How the F-35 Software Should Have Been Done

As we’ve seen and discussed, software has become the major obstacle to successful programs and the F-35 is probably the poster child for this.  The F-35 logistics and maintenance program, ALIS, was supposed to have been a miraculous piece of software that would do … well … everything plus several things we haven’t even thought of yet.  As it turned out, it couldn’t run a toaster correctly and may be the biggest military software flop in history.  In addition, the vaunted Block 4 software that enables full combat capability from the aircraft is years overdue with no implementation date in sight and many of the features have been permanently deferred to a non-existent ‘future’ date or deferred to the next aircraft program.  Those features will never be part of the F-35.  Even worse, because of the hugely delayed software and the resulting concurrency, we’ve produced hundreds of orphan F-35s that are so out of date that they will never be upgraded.  They’re essentially garbage throwaways at $100M each. 
 
Could all this have been avoided?  I don’t see how.  After all, this is how aircraft development and acquisition programs go, right?  I mean, everyone knows that, right? 
 
Well, let’s now take a look at how the software should have been handled and how all of this could have been avoided.  Wait … is that really possible?  Could all of this have been avoided?  Yes, it could, quite simply, as a matter of fact, and now we’ll see how.
 
 
Requirements – To begin, the software was insanely over spec’ed.  Only a lunatic – or the US military – would have attempted to cram so many features into the software.  We’ve talked about this at length.  The software had far too many requirements that had nothing to do with combat (looking at you ALIS) and nothing to do with realistic combat (looking at remote guidance handoffs and similar technology for the sake of technology features).  The military is obsessed with technology for its own sake.  Our guiding principle should be K.I.S.S. (Keep It Simple, Stupid).  One could also refer to this as K.I.S.A. (Keep It Simple, Admiral) since ‘admiral’ is a synonym for ‘stupid’.  The two words are interchangeable. 
 
By reducing the software requirements to just direct and realistic combat features we could have cut the scope, cost, and time to produce the software in half, or whatever actual large proportion.  So, half our job is done before we even begin!
 
Think of this as the Boyd approach to software:  not a single line of code that doesn’t directly enable realistic combat.  Programmer Boyd would be proud of us!
 
Of course, even with drastically pared down requirements, some significant amount of software is still required and here’s how it should have been handled.
 
We start by recognizing three absolutely critical and obvious conditions:
 
1. Software is platform agnostic. 
 
2. Software must be its own, stand-alone program, separate from the hardware program.
 
3.  Hardware development cannot proceed until the software is finalized.
 
 
Platform Agnostic Software - This is the key to software development. We didn’t need to have an actual F-35 aircraft in order to develop the software.  The software can be developed in laboratory simulations or on surrogate aircraft if an actual aircraft is needed for some reason that I can’t fathom.  We could have loaded the software on a Piper Cub, if necessary.  This would have allowed us to completely develop the software without every spending a penny on the physical aircraft.  The physical aircraft is the last thing we need.  It’s the final piece of the puzzle not the first.  The F-35 attempted to do the reverse.  They built the aircraft first and then remembered they had to add some software.  Utterly predictably, that approach failed miserably.
 
Stand-Alone Program Management – Software comes before hardware and must be its own, stand-alone project from a program management perspective.  Software cannot be an afterthought, add-on to the hardware as it was with the F-35.  The only way to effectively manage the software and avoid having it become an afterthought is to make it its own program with its own, clearly and rigidly defined requirements, schedule, and milestones.  If the software fails to meet its milestones, you don’t screw around or extend the program;  you kill it, learn lessons, fire and court-martial the managers, and move on.  Failure, then, becomes a positive in the sense that it serves as a warning – a severe warning – to the next project and manager to maintain tight control on the project and to be realistic regarding capabilities.  No more promising the moon and delivering nothing.  Fire and court-martial a few people and the next ones fall in line.
 
Start Point - Software is the hardware enabler.  Without the software, the hardware is just a very expensive paperweight.  In other words, there is no point even buying the first hardware rivet until the software is complete.  Thus, the completion of the software is what controls and triggers the start of hardware development.  This doesn’t mean partial completion with some nebulous phased delivery in the ephemeral future;  it means just what it says:  complete.  Finished.  Nothing left to do.  The contract is fully satisfied.  ‘I’s’ are dotted and ‘T’s’ are crossed.  Last line of code is written.  Had we followed this with the F-35, we would not yet have spent a single penny on the F-35 aircraft, itself.  What a savings!  We would not now have hundreds of orphans and wasted billions of dollars and have an entire fleet of only partially combat capable aircraft.  We might have even recognized, decades ago, that the software was not viable and halted the program while we could have still easily gotten out from under it.  We could have learned lessons and moved on to a second, wiser attempt (who am I kidding?  we don’t learn lessons  …  but, I digress).
 
 
Conclusion
 
Nothing that I’ve described is anything other than common sense and none of it requires any act of Congress.  It could be implemented tomorrow by nothing more than a command from the Chief of Naval Operations or Secretary of the Navy.  Some of you will protest some aspect or another but that’s just you being trapped in your paradigm and unable to see outside it.
 
Had we done this with the F-35, do you see the very early off-ramp that would have presented itself when it quickly became obvious that the software would not, and could not, be delivered in any useful time frame?  For just a hundred million dollars or so of initial programming, it would have become clear that we did not have a viable software and the program would have terminated with the hardware portion never having begun.  How many billions of dollars would we have saved? 

What’s Missing?

Here’s just a fun little thought exercise.  The fleet is decidedly unbalanced.  The only surface ship we have is the Burke class which is incapable of effective anti-surface or anti-submarine combat.  It’s a pure anti-air and Tomahawk land attack platform by capability and training.  The fleet is missing various types of ships with different capabilities and costs.
 
If you were the Chief of Naval Operations and had enough extra funding to build one additional ship type, what would it be, and why?
 
ComNavOps’ choice would be a small ASW corvette … or maybe a true destroyer like a modernized Fletcher … or maybe an 8” gunned cruiser … or maybe a Midway/Forrestal size carrier … or … 
 
Hmm, this may be harder than I thought to pick just one type.
 
Maybe, despite ComNavOps’ proof of uselessness, you’d pick a lightning carrier or a sea control carrier?  Maybe a class of SSGNs?  Or maybe you’re a believer in small missile boats?
 

Alright, I'm going to pick the small ASW corvette to deal with the multitude of diesel subs, provide convoy escort, patrol chokepoints, protect homeland harbors, provide ASW protection for Guam, and pick up the crap peacetime duties like anti-piracy.

What one class would you pick to get the most bang for the buck?

Defeat in Detail

‘Defeat in detail’ is a military tactic of destroying an enemy force by engaging its small, isolated units one by one with a larger force.
 
This is a great military theory – and proven successful – but it requires that the enemy present his forces in small, dispersed packets ready to be defeated.  This generally only happens if one is fighting an utterly inept foe or if the enemy’s units are forced to disperse due to unrecoverable circumstances such as the rout of a main force or the end of a conflict when the enemy lacks the forces to mass and fight.
 
In other words, no sane military is going to willingly present its forces to the enemy in small, isolated units.  Unfortunately, this is exactly what the Navy and Marines seem determined to do.  They seem committed to a war doctrine of small, isolated, individually weak units that will, in some unexplained and unfathomable manner, not only survive and avoid defeat in detail but will go on to exert an effect greater than the woefully weak sum of its parts.
 
Let’s briefly remind ourselves of the small, isolated units the Marines and Navy are planning to field.
 
Missile Shooters - The Marines have converted from a middle weight, combined arms force to a penny packet force of platoon size units that will engage in missing sniping deep inside enemy controlled territory. 
 
Distributed Lethality – The Navy wants to disperse all manner of isolated ships (the LCS is frequently mentioned) deep inside enemy territory where they will not only survive but, in some mythical way, find enemy ships and sink them while remaining undetected.  The Navy has even talked about arming amphibious and logistic ships for use in the distributed lethality scheme.  How these non-stealthy, slow, defenseless ships would remain undetected and survive remains unexplained.
 
LAW – The Marine’s Light Amphibious Warship (a laughable term right up there with Littoral Combat Ship) is intended to operate alone or in very small groups while supplying hidden Marine units and relocating them from island to island.  How these small, non-stealthy, slow, defenseless ships would remain undetected and survive remains unexplained.
 
Unmanned Surface Vessels – The Navy plans to use dispersed, remote, and/or isolated small, unmanned vessels in some yet to be fully explained manner which they believe will ‘confuse’ the enemy and rain destruction down on an unaware foe.
 
Unmanned Underwater Vessels – Similar to the USV plan, the Navy envisions small UUVs operating alone inside enemy waters in some unexplained manner.
 
Retirements – The Navy is downsizing the fleet’s firepower by retiring Ticonderoga cruisers and SSGNs with no direct replacement, contributing to a significant decrease in VLS cells in the fleet.  Thus, the individual ships and task forces are becoming steadily weaker.
 
LCS – The Navy has described the LCS as the modern day PT boat and envisions them operating in enemy territory, hiding amongst islands.
 
Task Forces – The Navy is training only with single carrier task forces and escorts numbering around three per carrier.  While one would desperately hope this is not the actual wartime plan (so why aren’t we training like we’ll fight?), the reality is that’s the only configuration being practiced.  If this is what actually happens, this will be less than a ¼ carrier task force.
 
And the list goes on.
 
The common characteristic of these small, isolated units is that they are defenseless in any practical way.  When found – and it’s a question of ‘when’ not ‘if’ – they will be destroyed as a matter of course.  In other words, they’ll be defeated in detail.  The Navy and Marines seem utterly ignorant of the lessons of history as they apply to combat.  All of our much-hyped plans will be quickly put to ruin when the individual units encounter larger forces. 
 
Defeat in detail.

F-35 Software Problems Continue

We’ve previously noted that software has become the leading cause of schedule delays and cost overruns and we cited the F-35 program’s attempt to implement the Technology Refresh (TR-3) leading to Block 4 upgrades (see, “F-35 Software Case Study” and “The Heartbreak of Software”) without which the F-35 cannot achieve full combat capability.
 
About a year ago, the Pentagon put a freeze on deliveries of new F-35s pending fixes for the TR-3 implementation.  F-35s have been piling up in warehouses awaiting a resolution of the software issues.
 
Honestly, the freeze on deliveries has been more symbolic than effective since the Pentagon has continued payments for the new aircraft with just a $7M withholding per aircraft.[1]  That means that Lockheed has still been getting around 91% of the contract price for aircraft that don’t meet spec and can’t be delivered.  That’s not a bad deal if you can get it!
 
Financial aspects aside, I’m not sure any of us fully appreciate just how badly broken the software side of things are in the F-35 program.  The Pentagon has just caved to various pressures and announced that the delivery freeze has been lifted despite the software problem remaining unresolved.  Hmm …
 

Bowing to operational demands, the Pentagon has lifted a year-long freeze on accepting new F-35 stealth fighters — even though the problem that prompted the standstill has not been fully resolved.[1]
 
Persistent problems with TR-3 prompted officials to eventually capitulate to an interim software fix …[1]

 
Read this next quote slowly and carefully and fully grasp the meaning and implications.
 

… jets will be delivered with interim software that facilitates training, but a second software drop that enables combat capabilities likely won’t be available for at least another year.[1]

That’s right.  We’re delivering training jets but not fully combat capable jets.  We’re decades into this program, have built a thousand aircraft, and still don’t have a fully combat capable aircraft.  Someone should face a firing squad for this.
 
The purpose of this post is not to simply beat on the F-35 program.  Instead, I’d like to highlight a couple of points that this development hammers home for us.
 
Software – As we’ve noted, software has become the main obstacle to successful programs.  We’ve already stated that we need to change the way we treat software and make it its own program instead of just an afterthought for the hardware.  This latest incident just hammers that point home.  Our frontline combat aircraft, the F-35, is not yet fully combat capable due to continuing software problems because the software was treated as an afterthought. 
 
For acquisition programs, our focus has to be software, software, software.
 
SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE !
 
Phased Delivery – The incompetent, lazy method of running an acquisition program is to use some sort of incomplete, so-called ‘phased’ delivery where the product is delivered incomplete, to be finished over subsequent years of development.  Of course, this never works out.  The F-35, for example, has yet to achieve full combat capability and we’ve built some thousand aircraft, none of them fully combat capable.  That’s criminal and leads to endless upgrades which add to the cost of the aircraft.  That $80M aircraft becomes a $100M+ aircraft after all the upgrades are included. 
 
Further, by all accounts, we’ve produced hundreds of F-35 orphans which, due to concurrency, will never be brought up to standard and are, essentially, throwaways.  Again, that’s criminal.  This half-assed F-35 production program just hammers home the folly of any kind of phased delivery program.
 
We have to adopt a philosophy of the product, the whole product, and nothing but the whole product or don’t bother building it.
 
Contracts – The final point that this incident hammers home is the unmitigated stupidity of a contract that does not specify and demand delivery of a fully capable product in order to get paid a single penny.  You wouldn’t make a partial payment on an incomplete automobile, would you?  So why are we paying for incomplete aircraft (or ships or anything)?  Again, we need to bring back firing squads on a regular basis.
 
 
Inescapable Conclusion
 
Our acquisition program methodologies are badly broken and our military leadership is 100% complicit to the point of dereliction of duty and criminal fraud.  We have got to start learning lessons from our endless string of failures.  Congress needs to start firing admirals.  Accountability is the only way people as stupid as our military leaders will ever learn a lesson.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “F-35 deliveries to resume next week, despite incomplete upgrade”, Michael Marrow and Valerie Insinna, 11-Jul-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/f-35-deliveries-to-resume-next-week-despite-incomplete-upgrade/

Warship or Cruise Ship?

ComNavOps has long pointed out that our ships are cruise ships rather than warships.  Let’s check in and see what the latest is on that …
 

When the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) pulls away from its California berth for its upcoming deployment, the crew will embark with some homey creature comforts.
 
Comforts like cushy club chairs by an electric fireplace, reliable WIFI, a gaming room, a stadium-seating movie theater. There are also phones, a pair of teal-blue rotary dial phones [with] plain old telephone system lines, are tucked into two enclosed, sound-proofed booths.
 
Those amenities are features of the new fully renovated library and lounge, courtesy of the USO, that have taken over three spaces of the Lincoln’s command religious ministries department. Each space is softened by teal bulkheads, wood laminated flooring, wood accents and artificial plants with steam punk-styled and contemporary artwork of the former Abraham Lincoln dress the walls.
 
“What the Abraham Lincoln USO Center offers is a peaceful and modern respite for our sailors and Marines to rest and recharge and to reach their families while using wifi while at sea, to watch movies in legitimate movie theater seating, and play video games in a purposefully designed video game room,” Capt. Pete Riebe, Lincoln’s commander, said during a Monday ceremony on the carrier’s flight deck.[1]

 
Is this just a one-off experiment on the Lincoln?  No …
 

The newly named USO Center is the fifth to open aboard a Navy aircraft carrier, officials said, and similar redos of library and lounge spaces aboard four more carriers are planned this year.[1]

 
This is reprehensible as a matter of survivability, if for no other reason.  Recall that during the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions, sailors died because escape paths were blocked by loose debris.  Every item not directly related to combat is a survival liability.  We are knowingly and intentionally jeopardizing sailors lives.  Sure, everyone wants a cushy video-gaming lounge right up until you have to evacuate a flooding compartment and large overstuffed pillows and furniture are blocking your way.  Today, every ship is a moment away from combat and critical survival situations.  It is long past time to strip ship and recognize that a ship is supposed to be a WARship not a cruise ship.  Any sailor who won’t serve because they don’t have access to lounges, a movie theater, over-stuffed chairs, etc. is not a sailor worth having.
 
On a personal note, I’m torn between a luxury cruise to the Caribbean or a US Navy aircraft carrier cruise for my vacation this year.  I like the Caribbean destination but the aircraft carrier has better amenities.  It’ll be a tough choice.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Carrier USS Abraham Lincoln’s Latest Upgrade Dials Up Crew Comfort”, Gidget Fuentes, 11-Jul-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/07/11/carrier-uss-abraham-lincolns-latest-upgrade-dials-up-crew-comfort

Efficiency and Competition

In WWII, a dozen or more shipyards built Fletcher class destroyers.  The yards were given a set of blueprints and contracted to build the ships according to the plans.  It didn’t matter which yard built any given destroyer, they were all the same.  This worked because the Navy designed the ship and generated the blueprints.  Once that was accomplished, any yard could build the ship.  It was just a matter of following the plans.
 
In contrast, because the Navy no longer designs ships, generates blueprints, or even requires complete designs and blueprints prior to the start of construction, only the contracted yard can build a given ship.  The LCS is the standout example of this badly flawed approach.  Lacking any guidance or blueprints, both Lockheed and Austal generated their own LCS designs, spec’ed their own equipment and combat systems, and no one else could build them.  Thus, we wound up with two LCS classes that had almost nothing in common;  the epitome of inefficiency.
 
What should have happened is that the Navy should have generated a complete design concept – and locked it down instead of continuously changing it! – followed by a complete set of construction blueprints.  They could have then shopped around for the best manufacturing deal and, if necessary, utilized multiple shipyards to in competition to ensure that costs and quality were well controlled.
 
 Our ship design and contracting approach is badly broken and yet the Navy is not only embracing it but doubling down on it.  Ignoring common sense, best practices, and all previous experience, the Navy began the Constellation class frigate construction without a complete design or complete set of construction blueprints (see, “Lesson Learned?”).
 
How do we expect the shipbuilder to accurately bid on the construction without a locked in design and a complete set of blueprints?  They can’t!  And yet we turn around and try to blame the manufacturer when costs inevitably balloon out of control.
 
The Navy absolutely must regain control over the ship design and construction process.  We must reinstitute the General Board (design) and BuShips (blueprints).  Without those capabilities, the Navy is just going to continue producing failure after failure.

The Passive Warship

While many of the lessons of war are timeless, tactics do change as technology changes.  Consider the following observations and logic chain.

• With the existence of hundred/thousand mile cruise missiles, multi-thousand mile ballistic missiles, supersonic aircraft and missiles, 50 mile torpedoes, SSGNs, etc., any ship that is spotted can be killed and fairly quickly, from a distance.
• Given SIGINT, radar warning receivers, direction finders, and all manner of electromagnetic sensing devices, any ship that emits, intentionally or unintentionally, can be spotted.
• Hence, to be spotted is to be sunk.
• The obvious conclusion is don’t get spotted!
• The obvious way to reduce the chance of being spotted is to emit nothing.  No active radar.  No unshielded electronic devices.  No signals.  Emit nothing for an enemy to pick up.

 
Of course, with today’s ship designs, emitting nothing is, potentially, another definition of being blind and a ship that is blind is going to stumble into trouble.
 
The job of a naval force is to find the enemy.  How can that be accomplished without active emissions?
 
This is where we begin to see that we need a paradigm shift away from active detection systems and toward passive systems.  This doesn’t mean tacking a single electro-optical (EO) sensor on the superstructure somewhere and glancing at it occasionally, as is done today.  Instead, it means designing an entire ship around passive sensing as its main sensor system.  We need a passive warship design.  Let’s look a bit closer at this concept.
 
 
The Passive Warship
 
The passive warship begins with a maximum stealth design which includes not just radar stealth but infrared, acoustic, optical, electromagnetic, and wake stealth.  Once we have a ship that is as stealthy as possible we can begin designing its sensing system.  We want a maximum stealth ship design combined with primarily passive sensing – a ship that can’t be seen but can see all around itself.  The enemy can’t see it but it can see the enemy.
 
Electro-optical – The F-14 Tomcat (and other aircraft – no need to list them) had optical systems that were reportedly capable of detecting bomber size aircraft out to a hundred miles or so.  We have optical telescopes that can see distant galaxies.  Of course, those telescopes are far too large to mount on a warship but with something in between the F-14’s tiny camera and a giant observatory telescope we should be able to easily see fighter size aircraft at hundreds of miles.  Place several (not just one!) of these EO sensors around the ship to provide 360 degree coverage with a huge amount of overlap and redundancy to allow for battle damage and we have 360 degree, long range, passive sensing that matches or exceeds what radar can provide.  Remember that one major advantage of optical systems is that they can easily detect stealth aircraft.
 
What makes this approach viable is accompanying software that can monitor the optical images continuously and detect the faintest of possible targets – something that a human would fail to do simply due to visual fatigue. 
 
Of course, optical sensing is vulnerable to interference and degradation from weather, smoke, and other effects.  Thus, we need additional passive sensing to supplement and complement optical sensing.
 
Infrared – Take the preceding EO concept and duplicate it with IR sensors.  Picture aircraft infrared search and track (IRST) pods, scaled up for much greater sensitivity and range, placed all around the ship to, again, provide 360 degree coverage with overlap and redundancy.  IR sensing nicely supplements and complements optical sensing.
 
SIGINT – Signal intercept sensors provide passive detection of enemy electronic signals and communications.   These signals might be fire control comms, voice comms, data communications traffic, missile networking comms, helicopter traffic control comms, or any other type of signal.  Given the ability of many signal types to travel beyond the horizon – and thus be detected over the horizon – SIGINT can provide very long range detection.
 
UAVs – Not only do we want our passive warship to have the preceding capabilities but we need to extend the ship’s sensor reach/range using small, cheap reconnaissance UAVs equipped with passive sensors.  These UAVs can be employed continuously for area recon, specifically for target confirmation or intense monitoring of a specific area, or sporadically so as not give even a hint of the host ship’s presence.
 
Fire Control – The final step is to tie the passive sensor systems into the ship’s fire control.  Thus, passive sensors become the primary fire control and the ship never needs to radiate, even while defending against an attack.  Of course, if the ship is being attacked, it’s already been spotted and it’s no longer necessary to remain passive.  Active radar can be used at that point although it would still be preferable to avoid active systems thereby eliminating the enemy’s use of radar homing targeting.
 

There are already purely passive fire control systems throughout the world's militaries so this isn't something radically new. 

An alternative fire control scheme might be a mixed passive/active scheme which coordinates passive and active sensing so that tracking is passive and, at the last moment, active sensors (radar) activate for weapon guidance.  This would not, however, be the preferred approach. 
 
 
Discussion
 
From the preceding, we can envision a passive warship at the center of a 360 degree spherical ‘eye’ made up of dozens of optical, infrared, and signal sensors.  The sphere would extend from the horizon to hundreds of miles for elevated targets.  UAVs would further extend the monitored area.
 
The complementary systems would mitigate the negative effects of weather and whatnot.  What one system fails to detect, another will.
 
Of particular note is the ability of passive systems to detect stealth aircraft with ease.  A properly designed passive system almost renders radar stealth useless.
 
As noted, a passive fire control eliminates the enemy’s ability to use radar homing weapons.
 
We see, then, that a purely passive warship system has a lot going for it.
 
Radar would still be provided on our passive warship as there may be occasions to use it but there would be no need for high end, Aegis type systems.  A simple TRS-4D type radar for horizon ranges would be sufficient.
 
While the passive system is a rock solid concept, there are some unknowns that would need to be tested.  For example, can passive sensors provide sufficient weapon guidance?  What size sensors do we need?
 
We need to set up a passive test ship and determine whether we can detect, track, and fire control purely passively with sufficient effectiveness.  If we can’t, we need to find out where the limitations are and work to eliminate them.  We need to find out what the practical detection ranges are for various size/shape targets and flight profiles.  And so on.
 
Technology has changed and that demands a change in tactics.  Unfortunately, the Navy is anchored in the past.  We’re producing Burkes that are based on technology and tactics that are several decades out of date and hopelessly obsolete.  Our latest combat ship, the Constellation class, was obsolete before the first one was even laid down.  We are mired in the past.  It’s long past time for a paradigm shift in warship design.

USS United States

The most famous and gloried ship of the United States Navy is the sailing ship, USS Constitution, ‘Old Ironsides’.  However, on this 4^th of July, Independence Day celebration, what could be more appropriate than to take a look at one of Constitution’s sister ships, the aptly named USS United States.
 

USS United States

The USS United States was conceived in response to the actions of the Barbary pirates and the continued harassment of American ships by the British.  Congress passed the Naval Act of 1794 authorizing the construction of six frigates – four of 44 guns and two of 36 guns.  The Constitution was the most famous of the group but the United States was the first launched on 10-May-1797 and commissioned 11-Jul-1798.  The ship was built in Philadelphia to Joshua Humphreys’ plan.  The ship’s figurehead was the ‘Goddess of Liberty’.
 
She first sailed under Captain John Barry, performing trials and patrols before being laid up in 1801 during which her armament was upgraded along with other changes.
 
The ship reportedly sported two narrow red stripes, one each above and below the gunports, as opposed to the classic black and white scheme of the Constitution.
 
USS United States was activated for the War of 1812, captained by Stephen Decatur.  On 25-Jul-1812, she encountered the British frigate Macedonian and in a two and a half hour battle dismasted the British ship and took her as a prize.  Macedonian was eventually repaired and taken into the US Navy.
 
United States was later chased into  New London, Connecticut by a British squadron and sat out the remainder of the war.
 
Among other noteworthy post-war accomplishments, the USS United States saw the enlistment of Herman Melville (author of Moby-Dick) as an ordinary seaman on 18-Aug-1843.
 
The ship was decommissioned in Feb-1849 and lay in Norfolk until the Civil War when she was seized by Confederate forces and taken into service for harbor defense and training.  She was eventually scuttled when the Confederates abandoned Norfolk.  The Union raised the ship before finally breaking it up in 1864.
 
Though not as famous as her sister ship, Constitution, the United States still led a proud and productive naval service.  It is well that we remember her.

Book Review – "Target: Subic Bay"

Here’s a book review that gets my recommendation less for its story than for the niche subject, a Pegasus class hydrofoil, and the thought provoking usage of the vessel.[1]
 
Target: Subic Bay, by Mack Tanner, is a fictional story whose premise is a North Korean instigated overthrow of the Philippine government through the use of a few nuclear weapons and a rogue Philippine rebel acting as a front and an American admiral’s use of the Pegasus class vessel’s capabilities to attempt to thwart the coup.  Think about it … how would you go about thwarting a North Korean and nuclear weapons-backed coup with just a single Pegasus class hydrofoil? 
 

The storyline, to be honest, is solidly entertaining but nothing special.  What is special is the author’s descriptions of the many capabilities of the vessel (special ops landings, a UAV, the SLAM land attack version of the Harpoon, Harpoons, sonobuoys, the 76 mm gun, and the vessel’s extreme speed, etc.) and how a little unorthodox thinking can take advantage of those capabilities.  One’s thoughts can’t help but be drawn into the world of unconventional naval tactics and comparing those tactics against the unimaginative – and generally ineffective – actions of today’s risk averse Navy.
 
A very minor point is that the cover artwork does nothing for the book and is a disappointment.  One hopes it would have depicted a Pegasus vessel doing heroic things but such is not the case.  Of course, the cover artwork has no bearing on the value of the book, itself!
 
The Pegasus class hydrofoil was a fascinating and unique craft that stirs the imagination, even today.  The class was never given a chance to shine and that’s a shame.  This book offers a window into the possible uses of such a vessel and the book is worth the read for that, alone.
 
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Tanner, Mack, Target: Subic Bay, Zebra Books/Kensington Publishing Co., 1992, ISBN: 0-8217-3936-0

Constellation – Type 054B Comparison

The United States and China are both in the process of building a new class of frigate.  The US is building the Constellation class frigate and China is building the Type 054B which is an evolutionary advance on the Type 054A.  China has built/building 50 Type 054A and an unknown number of Type 054B for a total of, perhaps, 70 some Type 054 frigates.  In contrast, the US plans to build 20 Constellation class ships.
 
Let’s take a look at the cursory specs and see how they compare.
 

Type 054B Launch

As the specs demonstrate, the Constellation is just a bit inferior in several respects with the only advantage being a greater number of anti-ship missiles.  The Chinese frigate has better stealth, a more powerful gun, ASW torpedoes, and an extra close in weapon.  Based just on these specs, the Type 054B is the superior vessel.  That’s a disappointing commentary on ship design and the underlying combat-mentality that went into each country’s design.
 
The US had an opportunity to produce a modern, state of the art, optimized frigate and instead opted for an obsolete base design some 20 years old.  As with the Burke Flt XXIV, or whatever they’re up to now, the Navy has opted for the illusion of a safe design instead of a modern combat capable and survivable design.  China, on the other hand, has opted for a state of the art modern frigate.

Do We Need Aerial Tankers?

Do we really need carrier based, aerial tankers?  Your immediate reaction is, of course we do!  However, let’s hold off before we make that our final answer and take a moment to look just a bit closer at the tanker question.
 
Let’s start by answering the most basic question:  why do we have tankers, currently?  This is not a trick question.  There are two general answers:
 

• Overhead Tanking provides tanking for overhead aircraft who need a just a bit of extra fuel to get back aboard the carrier.  Perhaps the pilot had to execute one too many wave offs and go-arounds and has run just a bit low on fuel or maybe the aircraft came back from the mission low on fuel due to any number of possible reasons.  Those aircraft need fuel.
• Mission Tanking extends the reach of a mission.  WWII aircraft were limited to a range of whatever their onboard fuel tank allowed them.  Tanking is a means of extending the range of an aircraft by refueling during the mission.

 
Understanding those two basic requirements, let’s look a bit deeper and bit further into the future of tanking.
 
 
Mission Tanking
 
Let’s start with the mission extension requirement.
 
Here’s a question you may not have previously considered:  what determines the maximum range of a mission?
 
Simplistically, the range is determined by the aircraft’s unrefueled range plus any aerial refueling provided as part of the mission … but is that the whole story?  Since we’re doing a post on this, you can assume it’s not!
 
If fuel were the only determinant of range, we could, in theory, have carrier aircraft fly global missions.  The carriers could stay in port, launch aircraft, and those aircraft could strike/fight on the other side of the world;  after all, it’s just a matter of sufficient refueling events, right?  However, a moment’s thought suggests that the pilot of a single seat aircraft can’t remain awake, alert, and combat effective beyond a certain number of hours in the cockpit.  Anyone who’s driven long hours in a car understands the debilitating effect of cramped quarters even with occasional pit stops for relief, food, rest, and just to stretch one’s legs.  How much worse must it be for a pilot who, literally, is strapped in and can’t move or stretch, and struggles even to relieve himself.  At some point, the pilot becomes combat ineffective.  It’s analogous to the infantryman who quickly becomes ineffective in a landing craft due to seasickness after a brief period.
 
What is the time period beyond which a pilot becomes combat ineffective?  I don’t know – and it will vary somewhat from person to person – but a reasonable estimate is around three hours.  Beyond that point, the pilot begins to lose effectiveness.  Sure, there’s nothing like the adrenalin surge of combat to wake one up but there’s no escaping the underlying decrease in alertness, reflexes, and mental agility (which declines precipitously with fatigue).  A less than completely optimal pilot is another way to describe a dead pilot.  This is not to say that a mission longer than three hours can’t be accomplished but you’re dipping into diminishing returns at that point.  Diminishing returns is another way to describe a dead pilot and failed mission.  Modern combat requires 100% efficiency in order to have a hope of survival and success.  This, by the way, is the main reason why modular ships are inherent failures – they’re not 100% optimized.  But, I digress …
 
Let’s set aside range limitations and consider enemy threats.  Submarines, cruise and ballistic missiles, supersonic aircraft, very long range SAMs, and the like have resulted in being forced to doctrinally move our carriers further and further back from the target.  We’re now talking about having to operate many hundreds of miles away or even out to a thousand miles or more.  What does that do to the mission time frame?  Using subsonic aircraft with, say, a cruise speed of 550 mph, it would take 3.6 hours to fly a thousand mile, straight, out and back mission.  Now, throw in realistic time delays for departure assembly at the carrier, tanking, non-linear routes, in-flight refueling, actual mission execution time (air to air combat or loitering), landing pattern time, etc. and that bare minimum of 3.6 hours becomes something on the order of five hours.  Wait … what did we say about cockpit time beyond which a pilot’s performance begins to degrade?  Yeah, something on the order of three hours.  Uh, oh …
 
Returning now to the tanker issue, we can see that simply adding tankers to provide longer and longer ranges is not a correct or viable approach.  Tanking is beneficial only until it extends the mission time beyond the magic three hour limit.  After that, it becomes counterproductive.  Thus, even if we had a tanker that could deliver infinite fuel at infinite range, it would be useful only within fairly narrow constraints. 
 
The pilot’s combat effectiveness is the limiting factor, not fuel !
 
Thus, bigger, better, longer ranged tankers are not the answer beyond a certain point.
 
Note:  An almost semantic variation of the range extending, mission tanking is station time extension where we want to keep an aircraft on station for an extended time at a shorter range.  For example, an aircraft flying cap at, say, 300 miles, might need refueling to enable it to loiter on station for a couple hours even though it has sufficient onboard fuel for the 600 mile round trip.
 
 
Overhead Tanking
 
Not much to say about this.  Overhead/recovery tanking is a mandatory aspect of carrier operations.  There’s no getting around the need.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Single seat aircraft are constrained by the physical and mental fatigue limits of the pilot.  As we noted, a thousand mile mission is about the limit of a pilot’s combat effectiveness.  Thus, our attempts to design and build aircraft with combat radii greater than a thousand miles and/or to provide tankers that can extend missions beyond a thousand miles are pointless.
 
Of course, if our aircraft have only an inherent combat radius of, say, 200 miles then, yes, we need to provide tanking to accomplish a thousand mile mission.  However, we have, in the past, built aircraft with unrefueled, thousand mile radii, or nearly so, so that should be our design goal.  An aircraft with a thousand mile unrefueled radius pretty much eliminates the need for mission tanking except in the extreme of, say, maximum range, air-to-air combat which requires full power/afterburner once arriving on station.
 
The conclusion is that, yes, we most definitely need tanker aircraft but we need to be careful to recognize that we’re bumping up against pilot limitations, not fuel limitations.  This recognition should impact our tanker needs (number, size, capacity, etc.) and design.
 
 
 
__________________________

 
Note:  I selected a value of three hours as the point beyond which a pilot becomes ineffective.  It could be two hours, or four, or 3.187.  The exact value doesn’t change the premise and there is no exact value, anyway, since it would vary from pilot to pilot and would depend, in part, on the circumstances of the mission.  Therefore, I’m not going to entertain debates about the exact value.  Fair warning!

Intellectual Property

We’ve previously noted that intellectual property (IP) rights have become an obstacle to maintenance and development, as well as contracts and costs.  An example is the manufacturer’s data and IP for the LCS radars without which the Navy cannot develop simulation models.  Whether simulation models are a wise idea or not (they’re not!) is a topic for another time.
 
Some readers have expressed doubts that IP is really an issue.  Well, here’s yet another example, straight from the Army horse’s mouth.  Regarding the Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) for cruise missile defense, Brig. Gen. Frank Lozano had this to say about difficulties in implementing the Norwegian system,
 

… the Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) …  The cost of supporting a foreign system that the US does not hold intellectual property rights to, he added, is also a hindrance.[1]

 
There’s no particular point to this post other than documenting yet another example of IP issues impacting maintenance and development.
 
 
 

______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Switching course: Unhappy with options, US Army considers developing new IFPC interceptor”, Ashley Roque, 19-Jun-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/switching-course-unhappy-with-options-us-army-considers-developing-new-ifpc-interceptor/

Gaza Pier

ComNavOps has been keeping an interested eye on the Gaza aid pier (or causeway) as a moderately realistic simulation of a combat unloading operation involving one component of the Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS).  Would it work as advertised?  How effective and efficient would it be?
 
Surprisingly, the pier has already been shut down. 

… Pentagon announced the "Gaza pier" will be dismantled due to damage.[1]

Here’s a time line of the pier:
 

• Mar 7 – Biden announces Gaza pier plan
• Mar 9 – U.S. Army support ship General Frank S. Besson leaves to begin construction
• May 17 -  pier opens
• May 28 - pier ops suspended after piece breaks off
• Jun 8 - operations resume after repairs
• Jun 15 – Pentagon announces pier will be torn down

  
So, what can we learn from the Gaza pier effort?
 
The first noteworthy aspect of the pier was how long it took to build.  President Biden announced the pier on 7-Mar-2024 and construction was completed 17-May.  That’s around a 70 day time frame.  As a point of comparison, the Normandy Mulberry Harbors were put into operation in less than two weeks despite being hugely larger and more complicated and despite being done under combat conditions.
 
It appears that the pier was in operation approximately 18 days out of its 30 days of existence.  That’s disappointing.  That would not effectively support an amphibious operation.
 
The next noteworthy aspect is the pier’s apparent fragility.  While weather can be severe on any body of water, the Mediterranean is not exactly the North Atlantic or a Pacific typhoon.  I never heard a detailed description of the weather conditions that disabled the pier but there were no reports of any major storms.  One would have expected that such a key element of an amphibious assault would be a good deal more robust. 
 

Mulberry Causeway

 
Conclusion
 
So, what are we to conclude from this ill-fated exercise?  Well we see that the concept has not been exercised nearly enough and under nearly realistic enough conditions for nearly sufficient periods of time.  In other words, we’ve established a key piece of our amphibious concept without sufficiently testing it.  Some might be tempted to try to defend the pier/causeway by claiming that it just encountered some bad luck but … hey … isn’t that what war is?  If you can’t weather some bad luck and difficult conditions (to the extent there were any?) then you haven’t got a combat-robust system.
 
Therefore, we conclude that the pier/causeway is not a viable component of the JLOTS system and this must, in turn, make us question the entire JLOTS system.
 
The only way to prove otherwise is through extensive testing.  Come on, Pentagon.  How about a long term, realistic test?  It would seem mandatory, now, since the system failed its actual use test quite badly.
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “RIP to Biden's Gaza Pier As He Chalks Up Another Foreign Policy Disaster”, Bonchie, 15-Jun-2024,
https://redstate.com/bonchie/2024/06/15/rip-to-bidens-gaza-pier-as-he-chalks-up-another-foreign-policy-disaster-n2175519

MQ-25 Control

The Navy’s new, not yet active, MQ-25 unmanned tanker is a fascinating control scheme case study.  You may recall that it began life as a combat UCAV concept which then morphed into a combined strike/ISR, then a pure ISR, then a combined ISR/tanker, and, ultimately, into a pure tanker … with occasional rumors of ISR or strike capabilities still being possible with minor modifications.  That convoluted development path alone makes for a fascinating story but there’s another aspect of the MQ-25 that is equally fascinating and, as best I can tell, completely ignored and that is the control scheme required to operate the tanker and how that control scheme impacts the concept of operations (CONOPS).
 
The closest I’ve seen to a CONOPS is the vague, general requirement that the tanker should be capable of delivering 14,000 lbs of fuel at a distance of 500 miles (variously reported as 15,000 lbs at 500 nm, depending on the source).  Of course, that’s not even remotely a CONOPS;  it’s a capability and an ill-defined one at that.
 
Moving on …
 
The MQ-25 consists of two main components: the MQ-25 air vehicle and the MD-5 Ground Control Station (GCS).
 
In a bit of a first for a major program, the government is acting as the lead integrator.  I applaud that, however, there won’t be any manufacturer to blame if it does not go well!
 

The Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation program office (PMA-268) is moving forward with integrating its two key elements—the MQ-25 air vehicle and the MD-5 Ground Control Station (GCS) at the program’s System Test and Integration Lab (STIL) at Patuxent River.[1]
 
PMA-268 is the lead systems integrator, working closely with its two prime industry partners, Boeing  and Lockheed Martin Skunk Works … [1]
 
“This will be the first time we are integrating an air vehicle and GCS from two different prime contractors,” said T.J. Maday, MQ-25 labs and integration manager.[1]

 
Airframe development aside, the challenge is to integrate the aircraft and the GCS with the various control ship’s sensors and software.  Many levels of integration are required – no easy task.
 
 
Control Scheme
 
There is no direct ‘pilot’ control of the MQ-25.  A ground ‘pilot’ does not fly the aircraft as is done with other UAVs.  Instead, the MQ-25 will be controlled via general commands which the aircraft’s software will attempt to implement … eventually … as the immediate situation allows.  The analogy would be someone telling you to buy milk from the grocery store but they don’t give you exact, second by second instructions.  You’re given a general command and left to figure out the details and exact timing of how to go about it yourself.
 

… the AVO [air vehicle operator] is never intended to directly input singular controls to the AV, combined with the expected signal delay, this is omitted … [2]
 
AVOs will input large scale commands such as a flight path or holding pattern, an altitude or direction change while running concurrent systems like the Stingray’s fuel pod or landing gear. “The logic within the aircraft will resolve [these] requests as compatible with its current phase of flight … [2]

 
This kind of ‘execute when you can’ control is fascinating.  Consider the simple example of a command to turn to a new heading, say, 90 degrees off.  Seems simple enough, right?  But, what if an aircraft is being currently refueled?  The UAV might be wise to delay execution of the heading change until after the current aircraft finishes tanking.  On the other hand, what if the turn command is the result of an enemy threat dead ahead?  Maybe the UAV should turn very soon and very sharply?  In fact, maybe it should terminate the refueling?  Maybe there’s another friendly aircraft that needs refueling on a fairly high priority but not an emergency?  Should the UAV continue tanking or break off and disrupt the current aircraft’s plan and timing?  What’s the current aircraft going to do with the fuel it receives?  What’s the priority?  And so on … 
 
As you see, the variations to even this ‘simple’ command are infinite.  Can we write software that can correctly assess and evaluate all the possibilities?  That strikes me as no easy task considering that, for example, we’ve been working on the ‘simple’ F-35 logistics software (ALIS) for decades and have failed miserably and the F-35 Block 4 software has been largely abandoned due to failure to complete it.
 
Alternatively, what if the UAV receives no command but there is a threat dead ahead?  Does the UAV have the sensors and software to detect and interpret a threat on its own and then make an intelligent response?  While we’d like to believe that the person controlling the tanker will be omniscient and aware of all threats and command the UAV accordingly, that’s pure fantasy in actual combat.  Some threats will be detected but others will be missed or detected too late.  What if an aircraft in distress needs fuel but can’t contact whoever the UAV controller is?  With a manned tanker they might be able to contact the tanker pilot directly and request help but you can’t talk to a UAV.
 
 
Signal Delay
 
Did you note the reference in the quote to ‘expected signal delay’?  This, too, is intriguing.  We’ve come to believe that any remote, unmanned control is instantaneous and this would appear not to be the case, at least not for the MQ-25.  I don’t know what particular component of the control scheme introduces delay or what the length of the delay is. 
 
This signal delay is similar to the widespread and misguided belief that satellites provide instantaneous detection and weapons launch control against ships.
 
Consider the example of a late detected threat described above.  The pilot of a manned aircraft can react instantly when the undetected threat eventually materializes.  A UAV, especially one with a signal delay built in, cannot react instantly.  We may lose tankers while the UAV flies blithely on, uncomprehending and uncommanded.
 
It is also unclear to me whether the expected signal delay is an inherent, unavoidable characteristic of the system components or whether it’s a conscious decision that real time control is not needed.  Fascinating, either way!
 
Regardless, the approach is a wise one, in the sense that trying to control a UAV in real time in combat is not consistently possible and it is probably counter-productive to even try.  Of course, this only works if the software can be made smart enough to resolve and manage the potentially conflicting or contradicting commands the UAV will receive.
 
It is significant that there is no official mention of MQ-25 control by other airborne assets although the Navy has expressed interest in such alternate control.  At the moment, the only control is via the GCS stations which will reside on the carriers.  However, consistent with its obsession with the ‘any platform/sensor/weapon can network with any other platform/sensor/weapon’ philosophy, it now appears that the Navy is trying to make the MQ-25 controllable by other aircraft.
 

Boeing is also working with the Navy so that an airborne platform can control the MQ-25 Stingray and not just from its aircraft carrier home. When speaking about this, Rear Admiral Telford said:  “MQ-25 needs to have the ability to talk and be managed by any airborne platform, including those of our allies and partners.”[3]

 
Communications Security
 
We noted in a previous post that the desire to control the MQ-25 from other airborne assets was rooted in a fundamentally illogical assumption about communications security (see, "MQ-25 Control Concept"). 

The value in pilots being able to task MQ-25s mid-flight lies within a core assumption the Navy — and more broadly the Pentagon — has about the future battlefield: all communications will be subject to attack. The shipboard controllers may not always have contact or permission to communicate with the MQ-25 depending on the situation. If that’s the case, then a pilot of a nearby manned aircraft may need to redirect the unmanned tanker without assistance from the ship.

Of course, this raised the question, if the shipboard controller can’t communicate with the unmanned tanker due to enemy disruption of communications, why would we think that we’ll be able to communicate with the manned aircraft to tell the pilot to redirect the unmanned one?  That’s a logical inconsistency.  Military thinking just teems with this kind of logical inconsistency.
 
 
Issues
 
Communications – Regardless of the degree of communications with the MQ-25, how secure are the communication links?  Will the regular, if not constant, communications, back and forth, betray the UAV, carrier/control asset, or both locations?  Every person I’ve talked to who knows anything about signals intercept states unequivocally that our comms are nowhere near as secure as we like to believe.
 
For that matter, what type of communication signal will the MQ-25 use?  Satellite relay?  LOS?  Omni-directional?  Multiple modes?
 
Cyber Security – Anything that can receive a signal can be cyber attacked and the MQ-25 certainly qualifies.  At a minimum, the aircraft will have sensors taking in external signals and dedicated communication and data link receivers.  We don’t want a Battlestar Galactica scenario but, as we’ve seen repeatedly, even the best protected network or computer can be hacked and on a fairly regular basis.  Hardly a month goes by that I don’t receive a letter from some company saying that my customer data has been compromised and that’s from major corporations who claim to have secure networks!  China is working every day to find and develop cyber vulnerabilities in our assets.  Can an unmanned platform function reliably in the face of cyber threats? 
 
Ground Control vs. Aircraft Control – Both approaches have pros and cons, as we’ve discussed.  One further aspect of the discussion is that if you need an aircraft to control the tanker, you’ve essentially turned the ‘one-man’ tanker operation into a multi-aircraft procedure.  Requiring two aircraft to enable one to be a tanker is horribly inefficient and, essentially, doubles the cost while requiring twice the resources.
 
CONOPS – I desperately hope the Navy has thoroughly worked through the CONOPS under realistic conditions before concluding that the MQ-25 was the best solution.  My fear (near certainty) is that they hopped on board the unmanned tanker in a technology-for-the-sake-of-technology move and that an unmanned tanker is not the best solution.
 
 
 
 
 _____________________________ 
 
Note:  Fleet service timeline has been pushed back to 2026 or later.
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Navair website, “MQ-25 team preps for first air vehicle, control station integration test event”, 18-May-2022,
https://www.navair.navy.mil/news/MQ-25-team-preps-first-air-vehicle-control-station-integration-test-event/Wed-05182022-0715
 
[2]Forbes, “Developing The MQ-25’s Ground Control Station Means Thinking Like A Mission Commander - Not A Pilot”, Eric Tegler, 12-Jan-2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2021/01/12/developing-the-mq-25s-ground-control-station-means-thinking-like-a-mission-commandernot-a-pilot/?sh=643ac901557a
 
[3]Simple Flying website, “Pushing Boundaries: What Is The Boeing MQ-25 Stingray?”, Mark Finlay, 13-Feb-2024,
https://simpleflying.com/boeing-mq-25-stingray-guide/

Deadly Fish

Gotta get closer to shore, the Captain thought.  They were already dangerously, recklessly close with only a few feet of water under the keel but safety – and surprise – lay to the starboard, landward side of the ship, not the open ocean to port even though every sailor’s instinct told him to veer off and make for open water. 
 
A few whispered commands and more than a few discrete, disbelieving looks from the immediate crew and the ship inched closer to shore.
 
If any ship could carry out this mission, the Captain knew, it was this one.  The ship was a Fletcher II class destroyer – a true destroyer, not some unholy, underarmed, unarmored, cruiser size ship that was designated a destroyer to keep Congress from asking inconvenient questions.  This was a ship built to fight and kill.  The ship was designed with maximum radar, IR, and acoustic stealth to be as nearly invisible as was possible.  It mounted four 5” guns, dozens of CIWS and SeaRAM mounts, and a main battery of 10x 650 mm torpedoes in two quintuple, centerline, rapid reload launchers, one midships and one nearer the stern to provide separation in the event of battle damage.
 
Right now, the ship, and her five squadron mates were on their way to knock out the southern Chinese invasion fleet that, along with a middle and northern fleet, had been attacking Taiwan at three separate sites for the last five weeks.  The Taiwan forces had managed to absorb the initial assaults at great cost but were losing as the Chinese continued to pour reserve forces and supplies into the assaults.  Something had to give.
 
The preferred method of attack against the invasion fleet had been the anti-ship cruise missile but US stocks (and Chinese stocks!) had been quickly depleted in the first three weeks and had proven largely ineffective against the Chinese version of Aegis.  The US had believed in the effectiveness of their own Aegis system so it should have come as no surprise to US planners that the Chinese version (copied and improved from Aegis) would also be effective.  Yes, there had been several Chinese ships of various types sunk or knocked out of the fight but the Chinese pre-war numerical advantage and close proximity to the assault had allowed them to absorb the hits with almost no operational impact.
 
The US had targeted the amphibious and supply ships which, in hindsight, had been a mistake as it exposed the attacking cruise missiles to the full depth of the escort’s protective anti-air defensive layer.  Relatively few of the thousands of missiles launched over the weeks had gotten through.  The Navy’s Tomahawk Block V, while lauded by Navy leadership pre-war, was still, essentially, 1980’s technology with a few added enhancements mostly related to networking and remote communications which had no actual combat value.  It was, for all practical purposes, the 1980’s Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM).  While the range was impressive at 1000 miles, the missile lacked the supersonic speed, terminal maneuverability, and on-board countermeasures to successfully penetrate the Chinese Aegis defenses.  Range without lethality was pointless, as the Navy had found out the hard way.
 
The Navy’s air-launched Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) had had greater success but the Navy had unwisely cancelled production in anticipation of a Next Generation LRASM (NG-LRASM) and, thus, inventories were very small and the missiles were depleted in the first two weeks.
 
Thus, it was that the Fletcher II class squadron found itself skimming the southern shore of Taiwan, literally hugging the coast to blend their already minimal radar signatures with the returns from the land as they proceeded single file at 30+ knots with just 50 m bow to stern separation between ships.  This was insane sailing by any peacetime standard but was now the preferred tactic for this mission.  Only by getting lost in the land’s radar and acoustic clutter could the ships hope to survive long enough to reach their launch point.
 
The destroyers had broken off from escorting a resupply convoy as it pulled into Hualien during the early evening as darkness was descending.  Hualien was a major port on the central, east coast which was protected by mountains and had become a natural convoy destination.  It was 170 miles from Hualien to the southern tip of Taiwan – around five and a half hours sailing at the destroyer’s best speed.  The Chinese had seen convoys come (some badly battered, some largely untouched) and go from Hualien repeatedly and one more convoy went unremarked by Chinese infiltrators watching from the heights.  The appearance or disappearance of a handful of escort destroyers didn’t attract the attention of the Chinese army infiltrators who didn’t really know or care about naval matters.  The destroyers were just ships going about their convoy escort duties as they had done dozens of times before. 
 

Map of Taiwan

 

Now, the destroyer squadron rounded the southern tip of the island, just seventy or so miles to the Chinese invasion fleet.  Another five miles and the squadron reached the launch point.  Every additional mile from this point on significantly increased the risk of detection.
 
One after another, the destroyers pivoted away from the shore to unmask their centerline torpedo launchers and began the launch, rapid reload, launch cycle.  Each ship carried 40 torpedoes and the squadron launched a total of 240 torpedoes in under ten minutes before reversing course to had back the way they had come, their mission complete.
 

Southern Tip of Taiwan

As the wave of torpedoes approached the invasion fleet at their 30 kt cruising speed, they stayed near the shore where the surf noise helped mask their motor noise.  At around five miles, however, the torpedoes spread out along a ten mile front perpendicular to the shore.  This set up a ten mile wide sweep through the invasion fleet’s location.
 
At this point, the outlying fleet escorts began to pick up the acoustic signatures of the approaching torpedoes and, after a few more minutes of indecisiveness, confirmed the detection of the torpedoes and sounded the alarm.  The ships that were moving began to turn away and scatter to the north while those that were stopped or anchored began, frantically, to get underway.  Ironically, the initial reaction of the outer ships, which was to turn away from the threat, wound up bringing them closer to the main amphibious fleet and had the effect of concentrating the targets for the torpedoes.
 
With so little warning, there was no hope of escape as the torpedoes accelerated to their terminal attack speed of 60 kts.  The torpedoes began sensing individual targets and their simplistic programming resulted in them locking onto the nearest valid target, often multiple torpedoes per target.  The torpedo designers had purposely omitted any attempt at sophisticated target discrimination, acoustic imaging, networked smart allocation of targets, or any other worthless action that contributed nothing but cost to the torpedo.  These torpedoes were ‘dumb’.  They would go after the first target they saw that met some basic criteria.  This meant inefficient allocation of weapons but the designers realized that the solution to that was numbers.  If you could put enough weapons in the water, it didn’t matter how inefficient they were.  These torpedoes were the equivalent of area bombardment.  They would attack any target and amongst a Chinese invasion fleet, any target was a good target.
 
The Chinese ships frantically fled, twisting and turning to avoid the incoming torpedoes.  There were a few collisions and many near misses but, ultimately, it did no good.  A ship might evade one torpedo but the seeming endless wave of torpedoes ensured that another torpedo would lock on.  The first torpedoes began impacting and explosions and fires began dotting the sea.  The wave of torpedoes continued on.  Inevitably, by pure chance, some ships escaped being targeted and survived but the southern flank of the invasion fleet was devastated and disrupted.
 
The wave front of torpedoes continued on, passing through the escorts and impacting the largely motionless amphibious ships.  Ship after ship took hits, ripping the guts out of the invasion.  By the time the torpedoes passed through the center of the fleet and began approaching the northern escorts, there were few torpedoes left but even those few managed to completely disrupt the escorts, causing them to flee further north.
 
With the Chinese invasion fleet broken and the carefully networked Aegis-like air defense completely disrupted, a carefully timed B-2/21 bomber force, heavily supported by electronic warfare aircraft and led by an F-22 fighter sweep, hit the surviving ships of the invasion fleet with a barrage of various close range air dropped weapons.  This kind of close attack couldn’t have succeeded if the escort force was still intact, networked, and integrated.  The destroyers, however, had seen to that threat.  As the bombers and fighters pulled off their attack and headed home, the Chinese southern invasion fleet had, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist, providing some badly needed relief to the Taiwan defenders and allowing the defensive forces to concentrate on the middle and northern invasion sites.
 
 
 
 
_______________________
 
The Torpedo

Don’t believe the torpedo described in the story could exist?  Consider these range specifications for real torpedoes.
 
 
US Mk48 Torpedo
Range: 
38 km (24 mi; 21 nmi) at 55 kts
50 km (31 mi; 27 nmi) at 40 kts
 
Type 65 Soviet 650 mm Torpedo
Range:
50 km (31 miles) at 50 kts
100 km (62 miles) at 30 kts
 
Is it that big a leap to believe the torpedo described in this story could exist?
 
Story Torpedo
Range: 
137 km (85 miles; 74 nmi) at 30 kts with 60 kt terminal attack speed
 

 
Story Aspects
 
This story demonstrates, among several other things, the value of a very basic weapon.  The imagined torpedoes have been designed with none of the wire guidance, multi-mode seeker, acoustic imaging, etc. that drives up cost, consumes internal volume, increases production complexity which decreases production rates, requires complex software, and adds little combat capability improvements.  Thus, the internal volume savings can be devoted to additional fuel and/or a larger warhead.
 
Simpler, easier to produce, cheaper, and just as lethal – what’s not to like?

  
The story also demonstrates the value of an optimized, specialized weapon system, the destroyer, whose sole primary purpose was anti-surface/torpedo.  A multi-function ship with just a few torpedoes could never hope to achieve the kind of wholesale, efficient destruction described in this story.  The entire navy wouldn’t be composed of these ships, of course.  It would just be one or two squadrons worth.  The rest of the fleet would be a mix of various other ships, each with their own specialization.  This gives the operation planner a menu of specialized ships to choose from instead of being forced to use just one ship type which isn’t optimized for any one function (hi, Burke!).
 
 
Yet another aspect of the story is that it Illustrates the profligate expenditure of weapons (many readers will be shocked by the number of torpedoes used, having completely forgotten what real missions require in a true war) which is  characteristic of every real war in history and totally absent from every pre-war plan in history.
 
 
Missions
 
Additional mission examples for a torpedo destroyer might include:
 

• Sinking merchant ships in a blockade scenario, something that the current Navy surface ships would have a very difficult time doing.
• Launching specialized recon torpedoes (USV) for recon of harbors, shorelines, chokepoint passages, etc.
• Land attack using torpedoes with suitable fuzing against docks, dry docks, shoreline facilities, etc.
• Destruction of causeways being used to unload ships
• Anti-ship attack from over the horizon using with the aid of spotter UAVs
• Convoy escort

 
 
Fun Facts:
 
From Wiki:

• The torpedo inventory of the U.S. Navy in 2001 was 1,046 Mk-48 torpedoes.
• In 2017 Lockheed's production was approximately 50 per year.
• Mk48 production ended in 1996.  Production restarted in 2016 with initial deliveries in 2022, as best I can tell.

 

Disclaimer:  As always (and always ignored!), this is not intended to be a true combat simulation.  It is intended to illustrate some concepts in a more readable - and hopefully enjoyable - format.