It's the end of the year and it's been while since the last open post so let's do it again. This is your chance to offer a comment on whatever interests you.
Got a suggestion for a post topic?
Want to talk about something that's been neglected?
Want to tell me what you'd like more (or less) of?
Want to tell me how you'd make the blog better?
Got a rant you want to get off your chest?
You pick the topic!
Have at it!
Have at it!
A deep & large analysis about the currently catastrophic DDG(X) program (Arleigh-Burke successors)
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, that wouldn't be a post, it would be a book! And, the ultimate conclusion would be that the Navy is run by idiots.
DeleteShould Navy go back to air superiority and attack aircrafts combination on carrier? like F-14 and A7?
ReplyDeleteChina appears going this way. J-35 is an air superiority and J-15 multirole fighters. During last month's Zhuhai Airshow, a J-35 (navy version) markup displayed while a J-35A (air force model, mainly for export) performed a live show.
Giving China's carriers are smaller but still want to place two types of fighters. Do you think this air superiority plus see/land attack still have merit? or one multirole (F/A-18E/F or F-35) is better? giving carriers' sizes and missions.
We've covered this many times in this blog and you can answer it for yourself by answering this simple question: do you want to succeed and survive in combat or do you want to fail and die?
DeleteThe way you succeed and survive is by doing one thing and doing it supremely well. The way you fail and die is by trying to do multiple things and doing none of them well.
An airframe can only be supremely optimized for a single function. A pilot can be a supremely capable fighter pilot or he can be a supremely capable strike pilot. Limited training time does not allow a single pilot to be supremely good at more than one thing.
You have your answer!
I suspect that for many purposes surface warships are obsolete. You should be building submarines for many duties including mine-laying and mine-sweeping.
ReplyDeleteThe future will be about mines, drones, and missiles, not aircraft carriers and destroyers. This will be especially true for coastal waters.
Okay ... so how would you propose handling blockades, boarding, inspections, shore bombardment, amphibious assault support, convoy ASW and AAW escort, ballistic missile defense, etc.?
DeleteHow will drones get to open ocean or first island chain operating areas without a drone 'carrier'?
How does a submarine do mine sweeping? I've never heard of that.
Unless you're talking about developing intercontinental missiles, how will cruise missiles get within range of operating areas without a surface ship launch platform of some sort?
Many questions about your vision! Enlighten me!
What better for a blockade than mines and submarines?
DeleteBoarding, inspections, etc: if they arise often let a submarine arise from the depths and carry them out - unless it's a petty scale of activity suited to a coastguard.
Shore bombardment? Sub launches suitable missiles.
Amphibious assault support? Amphibious assaults won't happen: they'd be massacred.
Convoy ASW escort: subs could do that.
Convoy AAW escort: can you give me an example of when this was last done?
How will drones get to open ocean or first island chain operating areas without a drone 'carrier'? You design a sub to carry them in the unlikely event that the USN would be of any appreciable use in the neighbourhood of the first island chain.
How does a submarine do mine sweeping? Develop a method: there really is no point in forever preparing to refight WWII.
"a surface ship launch platform of some sort" will be undefendable on coastal waters.
"What better for a blockade than mines and submarines?"
DeleteSubs lack the ability to lay useful numbers of mines (tens of thousands for a large scale blockade). Subs lack the sensor range for useful surveillance. They lack the ability to dispatch drones/helos for extended range surveillance and visual identification. They have no ability to fire warning shots to stop ships or apply a gradation of force. They can only sink ships. It is also a colossal waste to tie up multitudes of submarines on blockade duty.
"let a submarine arise from the depths and carry them out"
A submarine cannot conduct boarding. They have no helos, no boats (a rubber raft is not useful for boarding), no fire support for the boarders. The personnel risk factor is off the charts in anything other than glass calm seas as we just recently saw when two SEALs died during an attempted boarding op from a much better equipped boat.
"Shore bombardment? Sub launches suitable missiles."
Come on, now. You're just being ridiculous. I'm tempted to delete the comment.
"Amphibious assaults won't happen"
Guns are no longer needed by aircraft ... and then Vietnam happened. Do I really need to list all the things that people have said will never happen and then did?
"Convoy ASW escort: subs could do that."
"Convoy AAW escort: can you give me an example of when this was last done?"
The last time wartime convoys sailed. Do you really think China is not going to attack convoys from the air? You're being absurd.
"You design a sub to carry them"
Won't even dignify that one.
"Develop a method"
If you can come up with one, I'm all ears.
You are clearly trying to win some sort of argument in your mind. There is little doubt that we could use more subs but writing off surface ships as obsolete is ridiculous.
This is an open post so I'll leave your comment up but I trust you won't attempt to post another comment of this poor quality. Thank you.
*Where practical* we should switch to submarine or subsurface vessels in a world where sensors become ever more effective and satellite imagery gets closer to realtime.
Delete"Subsurface" for me is a hybrid that doesn't deep-dive but merely snorkels: for the vast majority of the time vessels only need an air intake + nav&comms mast above the surface.
Lots of roles are better suited to either kind of sub. Oilers, due to them currently being easy pickings. Area denial. Sometimes anti-ship. Scouting / targeting. Mine-laying (but maybe not clearing). And tasks in high-risk coastal areas.
Dearirme wasn't suggesting all roles should be submarine. As always, one should apply the most appropriate solution to each task rather than take an absolutist approach to the argument.
PS ComNavOps is a proponent of armouring...a few meters of seawater are pretty effective and come free.
"a few meters of seawater are pretty effective and come free."
DeleteNothing could be further from the truth! Seawater - as in, a subsurface vessel - carries a monstrous price tag due to the 'free' seawater. Once you submerge a vessel, even only a few feet, EVERY fitting needs to be pressure rated which massively increases cost and weight. EVERY seam needs to be watertight and pressure rated. There's a reason why submarines are so expensive.
Rant: If the Marines are determined to strand themselves on a multitude of Gilligan’s Island, force them to take and maintain $ the currently useless LCS ships. Instead of the bizarre plan to use slow transports for resupply. Like repurposing destroyers as fast transports, as the Japanese used in Gaudalcanal Campaign; not that it was game changing for the IJN.
ReplyDeleteI mean think about it , “Littoral”, might not be value added to the island/ anti-ship missile idea, but it would look they were seriously trying.
One problem with that thought is that the LCS range AT SPEED is very short. For example, they could not sail to and from the South China Sea or first island chain at high speed.
Delete"For example, they could not sail to and from the South China Sea or first island chain at high speed."
DeleteEven if they had the range to get there at speed, would they actually be able to travel that far at speed without breaking down?
If this strategy involves building up a hub of marine personnel, equipment and a stockpile of weapons on the Taiwanese mainland, then perhaps it's not such a bad strategy.
DeleteType 076 has launched and named Sichuan. There is one EMAL on it (suspected to launch heavy drones). Any thought on how it will be used?
ReplyDeletehttps://www.twz.com/sea/chinas-monster-type-076-amphibious-assault-ship-seen-like-never-before-at-launch-ceremony
The 076 is an adaptation of the US America class and would fill a similar role. Lacking a Harrier/F-35B type aircraft, China appears to be betting all-in on larger, unmanned drones. I believe that to be an unwise decision but that remains to be seen.
DeleteAside from landing troops in an actual amphibious assault, the ship will be used not for power projection but for influence projection around the periphery of the first island chain (for example, to influence Vietnam and Philippines).
Can anyone say for certain why the Navy went full speed ahead on the Constellation-class FFGs? The intention is to buy 20 of these things. If we were to use modern naval thinking, the final number may be considerably less than what was initially intended (see DDG-1000, LCS,, SSN-21). I still don't know what the intended mission(s) of the FFG-62 is/are. Multi-mission? ASW? (Thats funny). According to www.seaforces.org :
ReplyDeleteArmament:
32-cell Mk.41 Vertical Launching System / VLS
for a mix of
RIM-66 Standard Missile SM-2MR
RIM-174 Standard ERAM
RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)
- - - - -
1 x BAE Systems Mk.110 57mm gun weapon system
1 x Mk. 49 missile launching system for RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM)
SSM launcher (4x4 cells)
for
RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile NSM/JSM or
RGM-84 Harpoon SSM
(Full link :https://www.seaforces.org/usnships/ffg/Constellation-class.htm)
According to dote.osd.mil:
(link: https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/navy/2022ffg62.pdf)
MISSION
The Maritime Component
Commander will employ the
Constellation-class to support
the National Defense Strategy
across the full range of military
operations. Specific mission
areas include anti-air warfare,
anti-submarine warfare, surface
warfare, electronic warfare/
information operations, and
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions.
I don't see any ASW weapons. No 2 x 3 Mk 32 SVTTs or VL-ASROCs.
"Can anyone say for certain why the Navy went full speed ahead on the Constellation-class FFGs? "
DeleteNo one, including the Navy, knows. Without a military strategy and derived CONOPS, any ship is just a stab in the dark as far as its usefulness.
Lacking a CONOPS, the Constellation has no focus and tries to cover all functional bases, none well.
It's a replacement for the failed LCS and the scrapped Perrys. The main design goal was to produce a 'not failure' rather than any particular, successful design.
What I don't understand is why they buy a ship built around Continental systems? Why not a Danish or a Dutch or a Spanish ships that uses US equipment? They should have built the Danish Iver Huitfeldt for me. A simple design that has US systems with a simple propulsion system but big enough to keep up with CBG's. But no they buy French design and spend a fortune building a different ship entirely. Madness. Sheer madness.
DeleteA look at Quad v China naval warfare scenarios?
ReplyDeleteQuad co-op issues?
Mine warfare v China?
Options for the use of USMC in a fight with China? Other than leaving them stranded on remote islands to die.
What is 'Quad'?
Delete"Options for the use of USMC in a fight with China?"
It all depends on what our objectives in a war are. For the maintenance of the status quo, which seems the most likely goal (though entirely wrong!), there is little use for the Marines and that's why they're desperately casting around for something to do and why they've come up with the ridiculous missile shooting concept.
Squad size units could be dispersed as glorified coastwatchers. Alternatively, they could be used for base defense.
Land forces are of use only when you want to seize (or defend) land. Likely war scenarios with China don't include much in the way of land operations. No land ops ... no Marines.
Quad is the informal alliancy sort of thing that no one is specifically detailing between India, Japan, Australia and the US regarding Indo Pacific security and trade.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue
DeleteRequest a detailed post on "Modern Application of Sea-Planes in Pacific Theater"
ReplyDeleteAside from odd jobs, perhaps search and rescue, there are no applications for sea planes that I can see. They're too large, too slow, non-stealthy ... that's called a target drone.
DeleteDo you see some role that I haven't thought of?
I agree, Marines must fill their listed role to protect advanced naval bases. If war threatens, an ARG/MEU is just a target. Off load the Marines at bases and send the ARG out of range to do whatever. Our air and sea bases in Asia have very little security. A Chinese commando team landing from sub or small boat could cause massive damage. This takes a alot of manpower. If you want just 200 Marines protecting Kadena AFB on Okinawa, you need 800 on base to provide 24/7 coveraged. They are also needed to deal with angry locals or refugees from bombings, plus lots of hands are needed to help clean up from bomb and missile damage.
DeleteThat Marine post was mine. There are lots of accounts of seaplane value during World War II. They are great for mass sea rescue from a sinking ship, and great for casualty evacuation when no airfield is near.
DeleteThey would make good sub tenders. It will be foolish to send a $3 billion sub to dock at Guam or Sasebo or even Yokosuka during a major war. Sending a tender near China is foolish, but a seaplane can land in a remote bay to link up with a sub to swap personnel and deliver some supplies, then fly away in less than an hour. Some PBYs had small pop-out cranes to off-load at sea.
A dedicated seaplane makes much more sense than the C-130 with floats like this Air Force proposal.
Deletehttps://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-mc-130j-float-water-landing/
https://www.twz.com/special-operations-c-130-seaplane-program-put-on-back-burner
DeleteWhile it might be too expansive to fit in one post, or take waaaay too much research time... I'd love to see an analysis of all the Navys shore commands and their usefulness (or lack thereof). The Navy cries about unfilled seagoing billets, yet we have enough commands to supply as many Admirals with a job as we have ships. How many are truly adding to the Navy combat capabilities, useful training, etc??
ReplyDeleteYou are correct that would be a mammoth post and a ton of time digging into obscure navy commands! I'll give you one example of an Admiral adding no value to our combat capabilities: Rear Admiral Walter D. Brafford, Chief, United States Navy Dental Corps. Really? An admiral running a dental group? We couldn't get a lower level officer or a civilian to run a dental group?
DeleteHere's another example. The Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) has 42,000 personnel supporting a fleet of 280 ships. That's 150 people per ship. That seems excessive.
DeleteThe Navy has 337,000 active duty personnel. BUMED comprises 12% of the total navy!
Here is the best example of an unneeded "command". Something I wrote about long ago:
DeleteThe U.S. Navy's base at Chinhae, Korea serves no function whatsoever.
https://g2mil.com/chinhae.htm
I would love a post on what the US Navy could learn from the Royal Navy and her sister navies in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
ReplyDeleteIt would also be interesting to hear what you think would be the appropriate size & structure for the Royal Navy to defend a post-Brexit UK
I'm sorry but while I casually follow UK naval matters, I have nowhere near the knowledge to draw any lessons from them or any other navy. For starters, I have only the vaguest idea of what the UK defense goals actually are and, without that understanding, I can't offer any evaluation or assessment of them.
DeleteWhat size should the RN be? I don't know, for the reasons noted above, but A LOT BIGGER, for sure.
Sorry, that's the best I can do. Perhaps you have some thoughts you'd care to offer?
Is there a lesson you think we could learn from the RN? I might be able to comment on some specific aspect if you suggest a specific point.
DeleteI once read Roger Thompson's excellent book, "Lessons Not Learned: The US Navy's Status Quo Culture" and I was impressed by how seriously the RN takes training. It seems like they value it much more than we do.
DeleteLooking on from afar, I also know little about what the UK's defense goals are either. To be honest, it seems they don't know either.
But as you say: Their budgets are now so small, everything seems to be in terminal decline anyway.
"how seriously the RN takes training"
DeleteThat is (or once was) a good lesson. It was not their training, per se, that was good but their willingness to hold to standards and fail people that made the training effective. Anyone who passed their training was actually well trained.
The US Navy has all kinds of training with impressive syllabi but we don't hold anyone to account. Everyone passes regardless of how poorly they performed. The recent test of SWOs on rules of the road revealed that only around 10-20% could pass and yet no one suffered any consequences.
"I would love a post on what the US Navy could learn from the Royal Navy and her sister navies in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
DeleteOne of the most obvious is that once naval forces stop generating usefulness and relevance to the countries population.... you soon stop having a navy big enough to matter. When you think of the current state of the Royal Navy compared to her illustrious past, it is a sobering lesson for the US Navy, who seems to be on the same slow declining trajectory.
I just reread some of the best chapters from "Lessons Not Learned" and you are correct. However, as you've said before, the up or out promotion system is a strong incentive not to outright fail people.
DeleteCNO, you have a good imagination. Would you like to write a post on what the Navy could be like today if all six Iowa- and the five Montana-class battleships had been built, along with all 12 Des Moines-class heavy cruisers and used in a way that made use of their strengths? Would they have been rotated in and out of storage/service life extension to reduce wear on the ships? What if a few battleships had been in active service in 1965? What role would they have played in the second Gulf War? What role could they play in the Red Sea (okay, that's kind of obvious)? Would they be of use defending Taiwan? Would keeping these ships in service have had any influence on the design of modern destroyers and cruisers if any combat experience had shown the value of armor?
ReplyDeleteSo, you'd like me to rewrite all of history since WWII? I don't think I'll live long enough to do that!
DeleteRemember, it's not even as simple as asking how our fleet might have been different; it also requires one to speculate on how the rest of the world would have responded. What new and different paths would weapon development have taken by our enemies to counteract our BBs? How would their navies and air forces have changed? How would we, then, have changed in response? And so on.
I'll give you a very short answer: nothing about us would have changed because, since WWII and certainly since the Cold War, we lack the will to use our naval forces. We see it today. Our carriers sail around and no one fears them. They don't deter anyone or anything because our enemies know we won't use them. We could have a thousand battleships and ten thousand carriers and they'd be useless because we don't have the courage to use them. China would just laugh at us, as they do now, because the know we won't use them.
It doesn't matter what theoretical strengths a battleship or cruiser has if we won't turn them loose ... and we won't.
Think about it. We have, what, some 100,000 troops in Europe, many hundreds of aircraft, fleets of ships in the vicinity and Russia went ahead and invaded Ukraine. They weren't deterred even for a second because they knew we wouldn't use any of those forces.
We have untold numbers of troops, the entire 7th Fleet, hundreds of subs and aircraft in the Pacific and yet China rampages through the E/S China seas and beyond because they know we won't do anything about it.
That's not the answer you want to hear but the truth is that platforms don't make history and influence events ... courage and willpower does. The platforms are almost irrelevant.
"So, you'd like me to rewrite all of history since WWII? I don't think I'll live long enough to do that!"
DeleteI wouldn't live that long either, but I was just thinking about a specific kind of hardware.
"Remember, it's not even as simple as asking how our fleet might have been different; it also requires one to speculate on how the rest of the world would have responded. What new and different paths would weapon development have taken by our enemies to counteract our BBs? How would their navies and air forces have changed? How would we, then, have changed in response? And so on."
Those are good points. Perhaps the supersonic anti-ship missiles would be one response to us keeping the BBs and CAs around. I've read the supersonic missiles were designed to destroy aircraft carriers and Aegis-equipped ships, but some of those missiles have large warheads and I really don't know what would happen if one of them hit a battleship. (Yes, we could find out through testing against steel of the same composition and layout as the armor.) I'm not sure if a supersonic anti-ship missile has ever been used in combat. I've read that the burst of speed as the missile approaches the ship that's supposed to make the missile impossible to shoot down also might make it harder for the missile to stay on target.
I was wondering what you would do to deploy such ships and how to upgrade them. I don't think you would do anything to reduce the number of big guns on the ships. Keeping the BBs in service may have resulted in more robust launchers for the Sea Sparrow missile (to withstand the blast) or an earlier deployment of vertical launch systems (VLSs) in US Navy warships.
Here's an example of alternate military history. I especially like the B49J Wild Weasel and the AC49E gunship.
https://www.ninfinger.org/models/rms_tips/b49alt.hist.html
I think alternate history is fun, though it's not for everyone. I wrote my suggestion because you sometimes write fiction. For your Pounce short story, someone brought up that the commanding officer of that LCS probably would have liked to have some Mk48 torpedoes. The fictional posts certainly generate interesting discussions.
"The fictional posts certainly generate interesting discussions."
DeleteI enjoy writing fictional posts if they can illustrate some point I want to make. The challenge is in keeping them to several paragraphs. A fictional, alternate history of world naval developments, no matter how succinctly summarized, would go well beyond several paragraphs! As you've seen, anything I leave out in the name of brevity gets jumped on by someone. It's a challenge!
You clearly have an interest in BB and CA usage. Perhaps you'd care to suggest a viable scenario which illustrates how you think they might be used. You can either write such a story as a guest post or, if you'd prefer, I can turn your concept into a story. The challenge is to come up with a viable, believable, somewhat realistic scenario that is both informative and entertaining. Think about it and let me know if you have an idea.
This is like an historical summary, not a short story, but here goes.
DeleteAlternate history part 1:
To ease the transition from a wartime to peacetime economy, all six Iowa-class battleships, the five Montana-class battleships, and all twelve Des Moines-class heavy cruisers were constructed. This program reduced unemployment as many men left the service after World War Two while making a long-term contribution to the national defense.
Because these ships had large crews and a specialized role, the new battleships and cruisers typically served briefly after completion before being put into storage.
Five years later, the United States found itself in another conflict. While the aircraft carrier became the capital ship during WWII, a battleship can still put more pounds of ordnance on the enemy than an air wing within a given time. All six Iowa-class battleships, along with the battleships Montana (BB-67) and Ohio (BB-68) also contributed during the Korean conflict. The 16-inch guns in a Montana were no more powerful than those installed in an Iowa, but the Montanas had a dozen of these guns, and thus a Montana can fire up to 24 shells per minute. The Montanas had a more formidable secondary armament, consisting of 5/54 guns, which had a longer range and fired a heavier shell than an Iowa’s 5/38 guns.
The post-Korea era saw another draw down, with the Navy settling on operating two battleships and three Des Moines class cruisers at a time. When a ship was temporarily taken out of service, it might receive some upgrades such as new communication systems. The heavy cruisers could not hit the enemy as hard as a battleship, but they were less expensive to operate. To reduce costs, an Iowa-class battleship often carried enough crew to operate one turret and half the boilers. In the event of conflict, reservists could be called up to fully man the ship if necessary. The Des Moines class was spared the extensive changes made to some WWII cruisers, such as losing turrets to missile launchers. The Des Moines class was the zenith of American heavy cruiser design, and it retained its gun armament that could put up to 90 8-inch shells on the enemy per minute.
Priorities shifted again when the United States became involved in Vietnam. The USS Illinois (BB-66) was the first battleship in the theater. No enemy troops within range of its guns were safe. The US Navy manned the battleship Kentucky (BB-65) with a full crew and sent it to the theater. Montana also deployed with a full crew.
The battleships proved valuable. On several occasions, the 16-inch guns destroyed bunkers that had survived multiple air strikes. Using the battleships did not risk pilots. However, not all targets were within gun range. The Navy field-tested an experimental weapon, a Regulus-II missile with a large conventional warhead. In some cases, these missiles were launched from the fantail of a battleship. The weapon’s size it awkward to use, but it was used successfully, heavily defended targets and also to knock out air defenses just before carrier aircraft arrived over the target.
The battleships were so effective they caused great consternation in North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The Soviets sent Styx missiles and advisors to the country and on one night fired a half-dozen missiles at Montana. Chaff dispensers and other measures deflected six of them, but one hit the ship. Firefighting crews went to work. The secondary fires caused by the missile’s propellant were difficult to extinguish, but the ship was ready to fight again in under two hours. Some sailors were hurt, but nobody died.
Alternate history part 2:
DeleteOn another night a large salvo of missiles was launched ships conducting artillery strikes. At least two missiles were shot down by escort ships. However, a battleship was hit, though again damage was not severe. A guided missile destroyer escorting the battleship also was hit. The warhead exploded, propellant contributed to fires aboard the ship, and the aluminum superstructure was almost completely destroyed. In a separate incident, a Styx missile exploded near a Navy guided missile cruiser. Nobody was killed, but some sailors were injured by shrapnel that penetrated the superstructure.
Nevertheless, these gunfire missions proved extremely effective in destroying North Vietnamese ports and troops. The US Air Force and Navy also stepped up a massive air campaign against North Vietnam. North Vietnam agreed to a peace settlement acceptable to South Vietnam and the United States. American forces began withdrawing from South Vietnam before 1969.
Not only were the Des Moines-class cruisers heavily armed and well protected, they were fast. Arguably, the crew of a Des Moines-class cruiser saved the world in 1973. As the Russian guided missile cruiser Grozny approached the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk as if it were about to launch missiles, the USS Dallas moved quickly to intercept Grozny, training all nine eight-inch guns on the Russian ship. To use a classic naval term, Dallas crossed Grozny’s T. Grozny immediately broke off the attempt at intimidation. The Russian fleet withdrew from the theater of operations. Years later, declassified radio intercepts revealed the Soviets feared a Montana-class battleship accompanied by an Essex-class antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS) were going to be deployed to the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Soviet commanders feared Russian sailors would mutiny if the Soviets pressed to fight the US Navy.
The extreme damage to the guided missile destroyer in Vietnam prompted the US Navy to take the anti-ship missile threat seriously. One was a reconsideration of ship design.
Modern ship design had rejected heavy armor. The reasons for this have been hard to pin down—perhaps it was a belief that future wars would go nuclear and make armor obsolete. It could have been to reduce mass to allow the ships to go faster. Or, armor may have been abandoned to reduce costs. However, the war had shown that the enemy could hit a warship. Perhaps more could be done to counter missiles, but any premise that direct hits could be avoided was false.
The Navy designed the Ticonderoga class cruiser accordingly. Because the ship would have been even more top-heavy with proper protection, plans to base it upon a Spruance hull were abandoned. Because this was to be an anti-aircraft warfare (AAW) ship, the sonar and torpedoes were deleted from the requirements. Also, considering the likelihood an AAW ship would get hit, the aviation fuel required for helicopters was now seen as a liability. Naval architects did their best to give the new Ticonderoga class the functional equivalent of a WWII heavy cruiser’s protection. The design included vents in the ship’s magazines designed to direct the blast away from the ship if the magazine were pierced by enemy fire. (A similar approach is used with some tanks.) The big SPY radar panels and other sensitive equipment were installed in shock-resistant mounts. Although the new Ticonderoga class did not look that much like the USS Long Beach (CG-9), it was equipped with six Mk26 twin-arm missile launchers. The ships also got six Vulcan Phalanx 20 mm Gatling guns and two Mk45 5/54 guns. The guns were mounted in a turret providing similar protection to a WWII 5-inch turret. During service life extensions, the 5/54 guns were upgraded with 5/62 barrels.
Alternate history part 3:
DeleteThe new cruiser was controversial due to developmental delays. The approach to armor involved careful design and materials testing. Also, the Aegis system received rigorous testing to ensure it lived up to the claims made for it. Ultimately the Ticongeroga class has been a great success service, with all 27 ships still being in service.
The Burke-class destroyers were developed as a smaller, less expensive supplement to the Ticongeroga-class cruisers, with two Mk26 twin-arm launchers and a less ambitious (though still effective) version of the Aegis system. The Burke class was accompanied by a Spruance-II anti-submarine destroyer that has point defense systems but no SPY radar or Aegis.
The Soviet Union responded by speeding up development of large anti-ship missiles. The Soviets also designed new ships with armor. It does not appear the Russians took the same care with quality control, as a Russian cruiser was sunk by two Neptune anti-ship missiles early in the invasion of Ukraine. The Russians claimed the ship was protected by a minimum of 100 mm of armor. Whether this is true was long debated among western military experts, even before this incident. It also is widely believed the steel used in the armor is not of true armor grade. The Kirov class battlecruisers also were a disappointment. The Soviets claimed the Kirovs, with their massive missile armament and heavy armor, could overwhelm American battleships and Aegis ships while shrugging off an American carrier’s air strike. These ships were so heavy that when not operating on nuclear power, their range was prohibitively short. Refueling is required so frequently the Kirovs have rarely strayed far from Russian shores.
For the US Navy, rigorous testing paid off. The Aegis system has been vindicated on several occasions, most recently when rebels fired four Sunburn supersonic anti-ship missiles at US ships in the Red Sea. All were shot down.
Through the 1970s and beyond, the battleships and heavy cruisers received service life extensions and upgrades. These included point defense systems such as the Vulcan Phalanx. Because the Sea Sparrow octuple launcher was vulnerable to the blast of a 16-inch gun, battleships instead received Sea Chaparral launchers (later replaced by the SeaRAM). The WWII 5-inch guns were replaced with Mk45 guns in armored turrets developed for the more modern warships. Yet these classic ships continued to demonstrate their value. In the early 1980s, there were plans to knock out Syrian anti-aircraft missiles with an alpha strike involving A-6s and A-7s. Instead, the New Jersey used its 16-inch guns to destroy the launchers with no Americans lost. On the Iowa-class battleships, the some of the old 5-inch turrets were removed but not replaced, to make room for armored box launchers each housing four Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles. The Tomahawks did not have as large a warhead as the Regulus-II, but the newer missiles are more practical. Quad canisters for Harpoon anti-ship missiles also were installed. The Montanas also received point defense systems. All the 5-inch turrets were modernized, but none were removed to make way for Tomahawk or Harpoon missiles. The Montanas remained as gun ships.
The heavy cruisers received point defense systems and modern 5-inch guns. Because these ships are smaller than the battleships, Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles were not installed.
Alternate history part 4:
DeleteThe last major incident in which the big guns saved the day was a disaster relief operation in Yemen. The relief workers, supported by the USMC, came under attack by drones and missiles. Marines did not have their 155 mm guns and enemy targets were beyond the range of mortars. The USS Dallas employed its nine 8-inch guns with excellent effect against multiple targets in a short time period.
NOTES:
The notion of operating a battleship with reduced crew during peacetime and calling up reservists in wartime to reduce manning requirements and operating costs is from the United States Fire Support Association. The website is long gone my memories of their suggestions may not be 100 percent correct. Sorry.
On the Gunline by David Bruhn and Richard Mathews says the Soviets probably did not give the North Vietnamese anti-ship missiles before 1974. This is alternate history, so some artistic license is being taken.
In Black Shoes and Blue Water, author Malcolm Muir seems to consider the Regulus-II missile cancellation a missed opportunity to give the surface fleet serious punch. I thought this book advocated developing a conventional warhead for this weapon but after re-reading parts of it, I’m not sure.
The idea of a massive air campaign and gun bombardment leading to a negotiated end to the war came from the excellent book Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot from James Stockdale. He opined that B-52s “plastering” Hanoi in December 1972 could have accomplished the same thing in 1965.
The damage to a US Navy cruiser is like what happened to the USS Belknap after colliding with the USS Kennedy. I’ve read that this incident, not the British experience in the Falklands, influenced the US Navy to require steel construction in the Burke class destroyers.
The Soviet cruiser Grozny threatening the USS Kitty Hawk is a real incident that happened in the Yom Kippur war. The book Soviet Guided Missile Cruisers, by Edward Hampshire and illustrated by Paul Wright, has a painting of this on page 37. The notion that the Soviets would claim to have a ship with at least 100 mm of armor is arbitrary. This book says the Kirov had “100 mm over reactor, 70 mm sides of steering gear, 50 mm deck, 80 mm conning tower.”
This video says Sea Chaparral missiles could have given battleships additional defense against anti-ship missiles. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzxlNpMrWdk
This blog has debated whether vertical launch systems are better than arm launchers and box launchers. I’m not going to settle the debate and don’t even want to try, but I decided to mix things up a little bit by making the Ticonderogas a modern Long Beach with three twin-arm launchers.
The use of fire support to protect a relief operation is inspired by the RAND Corporation paper “Naval Fire Support: An Assessment of Requirements” on pages 28-31. The paper stated that a destroyer with one 5-inch gun could not deliver adequately in this situation.
Interesting alternate history. A few notes for your amusement:
Delete1. If you're offering an alternate, better history, you might consider including an alternate way of fighting the Vietnam war that actually takes full advantage of a BB/CA presence. One of the absurdities of the US conduct of the war was allowing NV/VC to resupply unhindered through Haiphong harbor. A BB group, in force, could have put an end to that resupply, likely resulting in a US/SV victory. The NV/VC had nothing that could stop a BB battle group.
2. The Burkes were built as the US' first attempt at a stealth vessel rather than any kind of modified Tico or Spruance.
3. The Spruance, early on, had a radar system equal or superior to Aegis. I've posted on this.
Thank you.
DeleteAn interesting alternate story would be an account of a BB group attack on Haiphong harbor. What defenses would they have faced? What attack strategy would they have used. What would they have done to the shipping in the harbor? How much damage could they have inflicted on the port and surrounding facilities? Hanoi was only 60-70 miles away - the BB guns would have reached almost half way there, capable of destroying roads used for supply convoys! How would they deal with the aerial threat (NV didn't really have bombers or aircraft launched air-to-surface anti-ship missiles, as far as I know). Would the BB group attack be the prelude to an amphibious assault straight up the road to Hanoi, ending the war in one lightning stroke?
DeleteSomething to think about!
What happens to USS Enterprise, CNV-79? Since its launch in 2019, it has not started sea trial even today. It is second carrier of the Ford Class. I expect that problems found in USS Ford should have been addressed.
ReplyDeleteI have heard nothing about any improvements over the Ford. I would hope that EMALS, AAG, and elevator problems have been addressed and that the glaring weakness of the linked EMALS has been corrected, among other issues.
DeleteHow dare China install EMAL on 2nd ship before it has proven work on the first one? Work doesn't mean launch a few aircrafts but persistent work for a relatively long period (~ 6 months at least).
Deletehttps://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/type-076-amphibious-carrier-launched-by-hudong-in-shanghai/
CVN-79 is USS Kennedy. Yes, it was launched in 2019 but still has not started sea trial yet.
DeletePost ideas:
ReplyDelete- Whatever happened with that plane "accidentally" (?) shot down by the Navy in the mideast.
- China's reportedly sixth generation plane, assuming there's actual information on that.
Those are both good ideas, however, I've already been looking for information and nothing much is available. Eventually, of course, the Navy will issue an investigation report about the friendly fire incident but that will be many months from now.
DeleteI'll keep an eye on both and if useful information comes out, I'll post something.
B-21 as a naval patrol bomber.
ReplyDeleteThe B-2 cost over $2.1B each in total costs. The B-21, while smaller is still going to be $1B or more, each. That's a LOT of money for a patrol plane.
DeleteThat aside, a stealth bomber has much more important things to do than patrol mostly empty regions. A stealth bomber needs to be ... well ... bombing stuff!
Do you see it differently?
I can hear the ghost of Air Marshal Harris muttering that four-engined bombers had much more important things to do than patrol the mostly empty North Atlantic, they needed to be ... well ... bombing Berlin.
DeleteNot an entirely fair comparison, of course, but a stealthy patrol aircraft might have advantages.
"a stealthy patrol aircraft might have advantages."
DeleteOf course it has advantages! Who wouldn't want a stealthy patrol aircraft?
The problem, which you're conveniently ignoring, is the cost. No one can afford to build billion+ dollar patrol aircraft. If we're building billion+ dollar aircraft, they've got to deliver top end combat effects. They've got to be doing deep penetration and attack of the most heavily defended, highest value targets.
Perhaps a mini B-21 - a patrol aircraft needs just the range and stealth, not the ability to drop bombs and maybe not many missiles (wouldn't it be leaving as soon as it launches one giving away its position anyway?). Still might be in the $300m cost range.
Delete"Perhaps a mini B-21 - a patrol aircraft needs just the range and stealth"
DeleteYou may recall that we already have that! It's the X-47B. It's 38 feet long x 62 ft wingspan and has a range of 2400 miles. The X-47B underwent a few carrier tests and conducted several arrested landings and catapult takeoffs in addition to deck handling. There were some glitches but that's to be expected and it didn't sound like they were anything major.
What's missing is an effective sensor suite, presumably mainly passive with an occasional use radar.
I do see it differently. In a new pacific war I think you've shown we should expect to see many smaller targets over a wide operating area. 2 squadrons, say 24 aircraft, of B-21 partrol bombers would allow the opportunity to seek out and engage those targets in a very efficient way compared to ships or subs. I'm not a math guy, but I'm a good guesser, and I'd guess that acquiring and operating those 2 squadrons would compare favorablably, in a longterm financial sense, to acquiring and operation and ford class cairrier, an air wing, and the escorts and support ships that are needed to project a force like that across the pacific. I'd make that trade.
Delete"I think you've shown we should expect to see many smaller targets over a wide operating area."
DeleteI'm not sure I've ever suggested that would be the case. As in WWII, ships will travel in groups - either convoys or task forces. Lone ships are just targets waiting to be sunk at leisure. Force Z springs to mind.
"partrol bombers would allow the opportunity to seek out and engage"
You seem to have some kind of vision of patrol planes routinely encountering lone ships and sinking them as fast as the planes can be reloaded and sent out again. This would not be reality.
Consider patrol planes in WWII. Their job was to scout vast areas of 99.9% empty water, 99.9% of the time. Still, in an era of limited sensor range (eyeball to horizon), the enemy could appear out of nowhere and it was necessary to prove that the empty ocean was, indeed, empty. Almost every naval battle of WWII was anticipated. It was incredibly rare to simply stumble across a previously unknown enemy force (did it ever happen? I can't recall an instance) and even rarer to find a lone enemy ship.
Today, with ocean-spanning SOSUS type arrays, over-the-horizon radars, satellites, cyber spying, SIGINT, etc. it will be even less likely to have an enemy ship or group just pop up out of nowhere. Thus, as in WWII, 99.9%+ of the time, the patrol aircraft will find nothing.
To spend something on the order of $60B (construction cost + developmental cost + facilities/maintenance cost) so that 24 aircraft can spend 99.9%+ of their time doing nothing is an unwise allocation of resources, to put it mildly.
Now, if you envision sending stealth bombers on attack missions against likely task force locations, that might be worthwhile but that's a strike mission not a patrol mission. Even then, there are much higher priority targets than ships for the very few stealth bombers we would be able to afford.
You seem to have - dare I say - a romantic notion of brave flyers finding and attacking Chinese vessels in one-on-one battles. That's just not how modern warfare will play out. It's kind of like so many people's fascination with PT boats and the romantic notion of pirate-like sailors in their small boats leaping forth from hiding and decimating large task forces before disappearing back into the darkness. Romantic and dashing but not realistic.
Supercritical CO2 (sCO2) and Coal-Water Slurry (CWS) power / propulsion tech could enable cheap low-flammability fuel and extended cruising ranges. We’ve worked on this tech since the early 2000s. Now there are at least a dozen new 10MW to 300MW sCO2 gas turbine power plants being built and commissioned around the world, mostly for oilfield pumping power or commercial electric power using natural gas or coal as fuel. They cost less to operate than conventional marine gas turbines or steam turbines or diesels, because they’re more thermally efficient and smaller for a rated output.
ReplyDeleteThe power turbine rotor, rotor casing halves, recompression turbine, printed circuit heat exchangers, connector piping, and combustor pintles, are all small and light enough to disassemble and remove from the ship via hand cranes or by hand and carried through the ship’s passageways, piece-by-piece, whether scaled to power a frigate or an aircraft carrier. The hull doesn’t need to be cut into unless you’re removing reduction gearboxes, prop shaft fittings, etc. No other kind of engine suitable for powering large ships can be removed from the hull as easily and quickly. Major components are designed for 100,000hr service lives, with creep and erosion rates confirmed through testing.
Turbine rotor power density is 200kW/kg at 715C and 250bar of pressure, using Haynes or Inconel superalloys, or 1,000kW/kg at 1,200C, using Sylramic fiber with a Silicon Carbide matrix (a CMC used in the convergent-divergent nozzles and other hot section components of afterburning turbofans). Most of that power density increase is due to the mass reduction of CMCs vs superalloys (2.95g/cm^3 for Sylramic or SiC vs 8.97g/cm^3 for Haynes 230, so 3X lighter), and the rest is higher operating temperatures and pressures, plus higher tensile strength at 1,200C than Haynes at 800C. Sylramic is a SiC fiber similar to Carbon fiber, but created for 1,400C applications. Ramp-up / ramp-down rates are at least as good as gas turbines. CMCs can crack, like any other ceramic, but SiC is highly resistant to thermal shocks.
Kitty Hawk’s water boilers and geared steam turbine power plants were 16.58% overall thermally efficient at 34.2 knots (top speed), according to empirical fuel burn rates I found in a research paper from the Naval Post Graduate School on mathematical models for predicting the fuel economy for each major class of warship and logistics ship in service at the time, from 1996, entitled “Predicting Ship Fuel Consumption: Update”. Their model and empirical data have excellent agreement for CV-63/CV-67 classes.
CV-63/CV-67 fuel load: 4M gal of DFM / F-76
DFM/F-76: 810-850kg/m^3; 43.5MJ/kg; 650-1,000C combustion temp; 39,750Wh/gal
4M gal DFM = 12,882,039kg (560,368,696.5MJ) / 15,520.529m^3 (at 830kg/m^3) of fuel
I propose burning Coal-Water Slurry (CWS) to power sCO2 turbines for a cheaper fuel with limited flammability (800C to 850C auto-ignition temp vs 240C for DFM / F-76).
CWS: 870-1,020kg/m^3; 15.5-19.7MJ/kg; 950-1,150C combustion temp
4M gal CWS = 14,666,900kg (258,137,440MJ) / 15,520.529m^3 (at 945kg/m^3) of fuel
I used 17.6MJ/kg and 945kg/m^3 for my calculations and rounded results.
16.58% efficient water boilers and geared steam turbines:
31,672gph of DFM 34.2 knots; range is 4,967 statute miles
5,081gph of DFM 19.9 knots (22.885mph); range is 18,016 statute miles
715C / 50% efficient sCO2 gas turbines:
1,685gph of DFM at 19.9 knots; range is 54,331 statute miles
3,749gph of CWS at 19.9 knots; range is 24,415 statute miles
kbd512
Okay, that was a very detailed exposition about a topic I'm sure no one has any knowledge of. You're suggesting this can be the power plant for a naval vessel. The fact that no navy has adopted this means either that it's so new that no one knows anything about it outside of a lab setting or that there are drawbacks preventing its adoption. You've covered what you believe to be the benefits and advantages. Now, tell us about the drawbacks. EVERY system has drawbacks. What are they and how do they tip the balance?
DeleteCNO,
DeleteTrack Record:
* It’s a very new technology in the realm of commercial power plants.
* Doesn’t provide major efficiency benefits at lower temperatures and pressures.
* Little comparative data exists to evaluate performance vs cost.
* Natural gas and coal are the only fuels extensively used in testing and actual power plants.
* sCO2 tech is most closely comparable to nuclear thermal rocket engine tech. Volumetric power density of sCO2 power turbines starts at 10MW/L. NERVA XE Prime’s core power density was 3-5MW/L. SpaceX’s Raptor-3 has a 350bar chamber pressure. A 1,200C sCO2 system would run at 1,000bar. Overall power density is lower than a fission reactor, but we’re talking about 3-5m^3 of total system volume to power 1 shaft of an aircraft carrier. No other power and propulsion tech can do that in a practical way.
Extreme Power Density Results in Extreme Material Property and Fabrication Requirements:
* 700C to 800C requires superalloys and stainless with aerospace coatings (~100K base material cost; ~$10M total cost per engine to power a carrier; $40M in total)
* 1,200C requires ceramic matrix composites; Silicon and Carbon are incredibly abundant, but the energy input to go from natural resources to materials to components is astronomical (~$1M/MW base material cost; ~$75M per engine; $300M in total)
Power turbines and recompression turbines tend to be similar in size / mass. Dresser-Rand’s groundbreaking RamGen supersonic inlet CO2 compressors could be used to recompress the CO2 for less material and weight, but they’re also expensive. RamGen is another new-ish gas turbine tech that uses the shock waves from Mach 2 to Mach 3 flow velocity at the inlet to help recompress the CO2, rather than generating massive wave drag. This could eliminate the LTR turbine stage and recuperator for heat re-injection.
I can’t give a good estimates on fabrication costs because local energy prices and machining rates are major determining factors. They typically farm fabrication out to local specialty job shops with expertise, which you will pay dearly for. The heat exchangers, not the turbines, are the “weak link” in this tech, for technical design, fabrication, and operational problems. sCO2 power turbines have proven relatively trouble-free in operation. PCHEs are the only component of the entire system that really concerns me, because they are fundamentally “new” for this application, but they also enable the high ramp rates and are far less delicate than tube-and-shell heat exchangers.
Safety:
A rupture of any component is a non-survivable event for everyone inside the engine compartment, from the moment the system is “charged” with cold CO2. The best way to prevent casualties is following operating procedures to the letter and maintaining unyielding QC requirements.
Bottom Line:
The eye-watering material and fabrication costs will be swiftly recovered in the form of reduced fuel consumption and freed-up hull volume benefits. The safety issues are deadly serious, but manageable. Steam turbines were first invented in 1884. By 1888, at least 200 ships used steam turbines for electrical power. By 1894, HMS Turbinia was powered by a steam turbine. We have 300MWe power plants coming online now. It’s time to apply this tech to ships.
kbd512
A nice writeup about the challenges. The pair of comments makes for a well balanced discussion. Nicely done. Do you know of any company or country actively looking at placing this into maritime use?
Delete"A rupture of any component is a non-survivable event for everyone inside the engine compartment, from the moment the system is “charged” with cold CO2. The best way to prevent casualties is following operating procedures ..."
Of course, for a naval vessel, there's always the issue of battle damage and this sounds like a non-recoverable damage situation.
An illustrative example is the Freedom class LCS lube oil and combining gear system. It's not new tech and, in theory, should be quite reliable if the operators follow the procedures and yet every Freedom vessel that put to sea wound up with catastrophic lube/combining problems. So, simply saying that we can avoid safety issues by following the operating procedures may be a true statement but is not a dependable statement. A system has to be nearly idiot proof not balanced on the edge of disaster, maintained only with absolute adherence to procedures. It is guaranteed that the average sailor WILL screw it up. Does this alter your thinking at all?
"Natural gas and coal are the only fuels extensively used"
Tell me about the safety issues of handling natural gas and coal aboard ship in the quantities required. Many ships were sunk or damaged due to coal dust explosions in the past. Natural gas is problematic to handle in quantity. Again, the battle damage issue rears its head. What do you think?
CNO,
Delete1. Efforts towards using sCO2 for shipboard power and propulsion:
Design considerations of the supercritical carbon dioxide Brayton cycle of small modular molten salt reactor for ship propulsion
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0149197023002706
The South Koreans and Chinese are evaluating sCO2 for use with MSRs for shipboard propulsion to increase reactor fuel economy. MSRs use slurry fuels (Uranium fuel particles mixed into a molten salt) and run at higher temperatures than PWRs, making them more suitable for sCO2 as a working fluid / coolant. Instead of refueling a reactor every 12 to 18 months (commercial electric power reactors) or 10 to 25 years (ship / truck / train mobile reactors), or reprocessing cracked fuel rods into fresh fuel rods as France does and we once did, there’s a continuous process of adding a pinch of fresh Uranium to the molten salt and removing a pinch of fission products / neutron poisons that would otherwise stop the chain reaction, while the reactor is up and running.
There are a couple of other research papers within the scientific literature written by Chinese authors. The Chinese also intend to use sCO2 power turbines and MSRs for marine propulsion. China built and tested a semi-functional small commercial MSR demonstrator. I don’t think it used sCO2 for generating power and MSR tech is not quite ready for prime time.
There’s also a paper about using sCO2 gas turbines for aircraft propulsion:
Design and modeling of a multiscale porous ceramic heat exchanger for high temperature applications with ultrahigh power density
https://www.triceceramics.com/uploads/9/3/8/9/93899770/60_final_mit_paper.pdf
Using air cooling and 3C-SiC (a polymorph of SiC, not a Sylramic-reinforced CMC), they think they can get the heat exchanger power density as high as 717MW/m^3 and 300kW/kg with a 2.5X factor of safety against rupture. ASME BPVC would require 3.5X to 5X factor of safety. That’s entirely theoretical because hardware hasn’t been built and demonstrated. Power density is a function of heat transfer circuit surface area per unit volume. The overall design goal is to maximize surface area and minimize heat exchanger volume and mass, because that maximizes thermal power transfer efficiency. PCHEs are 1,000m^2 to 2,000m^3 per 1m^3. Their MCHEs are 7,000m^2+ per 1m^3.
2. Is the intrinsic danger of extreme pressure and temperature cause to reconsider using sCO2 for marine power and propulsion?:
A sCO2 power system is made from highly resilient materials capable of long-term survival in its intended operating regime. The startup and shutdown sequences, arguably the most dangerous phases of operation, are computer-controlled because they happen so fast. I would focus plant safety efforts on containment of damage following a rupture and keeping sailors out of the compartment unless it’s powered down and the CO2 safely discharged overboard or pumped back into liquid CO2 storage tanks.
3. Natural Gas and Coal Safety Issues Aboard Ship:
I would not use Methane as a fuel for warships, even though it’s the cheapest, cleanest, and most abundant of all fuel options. Methane’s flammability range is simply too wide. Coal dust is dangerous, but Coal-Water Slurry (CWS) requires ignition temperatures about 600C higher than diesel or kerosene. It’s a liquid in which the coal dust remains in suspension for a considerable period of time. I proposed using CWS to avoid accidental fires and explosions. The primary hazards to shipboard personnel exposed to CWS are poisoning-related. Coal can contain high levels of Arsenic, Mercury, Lead, and Radon gas, although the Radon should mostly be dispersed during the grinding of the coal dust / powder. With CWS, you’re deliberately mixing water into your fuel supply. The end result is that you get a desirable combustion temperature that certain superalloys, SiC, and CMCs can operate at.
kbd512
CNO,
DeleteThe idea behind this propulsion concept is to enable construction of larger ships with greater hull volume, compartmentalization, and armor. If we have much more efficient propulsion on the near-horizon and a nominal cost fuel to work with, that shifts the cost center to ship design and what each ship is equipped with. I want to combine sCO2 power / propulsion tech with Sharrow’s propeller tech, which has been proven to reduce fuel burn rates at all engine speeds, significantly at 20 and 25 knots, due to greater propulsive efficiency over conventional props. Using CWS as fuel for sCO2 turbines and Sharrow propellers, carrier CWS burn rate at 20 knots is ~2,437gph for a cruising range of 37,751 statute miles.
If every ship in our fleet was built on the hull (not a direct design copy) of a Forrestal class aircraft carrier (36X 60,000t) or North Carolina class battleship (252X 35,000t), and we had a 288 ship battle fleet, then our tonnage is ~11Mt vs ~4.5Mt. I’m not asserting that every ship should be equipped like a traditional aircraft carrier or battleship. We’d build a mix of traditional aircraft carriers, amphibious landing / shore logistics carriers, missile cruisers, battleships, and sub hunters / special mission ships.
https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Energy/Standard%20Prices/Petroleum%20Prices/E_2023Oct1PetroleumStandardPrices_230929.pdf
$/Gallon of DFM / F-76: $3.54
Each Carrier Hull: ~4M gallons of CWS fuel, 3M gallons of that fuel volume is actually coal
Each Battleship Hull: ~2.175M gallons of CWS fuel, 1.63125M gallons of coal
1 US Liquid Gallon = 0.133681ft^3
Bituminous Coal Bulk Density: ~52lbs/ft^3
US Appalachian Coal Price (December 2024): $76.25/2,000lbs
36 Carrier Hulls: 14,437,500ft^3 of coal
252 Battleship Hulls: 54,952,734.375ft^3 of coal
288 Ship Battle Fleet: 69,390,234.375ft^3 / 3,608,292,187.5lbs / 1,804,146.09375 short tons of coal; 173,025,000 gallons of deionized water
TTL Gallons CWS: 692,100,000 gallons
TTL Coal Cost: $137,566,139.65
TTL Deionized Water Cost ($0.50/gallon): $86,512,500
TTL CWS Materials Cost: $224,078,639.65
Materials $/Gallon CWS: $0.33
Grinding and Mixing $/Gallon CWS: $0.10
Miles from Appalachia to San Diego, CA: 2,377.2 miles
Rail Transport
Cost/Ton-Mile (2023): $0.196
TTL Rail Cost to Ship 1,804,146t of Coal to San Diego, CA: $840,607,910.76
TTL Rail Transport $/Gallon CWS: $1.21
$/Gallon CWS: $1.64 (final delivered cost)
Pipeline Transport
Cost/Ton-Mile (2023): $0.01 to $0.05
Cost 692,100,000 Gallons CWS to San Diego, CA: $300,199,988.46 (at $0.05)
$/Gallon CWS: $0.86 (final delivered cost)
Per Carrier Refueling Cost: #3.44M, $91.12/mile (CWS by pipeline); $6.56M, $173.77/mile (CWS by rail car); $14.16M, $169.42/mile (DFM/F-76)
Refueling the Atlantic Fleet will be much cheaper than the Pacific Fleet, but I presume most fuel is headed to the Pacific to counteract China.
kbd512
The Russian Navy would have a greater presence in the war if it had more Shmel-class gunboats (project 1204).
ReplyDeleteShmel-class gunboat:
full load: 71t
Length: 27.4m
Beam: 4.32m
Speed: 24 knots
Armament:
1x1 76 mm D-56TS
1x2 25 mm
1x2 14.5 mm
1x17 140 mm BM-14-17 rocket launcher
4 UGDM mines or 10 YaM mines
The boat also has armor.
What would you see them doing?
Deleteinfantry support through the river system
Deletethe same purpose as the BK-1124 from WWII
Delete"infantry support through the river system"
DeleteTanks can't survive on the Ukrainian battlefield but these boats will cruise the rivers with impunity??? Doesn't seem likely.
What survivable support do you see them providing?
"the same purpose as the BK-1124 from WWII"
DeleteThose were heavily armored (15-50 mm) and still not survivable. From a website about Soviet riverine gunboats and monitors,
"... no less than 85 of these were in service, 68 under construction, 110 on order. They paid a heavy price in operations, as about 90 were lost."
And that was before the days of modern anti-tank weapons, RPGs, TOW, guided missiles, UAV directed artillery, UAV attack drones, etc. The most heavily armed and armored tanks in the world are being chewed up on the battlefield. Do you really see these boats being survivable?
What are your thoughts on the Mogami class dropping the radio room, backup up CIC and Damage Control in an effort to reduce crew?
ReplyDeleteIt will be a 5400 tonne frigate with a wartime crew of 60.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/mogami-frigate-fast-and-stealthy-like-a-ninja/
To be clear, they didn't drop those functions, they just incorporated them into the CIC and increased the degree of automation.
DeleteRegardless, it would be a mistake unless you're comfortable with the idea of one-hit kills because that is way too few crew to conduct effective damage control during and after a battle. The article you cite states exactly this, that damage control is considered pointless and that the ship will likely be abandoned after a single significant hit.
I don't know the exact cost but the older versions of the ship cost around half a billion dollars so the newer version should cost a half to a billion dollars per ship. That's a lot of investment to write off after one hit!
If, as the article states, the Japanese based much of their design philosophy on the Russian Moskva loss, that's a mistake. Trying to draw lessons from a several decades old ship, poorly maintained, run by a crew that was poorly trained, would be foolish. There are unconfirmed reports that the crew didn't even attempt damage control.
I notice that you are usually quite negative and cynical about the state of the US navy. That's fair, but it can be a bit depressing to read that sort of post over and over. Is there any topic why you feel positive and hopeful?
ReplyDeleteDon't confuse objective and realistic with negative and cynical. I observe, analyze, and conclude. If the conclusions are less than positive and glowing it's because the reality is not positive.
DeleteCan you think of a positive aspect of the Navy that I haven't covered? I'd love to do more cheerful, happy posts! Give me a suggestion.
I, for one, am very pleased that the Navy has managed to, for the most part, keep their hands off the museum fleet. We've had major ship drydocking's (New Jersey and Texas) and some wonderful work on various other ships. (Kidd, Sullivans) Plus a plethora of these ships getting great content on You Tube.
ReplyDeleteHi there CNO, I like this blog's uncompromising view on the USN's shortcomings and am a regular reader. I have a number of topics I'd like you'd to cover in the future, but for now I'd be content if you could tell me whether stealth for warplanes is overblown as an advantage in the long-term.
ReplyDeleteThe way I see it, stealth is temporary (given Moore's Law and the accompanying radar and processing power improvements, along with IRST and other infrared sensors); aerodynamics is forever (since the laws of aerodynamics are extremely unlikely to change). To make a warplane very stealthy is almost always to compromise its aerodynamic performance, compared to a design that doesn't have to take radar stealth into consideration which can instead efficiently maximize its aerodynamic performance.
Given your previous articles regarding the F-14 Tomcat and the opportunities lost when the USN dropped it, it stands to reason that stealth isn't as important (and therefore a waste of money to implement) for defensive-oriented aircraft either, partly because you can't "show the flag" as well when you're using stealthy aircraft. What do you think?
On a side note, what is your exact stance regarding single-task aircraft when taking the F-14 Tomcat's abilities as a "Bombcat" into account? Were the F-14 Tomcat's bombing abilities just a happy accident? Or is that kind of versatility something you feel should be designed for in future warplane designs? The F-14's "Bombcat" capability didn't seem to impede its abilities to fulfill its CONOPS as an interceptor, after all.
" tell me whether stealth for warplanes is overblown"
DeleteUntil detection methods can pinpoint stealth from long distances, stealth is not only an advantage, it's mandatory. It's the basic price of admission to the aerial battlefield for anyone who hopes to survive. A non-stealthy target can be detected and engaged at long range. A non-stealthy target is what we call a target drone, just begging to be shot down.
Current stealth needs to be not only emphasize but enhanced by expanding the stealth into other regions such as infrared, visible, signals, etc.
Your point that stealth is a temporary advantage in the long run is, potentially, valid but the end of stealth's advantage is far down the road yet. We need to be building maximum stealth aircraft. If you've been following the blog, you've seen me call for stealthy AEW, stealthy drones, stealthy long range fighters and, if we build them, stealthy strike aircraft. Stealth, stealth, stealth! I trust that makes my position clear?
"stance regarding single-task aircraft when taking the F-14 Tomcat's abilities as a "Bombcat" into account?"
DeleteMulti-task is a fool's path - an evolutionary dead end. That the F-14 could be a passable strike aircraft was fortuitous. Note, however, that it was not a superb strike aircraft. For that, it would have needed the A-6 Intruder's computers and avionics, terrain following capability, low level capability and handling, superb low level maneuverability, air-to-ground radar and software, enhanced ground threat detectors, etc. The Bombcat was a no-threat-environment, high level bomb dropper. It was NOT an optimized strike aircraft.
"F-14 Tomcat and the opportunities lost when the USN dropped it"
Don't misunderstand. An upgraded F-14 would have been an excellent alternative to the F-18. It would NOT have been an alternative to a stealth fighter such as the F-22.
Suggested Post might be inefficient, noncombat job posts that dilute/degrade combat strength. Examples might be the payroll clerk that should be a civvie on a base, "training" posts that have nothing to do with actual Naval matters (obstacle courses/speech, etc.), HR, sex harassment education/rape prevention (should be civilian), DEI and the list goes on. If the CBO is right, a quarter of the entire force is doing jobs that could be civilian manned. Let the fat fed government cut 5% of it's 4 million workforce, transfer that 5% say 200k over to the Armed Forces, and take the 200k positions amongst the 4 branches and get old ships manned, excess jets from Amarg to active, keep nuke subs going longer, etc. And yes, put about 10k into naval yards to fix ships!
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