this,
The
Navy deployed the LCS Detroit to South America — the 4th Fleet area of
operations — last year on a counternarcotics mission, and it returned earlier
this month. Those are the kinds of missions for which the LCS is perfectly
suited, Gilday said.
“I
can deploy these things with a [law enforcement detachment] and a signals
intelligence capability, and I can do that on LCS with carry-on gear,” Gilday
said. “It’s the right kind of platform for that. (1)
So, CNO Gilday acknowledges that the Navy built a supposed
warship whose only suitable purpose is low end, Coast Guard type missions. Nicely done, Navy.
One of the major problems for the LCS is that it no longer
offers anything unique. For example, the
new frigate will offer superior ASW capability – that actually works when the
ship is delivered, one hopes! That said,
why would the Navy continue to pour money into the LCS and ASW module when the
LCS is only marginally deployable and will begin retiring soon? It is not hard to foresee the Navy deciding
to suspend LCS ASW funding.
Similarly, the LCS ASuW module offers nothing that the new
frigate doesn’t offer ten times over.
The LCS MCM capability would be useful since there is no
alternative but it’s still years away and, again, the ships are going to begin
retiring before the modules start showing up!
Gilday sums his LCS objective up, thusly,
“LCS
for me is something, on my watch, I’ve got to get right.” (1)
Seriously, the opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was
before the program started, when it was still a concept. That was the time to develop a Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) and understand what you would and would not get from such a
ship. The opportunity for the LCS to
‘get right’ was before you committed to using non-existent technology. The opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’
was before you conceived an idiotic no-maintenance-at-sea concept.
I’m sorry, CNO Gilday but the opportunity for the LCS to
‘get right’ ended on day one of the program when the Navy committed to 55 ships
with no CONOPS, non-existent technology, and an idiotic maintenance plan. There’s nothing left to ‘get right’. The best thing that can be done, at this
point, is to stop kidding yourself that this class has anything to offer,
retire the entire class, and move on to more pressing matters. Stop pouring money into an acquisition money
pit and acknowledge what all the rest of us could see from day one – that the
program was an ill-conceived, dismal failure – and take your lumps and move
on.
(1)Defense News website, “US Navy prepares major surge of
littoral combat ship deployments”, David B. Larter, 1-Aug-2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/31/the-us-navy-is-preparing-a-major-surge-of-lcs-deployments/
The LCSs need to deploy? Why? Do our tugs need more practice towing them home?
ReplyDeleteOuch! I think CNO Gilday is going to take you off his Christmas card list!
DeleteThe new LCS "Steel Beach" module needs to be tested.
DeleteTaking advantage of the hi-speed, water skiing, kite surfing and flight deck fire pits need extensive testing. Also the below deck beer cave submodule.
Party Boats of the Fleet.
"The LCS MCM capability would be useful since there is no alternative but it’s still years away and, again, the ships are going to begin retiring before the modules start showing up!"
ReplyDeleteI'm sorry, but as an old mine warfare sailor, I have to take exception. The LCS MCM module is not a capability, it is a dream--and a very bad dream, at that. The only thing that the LCS can do is go 40+ knots (when the engines work), and the last thing in the world you want to do in a minefield is go 40+ knots.
The Navy has to build dedicated mine warfare ships. Whatever conceptual approach they use, they have to have dedicated ships to implement that approach. It has to be a primary mission, not a collateral duty. A bolt-on to some other ship designed to do something else (whatever that is, in the case of the LCS) simply won't get it done. The Navy has never wanted to spend money on mine warfare, because mines aren't sexy. But there is no other capability that returns more bang (literally) for the buck than mines.
I don't know what has been declassified, so I will be somewhat vague, but when we mined the North Vietnamese harbors, we closed those ports down until the End Sweep clearance operation. An enemy could do the same to us, and we could do very little about it.
I beg to differ. Mines are quite sexy when they destroy or disable enemy shipping, ships or navy assets on the cheap.
Delete"I have to take exception. The LCS MCM module is not a capability, it is a dream--and a very bad dream, at that."
DeleteOh, you'll get no argument from me! The LCS MCM module - if it worked - would be only a very minor step up from nothing. As you well know, we're retiring both the Avengers and the MCM helos with nothing to replace them. That's criminally negligent.
"the last thing in the world you want to do in a minefield is go 40+ knots."
DeleteAs the saying goes, any ship can be a minesweeper. Once.
I believe getting it right would be just halting and eliminating them now (yesterday, last year, last decade would be better).
ReplyDeleteYou know sometimes something is unique say a shattered bit of historical art. Its worth finding the right person and endless hours/money/effort to make it right laboriously over time.
Sometimes however something was a bad ideal and not worth saving. You just end it. More importantly do it with a really clear eyed self examination of how you walked into the shat show that is the LCS so you can get a nice little 10 point set of rules that stops it from reoccurring. There is nothing to get right, just focus on not getting that wrong again.
Keep the WHEC-726 Migett paint it gray and start training sailors by rotation to sail a frigate sized ship (plus like all aging USCG vessels you get contentious damage control experience) that even if aged can actual cruise about for more than a couple weeks. Buy/build a lot of the Italian upgraded Osprey class Mine sweepers (its small seems like you farm that around the US yards)and deploy than to Asia and the Persian gulf with crews of the former LCS and just about dead Avengers so we actually have credible reply to the threat of mines.
Wait for your mini Burks that hopefully do not have a single cost overrun.
Go back to defending the Ford somehow that seems like it needs more effort.
Also does the USCG have extra law enforcement detachments laying about? Or does that mean some cutter does not have one or an under staffed one so the LCS can do something anything?
Every time I read about the LCS I think about what a good Southern women would say: “well, bless its’ heart”
ReplyDeleteThey best finish the ASW module since the MFTA/VDS combo is going on the Frigate. The full system seems to be installed between LCS-1&3 now. Hopefully it gets moved to an Indy when they pull them from service. Beyond Conops, the requirements were poorly scrubbed. This is what has me worried about future ships. The Navy doesn't leave butts in seats long enough for people to learn what they need to in order to read a requirement and know how stupid it is. 7500kg max weight for a TEU sized mission container that could support a 30,000kg+ weight? Aviation module weight below MTOW of an H-60R. A gas tank and burn rate you can do the math to see the range requirement can't be met without burning the mission fuel. And on and on. I'd still insist on learning from it all. Clearly in the end here we are seeing the Indy outperform the Freedom's. They are deploying more. More of them are to be built. They are getting built much faster. They meet the range requirement. When you look at things like endurance, you see the limits of a small ship design. EPF can sustain crew and mission detachment 44+104 for 14 days. Pretty much the same as LCS 98 for 21 days. We know 40 knots is a stretch and can compare the costs clearly now between propulsion types for a ship this large in the long run. Reality is fast ferries always go from 0 to full speed over and over. That is never going to be a warship profile. The needed trade off for capacity is abundantly clear. Propellers get it done just fine.
ReplyDelete"The full system seems to be installed between LCS-1&3 now."
DeleteThis may be a matter of terminology but, as I understand it, there is no full ASW module installed anywhere. There are bits and pieces installed and what's been installed is pre-production prototypes. The Navy is also grappling with weight issues and are looking to trim down the module. The individual components seem to work in other applications (other ships/navies) but the overall module is overweight and cannot be installed as designed. The Navy has issued contracts to various companies to find a way to reduce weight. Results are pending.
Ironically, the ASW module might be the most functional but it is also the least deployable, at the moment, due to weight!
DOT&E and GAO reports confirm all this.
"We know 40 knots is a stretch"
Just to clarify, ship trials have shown that the max LCS speed for either class is around 37 kts.
My understanding has always been that the engines are too noisy for proper sonar functioning, which significantly impairs any ASW mission.
DeleteMy further understanding is that the Royal Navy had the same problem with a class of destroyers/frigates, I think either the Type 21s or Type 22s, or maybe both. That's at least one reason why they went to CODLAG for the Type 23 frigates and IEP for the Type 45 destroyers.
Slides 16 and 17. https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2020/SNA2020-LCS-InTheFleetToday.pdf?ver=2020-01-14-153047-243
DeleteSlides 2,5&6
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2020/SNA2020-MissionPackageProgramUpdate-CaptGusWeekes.pdf?ver=2020-01-17-113429-960
You can also see the module sitting pier side east of FSF-1 and the Fast Supply Vessel next to it at the base in Panama City if you look at google earth.
Give them to the Coast Guard. If the Coast Guard doesn't want them (a likely possibility) then give them away. If we can't give them away, sell them to the Russians. They're used to having ships that can't get underway because nothing works.
ReplyDeleteThey are too expensive to operate, and lack the range and endurance and sea keeping the USCG would want.
DeleteI suppose the USCG would take the NSMs the navy bought in a box bolt on form the the guard could sink ships again.
Given their typical mission profile, I wouldn't think range and endurance would be huge considerations for USCG. I'm not aware that their sea-keeping issues are necessarily greatier than for other ships their size, but perhaps I am ill-informed there.
DeleteI'm not sure about operating costs, but I would guess that operations in and out of a base could be handled better than deployments. The base maintenance concept would seem a better fit for USCG than for the Navy. At any rate, on a discounted cash flow basis, getting a bunch of ships free up front would absorb a lot of operating costs for a long time.
I would think that something that could move fast in short bursts would be useful for them, and the 57mm popgun is probably enough to do some damage when they get there. Kind of like with the LHAs/LHDs as, "Harrier/Lightning Carriers," I'm trying to find something to do with something that we have spend a bunch of money on.
57 mm is actually kind of useless the USCG has tried to sink dangerous hulks recently with them and was not happening thay had use demo teams. If we want to play 24 what happens when a terrorist is ramming a massive cargo ship into something a 57mm gun is pointless.
DeleteRange and endurance are key considerations for the USCG
NCS - range 12,000 nmi endurance 60-90 days
OPC -(current)- range 10,200 nmi endurance 60 days
Medium range cutter - range 9900 nmi 6-8 week patrol expected.
USS Freedom - 3500 nmi (that is charitable since it requires 14 knots not anything like its awesome supposed super fast speed), endurance 21 days.
Why would the USCG take a white elephant that can not mach the specifications it needs for its top line cutters.
Edit also if Coffee man below is correct not holding the ship together with tape and whatever on the fly (err sail) would be very much anti USCG tradition.
DeleteI know USCG has those range and endurance numbers for their current cutters, but are they really gone for those lengths of time? I know the jokes about coming back from a lengthy deployment--since last Thursday--but I actually thought there was some truth to that.
DeleteYes, I know the maintenance profile doesn't fit USCG bubble-gum-and-baling-wire traditions, and that may be a disqualified. I just think it should be examined. If the Coast Guard doesn't want them, I have no idea what to do with them, except somehow or another get them out of the US Navy. And for Pete's sake, don't build any more.
"Yes, I know the maintenance profile doesn't fit USCG"
DeleteThe problem is not just a simple matter of whether to do the maintenance on board the ship or shore side. The entire maintenance concept is different and it has a huge impact on total manning (ship + shore). For example, the premise of the LCS maintenance is one of predictive maintenance. The LCS has a LOT of remote monitored maintenance points (pumps, valves, instruments, temperatures, etc.) that are, supposedly, transmitted continuously to a shore base where they are analyzed to predict required maintenance. With that information in hand, the required maintenance personnel and parts should, in theory, be waiting for the LCS when it pulls into dock. Of course, this all requires an extensive shore side effort to receive the data, analyze it, schedule work, and move the right personnel to the right location. This all requires equipment, organization, and people that are far beyond anything the Coast Guard is likely to want to take on.
The reality is that the bandwidth for the remove monitoring far exceeded the LCS and shore capability, the analysis did not occur, the right parts and personnel were not available, and the deployed LCS was left sitting dockside for extended periods.
The Navy also found that the total manning (ship + shore) was far beyond what they had projected. The LCS requires more total manning than a Perry and likely is up there with a Burke. The contractor manning requirement alone is enormous.
Why do yo think the LCSes, even without modules, aren't deploying? The Navy found from the first two overseas deployments that the maintenance model didn't work. It was utterly unaffordable, unworkable, and unmannable. Thus, the Navy is just having the LCS sit at home or do short, near-the-US anti-drug patrols.
So, with all that in mind, can you see the Coast Guard wanting to take on that financial and personnel burden?
I keep hearing the 'give 'em to the CG' idea but the CG doesn't want any part of this debacle! Why would they?
The one thing I could see is that they get a bunch of ships for free. From a time value of money standpoint, that could absorb a lot of O&M costs. But put it this way, if the Coast Guard doesn't want them if they're free, then what does the Navy want with them?
Delete"short, near-the-US anti-drug patrols" is a big part of the USCG mission. If the LCSs are useful for that, maybe there is a USCG fit.
DeleteAgain in they're free to the USCG and they still don't want them, what does that say about whether the Navy should want them?
"they get a bunch of ships for free"
DeleteThey're the farthest thing from free! True, the purchase price is already paid but the operating cost is astronomical and, worse, it requires a shore maintenance support system that currently doesn't exist for the CG. Thus, even if the CG wanted them, they'd have to create from scratch a new, unique maintenance support system.
They'd also have to create new support pipelines for whatever non-CG standard ship systems the LCS have (combat software system, 30 mm gun systems, and so on).
Free? Only in one very narrow sense of the word!
"what does that say about whether the Navy should want them?"
DeleteThe Navy doesn't want them! That's why they aren't deploying. That's why four have already been scheduled for very early retirement.
The Navy doesn't want them - they're just stuck with them and are trying to find some little, near-home task for them to do to try to avoid the total embarrassment of an entire class that can't deploy.
"I know USCG has those range and endurance numbers for their current cutters, but are they really gone for those lengths of time?"
DeleteI am pretty sure on the larger cutters your USCG time is longer on average per year at sea. But I can't find the data right now. I keep looking but circumstances change the data for any particular ship. And of course the Guard runs a lot of small local boats than the Navy so you will see skew out of that.
But that does not matter what is does say is the USCG buys for that kind of endurance and even to smaller cutters. I assume since that is no change from the previous versions that is a constant service policy. Although who knows maybe the USCG will take back the Cyclones now that the navy has up armed them and maybe wants them to go away again and they can always use another decades old ship that was at least a good design.
The whole model of the LCS is antithetical to what the USCG buys.
I just can't see them taking them unless they are forced and I doubt Congress would allow it.
"Again in they're free to the USCG and they still don't want them, what does that say about whether the Navy should want them?"
Everything. They should be used as automated targets with at their CIWS, decoys and short range defense active so we can see how good an attack of NSMs or the new naval targeting Tomahawk or the SM-6 etc are. Actually you could have them run at top speed to to make a more difficult hit. Not that any US missile manufacture would like the results of decent test vs just a stationary target without countermeasure.
Can someone buy Admiral Gilday a copy of Don Quixote? His hearts in the right place, but he's tilting at nautical windmills.
ReplyDeleteSort of related. Came across a rumor I cannot pin down yet that the Cyclones will be slated to be retired next year (2021).
ReplyDeleteMaybe that will give the residual LCS ships something to do - poorly.
The disturbing part of the LCS debacle is that its still going forward!! There are still around 15 yet to be built. WHY??? If there were any Admirals or civilian leaders who truly wanted to "get it right", there would be massive program changes. Some options Id like to see include...
ReplyDelete***Mothballing all ships. If/when the modules materalize, they can be revisited. The crews, and op dollars spent can be better used elsewhere. Keep one or two online, redesignate as pierside research vessel with no deployments.
***Stop production of future ships. Yesterday. There is no reason to have another decade of production of these planned. Absolute waste. Government contracts and shipbuilding infrastructure be damned, but soften the hit by replacing LCS contracts with FFG. Free up yard space and time for the FFG to be built quicker, in higher numbers at multiple yards. While I have reservations about the FFG, Id rather have a half dozen more of them than a dozen+ more LCS!!!
3 reasons Money,Jobs and Votes ok make it 4 Stupidity and No backbone from the Navy or Pentagon
Delete"By the time the ship gets to Singapore, it needs a lot of work done to it and your deployment time is cut down by the fact that you have to repair the ship once it arrives."
ReplyDeleteOnce, a Russian naval officer referred to some particularly old ships as the "sink-by-themselves squadron".
Guess what? Now America has that capability as well!
“LCS for me is something, on my watch, I’ve got to get right.”
ReplyDeleteThe way to get them right is to forget trying to make them right, get rid of them, and get the replacement right.
If we get the FFG(x) right, we can forget about the LCSs. But I'm not at all certain we are doing that.
I dont think we are getting the FFG right either... We dont need an AEGIS frigate!! We need somthing ASW-centric, but its still better than LCS...
Delete
DeleteI've gone for a more balanced approach. Build:
-20 cruisers, Tico replacements, basically bigger Ticos with 8" guns
-40 AAW destroyers, could be Burkes
-60 GP escorts, could be the FFG(X) with some tweaks
-80 ASW frigates, like ComNavOps's ASW escort
They would be assigned notionally to 20 escort squadrons of 10 ships each--1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, and 4 ASW frigates.
For the GP frigate, I actually like the Italian FREMM somewhat better than the US version. There is a design version of it that keeps the 5-inch gun and adds more VLS cells. But I admittedly don't know all the details of the design process, so I'm not sure what tradeoffs need to be made. I also like the Australian adaptation of the Spanish F-100 class, although I don't think it needs AEGIS. I actually like the APAR/SMART-L combination on the GP frigates, to give at least some ships an alternative to the oft-injured AEGIS. I don't know how much high weight becomes a problem, but I would add low weight with armored bulkheads, and that would presumably free up some topside weight.
What you said is what China Navy doing now.
DeleteI can say that the Navy is missing on all cylinders with this vessel. The crew does absolutely no work on the vessel. There was a work item written to replace the locking mechanism on a desk Drawer! Remove and replace 5 square feet of insulation? Install a gasket to stop the leaking on a hand pump? more crack repairs than you can imagine. But the fact remains that the crew s of these vessels have no pride in ownership of the vessels as they are not working on them. When they were deploying from Singapore, they would take two contractors with them to do maintenance in the main machinery rooms while the sailors drink cokes.
ReplyDeleteLike rich parents with a nanny. It's not the kid's fault.
DeleteSeriously??? Thats insane!! What is the point of having rates besides OS then if theres no technical aptitude anymore???
DeleteCNO,
ReplyDeleteImagine if all the effort and money which went into the LCS had gone into it's anti sub warfare.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/us-navy-begins-design-evaluation-for-new-sub-tracking-ships/
The USN has just 5 of these ships, and they are unarmed.
"The existing unarmed research vessels make an outsized contribution to the U.S. Navy’s anti-submarine capabilities. By trailing sensitive listening equipment on miles-long cables behind them called the Surface Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), the vessels are able to detect and then help track submarines from great distances, and then provide that data to other ships, planes, or submarines. Their unusual catamaran design provides stability in rough seas and reduces the sound transmitted into the water by the ship’s machinery."
Instead, the USN will get 38 LCS.
Andrew
We forgot ASW after the Berlin Wall fell. Just like we forgot mine warfare after Inchon.
DeleteI still remember the answer given by an instructor at counterinsurgency school 50+ years ago, when asked what kind of war are we going to have to fight? "The one we don't prepare for."
Sounds like it would be excellent as the focus of a SINKEX, to be honest.
ReplyDeleteWell, the Navy never does enough actual testing, so why not use those worthless ships to see how effective modern missiles, etc. actually are?
DeleteBipartisan push back in congress about what the Navy wants.
ReplyDelete“We want to make sure that we don’t end up with situations like LCS where we’re trying to figure out what the mission is at the same time we’re building them.” Congressman Courtney
Also Senate Chairman Inhoff has been critical of the navy
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/07/inhofe-navy-arrogance-on-uss-ford-oughta-be-criminal/
LCS is a strategic blunder created after Soviet Union collapsed. US navy has changed strategy to fight regional powers than superpowers. LCS and DDG-1000 are products of that strategy.
ReplyDeleteHowever, no regional power warrant use of LCS.
Surprised, Chinese navy has risen quickly in recent years. LCS is nearly useless against China due to its poor firing and self defense capabilities. No wonder, US Navy decides to retire them earlier.
While your analysis of the cause is correct. I couldn't believe it at the time. Your analysis of the LCS in not.
DeleteShips can be reconfigured. The LCS could meet all it goals by buying stuff off the shelf. It's the development program at fault.
So stick NSM launches on them. Buy a container containing a towed array. Buy all those small UUSV mine clearing stuff.
And Mk-56s with ESSM for air defense. All off the shelf.
Delete"LCS could meet all it goals by buying stuff off the shelf."
DeleteUmm … there's a bit more to it than that. The LCS (both classes) are overweight and have zero weight growth margin. They also have nearly zero stability (center of gravity) margin. So, yes, it's possible to buy existing equipment but the ships have no weight/stability to margins to work with. The acquired equipment would have to be very small, very light, and located very low in order to be installed. That would present some severe challenges. For example, the ASW module IS EXISTING EQUIPMENT and likely works just fine but the Navy has been unable to reduce the weight enough to install it. The Navy has contracts out with a couple of companies tha are working on how to reduce the weight of the components enough to install it.
Even if you could find suitably small, light equipment that would be useful, there's the integration issue. As you know, you can't just drop a piece of equipment on a deck and have it work. You need to supply utilities (electric, water, cooling, data links, etc.) which, given the LCS' modular design, is now a challenge because any bought equipment would be non-modular-standard.
Then, there's the issue of integration with the ship's combat software system. No commercial purchased equipment would be compatible with the LCS combat system. You'd have to write special combat system software to interface with and operate the equipment.
So, while it is theoretically possible to buy commercial off-the-shelf equipment, the practical issues make it very unlikely or, at best, very challenging. It then becomes a question of how much more money do we want to pour into the LCS program when we've already started retiring the ships and the new frigate is going to replace them?
Since the LCS was built all the off the shelf components have shrunk in size and power. A 20 foot container is a complete towed array with combat system, if needed, built in. You don't even need a Navy ship to use it.
ReplyDeleteThis is a report by our major government funded think tank on how to turn 1800 tonne OPV into corvettes https://www.aspi.org.au/report/concentrated-vulnerability-distributed-lethality-offshore-patrol-vessels.
Just a thought; stop producing more LCS and convert the existing ships into unmanned vessels? Maybe then some of the expense could at least go into some experience in that area?
ReplyDeleteI am very disappointed after reading all of this. Not knowing anything about the LCS ships, I thought they were beautiful and wonderful. It made sense to me to have ships that could zip around and fight in shallower waters.
Using the LCS as an unmanned test bed is an excellent concept. Unfortunately, I've not heard anything from the Navy that suggests they would even consider it.
DeleteI encourage you to peruse the archives and come up to speed on the LCS. The ships have some severe problems and we've documented them pretty well. They were a class with some conceptual potential, originally, but the design fell apart very early in the process.
Here's one particular post that discusses the conceptual origin of the LCS. It's instructive to compare the original concept to what eventually emerged as the LCS: LCS - Conceptual Origin
I read that and do understand better. It sounds to me like the idea was a super-duper patrol ship. Plus, the ability to hunt mines. Sounds good to me. I’ll bet people were looking at the Strait of Hormuz when getting the idea. I agree with that. Are critics of the ships being too harsh by comparing them to Destroyers or etc? Be gentle, I am just beginning to learn about them.
ReplyDelete"Are critics of the ships being too harsh by comparing them to Destroyers or etc?"
DeleteThey were intended to be replacements for the Avenger class MCM ships and the Perry class FFGs. So, it's fair to compare them to those classes. Critics see two levels of problem:
1. They compare poorly to the classes they were intended to replace.
2. They compare poorly to general combat ship standards.
The best thing you can do is to peruse the Archives and read the many articles listed under the 'LCS xxxx' keywords. That will bring you nicely up to speed. Enjoy the reading!
I get it now: Using them to replace the dedicated minesweepers would be a downgrade. Using them to replace an actual Frigate would be too. My question (and original understanding) was more like replacing the Cyclone-Class with a ship that would not need to be carried to the theater. Do you think they are at least good for that?
ReplyDelete"would be a downgrade."
DeleteYou're correct that each function would be a downgrade from the legacy function/ship. The hope-for upgrade was that the LCS would have swappable modules that would allow week-to-week changing of the functions, all in one ship. Whether that would have resulted in a net upgrade is highly debatable but the question was rendered moot when the Navy determined that it would require multiple weeks to swap out a module and abandoned the entire module swapping scheme. That left the LCS as a single-function ship that was a decided downgrade from the legacy ships.
Add to that the utter failure to develop viable modules and the entire program became a colossal failure. Even today, there is not yet a functional ASW, MCM, or ASuW module and now the first four ships are being retired without ever having fielded a module.
"Cyclone"
Yes, the LCS could be a viable replacement for a Cyclone which is just a patrol boat. However, the Cyclones were built for around $14M each. The LCS costs around $700M. So, functionally, a LCS can be a patrol boat but in terms of value for the dollar, it's a complete failure as a patrol boat. It's like using an Army division to help an old lady cross the street - it can do it but it's an enormous waste of resources for something that a single Boy Scout can do.
This concept would probably be best applied to the “Lost Focus” article that I enjoyed. If replacing the Cyclone with an LCS is like comparing a Boy Scout to an Army division, then it is money well spent.
DeleteIF an LCS can truly dominate the littoral space, then I say keep the minesweepers to mine-sweep, keep the Destroyers and make true Frigates for the open ocean and ASW.
I support spending $700 million per ship to save even one Marine fighting on the beach and to win the battle he will fight.
I wonder if any opinions would change if the mine-clearing package would be replaced with a mine-laying one?
ReplyDeleteI'm going to be the probably lone voice of support for the LCS, but I'll go on ahead. The initial premises of the program were obviously flawed and it clearly hasn't met the initial promises. However, the ships are here, and going forward getting these ships right is much cheaper than just scratching it all and building new ships. My personal thoughts on the way forward.
ReplyDelete1) Get the maintenance/reliability program rock solid. This may have already occurred, as the news recently has been positive, but that could just be happy talk.
2) Finish the MCM module and equip most Flight I ships with MCM module. Cancel the ASW module and use the money to upgrade the DDGs ASW.
3) Develop a SIGINT/EW module for the Flight 0 ships.
4) Cancel the FFG (X) and use the money to fund 32 Flight II LCSs with improved deadweight to mount a real deck gun, such as the 8"/55 that was mounted on the slightly larger USS Hull. Equip all Flight II ships with the ASuW module.
5) Equip all Flight I and Flight II ships with Mk. 56 VLS cells for local air defense.
6) Develop an ESSM-based anti-ship missile to improve upon the limited Hellfire range.
I've got nothing against an LCS supporter IF they can elucidate a reasonable case which is hard to do given the LCS' flaws. I like your focus on trying to get something out of the LCS in the future. Let's take a quick look at your ideas:
Delete1. The problem is that the installed equipment, such as the combining gear, is extremely complex - too complex for crews to handle. So, it's not a matter of establishing a maintenance program, it's an inherent weakness that can only be solved by replacing the entire propulsion plant which, of course, won't be done. So, this problem can be improved a bit but it can't be fully solved.
2. Agree. The problem is that the MCM module is very limited in capability even if it worked as advertised.
3. We've described exactly that in an old post. See, Electronic LCS
4. The LCS cannot handle the firing (recoil) stress of a larger gun. Early on, the cost saving decision was made to downgrade the structural elements of the LCS hull. This weakened the flight deck and limits the LCS to a max of two medium weight helos and it resulted in extreme vibration of the ship at speed to the point that the existing gun accuracy was affected. It would required a complete rebuild and strengthening of the LCS to handle a larger gun and that amount of strengthening would far exceed the ship's weight margins. Just not possible.
5. Theoretically possible but weight and stability margins are zero so something would have to come off the ship to compensate and very careful attention would have to be paid to stability. Stability was one of the reasons the module swapping had to be abandoned.
6. Nothing wrong with this but it ties back to 5. and also would require a modified fire control system (more big bucks!)
So, I love that you're trying to find a use for the LCS but you can see that effort is hampered by the basic design flaws (complexity, weight and stability margins being major factors) that are designed in and can't really be fixed.
I've also done posts on alternate uses for the LCS. See, LCS Alternative Uses. Check out the archives and keywords. You'll find lots of LCS information describing the concept, problems, and options.
I agree.
Delete1) I'm not familiar with what's changed in the last four years, so I'm skeptical of both the Navy's official "happy talk" as well as the doom and gloom of 2012 based accounts. All I'll say is the next few years will prove it.
2) Agree. It's limited. I think the MCM mission is best executed from the Expeditionary Staging Base ships as a mothership.
3)I missed that post, I'll check it out.
4) That's why I mention it as a Flight II variant, not on the current variants. Obviously weight margins need to go up and strengthening of the hull needs to occur. Putting the hangar below decks ala Virginia CGN would get a lot of the way there while utilizing what these ships have in abundance. A short hull plug could also help, as could a general lightening of the ship. Fundamentally, the ability to get in fast, punch hard, and get out quickly is exactly what the LCS should have been designed for.
5) Agreed. I believe the LCS 1 variants have the weight margins per the GAO, while LCS 2 has excess range (thus fuel weight). It's tight though.
RE: the Flight Is, Per my understanding (could be errant), a 32-cell Mk. 56 weighs around 24 tons (30+ loaded) while the MIW module had a weight margin of 14 tons and the LCS 1 variants from LCS 5 on themselves have a 67 ton weight margin.
DeleteThe LCS 2 variant fails to meet the required 50 ton weight margin but my understanding is that they dramatically exceed the range requirement, so fuel could be reduced to enable the carriage of the Mk. 56.
As far as the Flight IIs I propose, putting the hangar below decks would dramatically reduce the required size of the deckhouse, thus improving both weight and stability. That plus a 20 foot hull plug would almost certainly enable the carriage of a major caliber gun with the required strengthening.
" 24 tons (30+ loaded) while the MIW module had a weight margin of 14 tons and the LCS 1 variants from LCS 5 on themselves have a 67 ton weight margin."
DeleteAt this point, it's like counting pennies, the margins are so tight. EVERY addition gains weight as it goes along the path to installation so the margins will get even tighter! When you're reduced to counting each individual ton, you've got problems.
I've done a post on the weight margins (see, "Fat, Drunk, and Stupid"). I've also posted on the speed reductions - check out the archives.
You see where you're headed in with the LCS 2 variant? If you're going to completely redesign the ship's internals, add plugs, move hangars, redesign superstructure, hugely beef up the structural elements, etc., you've created a brand new ship that still has the basic flaws designed in (though somewhat mitigated by the changes). At that point, wouldn't it be better to just 'clean sheet' design a brand new ship WITHOUT any of the LCS flaws rather than design a brand new ship WITH the LCS flaws?
The combination of very poor Navy requirements and asking two companies who had never designed warships before to design a ship has resulted in a design that is fundamentally flawed in its structure. There's simply a limit to how much correction we can do even with redesigns. What we find - and what you're suggesting - is that the only solution is to design a brand new ship either from a clean sheet or by so hugely modifying the LCS design that it amounts to a near clean sheet, but with inherent flaws (stability, metacentric height, SLA, draft, powertrain, structural members, etc.). You get what you pay for. We asked non-warship designers to build a ship and we got a fundamentally flawed ship. No surprise.
What I've suggested in previous posts is that we find some uses for the LCS as they are rather than continue trying to put more lipstick on the pig. The electronic LCS seems to me to be the best use. It takes advantage of what the LCS has and requires minimal modifications.
Related side note: The DOT&E tests showed the Freedom class range was 1960 nm at 14 kts. The Independence range has also been downgraded (don't have the numbers in front of me) by having the fuel reduced to meet weight restrictions. So, there's not much range to play with even on the Indy variant!
I don't think the Brits with their Type 22 and 42 hull plugs or the US with the Gearing class hull plug would consider it a whole new ship. I think you're misrepresenting me when I say "move hangars". The space is already there. Supporting equipment would need to move, but the space exists in abundance. Ditto with "redesign superstructure". At it's most basic all it needs to be is less structure and move the SeaRam. "Hugely beef up the structural elements" in places to support the weight yes. Far cheaper than building the structure of a brand new $1B frigate.
DeleteI've always understood that the Flight I Freedoms have weight to spare, and that the Flight I Indys have range to spare. This coming from both GAO and other generally reputable sources. While 67 tons of excess Service Life Allowance isn't great, it is Service Life Allowance for a reason, and the ~30 ton Mk. 56 installation (with ASuW capable ESSMs) would go a long way towards making this a real warship.
ReplyDeleteI think the changes to the ship deriving from the hull plug and redesigned deckhouse are far less than the amount of work required to clean sheet a new ship. While work and development would clearly be required, I see an LCS Flight II as the lowest risk solution that has advantages of a hot production line, commonality of parts, training, maintenance with the Flight Is, and operationally maintains the speed required to, as I said, get in fast, punch hard, and get out. Is it perfect, absolutely not. Would a heavy cruiser sized ship be a better gun boat, absolutely. But the LCS is relatively cheap and with that upgrade would punch well above it's weight class.
Possible Missions:
ReplyDelete1) Electronic Warfare (Ghost Ship): Load it with electronics to mimic the emissions of a supercarrier. It will draw the fire of the enemy away from the real carriers. Hopefully, they can also be armed with enough Anti-Missile defenses to protect the crew! On the other hand, during my time on a Perry, we were told, point blank, our ship would put itself in front of a torpedo rather then let it hit one of our carriers.
2) Training ship for SWOS. Forget classrooms and a campus. Just have new Ensigns live on the ship and learn the naval profession on the open ocean. Create a good bar area for all of them to drink together at the end of the day and sing shanties into the night.
3) Paint the hull Navy Blue and the superstructure White and use it to entertain diplomatic parties around the world. The ships might be useless to the battle fleet, but they still look pretty cool to the 99.999% of the world's population who have NO IDEA the ship is a dud. One of them can even be designated "Navy One" to be used by the President to host visiting dignitaries on a cool naval platform. One could imagine an American diplomat putting the champagne flute of a foreign Prime Minister's wife on the frame of the magnetic railgun as it fires a beautiful star shell into the night sky without spilling a drop. The sleek, modern look of the ship makes the US Navy "look" like the baddest fleet in the world to most civilians. Impressions matter.
The EW option is actually one that I've advocated. See, "Electronic LCS"
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